Motion to appoint receiver
Mere difficulty in trying to collect a debt is not sufficient basis for the court to appoint a receiver. (Medipro Medical Staffing LLC v. Certified Nursing Registry, Inc. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 622, 628-629.) The Medipro Court explained, “Medipro's evidentiary showing demonstrated that it had, at most, encountered some difficulty in its initial efforts to collect on its money judgment. If this was sufficient to constitute the ‘necessity’ required to justify the ‘extraordinary’ remedy of the appointment of a receiver to take over a judgment debtor's business, it is difficult to see how the appointment of receivers would not become a routine part of the collection of judgments—a result at odds with the solid wall of precedent holding to the contrary.”
On February 7, 2025, judgment was entered in this action for the above stated amount. Plaintiff states he has attempted to collect on the judgment by attempting to locate a bank or deposit account, mailing a letter requesting payment, serving post-judgment interrogatories and requests for production of documents, and mailing a letter requesting responses to the post-judgment discovery. (Looney decl., ¶¶8-10.) On July 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel responses to his postjudgment discovery requests.
That motion was granted on September 10, 2025. The order granting that motion was mailed on October 20, 2025. Judgment Debtor’s business is open and located at 1628 Cold Springs Road in Placerville. (Id., at ¶¶4, 7.) According to Plaintiff, the sheriff’s office will not sell liquor inventory; the installation of a sheriff’s keeper is ineffective; the size of the judgment makes it impractical to levy upon equipment, fixtures, or inventory; plus, the value of equipment and fixtures is depressed. Thus, Plaintiff concludes there is no other option but to appoint a receiver to seize and sell the liquor license to satisfy the judgment.
Plaintiff has not made a sufficient factual showing that appointing a receiver to seize and sell the liquor license is necessary. Plaintiff has failed to show the absence of alternate remedies, or if alternate remedies exist, their inadequacy. Rather, as in Medipro, supra, Plaintiff has only shown that he has encountered some difficulties in his initial efforts to collect the judgment. While Plaintiff states in his declaration that he investigated Defendant’s finances, there is no explanation regarding the depth of this investigation.
The court is not convinced that no bank accounts exist linked to a business that is purportedly still open. Plaintiff’s representations regarding the inadequacy of alternative remedies are not supported by foundation. Mere difficulties in collecting the judgment are insufficient grounds for appointing a receiver. Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proving that a receiver is necessary in this matter. The motion is DENIED. Due to the lack of opposition, the court’s minutes shall constitute the order of the court.
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2. 25CV02048, Looney v. Askar
Plaintiff Gary E. Looney dba Collectronics of California (“Plaintiff”) moves for an order appointing Landon McPherson as receiver to take possession of and, if necessary, sell the liquor license of Ramez Issa Askar, individually dba Media Wine & Spirits #1 (“Judgment Debtor”) in order to carry out the judgment entered in this case in the amount of $16,469.00. Specific statutory procedures are established for enforcement of money judgments. This includes the appointment of a receiver after judgment to carry the judgment into effect. (CCP section 564(b)(3).
The judgment debtor's interest in an alcoholic beverage license may be applied to the satisfaction of a money judgment. (CCP § 708.630(a).) A trial court must consider the availability and efficacy of other remedies in determining whether to employ the extraordinary remedy of a receivership. (City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Daley (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 734, 745.) In making this decision, the court must depend upon 2
competent and admissible evidence submitted by the parties, and not conclusions and hearsay. (McCaslin v. Kenney (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 87, 94.) “California rigidly adheres to the principle that the power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one which is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.” (Morand v. Superior Ct. (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 347, 351.) “It is said by the state's courts that the appointment of a receiver is ‘an extraordinary and harsh,’ and ‘delicate,’ and ‘drastic,’ remedy to be used ‘cautiously and only where less onerous remedies would be inadequate or unavailable...’” (Ibid.)
Mere difficulty in trying to collect a debt is not sufficient basis for the court to appoint a receiver. (Medipro Medical Staffing LLC v. Certified Nursing Registry, Inc. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 622, 628-629.) The Medipro Court explained, “Medipro's evidentiary showing demonstrated that it had, at most, encountered some difficulty in its initial efforts to collect on its money judgment. If this was sufficient to constitute the ‘necessity’ required to justify the ‘extraordinary’ remedy of the appointment of a receiver to take over a judgment debtor's business, it is difficult to see how the appointment of receivers would not become a routine part of the collection of judgments—a result at odds with the solid wall of precedent holding to the contrary.”
On August 5, 2025, judgment was entered in this action for the above stated amount. Plaintiff states he has attempted to collect on the judgment by attempting to locate a bank or deposit account, mailing a letter requesting payment, serving post-judgment interrogatories and requests for production of documents, and mailing a letter requesting responses to the post-judgment discovery. (Looney decl., ¶¶8-10.) Judgment Debtor’s business is open and located at 7435 Melrose Avenue in Los Angeles. (Id., at ¶¶4, 7.)
According to Plaintiff, the sheriff’s office will not sell liquor inventory; the installation of a sheriff’s keeper is ineffective; the size of the judgment makes it impractical to levy upon equipment, fixtures, or inventory; plus, the value of equipment and fixtures is depressed. Thus, Plaintiff concludes there is no other option but to appoint a receiver to seize and sell the liquor license to satisfy the judgment. Plaintiff has not made a sufficient factual showing that appointing a receiver to seize and sell the liquor license is necessary.
Plaintiff has failed to show the absence of alternate remedies, or if alternate remedies exist, their inadequacy. Rather, as in Medipro, supra, Plaintiff has only shown that he has encountered some difficulties in his initial efforts to collect the judgment. While Plaintiff states in his declaration that he investigated Defendant’s finances, there is no explanation regarding the depth of this investigation. The court is not convinced that no bank accounts exist linked to a business that is purportedly still open.
Plaintiff’s representations regarding the inadequacy of alternative remedies are not supported by foundation. Finally, Plaintiff has not filed a motion to compel further responses to his post-judgment discovery requests. Mere difficulties in collecting the judgment are insufficient grounds for appointing a receiver. Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proving that a receiver is necessary in this matter. The motion is DENIED. Due to the lack of opposition, the court’s minutes shall constitute the order of the court.
3. 25CV02065, Mencarini v. General Motors, LLC.
Defendant General Motors LLC (“GM”) demurs to the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed by Antonio R Mencarini (“Plaintiff”) on the grounds that, pursuant to Section 430.10(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff’s Fourth cause of action for breach of the implied warranty is time-barred by the applicable four-year statute of limitations; and, Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for fraudulent inducement – concealment is barred by the three-year statute of limitations; Plaintiff 3