BROOKER vs BROVKO, et al.

25CV010674: BROOKER vs BROVKO, et al. 04/21/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16C

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE: The Sacramento Superior Court is transitioning operations from the Gordon D. Schaber and Hall of Justice buildings to the new Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye Courthouse through a phased move plan beginning on April 13, 2026. Visit the court’s website at www.saccourt.ca.gov for the most current and up to date information regarding the transition. The physical and mailing address of the new downtown courthouse is:

Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye Courthouse 500 G Street Sacramento, CA 95814

Please take notice, effective April 13, 2026, Department 54 has moved to Department 16C at the Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye Courthouse. The Honorable Christopher E. Krueger remains presiding over all Home Court proceedings, including Case Management and Law & Motion. All hearings currently scheduled or reserved after the effective date shall remain in place and will be heard in Department 16C.

Hon. Christopher E. Krueger Department 16C 916-874-7848

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants Maryna Brovko and Pavlo Brovko’s (collectively, “Defendants”) demurrer to plaintiff in pro per Karen Brooker’s (“Plaintiff”) First Amended Complaint (“1AC”) is ruled upon as follows.

Defendants’ request for judicial notice of the Notice to Terminate Tenancy is denied. Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice without setting forth any argument to establish why such material is judicially noticeable pursuant to Evidence Code sections 451 or 452.

Plaintiff commenced this action on May 1, 2025. Plaintiff filed the operative 1AC on June 10, 2025, alleging causes of action for: (1) violation of Civil Code section 1946.2; (2) wrongful eviction; (3) fraud and intentional misrepresentation; and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). Plaintiff alleges she was evicted from 6503 Hillsdale Boulevard, Sacramento, California 95842 based on false pretenses.

25CV010674: BROOKER vs BROVKO, et al. 04/21/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16C

Defendants demur to each cause of action on the ground that each fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Plaintiff has opposed.

Legal Standard

The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the pleading it challenges by raising questions of law. (Salimi v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 216, 219; Nordlinger v. Lynch (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271.) A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Extrinsic evidence may not properly be considered on demurrer or on a motion to strike. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881; Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Thornton (1897) 117 Cal. 481, 482.)

For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) In this respect, the Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . ., we are not concerned with plaintiff's possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.) The sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action, not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.)

First Cause of Action – Violation of Civil Code 1946.2

Plaintiff alleges that on or about November 1, 2024, Defendants issued a 60-Day No Fault Eviction Notice, which notice was defective on its face because it failed to comply with Civil Code section 1946.2(d)(3)(A) in that it omitted required information regarding the relationship of the individuals alleged to be moving into the property, failed to cite to statutory authority, failed to describe the amount of relocation assistance being offered, and failed to provide the mandatory language regarding the handling of abandoned personal property. (1AC, ¶¶ 7, 8.) Plaintiff alleges that in reliance of the notice, and after vacating the property, she discovered Defendants failed to move in family members as

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010674: BROOKER vs BROVKO, et al. 04/21/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16C

set forth in the notice within the 90-day statutory window. (1AC, ¶¶ 11, 18, 19.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to reoffer the unit despite the existence of the comparable vacant 6501 unit. (1AC, ¶ 21.) In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants later claimed a qualifying family member moved in on April 1, 2025, but that claim was contradicted by Plaintiff’s photographs, code enforcement records, and utility evidence showing that SMUD service was not activated until later in April, after the legal deadline. (1AC, ¶¶ 19, 20.) Plaintiff alleges she has suffered financial and emotional distress damages as a result, including but not limited to motel expenses, moving and storage costs, and credit-related hardship. (1AC, ¶¶ 14, 23.)

Defendants demur on the grounds that: (1) the 1AC fails to allege how the alleged deficiencies caused her damages; (2) the 1AC does not allege that Defendants did not intend to comply with the family move-in exemption at the time the notice was served; (3) the 1AC does not allege Plaintiff made a written request that the unit be reoffered to her as required by the statute; and (4) Code of Civil Procedure section 1155 requires that any action based on notice of termination be verified. Defendants also assert that defects in an eviction notice do not, by themselves, give rise to a private cause of action under section 1946.2.

In opposition, Plaintiff maintains the 1AC sufficiently alleges a violation of section 1946.2 because that statute requires the intended occupant to move in within 90 days and occupy the unit as a primary residence for at least 12 consecutive months, and if that does not occur, the owner must offer the unit back to the displaced tenant and reimburse reasonable moving expenses beyond any relocation assistance already paid.

The Court disagrees with Defendants that the 1AC does not sufficiently allege damages. The 1AC alleges not just notice defects; it also alleges that Defendants failed to reoffer Plaintiff the unit despite the existence of a comparable vacant unit and that this failure caused Plaintiff damages. The fact that more than notice defects are alleged also dispels Defendants’ argument that notice defects, by themselves, do not give rise to a private cause of action. Defendants’ argument that the 1AC fails because it does not contain an allegation regarding Defendants’ intent is also rejected because it is unsupported by any citation to legal authority mandating such an allegation in order to state a claim for violation of section 1946.2.

Similarly, Defendants offer no legal authority that the claim requires an affirmative allegation that the Plaintiff made a written request that the unit be reoffered. Lastly, Code of Civil Procedure section 1155 does not exist.

On reply, Defendants raise an argument for the first time that the 1AC does not allege a “material violation” as required by section 1946.2(h)(1). This was not raised in the moving papers and, therefore, will not be considered. It is elementary that points raised for the first time in a reply brief are not considered by the court. (See St. Mary v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010674: BROOKER vs BROVKO, et al. 04/21/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16C

Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 783; Campos v. Anderson (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 784, 794, fn. 3.)

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ demurrer to the first cause of action is OVERRULED.

Second Cause of Action – Wrongful Eviction

Defendants demur to Plaintiff’s second cause of action for wrongful eviction on the ground that it is duplicative of the first cause of action and therefore fails for the same reasons as the first cause of action. Specifically, Defendants argue the 1AC does not allege fact showing Defendants acted unlawfully or in bad faith in serving the eviction notice.

As the Court has overruled the demurrer to the first cause of action, the demurrer to the second cause of action based on the same arguments is also OVERRULED.

Third Cause of Action – Fraud and Intentional Misrepresentation

Plaintiff alleges Defendants affirmatively represented that the unit would be occupied by Defendants’ family members, which necessitated Plaintiff’s displacement, but Defendants knew or should have known these statements were false. (1AC, ¶¶ 33-35.) Plaintiff alleges no qualifying family members moved into the unit within the required 90- day period after Plaintiff vacated. (1AC, ¶ 35.)

Defendants assert the allegations are not pled with the requisite specificity because the 1AC does not specify the content of the representations, when and how they were made, or how Plaintiff justifiably relied on them to her detriment.

The Court disagrees. The 1AC alleges defendant Maryna Brovko sent Plaintiff a text message on October 24, 2024, stating she would soon receive a 60-day notice to vacate the premises because Defendants’ family members would be moving into the property, and that the representation was repeated on the 60-day notice to vacate dated November 1, 2024. (1AC, ¶ 33.) The 1AC alleges, “At the time these statements were made, Defendant knew or should have known that they were false.” (1AC, ¶ 35.) Further, “Plaintiff reasonably relied on Defendants statements, believing that the unit was needed for immediate family use.

Plaintiff took significant action in reliance on these representations, including giving up her tenancy, vacating her long-term home on January 6, 2025, and relocating at substantial expense and personal hardship.” (1AC, ¶ 36.) The foregoing specifies the content of the representation, when and how it was made, by whom, and justifiable reliance that caused damages.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010674: BROOKER vs BROVKO, et al. 04/21/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16C

Again, on reply Defendants raise arguments that were not raised in their moving papers. Specifically, that the allegations are a promise of future intent, not a misrepresentation of existing fact. This argument will not be considered by the Court because it is being raised for the very first time on reply.

Accordingly, the demurrer to this cause of action is OVERRULED.

Fourth Cause of Action – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by [the defendant] with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the [defendant's] outrageous conduct. [Citation.] Conduct is considered outrageous when it is ‘so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’” (Belen v. Ryan Seacrest Productions, LLC (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1145, 1164.)

Defendants contend that the alleged conduct of evicting Plaintiff does not constitute conduct that is sufficiently extreme or outrageous to state a cause of action for IIED.

Plaintiff argues the 1AC adequately pleads IIED because it alleges that “Defendants used a false family move-in notice to force her from her home of approximately nine years, then failed to timely and genuinely occupy the unit as represented, left the unit vacant, and failed to reoffer possession when the stated basis for the eviction did not materialize.” (Opposition, at 6:19-22.)

Liberally construed and accepted as true for purposes of demurrer, the allegations at most establish that Defendants evicted Plaintiff under false pretenses, while aware of her limited income and the fact that she was caring for a dog with terminal cancer at the time. (1AC, ¶¶ 40-41.) The Court is not persuaded that the facts qualify as extreme or outrageous conduct for purposes of IIED. The demurrer to this cause of action is, therefore, SUSTAINED.

Jurisdiction

Defendants’ argument that the 1AC fails to sufficiently allege the Court has jurisdiction because it does not specify how the alleged violations of section 1946.2 or the alleged misrepresentations fall within the Court’s jurisdiction is rejected. The Notice of Motion does not include this as a ground for the demurrer. The notice of motion must state in writing the “grounds upon which it will be made.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.) Courts generally may consider only the grounds stated in the notice of motion and cannot grant

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010674: BROOKER vs BROVKO, et al. 04/21/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16C

different relief, or relief based on different grounds, from those specified in the notice of motion. (Luri v. Greenwald (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1125.)

Conclusion

Defendants’ demurrer is OVERRULED, except as to the cause of action for IIED, which is SUSTAINED. Leave to amend is granted because this is the first challenge to the pleading. Plaintiff may file and serve a Second Amended Complaint on or before May 5, 2026.

Defendants may file and serve a response within 30 days of service of the Second Amended Complaint, or 35 days if served by mail.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, or further notice is required.

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 16C Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16030877014 To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID 16030877014. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/courtreporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010674: BROOKER vs BROVKO, et al. 04/21/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16C

Parties may contact Court-Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-13.pdf.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.