Motion for Appointment of Receiver
for the remaining three, leaving only those three, out of the Notices for 157 members, being undeliverable. Howard also explains that no member has submitted an objection, request for exclusion, or a dispute of the computation for hours and settlement allocation. She notes that the deadline for submitting any objection, exclusion request, or dispute had expired by the date of the declaration.
Howard also explains that the Net Settlement Amount is about $155,250, after subtracting the attorneys’ fees, costs, administration expenses, and the enhancement payments for the named Plaintiffs. This, she explains, results in an average payment to members of about $988.85 with the highest being about $2,770.64 and the lowest about $11.74. She also details the individual PAGA payments to PAGA employees, with the average being about $119.86, the highest about $182.86, and the lowest about $4.57.
The court finds that settlement notice has been completed according to the court’s order and no member has objected to the settlement, disputed the calculations, or sought to be excluded. There are no other outstanding issues, based on this court’s prior findings resolving all other issues for fairness and compliance with applicable authority.
The court GRANTS the motion. The prevailing party shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.
6. 24CV06214, Midland Credit Management Inc. v. Alton
This matter is on calendar for the motion of Defendant Elisha Alton (“Alton”) to vacate the entry of default entered on January 28, 2025, and the default judgment entered on February 4, 2025. This motion was initially heard on March 4, 2026.
At that time, this court continued the hearing to allow Alton to provide proof of service demonstrating service of notice of the hearing. On July 10, 2026, Alton filed a supplemental declaration and proof of service that supplemental declaration was served, prior to it being filed, on July 9.
Proof of service for notice of the hearing remains defective. As noted in this court’s prior ruling, “Defendant filed proof of service for the moving papers but this was attached to the moving papers and shows service prior to filing and obtain a hearing date. Accordingly, there is no proof of service for anything showing notice of the hearing.”
Looking for case law or statutes not cited here? Search published authorities
Examples: “Why did the court rule this way?” · “What were the procedural grounds?” · “Is appearance required?”
This court will continue the hearing on this matter one final time to allow Alton to file proof of service of the new hearing date on this motion. The hearing is CONTINUED to August 26, 2026, at 3:00 p.m., in Department 16. If proof of service of the August 26, 2026, hearing date is not filed for that date, the motion will be denied. This court’s minute order shall constitute the order of the court.
7. 25CV02737, Looney v. C Casa Napa, LLC
Plaintiff Gary E. Looney dba Collectronics of California (“Plaintiff”) moves for an order appointing Landon McPherson as receiver to take possession of and, if necessary, sell the liquor license of defendant C Casa Napa (“Judgment Debtor”) in order to carry out the judgment entered in this case in the amount of $15,397.81.
Specific statutory procedures are established for enforcement of money judgments. This includes the appointment of a receiver after judgment to carry the judgment into effect. (CCP section 564(b)(3).) The judgment debtor's interest in an alcoholic beverage license may be applied to the satisfaction of a money judgment. (CCP § 708.630(a).)
A trial court must consider the availability and efficacy of other remedies in determining whether to employ the extraordinary remedy of a receivership. (City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Daley (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 734, 745.) In making this decision, the court must depend upon competent and admissible evidence submitted by the parties, and not conclusions and hearsay. (McCaslin v. Kenney (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 87, 94.)
“California rigidly adheres to the principle that the power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one which is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.” (Morand v. Superior Ct. (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 347, 351.) “It is said by the state's courts that the appointment of a receiver is ‘an extraordinary and harsh,’ and ‘delicate,’ and ‘drastic,’ remedy to be used ‘cautiously and only where less onerous remedies would be inadequate or unavailable...’” (Ibid.)
Mere difficulty in trying to collect a debt is not sufficient basis for the court to appoint a receiver. (Medipro Medical Staffing LLC v. Certified Nursing Registry, Inc. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 622, 628-629.) The Medipro Court explained, “Medipro's evidentiary showing demonstrated that it had, at most, encountered some difficulty in its initial efforts to collect on its money judgment. If this was sufficient to constitute the ‘necessity’ required to justify the ‘extraordinary’ remedy of the appointment of a receiver to take over a judgment debtor's business, it is difficult to see how the appointment of receivers would not become a routine part of the collection of judgments—a result at odds with the solid wall of precedent holding to the contrary.”
On September 19, 2025, judgment was entered in this action for the above stated amount. According to Plaintiff’s declaration, defendants Ryan Post, Chris O’Malley, and Catherine Bergen are the personal guarantors of Judgment Debtor. (Looney decl., ¶3.) Plaintiff states he has attempted to collect on the judgment by attempting to locate a bank or deposit account; mailing a letter to the personal guarantors requesting payment; making phone calls to “the responsible parties” on various dates; serving post-judgment interrogatories and requests for production of documents, and mailing a letter to the personal guarantors requesting responses to the post-judgment discovery. (Looney decl., ¶¶6-10, 16.)
Based upon a web search, Judgment Debtor’s business is closed. (Id., ¶7.) According to Plaintiff, the sheriff’s office will not sell liquor inventory; the installation of a sheriff’s keeper is unavailable or ineffective; the size of the judgment makes it impractical to levy upon equipment, fixtures, or inventory; plus, the value of equipment and fixtures is depressed. Thus, Plaintiff concludes there is no other option but to appoint a receiver to seize and sell the liquor license to satisfy the judgment.
Plaintiff has not made a sufficient factual showing that appointing a receiver to seize and sell the liquor license is necessary. Plaintiff has failed to show the inadequacy of alternate remedies. Rather, as in Medipro, supra, Plaintiff has only shown that he has encountered some difficulties in his initial efforts to collect the judgment. While Plaintiff states in his declaration that he investigated Defendant’s finances, there is no explanation regarding the depth of this investigation. Plaintiff’s representations regarding the inadequacy of alternative remedies are not supported by foundation. Plaintiff has not provided evidence that the phone numbers he called were valid numbers to reach any of the personal guarantors.
Moreover, the number of motions filed by Plaintiff to appoint a receiver in various actions itself shows that this method of collection has become routine rather than being reserved for cases in which it is truly necessary. Mere difficulties in collecting the judgment are insufficient grounds for appointing a receiver. Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proving that a receiver is necessary in this matter.
In addition, proof of service only shows that defendant C Casa Napa was served with the motion. 14
No proof of service is provided for defendant personal guarantors. The motion is DENIED. Due to the lack of opposition, the court’s minutes shall constitute the order of the court.
8. 25CV08672, Hemphill v. Levine
This matter is on calendar for the petition of Robert Hemphill (“Petitioner” or “Hemphill”) to confirm an arbitration award dated October 8, 2025, and later amended on November 25, 2025 (“the Award”). It is also on calendar for the cross-petition of Respondents Brandon Levine (“Levine”) and Lierre, Inc. (“Respondents”).
The dispute involved a commercial landlord tenant lease, with Hemphill as the landlord, and Respondents as the tenant. As reflected in the Award, Petitioner prevailed in the arbitration proceedings before arbitrator Robert Murray (“Arbitrator”). In opposition, Respondents request this court review the Award for legal errors as the underlying contract allowing for arbitration contained a provision that the arbitrator did not have the power to commit errors of law or legal reasoning and that any such errors could be corrected by a petition to correct or vacate the award under the Code of Civil Procedure sections 1286.2 or 1286.6. (Attachment 4(b) to Petition, Commercial Lease, section 12.28.3, pp. 27-28.)
1. Timeliness
The above Codes of Civil Procedure are part of the statutory scheme for confirming, vacating, or correcting an arbitration award. This statutory scheme contains time limits for filing a petition to vacate or correct an award: “A petition to vacate an award or to correct an award shall be served and filed not later than 100 days after the date of the service of a signed copy of the award on the petitioner.” (CCP section 1288.)
The Award is dated October 8, 2025. Allowing for 100 days to file a petition results in finding that any petition to vacate or correct the award must have been filed by January 16, 2026. Respondents’ Opposition to Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award and Counter Petition to Vacate Arbitration was filed on December 18, 2025, within the statutory timeframe and is therefore timely.
2. Merits of the Award
The Award imposed damages of $575,000 to rebuild the offices and bathrooms; $200,112 to restore the mezzanine, and $1,400 to dispose of the mezzanine debris, for a total gross recovery of $775,512. (Attachment 8(c) to Petition.) Levine was granted a credit of $15,000 for the security deposit retained by Hemphill. (Ibid.) Therefore, the net award to Petition was determined to be $761,512. (Ibid.) The parties agree that this court may review the Award for legal error.
a. Lease Expiration, Surrender, Acceptance, and Waiver
i. Acceptance of Premises without Reservation
Respondents argue the Arbitrator failed to apply mandatory law governing lease expiration, surrender, acceptance, and waiver. They argue Hemphill’s conduct accepting the subject premises after expiration of the parties’ Lease without reservation operated as a waiver of post-termination claims based upon restoration or continued performance.
1. The Lease
The Lease granted the Tenant the right, during the Lease term, to remove two specific categories of improvements: (1) the mezzanine and (2) the existing interior office structures, which included bathrooms constructed within those offices. Section 4.04(a) permitted removal of the mezzanine and required that, “At the end of the Lease, the tenant shall restore the mezzanine back to its original location.”
15