EDWARD LLITERAS-HUDNELL vs PLEASANT VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.

2024CUPP031421: EDWARD LLITERAS-HUDNELL vs PLEASANT VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al. 05/28/2026 in Department 20 Motion for Summary Judgment

Motion: Defendant Pleasant Valley School District’s (“Defendant” or “District”) Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative: Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. Defendant has not carried its burden of persuasion or production to make a prima facie showing that there is no triable issue of material fact.

Plaintiff shall provide notice.

Background

In the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), Plaintiff claims that on or about January 26, 2024, while a student at Pleasant Valley School of Engineering and Arts (PVSEA), he was pushed off a slide by another student and sustained injuries. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant negligently hired, supervised, and/or retained the teachers on duty at the time of the subject incident and breached its duty to reasonably supervise the playground where the incident in suit occurred, which breach was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm. Plaintiff further alleges the District breached a mandatory duty to actively monitor and protect its students. Finally Plaintiff alleges that a dangerous condition existed of which the District failed to warn.

Defendant’s Motion

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is premised on the assertion that Plaintiff cannot establish a triable issue of material fact as to whether Defendant breached its duty of care or its duty to supervise Plaintiff, or that any alleged breach by Defendant caused Plaintiff’s injuries. (Notice of Motion, p. 2:11-14.)

Deficiencies in Separate Statement

California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350, subdivision (f) requires that an opposing party who contends that a fact is disputed or who contends that additional material facts are pertinent to the disposition of the motion must cite the evidence in support of those positions. Subject to exceptions not pertinent here, Rule 3.1350, subdivision (e)(4) requires that the opposition be supported by evidence.

In response to UMF Nos. 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 13, Plaintiff cites to emails and the District’s responses to discovery, neither of which have been filed in support of the Opposition and neither of which have been authenticated. Plaintiff also cites to pages of Ms. Steen’s deposition, only some

2024CUPP031421: EDWARD LLITERAS-HUDNELL vs PLEASANT VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.

of which are attached as part of Defendant’s motion. The Court does not consider citations to documents which have not been filed either in support of, or in opposition to, the motion.

Legal Standards on Summary Judgment

The legal standards on summary judgment are well established and they are not repeated here.

Objections

The following evidentiary objections by Defendant are OVERRULED: 5 (overruled on the grounds stated), 7, 8, and 9.

The following evidentiary objections by Defendant are SUSTAINED: 1: sustained that Ms. Steen acknowledged separation could have been implemented earlier; otherwise overruled (Evid. Code § 403), 2 (Evid. Code § 310), 3 (Evid. Code § 403), 4 (Evid. Code § 403), 6 (Evid. Code § 310), 10 (sustained as to ¶ 41 (§ 310); otherwise overruled), 11 (sustained as to legal conclusions (§310); otherwise overruled), 12 (Evid. Code §§ 403, 702, 1200, 1401.)

Material Facts

For the limited purpose of ruling on this motion, the Court makes the following findings regarding Defendant’s Undisputed Material Facts (“UMF”) and Plaintiff’s Additional Material Facts (“AMF”):

Defendant’s Material Facts Which are Undisputed and Established 1-3, 6, 11-12, 14

Defendant’s Material Facts Which are Disputed and Established 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 13

Defendant’s Material Facts Which are Disputed and Not Established 7

Plaintiff’s Additional Material Facts Which are Established

2, 3 (established only that the substitute teacher was not on the playground during the recess lunch period on the day of the incident, 4 (established only that after the incident in suit, the District immediately implemented the playground separation), 6 (established only that Ms. Steen did not report to the administration the September 2023 Seesaw message that Nico hit Plaintiff), 7 (established only that Nico exhibited the cited impulse control behaviors for a period of time and that the administration was aware of the behaviors).

Plaintiff’s Additional Material Facts Which are Not Established

1, 5, 8, 9

2024CUPP031421: EDWARD LLITERAS-HUDNELL vs PLEASANT VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.

Ruling on the Motion

“ ‘While school districts and their employees have never been considered insurers of the physical safety of students, California law has long imposed on school authorities a duty to “supervise at all times the conduct of the children on the school grounds and to enforce those rules and regulations necessary to their protection. [Citations.]” [Citations.] The standard of care imposed upon school personnel in carrying out this duty to supervise is identical to that required in the performance of their other duties.

This uniform standard to which they are held is that degree of care “which a person of ordinary prudence, charged with [comparable] duties, would exercise under the same circumstances.” [Citations.] Either a total lack of supervision [citation] or ineffective supervision [citation] may constitute a lack of ordinary care on the part of those responsible for student supervision. Under section 815.2, subdivision (a) of the Government Code, a school district is vicariously liable for injuries proximately caused by such negligence.”(Dailey v.

Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 741, 747.)

“In addition, a school district and its employees have a special relationship with the district's pupils, a relationship arising from the mandatory character of school attendance and the comprehensive control over students exercised by school personnel, ‘analogous in many ways to the relationship between parents and their children.’ [Citations.] Because of this special relationship, imposing obligations beyond what each person generally owes others under Civil Code section 1714, the duty of care owed by school personnel includes the duty to use reasonable measures to protect students from foreseeable injury at the hands of third parties acting negligently or intentionally.

This principle has been applied in cases of employees' alleged negligence resulting in injury to a student by another student [Citations] (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 869-870.)

Where a school fails to provide supervision and an injury results from conduct that would not have occurred had supervision been provided, liability may be imposed. [Citations] Where supervision is provided but the supervisor allows dangerous conduct to go on, liability may be imposed. [Citations] (Thompson v. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 1352, 1372.)

Defendant sets forth UMFs and supporting evidence that as of January 26, 2024, five-year-old Plaintiff was a student at PVSEA, a school operated by the District (UMF No. 1, 2); that in September 2023, Plaintiff’s mother reported to his teacher that Plaintiff told a family member that another student, Niko, had hit Plaintiff (UMF No. 6); that after receiving this report, Plaintiff’s teacher did not observe any ongoing issues or threats between Plaintiff and Niko (UMF Nos. 8- 10); that on January 26, 2024, Niko pushed Plaintiff off a slide (UMF Nos.1, 4); that at the time of the incident in suit, there were at least two adult supervisors supervising students on the playground where the incident occurred (UMF 5); that prior to the incident the District had no notice that Plaintiff’s teacher or any campus supervisor that would have been observing the playground area was unfit or incompetent to supervise Plaintiff (UMF Nos. 11, 12); and that on November 20, 2024, when asked to state all facts to support the claim that the District’s negligence caused Plaintiff’s injuries, Plaintiff stated only that he was injured when another child pushed him off the slide.

It is undisputed that Plaintiff is not claiming dangerous condition of public property. Defendant does not address the allegation of breach of mandatory duty.

2024CUPP031421: EDWARD LLITERAS-HUDNELL vs PLEASANT VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.

In moving for summary judgment, a defendant can present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff's cause of action or alternatively, may present evidence ”that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 855.) In determining whether a material triable issue exists, the Court must construe the evidence offered by the moving party in support of the motion strictly. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins.

Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839.) The evidence presented by Defendant does not conclusively negate the elements of breach or causation. It is devoid of any meaningful description of the size and contours of the playground, how many children were on the playground at the time of the incident; how far away the supervisors were from the incident when it occurred, what they were doing at the time of the incident and what they observed (if anything). There is no description at all about the incident and the events immediately preceding it including whether it was sudden or protracted.

In short, other than establishing that there were “at least” two adult supervisors supervising children on a playground, Defendant has not established that the supervision was adequate, or if inadequate, it was not a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s injuries.

Plaintiff cites Woodsmall v. Mt Diablo Unified School Dist. (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 262, 266-267 (“Woodsmall”) for the proposition that a claim of negligent supervision may be decided on a motion for summary judgment if the plaintiff fails to show facts demonstrating that any injury was actually caused by a lack of reasonable supervision. Woodsmall does not so hold. In that case, on appeal, judgment for the plaintiff was reversed for insufficiency of the evidence following a trial. On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and must make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) Plaintiff has no burden until Defendant causes a shift by meeting its burden. Defendant has not done so.

To the extent Defendant relies upon Plaintiff’s November 20, 2024 response to Special Interrogatory No. 4 to establish ”that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 855), the Court is not persuaded. It is not enough for defendant to show merely that plaintiff “has no evidence” on a key element of plaintiff's claim. A defendant must also produce evidence showing plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support that claim. (Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.) Defendant has not established that Plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his claim. Therefore, the burden of production is not shifted to Plaintiff.

For all of the above reasons, the Court DENIES the motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff shall give notice.

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