Motion for Appointment of Receiver
Complainant Dalk has delayed in bringing the motion, absent a showing of prejudice, delay alone is not a basis for denial of leave to amend. Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 563. There is no prejudice, because the pleading is otherwise being amended due to the demurrer.
Cross- Complainant Dalk’s motion for leave to amend is GRANTED. He may file his proposed First Amended Cross-Complaint within 10 days of this order. The Court’s minute order shall constitute the order of this court.
4. 24CV04975, Looney v. Amerigo, LLC.
Plaintiff Gary E. Looney dba Collectronics of California (“Plaintiff”) moves for an order appointing Landon McPherson as receiver to take possession of and, if necessary, sell the liquor license of defendant Amerigo, LLC, dba Kirway Xpress (“Judgment Debtor”) in order to carry out the judgment entered in this case in the amount of $16,456.53.
Specific statutory procedures are established for enforcement of money judgments. This includes the appointment of a receiver after judgment to carry the judgment into effect. (CCP section 564(b)(3).) The judgment debtor's interest in an alcoholic beverage license may be applied to the satisfaction of a money judgment. (CCP § 708.630(a).)
A trial court must consider the availability and efficacy of other remedies in determining whether to employ the extraordinary remedy of a receivership. (City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Daley (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 734, 745.) In making this decision, the court must depend upon competent and admissible evidence submitted by the parties, and not conclusions and hearsay. (McCaslin v. Kenney (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 87, 94.)
“California rigidly adheres to the principle that the power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one which is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.” (
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Mere difficulty in trying to collect a debt is not sufficient basis for the court to appoint a receiver. (Medipro Medical Staffing LLC v. Certified Nursing Registry, Inc. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 622, 628-629.) The Medipro Court explained, “Medipro's evidentiary showing demonstrated that it had, at most, encountered some difficulty in its initial efforts to collect on its money judgment. If this was sufficient to constitute the ‘necessity’ required to justify the ‘extraordinary’ remedy of the appointment of a receiver to take over a judgment debtor's business, it is difficult to see how the appointment of receivers would not become a routine part of the collection of judgments—a result at odds with the solid wall of precedent holding to the contrary.”
On December 10, 2024, judgment was entered in this action for the above stated amount. According to Plaintiff’s declaration, Joseph Esmail is the personal guarantor of Judgment Debtor. (Looney decl., ¶3.) Plaintiff states he has attempted to collect on the judgment by attempting to locate a bank or deposit account; mailing a letter requesting payment; serving post-judgment interrogatories and requests for production of documents; and mailing a letter requesting responses to the post-judgment discovery. (Looney decl., ¶¶6-10.) Based upon a web search, Judgment Debtor’s business is open. (Id., ¶7.)
According to Plaintiff, the sheriff’s office will not sell liquor inventory; the installation of a sheriff’s keeper is unavailable or ineffective; the size of the judgment makes it impractical to levy upon equipment, fixtures, or inventory; plus, the value of equipment and fixtures is depressed. Thus, Plaintiff concludes there is no other option but to appoint a receiver to seize and sell the liquor license to satisfy the judgment. 6
Plaintiff has not made a sufficient factual showing that appointing a receiver to seize and sell the liquor license is necessary. Plaintiff has failed to show the inadequacy of alternate remedies. Rather, as in Medipro, supra, Plaintiff has only shown that he has encountered some difficulties in his initial efforts to collect the judgment. While Plaintiff states in his declaration that he investigated Defendant’s finances, there is no explanation regarding the depth of this investigation. Plaintiff’s representations regarding the inadequacy of alternative remedies are not supported by foundation.
Moreover, the number of motions filed by Plaintiff to appoint a receiver in various actions itself shows that this method of collection has become routine rather than being reserved for cases in which it is truly necessary. In addition, Defendants Ismael Joseph and Amerigo, LLC have now appeared in this action. Defendant Joseph contested that he was served with the summons and complaint in this action and sought to set aside Defendants’ defaults and the default judgment. Those requests were denied for procedural reasons. Defendants have now made themselves available through their attorney.
Mere difficulties in collecting the judgment are insufficient grounds for appointing a receiver. Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proving that a receiver is necessary in this matter. The motion is DENIED. Due to the lack of opposition, the court’s minutes shall constitute the order of the court.
5. 24CV05458, Crisafulli v. Sonoma Media Investments, LLC
Motion for Final Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement GRANTED in full.
Facts
After Plaintiffs filed this putative class and representative employment action for violations of Labor Code wage-and-hour provisions and the Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”), the parties entered into a stipulation allowing Plaintiffs to file a first amended complaint (“FAC”). In the FAC, plaintiffs allege that when Defendants employed them, Defendants committed numerous wage-and-hour violations with respect to Plaintiffs and other similarly-situated employees, including, among others, meal-break violations, failure to pay overtime, and failure to pay minimum wage.
Settlement
On December 12, 2024, the parties took part in a formal mediation session before a neutral mediator and, although the parties initially were unable to reach an agreement, on December 16, 2024, they mutually agreed to accept the mediator’s proposal. Declaration of Alexandra Rose (“Rose Dec.”), ¶13. The parties eventually executed a final, written Joint Stipulation of Class Action and PAGA Settlement (the “Settlement”) on August 25, 2025.
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement. There was no opposition. After the hearing of March 4, 2026, the court granted the motion in full, issuing a 12-page ruling explaining the applicable law and its findings.
The Settlement, as detailed in the court’s order, covers a class about 157 current and former non-exempt employees (the “Class Members”) employed by Defendant in California during the class period, defined as September 12, 2020, through March 15, 2025 (the “Class Period”). The PAGA Period is defined as September 12, 2023, through March 15, 2025, and those who worked during the PAGA Period are referred to as the PAGA Employees.
The parties have agreed to settle the class and PAGA claims in the FAC for a nonreversionary “Gross Settlement Amount” (“GSA”) of $350,000, exclusive of employer-side payroll taxes, a common fund which includes all costs, fees, and other allocations. Attorneys’ fees will amount to 35% of the GSA while the attorneys will recover actual costs and expenses up to 7