BROOKER vs BROVKO, et al.

25CV010674: BROOKER vs BROVKO, et al. 09/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Cross-Complaint in Department 16C

Tentative Ruling

In pro per Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Karen Brooker’s (“Brooker”) demurrer to Cross- Complainants Maryna Brovko and Pavlo Brovko’s (jointly, “Brovkos”) Cross-Complaint is ruled upon as follows.

I.

Background

This is a wrongful eviction action. Brooker alleges that the Brovkos misused the family move-in exemption to Civil Code section 1946.2, which provides that the owner of a property shall not terminate a tenancy without “just cause.” “No-fault just cause” includes an “[i]ntent to occupy the residential real property by the owner or the owner’s spouse, domestic partner, children, grandchildren, parents, or grandparents for a minimum of 12 continuous months as that person’s primary residence.” (Civ. Code, § 1946.2, subd. (b)(2)(A)(i).)

On August 6, 2025, the Brovkos filed the operative Cross-Complaint. The Brovkos allege that they took ownership of the property located at 6503 Hillsdale Boulevard, Sacramento, California (“Property”) in October 2024. (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 1, 10.) Brooker was allegedly a tenant at the Property when the Brovkos took ownership. (Id., ¶ 10.) The Brovkos allegedly served Brooker with a 60-day notice (“Notice”) to terminate the tenancy due to the Brovkos’ need to have family members take possession of the Property. (Id., ¶ 11.) The Brovkos allege that their family members took possession of the property within the timeframe set forth in Civil Code section 1946.2. (Id., ¶ 16, 18.)

The Brovkos allege that Brooker abused the legal process by filing a complaint based on false allegations in that the Brovkos’ family members had failed to move into the Property within the statutory timeframe, when they had actually moved to the Property on April 1, 2025, in compliance with Civil Code section 1946.2. (Id., ¶27-29.) The Brovkos also allege that Brooker violated the terms of her lease by “harboring” her adult son without written approval from the prior owner or from the Brovkos. (Id., ¶ 13.) Brooker and her son allegedly engaged in a campaign of harassment and intimidation, in which she refused to forward her mail, placed unauthorized mail holds, disrupted the new tenant’s ability to receive mail, trespassed, rummaged through trash bins, tampered with mail, complained she was unlawfully evicted, and took pictures of the Property and the new tenants. (Id., ¶¶20-25.)

In the Cross-Complaint, the Brovkos allege causes of action for (1) abuse of process, (2) defamation, (3) breach of lease agreement, and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

25CV010674: BROOKER vs BROVKO, et al. 09/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Cross-Complaint in Department 16C

Brooker demurs to each cause of action on the grounds that they fail to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action and are uncertain.

The Brovkos oppose.

II.

Legal Standard

The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the pleading it challenges by raising questions of law. (Salimi v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 216, 219; Nordlinger v. Lynch (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271.)

A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The purpose of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v.

Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) In this respect, the Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.) A general demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. (Blank v.

Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318, William S. Hart Union High School Dist. v. Regional Planning Com. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1612, 1616, fn. 2.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . . we are not concerned with plaintiff’s possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v.

Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action – not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010674: BROOKER vs BROVKO, et al. 09/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Cross-Complaint in Department 16C

III.

Discussion

A. Abuse of Process

Brooker argues the Brovkos fails to state a cause of action for abuse of process, because the only “process” identified in the Cross-Complaint is her filing of the underlying lawsuit.

The Brovkos argue they have sufficiently alleged that Brooker wrongfully filed her action to damage their reputation and extract a settlement based on false allegations.

“The common law tort of abuse of process arises when one uses the court’s process for a purpose other than that for which the process was designed.” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1056.) To state a cause of action for abuse of process, a litigant must allege that the opposing party “(1) contemplated an ulterior motive in using the process, and (2) committed a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings.” (Id. at p. 1057.) However, “while a defendant's act of improperly instituting or maintaining an action may, in an appropriate case, give rise to a cause of action for malicious prosecution, the mere filing or maintenance of a lawsuit—even for an improper purpose—is not a proper basis for an abuse of process action.” (Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1157, 1169.)

The Brovkos allege only that Brooker has filed a “false” complaint. As such, the Brovkos have failed to sufficiently allege that Brooker has engaged in conduct, other than filing the underlying complaint, that would give rise to a cause of action for abuse of process.

Therefore, the demurrer to the first cause of action is SUSTAINED.

B. Defamation

Brooker argues that his cause of action fails because the Brovkos fail to allege sufficiently factual allegations regarding the purportedly defamatory statements, including any specific words, dates or recipients of the alleged statements. Brooker also argues that her statements to neighbors and housing authorities are privileged communications pursuant to Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) and are protected opinion and petitioning activity under the anti-SLAPP

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010674: BROOKER vs BROVKO, et al. 09/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Cross-Complaint in Department 16C

statute.

The Brovkos argue that their allegations are sufficient under California’s notice pleading standard for defamation. The Brovkos also argue that Brooker’s statements are not barred by the Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b).

“The elements of a defamation claim are (1) a publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damage.” (Wong v. Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1369.) Defamation is effected by either libel or slander. (Civ. Code, § 44.) Slander is “a false and unprivileged publication, orally uttered . . . which . . . [c]harges any person with crime, or with having been indicted, convicted, or punished for crime.” (Id., § 46.) “Words which fall within the purview of Civil Code section 46 are deemed to constitute slander per se [citations] with the effect that the utterance of such words is actionable without proof of special damage.” (Albertini v. Schaefer (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 822, 829.)

Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), also known as the litigation privilege, provides that a privileged publication is one made “[i]n any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by law. . .”

Here, the Brovkos allege that Brooker has “falsely stated to third parties, including neighbors and local housing authorities, that Cross-Complainants fraudulently evicted her, misused the family move-in exemption under California law, and engaged in deceptive practices as landlords.” (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 40; See also ¶¶ 38-46.) These allegations are sufficient to allege a cause of action for defamation as they allege Brooker made a false publication to third parties stating that the Brovkos engaged in illegal and/or fraudulent acts, which falls within Civil Code section 46, subdivision (1), that resulted in emotional, reputational, and financial damages.

Although Brooker’s alleged statements to local housing authorities may be privileged under Civil Code section 47 as statements made in a “official proceeding authorized by law,” Brooker’s alleged statements to neighbors and other community members are not. Nor does Brooker provide any legal authority that statements made to neighbors outside an official proceeding are privileged for purposes of Section 47. Further, Brooker provides no legal authority that purports to require the Brovkos to allege the specific words, dates or recipients of the allegedly defamatory statements. Nor is the Court aware of any heightened pleading standard for defamation causes of action.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010674: BROOKER vs BROVKO, et al. 09/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Cross-Complaint in Department 16C

Thus, Brooker’s demurrer to the second cause of action for defamation is OVERRULED.

C. Breach of Lease Agreement

Brooker argues that the Brovkos have failed to sufficiently allege a cause of action for breach of the lease agreement because they failed to attach a copy of the lease agreement and failed to allege the specific term that was allegedly breached.

The Brovkos contend they have sufficiently alleged the existence of a valid lease agreement in paragraphs 48 and 49 of the Cross-Complaint. These paragraph state:

48. A valid lease agreement existed between Cross-Complainants and BROOKER.

49. Cross-Complainants and BROOKER entered into a lease agreement for the property located at 6503 Hillsdale Blvd in Sacramento, California, which Cross- Complainants assumed upon purchasing the property on October 8, 2024.

(Cross-Complaint at p. 7:21-25.)

To establish a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the existence of the contract, (2) Plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) Defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damage to Plaintiff. (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.) In order to plead a breach of contract cause of action, the plaintiff may either attach a copy of the agreement, set forth the material terms verbatim or plead the legal effect of the agreement. (Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Insurance Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199.)

In order to plead a contract by its legal effect, plaintiff must “allege the substance of its relevant terms. This is more difficult, for it requires a careful analysis of the instrument, comprehensiveness in statement, and avoidance of legal conclusions.” (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489.) For example, in Miles v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 394, 402, the court found that the plaintiff

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010674: BROOKER vs BROVKO, et al. 09/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Cross-Complaint in Department 16C

successfully pled the legal effect of a contract where, “[p]laintiff alleged an express contract to refinance his loan, including the loan balance, the interest rate, and the monthly payment.” Similarly, the court in Maxwell v. Dolezal (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 93, 98, found that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged the existence of a contract where “[h]e alleged that on or about March 30, 2010, he entered into an agreement with Dolezal in which he agreed to assign his intellectual property rights in exchange for free housing, free food, and 50 percent of the monies received as a result.”

Here, the Brovkos fail to attach the lease to the complaint, allege the material terms of the lease verbatim, or sufficiently plead the legal effect of the lease agreement.

As a result, the demurrer to the third cause of action for breach of lease is SUSTAINED.

D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Brooker argues that the Brovkos have failed to allege extreme and outrageous conduct and that ordinary landlord-tenant disputes do not satisfy that requirement. Brooker also argues that Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege their severe emotional distress.

The Brovkos argue that they have sufficiently alleged that Brooker engaged in a sustained, post-tenancy campaign of stalking and harassment directed at the Brovkos in their family home, including trespassing, surveillance, rummaging through trash bins, and tampering with mail.

“The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is comprised of three elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) the plaintiff's injuries were actually and proximately caused by the defendant's outrageous conduct.” (Cochran v. Cochran (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 488, 494.) It is not enough for the conduct to be intentional and outrageous. (Christensen v.

Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903.) The extreme and outrageous conduct must be directed at the plaintiff, or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware. (Ibid.) To be outrageous, conduct “must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Ibid.) Severe emotional distress means “‘emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it.’” (Potter v.

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 965, 1004.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010674: BROOKER vs BROVKO, et al. 09/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Cross-Complaint in Department 16C

The Brovkos have adequately alleged a course of conduct by Brooker which may constitute extreme and outrageous conduct. (See Cross-Complaint, ¶¶ 20-24, 33, 59.) Accepting the Brovkos allegations as true, as required on demurrer, they have alleged that Brooker engaged in a number of harassing acts that exceed the scope of a typical landlord-tenant dispute. Additionally, they have sufficiently alleged that severe emotional distress as a result of Brooker’s alleged conduct. (Id., ¶¶ 61-64.)

Thus, Brooker’s demurrer to the fourth cause of action is OVERRULED.

E. Uncertainty

A demurrer will lie if the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous and unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (f).) “[D]emurrers for uncertainty are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Lickiss v. Financial Inds. Reg. Auth. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.) The favored approach is to clarify theories in the complaint through discovery. (See Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Nevertheless, a demurrer for uncertainty may be sustained when a defendant cannot reasonably determine what it is required to respond to; for example, when a plaintiff joins multiple causes of action as one, fails to properly identify each cause of action, or fails to state against which party each cause of action is asserted if there are multiple defendants. (Ibid.)

In the moving papers, Brooker fails to make any specific legal argument or present any legal authority to support her assertion that the Cross-Complaint is uncertain. Because Brooker fails to identify what renders the Cross-Complaint “so incomprehensible that [] defendant cannot reasonably respond” and fails to provide legal argument in support of this ground of the motion, the demurrer on the ground of uncertainty must be overruled. (Lickiss, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 1135.)

IV.

Disposition

Accordingly, Brooker’s demurrer is SUSTAINED IN PART and OVERRULED IN PART as stated above.

As this is the first challenge to the pleadings, the Court will grant leave to amend. The Brovkos

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010674: BROOKER vs BROVKO, et al. 09/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Cross-Complaint in Department 16C

may file and serve a First Amended Cross-Complaint no later than October 1, 2026.

Although not required by Court rule or statute, the Brovkos are directed to present a copy of this order when the amended cross-complaint is presented for filing. Brooker shall file and serve her response within 30 days thereafter, 35 days if the fourth amended complaint is served by mail.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Department 16C Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-1475 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 16C Zoom Link is https://saccourt-cagov.zoomgov.com/j/16030877014 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 160 3087 7014. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010674: BROOKER vs BROVKO, et al. 09/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Cross-Complaint in Department 16C

reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed on the Court Reporter Services webpage available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://saccourt.ca.gov/general-information/court-reporter-servicestranscripts. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://saccourt.ca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/227/639084034465370000.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

*** EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA 95814. ALL HEARINGS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 54 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16C OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ***