A.S. vs. County of Sacramento

34-2022-00324020-CU-PO-GDS: A.S. vs. County of Sacramento 07/07/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

on approximately 10 occasions from 2003 to 2005. The operative complaint filed on 7/22/2022 asserts against defendant County a single cause of action for “Negligence,” which generally alleges that defendant County owed for a variety of reasons a duty of care to plaintiff and that defendant County breached such duty in a variety of ways. (Compl., ¶¶9-67.) The complaint asserts that defendant County is directly liable for its own failure to discharge mandatory statutory duties including but not limited to Welfare and Institutions Code §328, Health and Safety Code §1522 and Penal Code §11166 and also vicariously liable for the acts and/or omissions of County’s employees, agents and/or independent contractors. (Compl., ¶¶68-69.) Trial is currently set to commence on 7/13/2026.

Moving Papers. Defendant County moves for summary judgment on plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that “[o]ne or more of the elements of a negligence cause of action against the County cannot be established, and the County is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law as to vicarious liability for negligent conduct of employees.” (Mov. MPA, p.1:13-15 (underline added for emphasis).) As support for summary judgment on such grounds, defendant County advances Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) Nos. 1-24. (Mov. Sep. Stm., pp.2-7.) In the alternative, defendant County seeks summary adjudication of the following seven (7) issues:

1. There was no duty to protect A.S. from unforeseeable criminal conduct by the foster mother’s father during the child’s visit to his home in Oakland, with County relying on UMF Nos. 1-3, 9, 12-15, 18-19 and 21-23; 2. Defendant County did not breach a duty to protect Plaintiff from sexual abuse, with County citing UMF Nos. 2-3, 5-8, 11-12, 14-15, 18-19 and 21-23 as support; 3. Defendant County did not proximately cause the sexual abuse of A.S., with UMF Nos. 2, 5-7, 11, 13, 18 and 21 being offered by County as support; 4.

Defendant County’s response to the 5/31/2005 report of sexual abuse constituted “discretionary actions” entitled to immunity under Government Code §820.2, with County advancing UMF Nos. 6-8, 10 and 18 in support; 5. Defendant County’s alleged breach of a mandatory duty under Penal Code §11166 did not proximately cause plaintiff’s injury, with UMF Nos. 4-8 and 10 being cited as support by County; 6. Defendant County’s alleged breach of a mandatory duty under Health and Safety Code §1522 did not proximately cause plaintiff’s injury, with County relying on UMF Nos. 2, 12, 14 and 21-23 as support; and 7.

Defendant County’s alleged breach of a mandatory duty under Welfare and Institutions Code §328 by the County did not proximately cause plaintiff’s injury, with UMF Nos. 1, 3, 9 and 18 offered by County as support. (Am. Not. of Mot., p.2:7-23; Mov. Sep. Stm., pp.8-24.)

Opposition. Plaintiff opposes, arguing that this motion should be denied because the

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evidence cited as support is inadmissible insofar defendant County’s attorney “was not present for any of the events at issue in this case;” “[s]he has no personal knowledge of what happened to Plaintiff, how the County operated, or what its records say;” and her “declaration does not authenticate a single document, does not establish a proper foundation for any exhibit, and does not demonstrate personal knowledge of any fact.” As such, “the facts derived from the Exhibits lack foundation and constitute hearsay with no exception.”

The opposition further contends the present motion “fails on the merits” because defendant County has failed to establish not only that there is no triable issue as to any material fact but also that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Instead, the moving papers do little more than identify various factual disputes that must be submitted to a jury including whether the sexual abuse was unforeseeable, whether County breached its duty of care, and whether any breach proximately causes plaintiff’s harm.

While the moving papers assert that the criminal conduct at issue could not have been foreseen and there was no breach of duty, the evidence shows otherwise especially when “[t]he County knew--through Plaintiff’s reports to her social worker--that Mr. Miller was sexually abusing her.” In the end, plaintiff insists defendant County is subject to liability on both a direct and vicarious basis and triable issues exist as to its liability for breaching various mandatory duties including Penal Code §11166 and Welfare and Institutions Code §16501(f), while adding that County’s invocation of “discretionary immunity” disregards recent case law which confirms such immunity applies “only to deliberate and considered policy decisions, in which a “[conscious] balancing [of] risks and advantages...took place.”

In her separate statement, plaintiff concedes that a handful of the 24 UMFs offered by defendant District are “undisputed” but contends that all others are “disputed” at least in part. Plaintiff also offers 64 Additional Material Facts of her own in an attempt to establish the existence of triable issues of fact which mandate denial of this motion.

Standards for Summary Judgment/Adjudication

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication, the Court engages in a threestep process. First, the issues framed by the pleadings must be identified since the pleadings themselves define the scope of what may be addressed via a motion for summary judgment/adjudication (FPI Development Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382) and the evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings. The Court cannot consider an unpleaded issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to such a motion may not create triable issues beyond the scope of the pleadings, nor are they a substitute for filing amended pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast

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Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its initial burden of production. A defendant moving for summary judgment “bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that [the defendant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1301.) This burden may be met by establishing either that one or more elements of a cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ.

Proc. §437c(p)(2).) A defendant cannot successfully shift the burden to a plaintiff by merely suggesting the possibility that the latter cannot prove his/her case but must make “an affirmative showing” in support of its motion. (Addy v. Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 214.) If a plaintiff pleads several theories of liability against the defendant, then the latter has the burden of demonstrating there are no material facts requiring trial on any of them. A moving defendant whose evidence omits facts as to any theory of liability effectively permits that portion of the complaint to be unchallenged and even where no opposition is presented, a moving defendant must still make a showing sufficient to eliminate all triable issues of fact. (Wright v.

Stang Manufacturing Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1228; see also Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377, 397.)

A plaintiff opposing summary judgment has no evidentiary burden unless the moving defendant has first met its initial burden. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840; see also Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1151-1152; Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1085-1086.) If a moving defendant has met its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to show the existence of a material factual issue as to the cause of action alleged or the defense to it. (Code Civ.

Proc. §437c(p)(2); see also, Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326-327.) Only where the moving defendant makes the requisite initial showing does a court need to examine the opposition papers to determine if the latter demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) The opposing party must present admissible evidence and may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleading. (Id.)

In ruling on the motion, a court must construe the evidence of the opposing party liberally and that of the moving party strictly, resolving any doubts in the opposing party’s favor. (Miller v. Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 868, 874; Cortez v. Vogt (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 917, 925-926; see also, Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Brown v. FSR Brokerage, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 766, 773.)

While a summary adjudication motion is treated largely the same as one for summary

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judgment, there are a few important differences. CRC Rule 3.1350(b) explicitly mandates that issues presented for summary adjudication be stated in the notice of motion and repeated verbatim in the separate statement. Another difference is that summary adjudication cannot be granted unless it “completely disposes” of a cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for punitive damages, or question of duty. Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(1) provides in its entirety:

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for [punitive] damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for [punitive] damages, or an issue of duty. (Underline added for emphasis.)

Finally, before turning to the specific issues raised by this motion, the Court reminds the parties of the “Golden Rule” of summary judgment/adjudication: “If it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist.” (See, Zimmerman, Rosenfeld v. Larson (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1477 (italics in original).) Moreover, according to Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied. (Nazir, at 252 (citing Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Ch.10:95.1); see also, Insalaco v. Hope Lutheran Church of West Contra Costa County (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 506.)

That said, the Court now turns to the specific contentions advanced in support of and opposition to this motion for summary judgment/adjudication.

Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff’s Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice of “[t]he Complaint, all pleadings, all docket entries, papers and filings in the above-named matter, entitled A.S. v. County of Sacramento, et al., Case No. 34-2022-00324020-CU-PO-GDS” is GRANTED but is limited to only those purposes appropriate for judicial notice. (See, Evid. Code §451(a), §452(b)-(d); see also, Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not to the truth of the statements contained therein]; Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119

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Cal.App.4th 140, 145-148; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569-70.)

Objections to Evidence

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §437c(q), the Court declines to rule on plaintiff A.S.’s 11 written objections to evidence since they are not material to the disposition of this motion. To the extent plaintiff’s written objections to evidence also purport to include separate and distinct objections to defendant County’s UMFs themselves and/or portions thereof, such objections are overruled because objections are properly directed at evidence only. (See, CRC Rules 3.1352, 3.1354.)

To the extent plaintiff’s Supplemental Separate Statement in Opposition purports to assert objections to evidence proffered by defendant County, such objections are overruled because CRC Rule 3.1354(b) not only expressly requires written objections be set forth in a separate document and quote the objectionable material but also expressly prohibits objections to evidence from being “restated or reargued in the separate statement.”

Defendant County did not file any separate written objections to evidence with either its original or supplemental reply papers.

Discussion

A. Summary Judgment. As noted above, defendant County now seeks summary judgment against plaintiff on the grounds that “[o]ne or more of the elements of [her] negligence cause of action against the County cannot be established, and the County is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law as to vicarious liability for negligent conduct of employees” (Mov. MPA, p.1:13-15 (underline added for emphasis)) and as support for this proposition, defendant County relies on UMF Nos. 1-24 (Mov. Sep. Stm., pp.2-7).

The threshold question here is whether the moving papers here are sufficient to satisfy defendant County’s initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2) with respect to these grounds on which summary judgment is sought and as will now be shown, the Court finds that the moving papers are not sufficient to meet defendant’s initial burden of production under §437c(p)(2).

Because the moving papers are by their own terms limited to defendant County’s potential vicarious liability for its employees’ negligent conduct, summary judgment cannot be granted in favor of County because, as pointed out above, plaintiff’s complaint expressly alleges that defendant County is subject to liability on both a direct and vicarious basis. (See, e.g., Compl., ¶¶68-69.) Insofar as defendant’s motion for summary judgment does not purport to address the potential for liability to plaintiff based on County’s own direct liability based on mandatory duties, defendant County is

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not entitled to judgment on the entirety of the complaint as a matter of law. (See, e.g., Wright v. Stang Manufacturing Co., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at 1228; Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at 397.) These appellate authorities indicate that where a plaintiff pleads several different theories of liability against a defendant, the latter has the initial burden of demonstrating there are no material facts requiring trial on any of these different theories of liability and the failure to address all alleged theories of liability effectively leaves a portion of the complaint unchallenged, thereby precluding summary judgment in favor of the moving defendant regardless of whether there is any opposition or whether the opposition includes evidence showing the existence of a triable issue of material fact.

This deficiency alone requires denial of defendant County’s motion for summary judgment.

While the Court need not proceed further as to defendant’s County’s motion for summary judgment, it finds that even if the moving papers had been sufficient to meet defendant County’s initial burden of production under §437c(p)(2), summary judgment must still be denied because when construed liberally as required by current California law (see, e.g., Miller v. Bechtel Corp., supra, 33 Cal.3d at 874; Cortez v. Vogt, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at 925-926), the evidence in opposition is sufficient to establish the existence of multiple triable issues of material fact which independently mandate denial of summary judgment as a matter of law.

According to UMF No. 2, “The Torres foster parents were screened and found clean of criminal history and the child abuse index” but in response, plaintiff cites to evidence which tends to show that defendant County has no knowledge or documents affirmatively indicating that the Torres actually underwent a background check, investigation and/or screenings before plaintiff’s placement with them; instead, defendant County merely indicated in response to plaintiff’s request for production that third parties or other agencies “would possess such documents, if any.” Additionally, in response to plaintiff’s requests for admission relating to defendant County’s approval of the Torres’ household “as a safe foster care environment” and licensing of those “responsible” for plaintiff, defendant County provided an unequivocal denial followed by a statement that “[d]iscovery is continuing.” Similarly, defendant County stated it was unable to admit or deny that it “did not conduct a family evaluation” with Mr.

Miller before placing plaintiff with the Torres family; “did not require any pre-certification training” before placing plaintiff with the Torres family; and “did not require [any] continuing education” after certification and/or licensing of caregivers. Finally, the opposition cites the deposition testimony from defendant County’s “PMK” (presumably referring to a person “most qualified” under Code of Civil Procedure §2025.230) which indicates that she was unable to find any documents from the Family Alliance Foster Family Agency relating specifically to the certification of the Torres home, to any “background check clearance documents,” or to any precertification visit to the Torres home, nor did she find any information on whether the Torres were ever certified or

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licensed by defendant County. The Court finds that when this evidence (to which no objections were asserted) is construed collectively and liberally in favor of the opposition, it is enough to establish the existence of a triable issue of material fact in connection with UMF No. 2’s assertion that the Torres had in fact been “screened and found clean of criminal history and the child abuse index.” This alone also independently precludes the granting of summary judgment (see, e.g., Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at 252 [moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied]) and the Court need not proceed further.

Further, UMF No. 3 states, “Sacramento County DHHS/Child Protective Services informed the court that A.S. desired to be adopted” but in response, the opposition cites Ms. Torres own testimony that plaintiff had said “she did not want to be adopted.” (T. Torres Depo., p.30:14-16 (underline added for emphasis).) Such conflicting testimony creates another triable issue of material fact which also independently mandates denial of summary judgment.

Moreover, according to UMF No. 4, a report to Sacramento County DHHS Child Protection Services on 5/31/2005 provided that “[A.S.] told her fos/adopt mom yesterday that fos/adopt’s own father who resides in Oakland had sexually abused her during spring break in March 2005” and “[A.S.] said this was the first and only time something like this had happened.” However, plaintiff’s own declaration in opposition attests in Paragraphs 5 and 7 that she had been “sexually abused on approximately ten occasions during overnight visits to [Mr. Miller’s] home in Oakland during my placement” with the Torres from 2003 to 2005 and this evidence, to which no objection has been asserted, is when construed liberally in favor of the opposition sufficient to show yet another triable issue of material fact that separately and independently precludes summary judgment.

Again, while the Court need not proceed further as to defendant County’s motion for summary judgment, UMF No. 9 asserts that on or about 6/15/2005, County reported to the Court that A.S.’s placement at the Torres residence was “stable until May 31, 2005, when [A.S.] informed the foster mother that she was touched inappropriately by the foster mother’s father while visiting in his home during Spring vacation.” On its face, UMF No. 9 is not restricted to the mere assertion of the County having made a “report” to the Court but also includes the implied assertion that the report was accurate as to the “stable” nature of A.S.’s placement until May 31, 2025.

In response, the opposition cites several paragraphs of plaintiff’s own declaration which indicate that, aside from the sexual abuse by Mr. Miller, both plaintiff herself and her sister (also a foster child placed the Torres home) had been previously subjected to a variety of physical and other abuse by Ms. Torres. (Pl. Decl., ¶¶2-3, 7-8, 12-14.) Additionally, this declaration attests

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that plaintiff had previously reported Mr. Miller’s sexual abuse to her “County social worker” who was believed to be Jason Drake but nevertheless, the Torres continued to leave plaintiff at Mr. Miller’s home in Oakland, where the sexual abuse continued. (Pl. Decl., ¶¶7-8, 12-14.) All of this evidence, to which no objection has been asserted, must be construed liberally in favor of the opposition and is enough to demonstrate additional triable issue of material fact regarding the so-called “stability” of plaintiff’s placement in the Torres home prior to 5/31/2025 as asserted in UMF No. 9 so as to independently mandate denial of summary judgment in favor of defendant County.

Additionally, UMF No. 13 states that in the 2003-2005 timeframe, the Torres would take their household including plaintiff to Oakland where Mr. Miller resided in order “to attend church on Sunday, and occasionally both Saturday and Sunday.” In response, the opposition adds that the Torres also frequently went to the Miller residence in Oakland on many other occasions (i.e., summer break, Thanksgiving, etc.) and further that both she and her sister were sometimes left with the Millers “without supervision for weeks on end,” citing plaintiff’s own declaration and her sister’s (Kayla Torres-Dobson) deposition testimony.

Again, given the lack of objections thereto, this evidence must be construed liberally and is sufficient to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact in connection with UMF No. 13 insofar as it asserts the reason for and/or frequency of the visits, thereby precluding the Court from granting this motion for summary judgment. Notably, to the extent defendant County might contend that the reason and/or frequency of the visits to the Miller home are not material for purposes of UMF No. 13, inclusion of such facts both violates CRC Rule 3.1350(d)(2) and concedes their materiality under Nazir v.

United Airlines, Inc., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at 252.

According to UMF No. 18, an “Emergency Response Referral sexual abuse report dated May 31, 2005 states that “fos/adopt’s own father who resides in Oakland had sexually abused [A.S.] during spring break in March 2005” and the Court notes that this report specifically indicates on Page One, “this was the first and only time something like this happened.” In response, the opposition again cites to plaintiff’s own declaration which attests in Paragraphs 5 and 7 that she had been “sexually abused on approximately ten occasions during overnight visits to [Mr. Miller’s] home in Oakland during my placement” with the Torres from 2003 to 2005 and this evidence, to which no objection has been asserted, is enough to create a triable issue of material fact relative to UMF No. 18 so as to mandate denial of summary judgment.

UMF No. 20 asserts that after plaintiff told Ms. Torres “she was being inappropriately touched by Torres’ father James Miller, A.S. did not return to Miller’s house.” In response, the opposition cites to plaintiff’s declaration which attests in Paragraphs 10- 14 that after telling her sister about the sexual abuse by Mr. Miller, Ms. Torres “confronted” plaintiff about her claims of sexual abuse; plaintiff later told not only the pastor of the Oakland church the Torres attended but also her “County social worker”

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believed to be Jason Drake; and even after these reports of sexual abuse, the Torres continued to take plaintiff to Oakland and leave her at Mr. Miller’s home where the sexual abuse continued. This evidence, to which no objection has been asserted, is when construed liberally sufficient to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact with respect to UMF No. 20 as well, thereby precluding summary judgment in favor of defendant County.

UMF No. 24 states that Sacramento County social worker Jason Drake was assigned to plaintiff’s case on 7/18/2025 but in response, plaintiff cites her own declaration in opposition which attests that she reported the sexual abuse to Mr. Drake while she was still living in the Torres home and still visiting Mr. Miller in Oakland where the sexual abuse continued, raising a triable issue as to when Mr. Drake was actually assigned to plaintiff’s case. (See, Pl. Decl., ¶¶9-14.) Additionally, the opposition cited Mr.

Drake’s own deposition testimony that he was unable to ascertain from his work logs when he was first assigned to plaintiff’s case. This evidence, to which no objection has been asserted, is when construed liberally sufficient to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact with respect to the assertion in UMF No. 24 so as to mandate denial of summary judgment. (See, e.g., Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at 252 [moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied].)

In sum, as discussed above, defendant County’s motion for summary judgment fails to satisfy the County’s initial burden and even if it had satisfied such burden, plaintiff has established the existence of numerous triable issues of material fact. Importantly, if defendant County had satisfied its burden, a single disputed UMF would require denial of this summary judgment motion. Here, having determined there are triable issues of material fact in connection with UMF Nos. 2-4, 9, 13, 18, 20 and 24, the Court finds that each disputed UMF separately and independently demonstrates that defendant County is as a matter of law not entitled to summary judgment based on the 24 UMF advanced in the moving separate statement.

Furthermore, this Court also finds that plaintiff’s own AMF Nos. 4-6, 9-10, 14-18, 20-46, 50, 52, 54, 56-59 and 62-64, along with the evidence cited as support for these AMF (to which no objections were asserted and which must be construed liberally in favor of the opposition), are enough to create several additional triable issues of material fact which mandate denial of summary judgment in favor of defendant County.

B. Summary Adjudication. As noted above, defendant County alternatively moves for summary adjudication on seven (7) specific issues and the Court will now address each of these issues in the order identified in the Amended Notice of Motion.

Issue One. The first issue listed in the Amended Notice of Motion is that

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defendant County had “no duty to protect A.S. from unforeseeable criminal conduct by the foster mother’s father during the child’s visit to his home in Oakland” and as support for this contention, defendant County relies on UMF Nos. 1-3, 9, 12-15, 18-19 and 21- 23. The threshold question here is whether the moving papers here are sufficient to satisfy defendant County’s initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2) with respect to Issue One and as will now be shown, the Court finds that the moving papers are not sufficient to meet defendant’s initial burden of production under §437c(p)(2) relative to this first issue.

Among the 13 UMFs specifically cited as support for this first issue, the Court finds that the UMFs directly related to defendant County’s claim that Mr. Miller’s criminal conduct was “unforeseeable” include UMF Nos. 21-22 but these are not sufficient to support such unforeseeability so as to preclude as a matter of law any duty on the part of County to protect A.S. from Mr. Miller’s criminal conduct. UMF No. 21 states, “According to Tamara Torres, her father James Miller had not ever been accused of inappropriate sexual behavior, until the report by A.S.,” while UMF No. 22 provides, “Tamara Torres testified that she never witnessed her father being ‘inappropriate’ with kids [and] her father had ‘never touched’ Tamara or her sister.” However, the Court is not persuaded that Ms.

Torres’ own subjective understanding and/or awareness that her father had never before “been accused of inappropriate sexual behavior” and her never personally “witness[ing]” her father being ‘inappropriate’ with kids” is, even when considered together, either determinative or necessarily relevant to establish as an undisputed material fact that her father’s criminal conduct toward plaintiff was as a matter of law “unforeseeable” by defendant County so as to preclude a finding of a duty of care on the part of defendant County to protect plaintiff from such conduct.

In the absence of undisputed evidence sufficient to demonstrate as a matter of law that Mr. Miller’s criminal conduct was objectively “unforeseeable,” defendant County necessarily failed to carry its initial burden of production relative to Issue One and thus, summary adjudication must therefore be denied as to first issue regardless of whether plaintiff has produced evidence showing the existence of a triable issue of material fact. This is especially true given plaintiff’s declaration in opposition attests in Paragraph 13 (to which no objection has been asserted) that several of “Mr.

Miller’s female cousins” said he had “always been really weird and touchy.” In light of the foregoing, the Court need not proceed further with respect to Issue One but it does so in order to identify additional reasons why defendant County is not entitled to summary adjudication on Issue One.

Even assuming arguendo the moving papers were sufficient to meet defendant County’s initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2) in connection with the first issue identified in the Amended Notice of Motion, summary adjudication must still be denied because when the evidence in opposition is construed liberally as required by current California law (see, e.g., Miller v. Bechtel Corp., supra,

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33 Cal.3d at 874; Cortez v. Vogt, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at 925-926), it is sufficient to establish the existence of several triable issues of material fact in connection with UMF Nos. 2-3, 9, 13 and 18, each of which is discussed above in connection with defendant County’s motion for summary judgment. Again, only a single triable issue of material fact mandates denial of defendant’s motion for summary adjudication on this issue but here, multiple UMFs offered in support of Issue One are in dispute, with each providing a separate and independent basis for denial.

Thus, defendant County is not entitled to summary adjudication on Issue One and the Court need not proceed further but it nevertheless does so because AMF Nos. 14-18, 20-46, 50, 52, 54, 56-59 and 62-64, along with the evidence cited as support for these AMF (to which no objections were asserted and which must be construed liberally in favor of the opposition), are sufficient to demonstrate several additional triable issues of material fact which require denial of summary adjudication on Issue One.

Issue Two. The second issue listed in the Amended Notice of Motion is that defendant County did not breach a duty to protect plaintiff from sexual abuse and as support for this contention, defendant offers UMF Nos. 2-3, 5-8, 11-12, 14-15, 18-19 and 21-23. However, even if the moving papers had been sufficient to meet defendant County’s initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2) in connection with Issue Two, the Court finds that plaintiff has met her burden of producing evidence which, when construed liberally in favor of the opposition as required by current California law, is sufficient to establish the existence of triable issues of material fact in connection with UMF Nos. 2-3 and 18, each of which is discussed above in connection with defendant County’s motion for summary judgment.

Again, only a single disputed UMF in support of Issue Two requires denial of the motion as to this issue. Thus, defendant County is not entitled to summary adjudication on Issue Two and the Court need not proceed further but it nevertheless does so because AMF Nos. 14-18, 20-46, 50, 52, 54, 56-59 and 62-64, along with the evidence cited as support for these AMF (to which no objections were asserted and which must be construed liberally in favor of the opposition), are sufficient to demonstrate several additional triable issues of material fact which mandate denial of summary adjudication on Issue Two.

Issue Three. The third issue listed in the Amended Notice of Motion is that defendant County did not proximately cause the sexual abuse of plaintiff, relying on UMF Nos. 2, 5-7, 11, 13, 18 and 21. In much the same way this Court found that the moving papers are not sufficient to satisfy defendant’s initial burden of production on Issue One relating to the foreseeability of Mr. Miller’s criminal conduct, this Court is not persuaded that the moving papers here are sufficient to demonstrate as a matter of law defendant County’s acts or omissions did not proximately cause or contribute to the sexual abuse of plaintiff. After all, whether a particular defendant’s conduct was a proximate cause of the harm alleged by the plaintiff is “purely a factual issue unless reasonable minds could draw only one conclusion” from the facts/evidence (see, e.g.,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00324020-CU-PO-GDS: A.S. vs. County of Sacramento 07/07/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

Guzman v. County of Monterey (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 983, 995 (citing Braman v. State of California (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 344, 356)) and as such, proximate causation is amenable to summary adjudication in limited circumstances.

Even assuming arguendo the moving papers were sufficient to meet defendant County’s initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2) in connection with the third issue identified in the Amended Notice of Motion, summary adjudication must still be denied because the Court finds that plaintiff has met her burden of producing evidence which, when construed liberally in favor of the opposition as required by current California law, is sufficient to establish the existence of triable issues of material fact in connection with UMF Nos. 2, 13 and 18, each of which is discussed above in connection with defendant County’s motion for summary judgment. Thus, defendant County is not entitled to summary adjudication on Issue Three and the Court need not proceed further but it nevertheless does so because AMF Nos. 14-18, 20-46, 50, 52, 54, 56-59 and 62-64, along with the evidence cited as support for these AMF (to which no objections were asserted and which must be construed liberally in favor of the opposition), are sufficient to demonstrate several additional triable issues of material fact which mandate denial of summary adjudication on Issue Three.

Issue Four. The fourth issue listed in the Amended Notice of Motion is that defendant County’s response to the 5/31/2005 report of sexual abuse constituted “discretionary actions” entitled to immunity under Government Code §820.2 and UMF Nos. 6-8, 10 and 18 are offered as support for this contention. Summary adjudication must be denied as to Issue Four because, as explained above, Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(1) expressly provides that a motion for summary adjudication may be granted “only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for [punitive] damages, or an issue of duty.” (Underline added for emphasis.)

Here, the issue presented for summary adjudication would not by its own terms dispose of the entirety of any cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for punitive damages, or question of duty and thus, this Court is without authority to grant summary adjudication on Issue Four.

But even if Issue Four were properly amenable to summary adjudication under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(1), summary adjudication must still be denied as to Issue Four because plaintiff carried her burden of producing evidence which, when construed liberally, is sufficient to establish the existence of triable issues of material fact in connection with UMF No. 18 for the reasons explained above in connection with defendant County’s motion for summary judgment. Thus, defendant County is not entitled to summary adjudication on Issue Four either.

Issue Five. The fifth issue listed in the Amended Notice of Motion is that defendant County’s alleged breach of a mandatory duty under Penal Code §11166 did

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00324020-CU-PO-GDS: A.S. vs. County of Sacramento 07/07/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

not proximately cause plaintiff’s injury and as support, defendant advances UMF Nos. 4- 8 and 10. Summary adjudication must be denied as to Issue Five because it would not by its own terms dispose of the entirety of any cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for punitive damages, or question of duty insofar as the negligence cause of action alleged in the operative complaint is not limited to the mandatory duty found in Penal Code §11166. Consequently, this Court is without authority under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(1) to grant summary adjudication on Issue Five but even if Issue Five were amenable to summary adjudication here, this motion must still be denied as to Issue Five because plaintiff satisfied her burden of producing evidence which, when construed liberally, is sufficient to establish the existence of triable issues of material fact in connection with UMF No. 4 for the reasons explained above in connection with defendant County’s motion for summary judgment.

Thus, defendant County is not entitled to summary adjudication on Issue Five.

Issue Six. The sixth issue listed in the Amended Notice of Motion is that defendant County’s alleged breach of a mandatory duty under Health and Safety Code §1522 did not proximately cause plaintiff’s injury, with defendant relying on UMF Nos. 2, 12, 14 and 21-23 as support. Summary adjudication must be denied as to Issue Six as well because it would not by its own terms dispose of the entirety of any cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for punitive damages, or question of duty insofar as the negligence cause of action alleged in the operative complaint is not limited to the mandatory duty found in Health and Safety Code §1522, thereby precluding the Court from granting summary adjudication on Issue Six.

Moreover, even if the proper subject for summary adjudication, this motion must still be denied as to Issue Six because plaintiff satisfied her burden of producing evidence which, when construed liberally, is sufficient to establish the existence of triable issues of material fact in connection with UMF No. 2 for the reasons explained above in connection with defendant County’s motion for summary judgment. Thus, defendant County is not entitled to summary adjudication on Issue Six either.

Issue Seven. The final issue listed in the Amended Notice of Motion is that defendant County’s alleged breach of a mandatory duty under Welfare and Institutions Code §328 did not proximately cause plaintiff’s injury, with defendant offering UMF Nos. 1, 3, 9 and 18 as support. Summary adjudication must be denied as to Issue Seven because it would not by its own terms dispose of the entirety of any cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for punitive damages, or question of duty insofar as the negligence cause of action alleged in the operative complaint is not limited to the mandatory duty found in Welfare and Institutions Code §328.

Consequently, this Court is without authority under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(1) to grant summary adjudication on Issue Seven but even if Issue Seven were otherwise amenable to summary adjudication, summary adjudication must still be denied as to Issue Seven because plaintiff satisfied her burden of producing evidence which, when construed

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00324020-CU-PO-GDS: A.S. vs. County of Sacramento 07/07/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

liberally, is sufficient to establish the existence of triable issues of material fact in connection with connection with UMF Nos. 3, 9 and 18, each of which is discussed above in connection with defendant County’s motion for summary judgment. Therefore, defendant County is not entitled to summary adjudication on Issue Seven.

Disposition

For the reasons explained above, defendant County’s motion for summary judgment or alternatively, summary adjudication of seven particular issues is DENIED in its entirety.

Moving defendant to provide notice of this ruling and file proof of service of same within five (5) court days.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)