Dakota Jacob Salas v. Dalbir Singh

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

DAKOTA JACOB SALAS, Case No.: CIVSB2509087 Plaintiff, [TENTATIVE] ORDER (1) OVERRULING DEFENDANT’S v. DEMURRER TO THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT; AND (2) DALBIR SINGH, DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE Defendant.

V. INTRODUCTION

A. The Complaint and Allegations

This is a personal injury action. On April 1, 2025, Plaintiff Dakota Jacob Salas initiated

this action against Defendant Dalbir Singh. Plaintiff’s original Complaint was on Judicial

Council form pleadings alleging claims for motor vehicle and general negligence. Plaintiff’s

First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleged one cause of action for motor vehicle negligence.

The operative Second Amended Complaint (SAC) filed February 11, 2026, alleges three

causes of action for motor vehicle negligence, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional

distress (IIED).

Plaintiff alleges that on November 19, 2024, at or near the I-15 northbound near Cleghorn

Road in San Bernardino, Plaintiff slowed his vehicle on the freeway as traffic came to a stop in

front of him; then, Defendant struck him from behind. Defendant attempted to flee the scene,

then deliberately swerved his vehicle towards Plaintiff’s vehicle with such speed and proximity

that Plaintiff believed a second collision was imminent and unavoidable. Plaintiff was forced to

brake hard and steer defensively, which triggered acute stress and neck and back pain.

B. Pending Motions

Now before the court are Defendant Singh’s demurrer to the SAC and a separate motion

to strike certain allegations in the SAC. Plaintiff opposes and Singh replies, as to both motions.

After issuing a tentative ruling and conducting a hearing on the motions, the Court now issues its

final ruling.

VI. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

As to both the demurrer and the motion to strike Defendant requests judicial notice of

four court documents associated with this action pursuant to Evidence Code section 452,

subdivision (d), which permits courts to take judicial notice of records of any court of this state.

With respect to judicially noticing court documents, “the truth of a document’s contents will not

be considered unless it is a judgment, statement of decision, or order.” (C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare

Corp. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1103.) Thus, a court may judicially notice the existence of

pleadings filed in the action, but not the truth of allegations therein. Here, Defendant seeks

judicial notice of Plaintiff’s Complaint, FAC, and SAC, along with the court’s January 21, 2026,

order granting motion to strike. The request is granted as to all of the documents in question.

VII. WHY THE COURT IS OVERRULING THE DEMURRER Defendant demurs to the second cause of action for assault and third cause of action for

IIED on grounds they are uncertain and fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of

action.

A. Sham Pleading Doctrine

Defendant contends the SAC is a sham pleading because in the original Complaint and

FAC, Plaintiff alleged Defendant’s conduct was negligent or reckless. Now in the SAC, Plaintiff

alleges Defendant acted with intent to harm him through apprehension of a battery and with

intent to cause severe emotional distress, and that Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress.

Defendant points out that the FAC alleged that Defendant “swerved his vehicle in

Plaintiff’s direction, in an apparent effort to intimidate Plaintiff. Plaintiff then stopped his vehicle

and called the police.” (FAC, ¶ 4.) Defendant argues this allegation is omitted from the SAC

because it is an admission that Defendant did not have the requisite intent for assault or IIED.

Also, Plaintiff used the word “apparent,” to which Defendant ascribes significant meaning,

contending it indicates an admission that Plaintiff suffered no further injury or distress.

Defendant further contends that the word “apparent” means Plaintiff admitted in the

Complaint and FAC that Defendant’s intent was not to cause contact between the two vehicles

and that Plaintiff was not placed in imminent apprehension of contact. Therefore, Defendant

concludes the SAC is a sham pleading because Plaintiff makes inconsistent allegations to evade

the court’s 1/21/26 Order striking the punitive damages allegations.

Defendant’s sham pleading argument fails. The Court does not assign the weight and

significance of the “apparent” that the defense does. One of the elements necessary to plead and

prove tortious assault is that it reasonably appeared to plaintiff that defendant was about to carry

out the threat. (Judicial Council of California Advisory Committee on Civil Jury Instructions

(CACI) No. 1301 (emphasis added).) When standard dictionary definitions of the words

“appear” and “apparent” are considered, they support an interpretation directly contrary to what

Defendant urges.

For example, “apparent” means readily seen, exposed to sight, open to view, visible;

capable of being easily perceived or understood; plain or clear; obvious. (Dictionary.com,

https://www.dictionary.com/browse/apparent, accessed 4/24/26.) “Appear” means to come into

sight, become visible; to be obvious or easily perceived; be clear or made clear by evidence.

(Dictionary.com, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/appear, accessed 4/24/26.) Thus,

Plaintiff’s use of the word “apparent” in the FAC is consistent with his later allegations in the

SAC alleging that Defendant assaulted him, because one of the elements for an assault claim is

that it appeared that a defendant was about to carry out a threat.

In the SAC, Plaintiff alleges Defendant deliberately swerved his vehicle directly into

Plaintiff’s lane at speed and crossed into Plaintiff’s immediate trajectory with such speed and

proximity that Plaintiff reasonably believed an imminent second collision was unavoidable.

(SAC, ¶ 5.) This allegation adequately pleads the reasonable appearance element needed to state

a claim for tortious assault. (CACI No. 1301.) Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the FAC

allegation that Defendant swerved his vehicle in Plaintiff’s direction in an apparent attempt to

intimidate him. (FAC, ¶ 4.) Instead, the two allegations are logically and factually consistent,

whether the Defendant’s goal was intimidation or threatening a second collision; it is feasible

and plausible that Defendant’s action was motivated by both objectives.

B. Second Cause of Action — Assault

In demurring specifically to the second cause of action for assault, Defendant repeats the

arguments he advanced for the unsuccessful sham pleading argument. Specifically, Defendant

argues that Plaintiff did not allege that a person would reasonably believe there was about to be

imminent contact between the two vehicles and that Plaintiff alleged in the FAC that Defendant

apparently was attempting to intimidate Plaintiff. As described above, these arguments lack

merit.

C. Third Cause of Action – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)

To prevail on an IIED tort claim, a plaintiff must plead and prove that: 1) defendant’s

conduct was outrageous; 2) defendant intended to cause plaintiff emotional distress or defendant

acted with reckless disregard of the probability that plaintiff would suffer emotional distress,

knowing that plaintiff was present when the conduct occurred; 3) plaintiff suffered severe

emotional distress; 4) defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s severe

emotional distress. (CACI No. 1600.)

First, Defendant argues the alleged conduct was not extreme or outrageous because

Plaintiff alleged Singh acted negligently and in reckless disobedience of traffic laws by fleeing

the scene and swerving towards Plaintiff to intimidate him. This argument mischaracterizes the

SAC’s new allegations that Defendant deliberately swerved his vehicle off the shoulder and

directly into Plaintiff’s lane at speed and crossed into Plaintiff’s trajectory with such speed and

proximity that Plaintiff reasonably believed an imminent second collision was unavoidable.

(SAC, ¶ 5.)

These factual allegations go beyond fleeing the scene and intimidation; they describe

conduct by the Defendant that supports the allegation that Plaintiff reasonably believed another

collision would occur – after all, it is clear from the context that both parties were still driving

their vehicles on the freeway in traffic with other vehicles around them. The reasonable inference

is that Plaintiff’s ability to maneuver out of the way of Defendant’s vehicle was severely limited

by the presence of other vehicles. Creating such an environment on an already busy highway

could be viewed as extreme conduct that exceeds all bounds of that usually tolerated in a

civilized community. (Ricard v. Pacific Indemnity Co. (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 886, 895.)

Next, Defendant argues that fleeing the scene is not conduct that is directed primarily at

Plaintiff. Conduct being directly primarily at the plaintiff is not an element needed to state an

IIED claim. Moreover, the SAC allegations make it clear that the conduct supporting the IIED

claim was not Defendant’s act of fleeing the scene. Instead, it was Defendant’s act of using his

vehicle in an inherently dangerous and threatening manner by jerking his steering wheel,

deliberately swerving off the shoulder directly into Plaintiff’s lane at speed, and crossing into

Plaintiff’s immediate trajectory with speed and proximity. (SAC, ¶¶ 5, 24.)

VIII. WHY THE COURT IS DENYING THE MOTION TO STRIKE Defendant moves to strike various portions of the SAC alleging claims for punitive or

exemplary damages, specifically the following pages or paragraphs: page 5, ¶ 19, lines 16-19;

page 6, ¶ 20, lines 6-7; page 6, ¶ 22, line 12; page 7, lines 1-2; page 7, ¶ 28, line 3; page 7, ¶ 29,

lines 4-6; page 7, ¶ 30, lines 7-11; page 7, ¶ 31, lines 12-13, page 7, lines 26-27. Defendant

contends the identified portions are irrelevant, false, or improper.

First, Defendant argues that if its demurrers to the assault and IIED claims are sustained,

then the motion to strike must be granted because Plaintiff only seeks punitive damages in

connection with those claims. But since the Court is overruling the demurrers to the assault and

IIED claims, this argument fails.

Second, Defendant argues the SAC is a sham pleading designed to evade the court’s prior

ruling in January 2026 striking the punitive damages from the FAC. As explained above in

Section III.A., this argument also fails.

Third, Defendant argues that under the assault and IIED claims, Plaintiff alleges

Defendant acted negligently and recklessly by fleeing the scene and swerving towards Plaintiff

to intimidate him. According to Defendant, fleeing the scene is not conduct directed at Plaintiff

and there are no allegations that fleeing the scene caused Plaintiff injury or severe emotional

distress.

This argument mischaracterizes and misstates the plain allegations under the assault and

IIED claims where Plaintiff does not allege negligence or recklessness. Instead, Plaintiff alleges

that Defendant consciously and deliberately engaged in despicable conduct with a willful and

knowing disregard for the rights and safety of others; Defendant intentionally refused to stop and

render aid or exchange information; Defendant intentionally turned and swerved his moving

vehicle toward Plaintiff’s vehicle at close range. (SAC, ¶¶ 19, 19.b, 19.c.)

IX. CONCLUSION 3. Defendant’s demurrers to the SAC are respectfully OVERRULED.

4. Defendant’s motion to strike punitive and exemplary damages allegations from

the SAC is respectfully DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: DRAFT – NOT FINAL Hon. Joseph B. Widman Judge of the Superior Court