RIVERA vs SACRAMENTO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al.

24CV016415: RIVERA vs SACRAMENTO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16C

Tentative Ruling

The Amended Notice of Hearing states the incorrect address for the hearing on this motion. Department 54 has moved to Department 16C at the Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye Courthouse at 500 G Street, Sacramento, CA 95814. Moving counsel shall notify opposing counsel immediately.

Defendant City of Sacramento’s (“City”) motion for summary judgment is DENIED as follows.

Factual Background

This action arises out of the alleged childhood sexual assault of Plaintiff Mary Rivera (“Plaintiff”) when she volunteered as a student aide in an afterschool program known as the START Program on the campus of Mark Twain Elementary School (“Mark Twain”) during the 2010-2011 school year.

City employees staffed the START Program at Mark Twain, including Joshua Ronaldo Vasquez (“Vasquez”), who was a Program Leader. (Pl.’s Resp. to City’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ISO Mot. (“UMF”) 5.)

As part of her 8th grade curriculum for leadership class, Plaintiff volunteered with the City, serving as a START Program student aide at Mark Twain. (UMF 7.) Plaintiff began volunteering in December 2010, and continued through the end of the 2011 school year, going 3-5 times a week. (UMF 8.) Plaintiff would start her volunteer work between 2:30 p.m. and 3:00 p.m. and finish between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. (UMF 10.) When Plaintiff arrived at Mark Twain to volunteer, she would check in with a Program Leader to get her assignment. (UMF 11.) Plaintiff’s duties included setting up tables, handing out snacks, helping with homework, setting up outdoor activities, and cleaning up. (UMF 12.)

Plaintiff alleges she was assaulted by Vasquez sometime in the last week of the 2011 school year. (UMF 13.) On the day of the assault, there was a “summer activity” or “carnival.” (UMF 14.) Plaintiff volunteered for the START Program on the day of the assault. (UMF 15.) Other student volunteers were also present that day, including “Isidro” and “Taz.” (UMF 21.) Among other things, Plaintiff led some games and

24CV016415: RIVERA vs SACRAMENTO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16C

supervised the kids. (UMF 19.) Plaintiff, Isidro, and Taz also cleaned up together. (UMF 24.)

After they finished cleaning up, Plaintiff, Isidro, and Taz went into a portable classroom to get out of the sun and have a snack. (UMF 26.) As Isidro and Taz were getting ready to leave, 10–30 minutes later, Plaintiff decided to wait a little longer. (UMF 28-29, Pl.’s Depo 139:8-12, 140:17-20, attached as Ex. E to the Decl. of Lee H. Roistacher ISO Mot.) Plaintiff testified that she stayed behind because she “didn’t want to go home.” She “liked being a volunteer more than . . . going home.” (Id. at 141:1-6.)

Vasquez was either in the portable classroom when Plaintiff, Isidro, and Taz arrived, or walked in with them. (UMF 27.) After Isidro and Taz left the portable classroom, Vasquez asked Plaintiff if she wanted to play a game. (UMF 30.) Plaintiff testified that Vasquez then sexually assaulted her. (UMF 31.)

The City adopted City Resolution No. 80-249 in 1980. (UMF 1.) The Resolution states in pertinent part:

Pursuant to the provisions of Labor Code Section 3363.5 and for purposes of that section only, a person who performs voluntary services without pay for the City of Sacramento at the express request of an authorized agent of the City is deemed to be an employee of the City for purposes of Part 2, Division 4, of the Labor Code while performing such service.

(Decl. of Mindy Cuppy ISO Mot., Ex. A.) There is no evidence in the record that the Resolution had been repealed when Plaintiff volunteered at the START Program. Thus, it apparently remained in effect.

Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this action on August 20, 2024, alleging causes of action for: (1) negligence, (2) negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, and (3) negligence per se against the City and Defendant Sacramento Unified School District.

The City now moves for summary judgment in its favor.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV016415: RIVERA vs SACRAMENTO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16C

Legal Standard

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication, the Court engages in a threestep process.

First, the Court identifies the issues framed by the pleadings. The pleadings define the scope of the issues on a motion for summary judgment. (FPI Dev. Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.) Because a motion for summary judgment is limited to the issues raised by the pleadings (Lewis v. Chevron (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 690, 694), all evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings. The Court cannot consider an unpleaded issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its burden.

A defendant moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause(s) of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause(s) of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 [quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2)].) Where, as here, a motion for summary judgment is based on the assertion of an affirmative defense, “the defendant has the initial burden to show that undisputed facts support each element of the affirmative defense. If the defendant does not meet this burden, the motion must be denied.” (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 467- 468 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].)

“‘[T]here is no obligation on the opposing party (plaintiff[] here) to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated “‘facts establishing every element [of its affirmative defense] necessary to sustain a judgment in [its] favor....’”’ ... [¶] What this means ... is that if an affirmative defense has four elements, it does not suffice even if the defendant produces overwhelming evidence as to three of those elements. If the defendant fails to address the fourth element at all or to produce substantial evidence supporting that element, the trial court cannot properly grant

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV016415: RIVERA vs SACRAMENTO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16C

summary judgment. Moreover, a summary judgment granted in those circumstances would have to be reversed, even if the plaintiff failed to introduce a scintilla of evidence challenging that element.’” [Citation.]

(Id. at p. 638.)

Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a material factual issue exists as to the cause of action alleged or the affirmative defense claimed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1); Aguilar, supra, at p. 850.) If the moving party fails to meet its burden, however, the motion must be denied; the opposing party need not make any showing at all. (Consumer Cause, Inc., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 468-477.)

Finally, in ruling on the motion, the Court must consider the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the opposing party. (Aguilar, supra, at p. 843; Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56, 64 [“[W]e liberally construe plaintiff’s evidentiary submissions and strictly scrutinize defendant’s own evidence, in order to resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff’s favor.”].) Summary judgment is properly granted only if the moving party’s evidence establishes that there is no issue of material fact to be tried. (Lipson v. Super. Ct. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 362, 374.)

Evidentiary Objections

Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections to paragraph 2 of the Declaration of Mindy Cuppy and Exhibit A thereto are overruled.

Discussion

The City moves for summary judgment in its favor “on the grounds that workers’ compensation is [Plaintiff’s] exclusive remedy against the City and this Court lacks jurisdiction over her claims.” (Not. of Mot. 1:22-27.) The City argues:

Determining that workers’ compensation is [Plaintiff’s] exclusive remedy against the City for damages resulting

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV016415: RIVERA vs SACRAMENTO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16C

from the alleged sexual abuse by Vasquez (a City employee) involves three questions.

First, was plaintiff a City employee? “Yes.”

Second, do § 3600’s “conditions of compensation” exist? “Yes.”

Third, does an exception in subdivision (b) of § 3602 apply? “No.”

(Mem. of P.&A. ISO Mot. 11:15-20.)

The Court agrees with the City’s analytical framework, but finds that the City has failed to meet its burden on the first question. Therefore, the Court limits its discussion to that issue.

Under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Lab. Code, §§ 3200 et seq. (the “Act”), the right to recover workers’ compensation benefits is the sole remedy of an employee against an employer for an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. (Lab. Code, §§ 3600, 3602; see also Arriaga v. County of Alameda (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1055, 1058-1059.)

Generally, a person “performing voluntary service[s] for a public agency ... who does not receive remuneration for the services” is excluded from the definition of “employee” under the Act. (Lab. Code, § 3352, subd. (a)(9).) However, under certain circumstances, volunteers of statutorily identified entities can be deemed employees under the Act. (See, e.g., Lab. Code, §§ 3361.5 - 3364.7.) One such exception to the exclusion of volunteers from the Act’s definition of “employee” is contained in Labor Code section 3363.5, which provides:

Notwithstanding Sections 3351, 3352, and 3357, a person who performs voluntary service without pay for a public agency, as designated and authorized by the governing body of the agency or its designee, shall, upon adoption of a resolution by the governing body of the agency so declaring, be deemed to be an employee of the agency for purposes of

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV016415: RIVERA vs SACRAMENTO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16C

this division while performing such service.

(Labor Code, § 3363.5, subd. (a) [emphasis added].)

The City argues that Plaintiff was a City “employee” for workers’ compensation purposes because in 1980, the City adopted Resolution No. 80-429 under Labor Code section 3363.5. However, the City’s briefing ignores an important limiting clause in Labor Code section 3363.5 and the Resolution, itself.

Both the statute and the Resolution provide that a person who performs voluntary services without pay for a public agency (in this case the City), is deemed to be an employee of the agency (the City) for purposes of the Act while performing such service. (See Labor Code, § 3363.5, subd. (a); Resolution No. 80-429, ¶ 1, attached as Ex. A to Decl. of Mindy Cuppy ISO Mot.)

The Court of Appeal has held that a similar clause used in another statutory exception to the exclusion of volunteers from the Act – Labor Code section 3364.5[1] – demonstrated an “intent to limit entitlement to workers’ compensation only for injuries sustained during volunteer services . . ., not injuries outside of such service.” (Kuo v. Dublin Unified School District (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 662, 679 [emphasis added].)

It is undisputed that the alleged sexual assault occurred after Plaintiff completed her volunteer duties for the START Program and her co-volunteers, Taz and Isidro, had left for the day. (UMF 26-31; Mem. of P.&A. ISO Mot. 8:27-9:6.)

Accordingly, the City has failed to meet its initial burden on the first question used in deciding whether workers’ compensation is the Plaintiff’s exclusive remedy against the City in this case, i.e., if Plaintiff was a City employee at the time of the alleged sexual assault.

Moreover, even if the City had presented evidence to satisfy its initial burden on this issue, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s deposition testimony would create a triable issue of material fact. (Pl.’s Depo 138:15-148:18.)

For the stated reasons, the City’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV016415: RIVERA vs SACRAMENTO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16C

Plaintiff’s counsel shall prepare an order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subsection (g), and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.

[1] Labor Code section 3364.5 states: “Notwithstanding Section 3351 of the Labor Code, a volunteer, unsalaried person authorized by the governing board of a school district or the county superintendent of schools to perform volunteer services for the school district or the county superintendent shall, upon the adoption of a resolution of the governing board of the school district or the county board of education so declaring, be deemed an employee of the district or the county superintendent for the purposes of this division and shall be entitled to the workmen’s compensation benefits provided by this division for any injury sustained by him while engaged in the performance of any service under the direction and control of the governing board of the school district or the county superintendent.”

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Department 16C Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-1475 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below.

If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court. Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 16C Zoom Link is https://saccourt-cagov.zoomgov.com/j/16030877014 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 160 3087 7014. To

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV016415: RIVERA vs SACRAMENTO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16C

appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed on the Court Reporter Services webpage available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://saccourt.ca.gov/general-information/court-reporter-servicestranscripts. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://saccourt.ca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/227/639084034465370000.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.