In re Property Dispute

insisted on the application formula and that is how defendant was able to insist on and obtain the Satisfaction of Judgment. In other words, according to plaintiff, defendant did not pay the $15,000/month and an additional sum to satisfy the default judgment, but rather the $15,000/month and nothing more, and that was used to satisfy the judgment and therefore could not keep the rent current (even putting to one side the escalation clause).

The reply also notes that although the prior action did include an option that the lease be forfeited, that was because possession was being sought. When the parties agreed that defendant could remain in possession, that by definition ended the forfeiture option, and the lease remained. And plaintiff makes a compelling case on the math alone. These are strong points and the court wants to consider them. The matter will be CONTINUED. Defendant will have an opportunity to file a sur-reply to address these issues. The court is concerned because the assertions in the reply are fundamentally inconsistent with the assertions made in the opposition under oath.

that this will have on the trial date, especially given the dismissals. The court's inclination is that it makes sense to try all of the case together, as all deal with what is apparently one road that traverses multiple properties. But if the trial date is jeopardized, the court might take a different view of whether consolidation is the best way to go. If plaintiff is claiming that the trial date will need to be vacated, plaintiff will need to be specific as to why in light of the common question of access to plaintiff's property and plaintiff's earlier position that consolidation is appropriate.

Case Number: 24SMCV04056 Hearing Date: August 26, 2026 Dept: I

This case involves property. Back in 2015, there was a fire at the property and the units became uninhabitable. The owner at the time, Leovy, allegedly told the tenants (cross complainants here) that he would rebuild the units and he would allow them to move back in when the construction was completed if they wanted to do so. Cross complainants then moved out of the property (which was necessary because of the fire) and lived elsewhere for a while.

In March 2024, cross defendant Fairfax purchased the property. Fairfax has stated that it would not honor Leovy's promise and seeks an order clarifying that there is no obligation on Fairfax to re-let the premises to the prior tenants. The prior tenants have sued to enforce the deal and claim that Fairfax's refusal to let them back is a violation. Fairfax has demurred to that cross complaint.

The parties agree that at the time of the fire (and now) the property was subject to certain rent control ordinances. The court notes that many of the cross complainants have different or slightly different facts--such as whether the agreement to re-lease the property made by Leovy is in writing or oral. But the gist is largely the same so the court discusses them together.

In a prior hearing, the court sustained Fairfax's demurrers with leave to amend. The court asked for certain clarifications and suggested that cross complainants try to avoid the kitchen sink approach. (The court notes that the kitchen sink is still here.) Cross complainants have amended.

One ground Fairfax raises is uncertainty. That demurrer is OVERRULED because the pleading is not so incomprehensible that cross defendant cannot understand it.

The more substantive argument is that the causes of action are time-barred. While the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, if the basis for its application is plain from the complaint itself, it can be raised on demurrer. (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308.)

The first six causes of action are based on alleged violations of the West Hollywood Municipal Code. There is no statute of limitations attached to those ordinances, but the three year general statute will apply. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 338 subd. (a).) The seventh cause of action is for wrongful eviction, essentially because of the violations articulated in the first six causes of action. The same 3 year statute will apply. The eighth cause of action is for discrimination. The statute there is two years. (Gov.

Code sec. 12989.1 subd. (a).) the ninth cause of action is for a violation of the Unruh Act, which is subject to a three year limitations period as well. (Gatto v. County of Sonoma (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 744.) The tenth cause of action is for negligence, and the statute is two years. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 335.1.) The elder abuse claim has a four year statute from the date of discovery. (Welf. & Inst. Code sec. 15657.7.) Breach of a written contract is four years from the time of the breach. (Gilkyson v.

Disney Enterprises, Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1336.)

The court will come back to the Civil Code section 1946.2 cause of action. There is an immediate apparent problem. The fire was at the very end of 2015--call it 2016 for all practical purposes. Apparently, nothing was done to rebuild the premises and make them habitable for at least 8 years, when Fairfax bought the property. So the court needs to do a bit of an analysis here. To the extent that the contractual and statutory requirement is that the landlord will promptly rebuild and restore the tenant to the unit, that statute must have run. While there can be a debate as to how long a reasonable period of time might be to do the work, the operative word is "reasonable," and the facts here are beyond any reasonable time frame.

The court agrees with the defense that cross complainants cannot be considered current tenants after a length of time like that. The court therefore agrees that cross complainants are, as a matter of law, not tenants, and not subject to the protections given to a tenant under the ordinances at issue. They were tenants at the time of the fire, but that tenancy expired long before 2024. And the breach of contract action expired as well.

The court will infer a reasonable time for a party to perform where the contract is silent. But reasonable is not infinite. Reading the alleged contract for all it is worth, Leovy had a reasonable period of time to start rebuilding and make the premises habitable and offer the cross complainants the right to let those premises. But as a matter of law, after four years of nothing it was pretty plain that Leovy was not doing what he promised to do, and four years after that, the longest of the statutes ran.

Cross complainants suggest that this is subject to the continuing violation doctrine. That doctrine essentially extends the statute of limitations where at least one violation occurred within the statutory period, the violations outside of the statute are sufficiently similar in kind, the action occurred with sufficient frequency, and the actions did not acquire a degree of permanence. (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185. None of those tests are met here. This is not a "continuing violation." Nor is this subject to the continuous accrual doctrine, which arises when there is a continuing or recurring violation. Where the doctrine applies, it will allow the statute to run from each violation, but will treat them as independent wrongs. (Id, at p. 1199.) But the court finds that neither doctrine applies, and therefore the causes of action are time barred.

Stepping back for a second, this ruling comports with common sense. To consider one to be an active residential tenant, one has to presume that the tenant lives in the residential unit. To be sure, there can be temporary relocations, such as where there is a need for extensive repairs. But there comes a time--and the time is a lot less than 4 years--where if nothing is being done, the tenant is no longer a tenant of the unit by any reasonable definition of the term.

The court also notes that cross defendant allegedly negotiated a reduction in the purchase price given this issue. That may well be, but it does not restart the statutory clock. Cross defendant took a risk and was compensated for it, but that does not make the case timely. Nor can it be said that cross defendant affirmatively undertook to restore the cross complainants to the property. The most that is said is that cross defendant assumed all of Leovy's duties. The court sees nothing like that alleged with any particularity--like quoting from the contract or even reciting or summarizing that aspect of the contract. And even if it did, the case is still time barred.

The court is well aware that the West Hollywood rent control ordinance is designed to protect tenants, and it should be liberally construed to that end. But liberal construction does not allow the court to stretch the words beyond their meaning. To be subject to the rent control ordinance's tenant protections, the plaintiff (or cross complainant) has to be a tenant. The court agrees with Fairfax that cross complainants' tenancies expired long ago. They could not maintain their status as a tenant indefinitely.

The court agrees that if a unit becomes uninhabitable and the tenants are temporarily removed to allow the unit to be restored, they maintain their tenancy status. But that presupposes a finite and relatively short amount of time while the unit is repaired; it does not assume forever. Where the unit is essentially destroyed, a landlord may decline to rebuild the unit--thereby taking it off the market--or may engage in other conduct. One thing a landlord can do is to agree voluntarily to give the people who had lived in the unit a "right of first refusal" to re-let the premises if and when the unit is repaired. That might be a valid contractual offer, but it does not mean that the optionee is a tenant for life.

One remaining question is whether, if it is a contract, whether Fairfax can be sued over it. Because the demurrer is resolved on statute of limitations grounds, the court does not need to reach the question whether such a contract would be binding on Fairfax.

That leaves the section 1946.2 cause of action. It does not apply because it does not apply to residential real property subject to a local ordinance requiring just cause for termination adopted on or before September 1, 2019. It is alleged that there was such an ordinance at the time the alleged promise was made. The demurrer is therefore SUSTAINED. The court will discuss with cross complainants whether they believe that leave to amend would be fruitful. The motion to strike is MOOT.

Case Number: 25SMCV06167 Hearing Date: August 26, 2026 Dept: I

These are two demurrers. They are OVERRULED.

Plaintiffs brought this action alleging that they bought property in the Pacific Palisades to build a home. They retained a general contractor for that purpose. They allege that in September 2022, they engaged Cohen Insurance Agency to place and maintain builder's risk insurance coverage for the property. The policy was obtained and issued by American Zurich through US Assure. It was in effect from October 6, 2022, to October 6, 2023. Plaintiffs state that the construction loan lender was listed as the mortgage holder and loss payee. The policy had a $4.3 million limit per structure.

In August 2023, Cohen allegedly provided renewal quotes to plaintiffs that caused plaintiffs to look elsewhere for insurance. On September 5, 2023, plaintiffs received an email from US Assure reminding them of the coming expiration date. Plaintiffs claim they contacted US Assure about renewing the policy. Plaintiffs also reached out to Farmers Insurance's agent Khazin Agency on September 20, after being referred by plaintiffs' real estate agent. Plaintiffs spoke with Ramirez and asked about having Khazin Agency renew the coverage with the same terms as the existing policy. Ramirez allegedly assured plaintiffs that this could be done.

In the meantime, Cohen reached out to plaintiffs to tell them that US Assure had quoted an extension of the policy. Plaintiffs assert that they thought about returning to Cohen but elected not to do so due to fear of delays. But plaintiffs also claim that had they known of the relationship between Farmers Insurance Group and the Kraft and Khazin Agencies, plaintiffs would have gone with Cohen.

Plaintiffs continued to follow up with Khazin in early October, and Ramirez allegedly sent an email on October 6 stating that she was rewriting the policy. On October 6, American Zurich through US Assure issued a new policy. On October 12, Ramirez told plaintiffs that the policy was identical to the prior policy although, plaintiffs claim, First Republic Bank had been dropped and the policy limits had been reduced from $4.3 million to $2 million per structure. Plaintiffs noticed that Kraft Lake Insurance Agency was listed as plaintiffs' representative. Plaintiffs