Michael Helmrich vs. San Juan Unified School District

a single volume of evidence (including declarations) with a table of contents when the evidence exceeds 25 pages.

Factual Background

This action arises from various events occurring at one of defendant District’s schools where plaintiff Stevi Helmrich, who has been diagnosed with Autism, a learning disability and speech/language impairment, was a student. Plaintiff’s father, Michael, has also alleged a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”), stemming from a 2/16/2022 incident involving an assault on Stevi by other students at the school. This matter was set for trial in May 2026 but it was vacated in April 2026 and referred at that time to the Trial Setting Process.

Moving Papers. According to the Notice of Motion, defendant District cannot be liable on Michael Helmrich’s NIED causes of action because (1) he “was not contemporaneously aware of the any [sic] injury[-]producing event to [his daughter] Stevi Helmrich” and (2) District “was not negligent in the underlying conduct claim[ed to] give[] rise to his cause of action for [NIED].” (Not. of Mot., p.2:3-11.) More specifically, the moving points & authorities contend “District was never negligent in relation to [Mr.

Helmrich’s] daughter” and although “[a] group of students made an attempt to attack [Stevi]” on 2/16/2022, “[t]he adult supervisors prevented the attempted attack.” (Mov. MPA, p.1:10-18.) Defendant District adds that aside from this “attempted attack” being prevented, it occurred before Mr. Helmrich arrived to pick up his daughter such that he ”never witnessed his daughter being injured.” (Id., at p.1:18- 20.) In support of this motion, defendant District GM has filed a Separate Statement which sets forth Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) Nos. 1-18.

Opposition. Plaintiffs oppose, claiming that there are triable issues relating to defendant District’s breach of its duty to protect plaintiff Stevi Helmrich from escalating bullying and her father’s contemporaneous perception of the injury-producing occurrence on 2/16/2022. In their Separate Statement, plaintiffs admit that one-half of defendant’s 18 UMFs are “undisputed” but contend the remainder is “disputed” for various reasons. Plaintiffs also offer 17 Additional Material Facts (“AMF”) claimed to independently preclude summary adjudication in favor of defendant District GM.

Standards for Summary Judgment/Adjudication

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication, the Court engages in a threestep process. First, the issues framed by the pleadings must be identified since the pleadings themselves define the scope of what may be addressed via a motion for summary judgment/adjudication (FPI Development Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382) and the evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00329107-CU-PO-GDS: Michael Helmrich vs. San Juan Unified School District 07/07/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 16D

the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings. The Court cannot consider an unpleaded issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to such a motion may not create triable issues beyond the scope of the pleadings, nor are they a substitute for filing amended pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its initial burden of production. A defendant moving for summary judgment “bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that [the defendant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1301.) This burden may be met by establishing either that one or more elements of a cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ.

Proc. §437c(p)(2).) A defendant cannot successfully shift the burden to a plaintiff by merely suggesting the possibility that the latter cannot prove his/her case but must make “an affirmative showing” in support of its motion. (Addy v. Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 214.) If a plaintiff pleads several theories of liability against the defendant, then the latter has the burden of demonstrating there are no material facts requiring trial on any of them. A moving defendant whose evidence omits facts as to any theory of liability effectively permits that portion of the complaint to be unchallenged and even where no opposition is presented, a moving defendant must still make a showing sufficient to eliminate all triable issues of fact. (Wright v.

Stang Manufacturing Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1228; see also Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377, 397.)

A plaintiff opposing summary judgment has no evidentiary burden unless the moving defendant has first met its initial burden. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840; see also Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1151-1152; Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1085-1086.) If a moving defendant has met its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to show the existence of a material factual issue as to the cause of action alleged or the defense to it. (Code Civ.

Proc. §437c(p)(2); see also, Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326-327.) Only where the moving defendant makes the requisite initial showing does a court need to examine the opposition papers to determine if the latter demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) The opposing party must present admissible evidence and may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleading. (Id.)

In ruling on the motion, a court must construe the evidence of the opposing party liberally and that of the moving party strictly, resolving any doubts in the opposing party’s favor. (Miller v. Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 868, 874; Cortez v. Vogt (1997)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00329107-CU-PO-GDS: Michael Helmrich vs. San Juan Unified School District 07/07/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 16D

52 Cal.App.4th 917, 925-926; see also, Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Brown v. FSR Brokerage, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 766, 773.)

While a summary adjudication motion is treated largely the same as one for summary judgment, there are a few important differences. CRC Rule 3.1350(b) explicitly mandates that issues presented for summary adjudication be stated in the notice of motion and repeated verbatim in the separate statement. Another difference is that summary adjudication cannot be granted unless it “completely disposes” of a cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for punitive damages, or question of duty. Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(1) provides in its entirety:

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for [punitive] damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for [punitive] damages, or an issue of duty. (Underline added for emphasis.)

Finally, before turning to the specific issues raised by this motion, the Court reminds the parties of the “Golden Rule” of summary judgment/adjudication: “If it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist.” (See, Zimmerman, Rosenfeld v. Larson (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1477 (italics in original).) Moreover, according to Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied. (Nazir, at 252 (citing Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Ch.10:95.1); see also, Insalaco v. Hope Lutheran Church of West Contra Costa County (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 506.)

That said, the Court now turns to the specific contentions advanced in support of and opposition to this motion for summary adjudication.

Objections to Evidence

Plaintiffs filed no written objections to evidence.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00329107-CU-PO-GDS: Michael Helmrich vs. San Juan Unified School District 07/07/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 16D

Defendant District’s five (5) written objections to evidence are overruled as follows:

No. 1: Ms. Chambers’ deposition testimony referring to certain students as “bullies of the school” is not made inadmissible based upon any of the objections made by District (i.e., lack of foundation/personal knowledge, hearsay, speculation) but the Court adds that a sustaining of any of these objection would have not altered the ultimate disposition of this motion. Nos. 2-5: These objections are overruled because District failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1354(b)(3), requiring objections to evidence to quote or set forth the objectionable material/testimony and the Court need not expend its finite resources searching for the material/testimony to which the objections are directed to in order to rule on such objections.

To the extent defendant District’s response to plaintiffs’ AMF purports to assert objections to evidence (see, Resp. to AMF Nos. 3, 5-7, 17), such objections are overruled because they are not set forth in a separate document as required by CRC Rule 3.1354(b) and do not quote or set forth the objectionable material/testimony as required by Rule 3.1354(b)(3) and the Court need not expend its finite resources searching for the material/testimony to which the objections are directed to in order to rule on such objections.

To the extent defendant District’s response to plaintiffs’ AMF purports to assert objections to one or more of the individual AMF themselves (see, Resp. to AMF Nos. 1- 2, 7, 11, 16-17), such objections are overruled because objections are properly directed at evidence only. (See, CRC Rule 3.1352, 3.1354.)

Discussion

Defendant District Failed to Satisfy its Initial Burden of Production. The threshold question here is whether the moving papers here are sufficient to satisfy defendant District’s initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2) with respect to the sole ground on which summary adjudication is sought: Defendant District “was not negligent in the underlying conduct” on which this NIED claim is based and Mr. Helmrich “was not contemporaneously aware of the any [sic] injury[-]producing event to [his daughter].” (Not. of Mot., p.2:3-11.)

That is, although this statement appears to reference two distinct points (i.e., that the District was not negligent and also that Mr. Helmrich was not contemporaneously aware of the injury-producing event) which in theory might have been advanced as alternative issues/bases for summary adjudication, District instead presents this as a single issue for summary adjudication relying on a single set of asserted UMFs, making no distinction in the moving separate statement and/or purported material facts necessary to support one point versus the other.

In any event, as noted above, defendant District’s moving Separate Statement

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00329107-CU-PO-GDS: Michael Helmrich vs. San Juan Unified School District 07/07/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 16D

sets forth UMF Nos. 1-18 which are claimed to substantiate this singular ground for summary adjudication but after careful consideration of the specific factual assertions made in UMF Nos. 1-18, this Court concludes that defendant District has failed to carry its initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2) with respect to its contention that it “was not negligent in the underlying conduct” giving rise to the subject incident.

More specifically, while the UMFs advanced by defendant were likely intended to establish that District was “not negligent” in connection with the subject incident on 2/16/2022, the Court finds no UMF which affirmatively demonstrates, much less as undisputed material facts, that District was “not negligent” in handling the various events which preceded and precipitated the “attempted attack” on 2/16/2022. In short, without addressing in the moving Separate Statement all facts material to the disposition of the NIED cause of action on the single ground cited in the Notice of Motion, defendant District has failed to establish that no negligence on its part caused or contributed to the subject incident on 2/16/2022.

That is, District’s asserted UMFs, even if they were supported with sufficient evidence, are collectively insufficient to dispense with the issue of negligence. The mere fact District may not have been negligent in the narrow time frame immediately prior to the “attempted attack” on 2/16/2022 does not, without more, affirmatively demonstrate as a matter of law that District “was not negligent in the underlying conduct” giving rise to this cause of action for NIED or is otherwise entitled to summary adjudication of this cause of action.

Consequently, summary adjudication must be denied regardless of whether the opposition has presented evidence sufficient to create any triable issue of material fact. In light of the foregoing, the Court need not proceed further but it does so in order to identify additional reasons why the moving papers are insufficient to satisfy defendant District’s initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2), thereby mandating denial of the present motion.

According to UMF No. 1, Ms. Chambers “agreed, at the request of Plaintiff Stevi Helmrich’s parents, to walk Plaintiff across the street from the campus of the school after the school day had ended to be picked up by one of Plaintiff’s parents.” However, the cited deposition testimony of Ms. Chambers actually indicates it was Ms. Chambers and her aide at the time who decided to walk Stevi across the street to be picked up. (Chambers Depo., p.42:7-11.) As such, the evidence which District itself cited as support for UMF No. 1 does not bear out the factual assertion therein and thus, defendant District failed to carry its initial burden of production with respect to UMF No.

1. Notably, to the extent the District would contend that it is immaterial for purposes of this motion whether it was at plaintiff’s parents’ request or District’s employees who decided to walk Stevi across the street, District’s inclusion of such facts both violates CRC Rule 3.1350(d)(2) and concedes their materiality under Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at 252. As a result, summary adjudication of the NIED cause of action must be denied without regard to any evidence offered in opposition.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00329107-CU-PO-GDS: Michael Helmrich vs. San Juan Unified School District 07/07/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 16D

While the Court need not proceed further regarding District’s motion, it finds that there are additional bases requiring denial of summary adjudication. According to UMF No. 6, Ms. Chambers “verbally confronted” an approaching student and “demanded the student disperse,” citing Ms. Chambers’ own deposition testimony at Page 45:6-18. However, the cited passage from the deposition transcript appears to relate solely to a different and/or subsequent event when 30-40 students who had been hiding came out into the parking lot and approached Stevi, at which time Ms.

Chambers’ directive that “they all needed to go home didn’t help.” (Chambers Depo., p.44:6-24; see also, UMF No. 8 [“the group of students attempted to attack Plaintiff” and also citing inter alia Chambers Depo., p.45:6-18].) As such, the Court finds that defendant District has failed to provide sufficient evidentiary support for the factual assertions in UMF No. 6 as well, constituting another independent ground for denial of this motion based on District’s failure to carry its initial burden of production.

Further, UMF No. 12 in the moving Separate Statement is, by its own terms, patently incomplete in that it ends mid-sentence without any punctuation. It states in its entirety: “Ms. Chambers also called Plaintiff’s mother, Ms. Jennifer Hicks, and requested the location of the parent picking Plaintiff up and was [sic]” Therefore, the Court holds that defendant District did not meet its initial burden of production in connection with UMF No. 12 either and this too independently mandates denial of the present motion regardless of whether the evidence cited in creates any triable issue of material fact.

According to UMF No. 17, when Mr. Helmrich arrived to pick up his daughter, he “exchanged words with the crowd of students, got into his truck, and then drove away,” relying solely on Page 48:6-7 of Mr. Helmrich’s deposition testimony. However, none of this cited testimony supports the factual assertions in UMF No. 17, as this testimony actually indicates nothing more than that Mr. Helmrich did not say anything to the other students, which plainly contradicts the express language of UMF No.

17. Additionally, none of the cited testimony shows that Mr. Helmrich either “got into his truck” or “then drove away.” In short, defendant has provided no evidentiary support whatsoever for UMF No. 17 and thus, defendant District failed its initial burden of production with respect to UMF No. 17 so as to preclude summary adjudication of the NIED cause of action as a matter of law.

Because defendant District’s motion relies upon UMF Nos. 1-18, a failure to establish even a single UMF constitutes a failure by District to satisfy its initial burden of production and warrants denial of this motion. Here, multiple UMFs have not been sufficiently established. Therefore, there are several separate and independent reasons why the moving papers here are not sufficient to satisfy defendant District’s initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2) and for each of these reasons, the present motion for summary adjudication must be denied regardless of

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00329107-CU-PO-GDS: Michael Helmrich vs. San Juan Unified School District 07/07/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 16D

whether the evidence in opposition establishes the existence of any triable issue of material fact. In light of the foregoing, the Court need not proceed further but it nevertheless does so in order to identify additional grounds mandating denial of summary adjudication.

Plaintiffs Met Their Burden of Production. Even if the moving papers had been sufficient to meet defendant District’s initial burden of production and thereby successfully shifted to plaintiffs the burden to provide evidence which establishes the existence of at least one triable issue of material fact (which District’s moving papers do not do), plaintiffs have carried their own burden of production especially in light of current California law requiring the evidence in opposition to be construed liberally while the evidence in support is construed narrowly. (See, e.g., Miller v. Bechtel Corp., supra, 33 Cal.3d at 874; Cortez v. Vogt, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at 925-926.)

As previously indicated, UMF No. 1 states that Ms. Chambers “agreed, at the request of Plaintiff Stevi Helmrich’s parents, to walk Plaintiff across the street from the campus of the school after the school day had ended to be picked up by one of Plaintiff’s parents.” Again, among the evidence cited in response to this UMF is Ms. Chambers’ own deposition testimony and this testimony actually indicates it was Ms. Chambers and her aide at the time who decided to walk Stevi across the street to be picked up by her father, thereby raising in itself a triable issue of material fact. (Chambers Depo., p.42:7- 11.)

Keeping in mind that the evidence in opposition must be construed liberally, the Court holds that plaintiffs have met their burden of producing evidence sufficient to create a triable issue of material fact in connection with UMF No. 1 and therefore, summary adjudication of the NIED cause of action must be denied as a matter of law. (See, e.g., Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at 252 [moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied].)

Although it need not proceed further, the Court does so in order to identify additional triable issues of material fact.

UMF No. 5 indicates that one of the students following Stevi and the two District employees called Stevi a “snitch,” apparently suggesting there was nothing more to this confrontation. However, in response, plaintiffs cite Ms. Chambers’ deposition testimony indicating that a student named “Jocelyn” actually “grab[bed Stevi] and attempt[ed] to fight her” before the aide (Mr. Bouillet) was able to pull Stevi away. (Chambers Depo., p.44:17-24.) Again, construing liberally the evidence in opposition, plaintiffs have carried their burden of producing evidence sufficient to create a triable issue of material fact relative to UMF No. 5 and this too precludes summary adjudication of the NIED cause of action.

According to UMF No. 9, when the multiple students in the parking lot began

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00329107-CU-PO-GDS: Michael Helmrich vs. San Juan Unified School District 07/07/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 16D

approaching Stevi, “Mr. Bouillet [the aide] shielded Plaintiff against the wall of a building.” However, in response, plaintiffs again cite Ms. Chambers’ deposition testimony which indicates that “Mr. Dan [Bouillet] took Stevi to the building that was empty, up on the stair, and had Stevi behind him[,] trying to protect [her].” (Chambers Depo., p.47:1-8.) This testimony, by its own terms, conflicts with UMF No. 9’s assertion that “Mr. Bouillet shielded Plaintiff against the wall of a building” and coupled with California law’s requirement for the evidence in opposition to be construed liberally, this Court holds that plaintiffs have shown a triable issue of material fact in connection with UMF No. 9 as well, constituting an additional ground for denial of this motion.

UMF No. 15 states that when Mr. Helmrich arrived at the school, he saw from approximately 100-150 feet away Stevi, Ms. Chambers and Mr. Bouillet “being followed by a group of students.” (Underline added for emphasis.) In response, the opposition cites Mr. Helmrich’s own testimony indicating that he saw “the mob of students” when he parked; “the mob” was surrounding Ms. Chambers and Mr. Bouillet with Stevi in between them and “[t]hey were fighting off these kids;” he saw some “arms” of the students making up “the mob” “flailing in there,” hitting the teachers and then Stevi, trying to grab her hair;” and specifically saw Stevi being “hit” by “arm or kicks.” (M.

Helmrich Depo., p.47:16-p.51:5.) This evidence, when construed liberally as required by California law, is enough to establish the existence of a triable issue of material fact relative to UMF No. 15 as well as UMF No. 18 [asserting that Stevi “was never physically injured during the altercation”] so as to mandate denial of summary adjudication on the NIED cause of action.

As noted above, UMF No. 17 asserts that when Mr. Helmrich arrived to pick up his daughter, he “exchanged words with the crowd of students, got into his truck, and then drove away.” However, in response to this UMF, the opposition cites Mr. Helmrich’s own deposition testimony which unequivocally indicates he did not “say anything to the students” who were in the parking lot. (M. Helmrich Depo., p.48:6-7.) Based on this clear testimony, the Court finds there to be a triable issue of material fact in connection with UMF No. 17 and this alone precludes the granting of this summary adjudication motion. (See, e.g., Nazir v.

United Airlines, Inc., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at 252 [moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied].)

In light of the aforementioned triable issues of material fact relative to UMF Nos. 1, 5, 9, 15, 17 and 18, the Court need not proceed further but it nevertheless finds that plaintiffs’ AMF Nos. 16 and 17 [asserting that Stevi was “hysterical” following the subject incident on 2/16/2022 and later became “depressed” and began “cutting herself”] along with the evidence cited as support (which must be construed liberally in favor of the opposition) are sufficient to demonstrate additional triable issues of material fact which mandate

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00329107-CU-PO-GDS: Michael Helmrich vs. San Juan Unified School District 07/07/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 16D

denial of the present motion.

Disposition

Having determined that (1) the moving papers are not sufficient to satisfy defendant District’s initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2) with respect to the sole ground on which summary adjudication is sought and (2) the evidence offered in opposition is sufficient to create several triable issues of material fact, defendant District’s motion for summary adjudication of plaintiff Michael Helmrich’s cause of action for NIED must be and hereby is DENIED in its entirety.

Moving defendant to provide notice of this ruling and file proof of service of same within five (5) court days.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)