Cheryl Pocock vs. Darrel Cowan

34-2018-00243344-CU-PO-GDS: Cheryl Pocock vs. Darrel Cowan 05/28/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16C

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE:

Please take notice, Department 54 has moved to Department 16C at the Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye Courthouse. The new courthouse is located at 500 G Street, Sacramento, CA 95814.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants Matheson Postal Services, Inc. and Darrel Cowan’s (“Defendants”) demurrer to Plaintiffs Cheryl Pocock et al.’s (“Plaintiff”) First Amended Complaint is OVERRULED.

I.

Background

This wrongful death action arises from a September 21, 2018 motor vehicle collision that occurred on Interstate 5 in Colusa County, California. (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Cowan was operating a tractor-trailer while in the course and scope of his employment with Defendant Matheson Postal Services, Inc., which collided with a vehicle carrying decedents Rose Jaffe, Rebecca Philpott, and Dale Jaffe. (Id., ¶¶ 3-7, 12.)

Plaintiff Kenneth Haines, Jr., (“Haines”) a passenger in the vehicle, allegedly survived the collision, but suffered serious injuries. (FAC, ¶ 18-19, 38.) Plaintiffs allege that the physical, mental, and emotional injuries Haines suffered caused him to enter into a downward spiral of depression and drug abuse. (Id., ¶ 38.) Haines allegedly died on March 17, 2025 from a drug overdose caused by injuries sustained in the accident. (Id., ¶ 38.)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants orally agreed to settle Haines’ negligence claims on March 7, 2025 for the sum of $3,400,000. (FAC, ¶ 24.) On March 17, 2025, at 3:06 PM, Defendant’s counsel allegedly sent an email to Haines’ counsel attaching the written settlement agreement. (Id., ¶ 27.) On March 17, 2025, at 7:16 PM, Haines allegedly died before he could sign the written settlement agreement. (Id., ¶ 28.) On March 27, 2025, Defendants stated that there was no enforceable oral contract to settle Haines’ claims and refused to execute the written settlement agreement. (Id., ¶ 30-31.)

Plaintiffs filed the original complaint on October 26, 2018. Plaintiffs filed the operative

34-2018-00243344-CU-PO-GDS: Cheryl Pocock vs. Darrel Cowan 05/28/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16C

FAC on 11/18/2025. Plaintiffs allege causes of action for (1) wrongful death [regarding the deaths of Rose Jaffe, Rebecca Philpott, and Dale Jaffe], (2) survival action - negligence, (3) breach of contract, and (4) wrongful death [as to the death of Haines].

Defendants demur to Plaintiffs’ third cause of action for breach of contract on the grounds that no contract was formed. Defendants demur to the fourth cause of action for Haines’ wrongful death on the ground that his drug overdose constitutes a superseding, unforeseeable intervening cause that severs the causal chain.

Plaintiff opposes.

II.

Legal Standard

The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the pleading it challenges by raising questions of law. (Salimi v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 216, 219; Nordlinger v. Lynch (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271.)

A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The purpose of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc. §452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v.

Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) In this respect, the Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111- 1112.) A general demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. (Blank v.

Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318, William S. Hart Union High School Dist. v. Regional Planning Com. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1612, 1616, fn. 2.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . . we are not concerned with plaintiff’s possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2018-00243344-CU-PO-GDS: Cheryl Pocock vs. Darrel Cowan 05/28/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16C

determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action – not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.)

III.

Discussion

A. Third Cause of Action – Breach of Contract

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to allege that the parties intended the contract to become binding prior to the execution of the written agreement. Defendants contend that the execution of the written settlement agreement was a condition precedent to contract formation. Plaintiffs argue in opposition that when parties intend that an agreement be binding, the fact that a more formal agreement must be prepared and executed does not alter the validity of the agreement. Plaintiffs contend that there are no allegations that the oral agreement was expressly contingent on the subsequent execution of a written agreement.

“The elements of breach of contract are ‘(1) the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to plaintiff.’” (Kumaraperu v. Feldsted (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 60, 70.) A settlement agreement is a contract. (J.B.B. Investment Partners Ltd. v. Fair (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1, 9.) A settlement agreement may be made orally. (People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Douglas (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 814, 819 [“An oral agreement of settlement . . . need not be in writing”].) “The first element—the existence of a contract—requires parties capable of contracting, their consent, a lawful object, and a sufficient cause or consideration.” (Ibid. [citing Civ. Code, § 1550.)

Defendants challenge the first element of Plaintiffs’ breach of contract cause of action by arguing that no agreement was created because the formal written settlement agreement was not signed. However, as explained in Banner Entertainment, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 348, cited by Defendants:

When it is clear, both from a provision that the proposed written contract would become operative only when signed by the parties as well as from any other evidence presented by the parties that both parties contemplated that acceptance of the contract’s terms would be signified by signing it, the failure to

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2018-00243344-CU-PO-GDS: Cheryl Pocock vs. Darrel Cowan 05/28/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16C

sign the agreement means no binding contract was created.

(Id. at p. 358 [emphasis added].)

On demurrer, the Court accepts Plaintiffs’ pleaded allegations as true. Here, Plaintiffs have alleged the existence of an oral settlement agreement between Haines and Defendants, the parties’ mutual assent to the terms of the agreement, and sufficient consideration in that Haines agreed to dismiss his cause of action with prejudice in exchange for the payment of money by Defendants. (FAC, ¶¶ 23-27.) Plaintiffs do not allege that the oral settlement agreement was expressly conditioned on the signing of a formal written agreement. As a result, the issue of whether the oral settlement agreement is enforceable because the later, written settlement agreement was not signed is a question of fact that is not appropriate for resolution on demurrer.

Therefore, Defendants’ demurrer to the third cause of action is OVERRULED.

B. Fourth Cause of Action – Wrongful Death

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action fails because Haines’ death by drug overdose constitutes a superseding, unforeseeable intervening cause that severs the causal chain.

Plaintiffs argue that they have sufficiently alleged that “Haines’ resort to illicit drugs was a tragic but foreseeable attempt to self-medicate for the unimaginable pain and grief that he suffered in the subject accident.” (Opposition at p. 7:19-20.) Plaintiffs contend that whether Haines’ drug use is a superseding cause of his death is a question of fact for the jury.

A plaintiff may bring a wrongful death action against individual defendants by alleging the following elements: (i) a tort (negligence or other wrongful act), (ii) the resulting death, and (iii) the damages, consisting of the pecuniary loss suffered by the heirs. (Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1263; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 377.60.) In any action for wrongful death resulting from negligence, the plaintiff must allege all elements of actionable negligence. (Jacoves v.

United Merchandising Corp. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 88, 105.) To proceed on an actionable negligence claim, “a plaintiff must show that [the] defendant had a duty to use due care, that he breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” (Hayes v. County of San Diego (2013) 57 Cal.4th 622, 629.) “Whether an intervening force is superseding or not generally presents a question of fact, but becomes a matter

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2018-00243344-CU-PO-GDS: Cheryl Pocock vs. Darrel Cowan 05/28/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16C

of law where only one reasonable conclusion may be reached.” (Ash v. North American Title Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1274.)

Here, the Court cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that Haines’ death by drug overdose was a superseding, unforeseeable intervening cause that breaks the causal chain. Defendants provide no legal authority that purports to show that death by drug overdose is a necessary break in the causal chain, regardless of whether the death occurs close in time or several years after the events giving rise to the cause of action. Plaintiffs have alleged that Haines experienced significant physical, mental, and emotional injuries that resulted in his use of illicit drugs as a method of self-medicating. (FAC, ¶ 38.) Whether Haines’ drug use and resulting death was or was not a consequence of the accident or an intervening cause is a question of fact that cannot be resolved on demurrer.

Therefore, Defendants’ demurrer to the fourth cause of action is OVERRULED.

IV.

Disposition

Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer is OVERRULED in its entirety.

Defendants shall file and serve its answer to the complaint no later than June 8, 2026.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

NOTICE:

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To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2018-00243344-CU-PO-GDS: Cheryl Pocock vs. Darrel Cowan 05/28/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16C

telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

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