Gilbert, Sydney vs. Murray, Jacob Wayne

It did not concern simply other vehicles. It was limited to the [defective component] in Plaintiff's truck and other vehicles [Plaintiff's expert] described what Ford itself had done to notify dealers and technicians about problems with this [defective component] model. Thus, everything about which he testified that applied equally to Plaintiff's vehicle. Such evidence certainly was probative and not unduly prejudicial." (Id. at 154; See also Doppes v. Bentley (2009) 174 Cal.App.4 th 967 [documents related to the frequency of repurchases and similar complaints about other vehicles of the same year, make, and model are relevant in actions that involved violations of the Song-Beverly Act.].)

Similarly, in Jensen v. BMW of North American, LLC (S.D. Cal. 2019) 328 F.R.D. 557, 562-563, the court found that "information regarding whether the same defects reported to BMW in other cars of the same make, model, and year as Plaintiff's subject vehicle could conceivably be relevant to whether BMW acted reasonably in denying Plaintiff's warranty claims. A fact finder may find BMW's knowledge or lack of knowledge about the same defects to be a consideration in deciding whether BMW acted in good faith as to Plaintiff's specific case." Therefore, the Court will order a further response to No.

30.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re: Gilbert, Sydney vs. Murray, Jacob Wayne Case No.: VCU333454 Date: June 9, 2026 Time: 8:30 A.M. Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman Motion: Demurrer Tentative Ruling: To overrule the demurrer; to order the City to answer the complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

Facts

Plaintiff sues Defendants Jacob Murray for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff sues the City of Hanford under Government Code section 815.2(a). Plaintiff alleges on or around April 30, 2025, the City deployed the Hanford Police's Homeless Assistance Resource Team officers to conduct a multi-agency homeless encampment cleanup near Aquifer Drive and the San Joaquin Valley Railroad tracks located in Hanford, California (hereinafter the "Subject Location".) (Complaint P.11.)

While at the Subject Location, the City "encountered" Defendant Murray, who had a previous criminal history including driving with a suspended license, driving under the influence of a controlled substance, sale of a controlled substance, assault, robbery, terrorist threat, breaking and entering, and theft, and who had been incarcerated on multiple occasions. (Complaint P.P.12, 13.) The City "merely told Defendant [Murray] to leave the Subject Location without detaining him or checking his criminal record to see if he had any active warrants for his arrest," Defendant Murray walked away from the Subject Location, but located a police truck operated, owner or controlled by the City. (Complaint P.P.14, 15.)

Additionally, that Defendant Murray saw the truck with the words "Hanford Police" on it and that the City left the vehicle unlocked in a high crime area where an encampment clean-up was taking place. (Complaint P.16.) Plaintiff further alleges the City left the truck unlocked with the keys inside and that it was therefore foreseeable that the truck might be stolen. (Complaint P.17.) Further, that the truck "posed a danger greater than an ordinary vehicle given that it was clearly marked as a police vehicle and contained various weapons or tools used in the furtherance of law enforcement activities." (Complaint P.17.)

Plaintiff alleges the Murray saw the truck was unlocked, stole the vehicle, led the City and other law enforcement personnel on a high speed chase and Murray, while driving the truck, failed to stop at an intersection and "rear ended a 3rd vehicle, driven by Lina Garza, who was already in the intersection waiting to make a left turn onto Cherry Street. The force of the initial impact forced this 3rd vehicle to collide into Plaintiff's vehicle. As a result of the collision, Plaintiff sustained injuries to her person and damage to her vehicle." (Complaint P.P.18-22.)

As to the second cause of action under Government Code section 815.2, Plaintiff alleges the following: 31. Upon information and belief, Defendants HANFORD and DOES 11-50, inclusive, owned, maintained, managed, cared for, and/or repaired the motor vehicle that caused Plaintiff to sustain injuries. As such, Defendants, and each of them, did so negligently maintain, manage, care for, and entrust their vehicle that they allowed said vehicle to be stolen by Defendant MURRAY which caused Plaintiff to suffer damages.

32. Defendants DOES 51-100 and each of them, was acting within the scope of their employment with and operating a vehicle owned by fellow Defendant HANFORD at the time of the subject collision.

33. Defendants HANFORD and DOES 11-50 are vicariously liable for the injuries to Plaintiff under Government section Sec. 815.2 and vehicle code sections Sec.Sec. 17001 and 17002.

34. Defendants HANFORD and DOES 11-50 are vicariously liable for the negligent acts of DOES 51-100, who were acting within the scope of employment pursuant to Government Code Sec. 815.2.

35. Defendants HANFORD and DOES 11-50 are liable for injuries caused by the negligent care and operation of the Vehicle by DOES 51-100 pursuant to Vehicle Code Sec.Sec. 17001 and 17002.

36. Defendants HANFORD and DOES 11-100 are liable for the tortious act of Defendant MURRAY because Defendants HANFORD and DOES 11-100, inclusive, left the Subject Truck unlocked, with the keys inside. It was foreseeable that the Subject Truck might be stolen as the Subject Location was the target of an active multi-agency homeless encampment cleanup. The Subject Truck, unlocked with the keys inside, invited criminals to tamper or otherwise operate the vehicle..."

Defendant City demurrers, as discussed below, for failure to state sufficient facts. Plaintiff, in opposition, argues that these acts resulted in a foreseeable injury to Plaintiff based on vicarious liability of a vehicle owner.

Authority and Analysis

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint "states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based." (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4 th 209, 220. To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.)

The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if "the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action." (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4 th 857, 879-80) To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4 th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer. (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But "doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

Public Entity Liability

The starting point is that, except as otherwise provided by statute, "[a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person." (Gov. Code Sec. 815(a).) "[T]his section 'abolished all common law or judicially declared forms of liability for public entities, except for such liability as may be required by the federal or state Constitution. Thus, in the absence of some constitutional requirement, public entities may be liable only if a statute declares them to be liable' [Citation.]" (Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1457.)

It has been recognized that it is impermissible to sue a public entity for common law negligence. (Torres v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 844, 850.) Government tort claims must be pled with particularity. (Susman v. City of Los Angeles (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 803, 809.) They must also be grounded in statute. (Gov. Code Sec. 815; E.L. White, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach (1978) 21 Cal.3d 497, 512, fn. 9.) While the demurrer substantially focuses on whether this cause of action is a negligent supervision or training claim disguised as a vicarious liability claim, the Court will analyze this claim in the manner it is pled under section 815.2 including addressing the duty arguments raised by Defendant.

Section 815.2 - Vicarious Liability

Koussaya v. City of Stockton (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 909, 943 summarizes the theories of recovery against a public entity as follows: "When a party is injured by a tortfeasor and seeks to affix liability on the tortfeasor's employer, the injured party ordinarily must demonstrate either (1) the employer violated a duty of care it owed to the injured party and this negligence was a proximate cause of the resulting injury (the direct liability theory), or (2) the tortfeasor-employee was liable for committing the tortious conduct that caused the injury while acting within the course and scope of his or her employment (the vicarious liability theory). [Citation.]

When the employer is a governmental agency, the statutory framework permits the injured party to pursue the vicarious liability theory in accordance with these general common law principles. [Citation.] However, the statutory framework requires, as a condition to the injured party's recovery on a direct liability theory against a governmental agency, that the injured party identify a 'specific statute declaring [the entity] to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care' by the agency in favor of the injured party. [Citations.]" (de Villers v.

County of San Diego (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 238, 247-248, fn. omitted)" (emphasis added.)

In other words: "[T]he public entities' potential liability...has two sources: (1) the public entities' liability based on their own conduct and legal obligations, and (2) the public entities' liability, based on respondeat superior principles, for the misconduct of their employees that occurred in the scope of their employment." (de Villers, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at 251-252.)

Koussaya, supra, 4 Cal. App. 5 th at 943-944 further notes: "Section 815.2 sets out the rule regarding vicarious public entity liability: "(a) A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his [or her] employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his [or her] personal representative. [P.] (b) Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from liability."

In turn, "section 820 delineates the liability of public employees themselves: '(a) Except as otherwise provided by statute (including Section 820.2), a public employee is liable for injury caused by his [or her] act or omission to the same extent as a private person. [P.] (b) The liability of a public employee established by this part ... is subject to any defenses that would be available to the public employee if he [or she] were a private person.' In other words, 'the general rule is that an employee of a public entity is liable for his [or her] torts to the same extent as a private person (Sec. 820, subd. (a)) and the public entity is vicariously liable for any injury which its employee causes (Sec. 815.2, subd. (a)) to the same extent as a private employer (Sec. 815, subd. (b)).' [Citation.]" (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 868)"

Therefore, vicarious liability for an employee's actions "...attaches if and when it is adjudged that the employee was negligent as well." (Munoz v. City of Union City (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1077, disapproved on other grounds in Hayes v. County of San Diego (2013) 57 Cal.4th 622, 639, fn. 1) Consequently "in order for vicarious public entity liability to attach, a public employee, either named as a defendant or at least 'specifically identified' by the plaintiff, must have engaged in an act or omission giving rise to that employee's tort liability." (Koussaya, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at 945.)

Here, the Court finds it sufficient that Defendant City's employee, identified as a Doe, is alleged to have left the vehicle unlocked, during an active multi-agency homeless encampment cleanup, in the presence of Murray, a person with a prior criminal history. As such, the Court examines the elements of negligence.

Negligence and Special Circumstances re: Duty

"[T]o prove facts sufficient to support a finding of negligence, a plaintiff must show that [the] defendant had a duty to use due care, that he breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury." (Hayes v. County of San Diego (2013) 57 Cal. 4th 622, 629)

As to duty, "absent special circumstances, California courts consistently have refused to impose a duty on owners or bailees of automobiles or ordinary pickup trucks who leave the key in the ignition of an unattended vehicle to prevent harm to third parties caused by a thief." (Carrera v. Maurice J. Sopp & Son (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 366, 378.)

Further: "Absent 'special circumstances,' the owner or bailee of a motor vehicle has no duty to protect third persons against the possibility a thief will steal the vehicle and injure them with it. [citations omitted] 'The Supreme Court cases show that " special circumstances" exist when heavy vehicles are left unattended and available for use by those not accustomed to driving them.' ([Avis Rent a Car System, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 221,] 228, italics in original.)" (Id. at 370.)

The application of this special circumstances doctrine is "...nothing more than a test of foreseeability of harm." (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 186.)

The Supreme Court in Palma summarized the following cases where a special relationship was found as to stolen vehicles: "In Hergenrether [v. East (1964) 61 Cal.2d 440] the plaintiffs had been injured when a two-ton truck owned by the defendant, but driven by a thief, collided head-on with the vehicle in which plaintiffs were riding. The truck had been stolen the evening before the accident when left unlocked, with the key in the ignition, by employees of the owner who had authorized their use of the truck.

We found those circumstances to be analogous to those in Richardson v. Ham (1955) 44 Cal.2d 772, in which a 26-ton bulldozer was stolen for a joyride by 3 inebriates, and those in Murray v. Wright (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 589, where a used car dealer purposely left keys in the ignitions of cars on his lot. In Richardson the enormity of the potential harm, and in Murray the facility with which a potential wrongdoer could learn of and take advantage of the virtual invitation to theft were circumstances sufficient to warrant imposition of a duty to third parties to prevent the foreseeable harm.

Those circumstances are merely illustrative, however, of conduct which may create foreseeable risk of harm and impose liability if that risk becomes a reality. "The special circumstances present in Richardson and Murray, and those suggested in Richards are not, of course, the only circumstances which justify the imposition of liability -- rather each case must be considered on its own facts to determine whether the joint effect of them in toto justifies the conclusion that the foreseeable risk of harm imposed is unreasonable, and that the defendant owner or one in charge of a vehicle has a duty to third persons in the class of the plaintiffs to refrain from subjecting them to such risk." (Hergenrether v.

East, supra, 61 Cal.2d 440, 445.)

Factors which distinguished the conduct in Hergenrether, and were held sufficient to establish a duty, are also present here. They included the area in which the truck had been parked -- one frequented by persons who had little respect for the rights of others, and populated by alcoholics; the intent that the truck remain in the location for a relatively long period of time -- overnight; the size of the vehicle -- rendering it capable of inflicting more serious injury or damage if not properly controlled; and the fact that safe operation of a half-loaded two-ton truck was not a matter of common experience.

These factors together led to a conclusion there, as similar factors may here, that a foreseeable risk of harm was posed by the truck left with its keys in the ignition or cab warranting imposition of a duty on the owner or operator to refrain from exposing third persons to the risk." (Palma, supra, 36 Cal. 3d 171, 185.)

Here, the facts alleged which would support the finding of a special circumstance include that the truck was unlocked, in the presence of persons with a criminal history, had the keys inside and that the truck, while not alleged to be "heavy" or oversized, did contain various weapons or tools common to police vehicles. Moreover, the nature of a stolen police vehicle, with lights, sirens and other identifying marks, differentiates the truck from an ordinary vehicle that is stolen.

"Whether [defendant] could foresee that leaving its truck overnight, unlocked, on a lot adjacent to the street, in this industrial city with a transient population and a high crime rate, was an invitation to theft (see Enders v. Apcoa, Inc. (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 897) by persons not competent to safely operate the trucks and who might cause serious injury or damage to third persons and their property while attempting to operate the trucks is a question of fact for the jury to determine." (Palma, supra, (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 186.)

Here, too, the Court finds that the conduct alleged in the complaint with respect to leaving the truck unlocked, in the presence of persons with a criminal history, had the keys inside and that the truck was a police vehicle containing various weapons or tools common to police vehicles, is sufficient to overrule the demurrer. Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer and orders Defendant City to answer the complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Visalia-County Civic Center Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2 Examiner notes for probate matters calendared Wednesday, June 10, 2026, that allow for posting: Status: Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc. Case Number | Case Name