Marshall Sperbeck vs. Capital Christian Center

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING:

****NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT WILL MOVE TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 28 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8C OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE.*****

Defendant Capital Christian Center’s (“Defendant”) motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, for summary adjudication is DENIED.

*** If oral argument is requested, the parties are directed to notify the clerk and opposing counsel at the time of the request which of the Undisputed Material Facts offered by the moving defendants and/or the Additional Material Facts offered by plaintiff will be addressed at the hearing and the parties should be

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34-2021-00293300-CU-CO-GDS: Marshall Sperbeck vs. Capital Christian Center 04/08/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 28

prepared to point to specific evidence which is claimed to show the existence or non-existence of a triable issue of material fact. ***

Moving and opposing counsel failed to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1110(f)(4), which requires that “electronic exhibits must include electronic bookmarks with links to the first page of each exhibit and with bookmark titles that identify the exhibit number or letter and briefly describe the exhibit.” Compliance with the rule is necessary to ensure the Court can easily and quickly locate the referenced exhibits. Failure to comply with these requirements in the future may result in papers not being considered, matters being continued so that papers may be submitted in the proper format, and/or the imposition of sanctions.

Moving counsel failed to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(g), requiring a separate volume of evidence (including all declarations) with a table of contents when the evidence exceeds 25 pages.

Moving counsel failed to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(b), requiring that each issue presented for summary adjudication be stated in the notice of motion and then repeated verbatim in the separate statement.

Moving counsel failed to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d)(3) requiring that citations to supporting evidence include reference to the exhibit, title, page, and line numbers.

I.

Background

This action arises out of Plaintiffs Marshall Sperbeck (“Sperbeck”), Vanessa Lepisi, Greg Armbrust, David Scott Sorgea, Porfirio Garza, Jr., and Lisa Navolio’s (collectively “Plaintiffs”) former employment with Defendant at Capital Christian School (“School”).

Plaintiffs allege they were employed at Capital Christian School and were wrongfully terminated on various dates between March and October 2020. (Third Amended Complaint (“3AC”), ¶¶ 1-9.) Plaintiff allege they were discharged in retaliation for disclosing their concerns regarding the lead applicant (who was eventually hired) for the School’s Head of School position, Tim Wong, to Rick Cole, who was Defendant’s pastor and the president of the School. (Id., ¶¶ 37-44.) Plaintiffs also allege they signed a written arbitration of termination agreement that is void against public policy and unenforceable. (Id., ¶¶ 21-35, 57-67.) Plaintiffs allegedly met Rick Cole, the Defendant’s pastor and the School’s president.

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Plaintiffs filed this action on January 29, 2021 against both Defendant and the School. The operative 3AC was filed on March 11, 2025. Plaintiffs’ first cause of action seeks declaratory relief regarding the validity of the arbitration provision against both Defendant and the School. Plaintiff Sperbeck alleges causes of action for breach of contract (second and fourth causes of action) and fraud (third cause of action) against Defendant and the School. Plaintiffs Armburst, Lepisi, Garza, and Sorgea allege a cause of action for fraud against both Defendant and the School.

Defendant moves for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication on the grounds that:

1.) The plaintiffs have waived any right to arbitration as set forth in the First Cause of Action;

2.) There was no breach of contract regarding the employment of MARSHALL SPERBECK;

3.) There was no fraud or misrepresentation related to the employment of MARSHALL SPERBECK;

4.) There was no fraud or misrepresentation related to the employment of LEPISI, SORGEA, GARZA, or ARMBRUST;

5.) NOVOLIO has no cause of action for relief as she is only a party to the First Cause of Action for declaratory relief and she too has waived any right to arbitration.

6.) All the plaintiffs’ causes of action must be dismissed consistent with their individual employment agreements;

7.) GARZA, who was a CAPITAL vice principal, was also a religious minister and therefore could be terminated without civil interference consistent with the “ministerial exception.”

(Notice at 2:1-14.)

Plaintiffs oppose, arguing that the entire motion fails as the School is not a moving party to the motion, that the School’s corporate status prohibits it from defending against the action, and that the separate statement fails to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350. Plaintiff also argues that triable issues of fact preclude summary judgment.

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Trial is scheduled of May 11, 2026.

II.

Legal Standard

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, the Court engages in a three-step process.

First, the Court identifies the issues framed by the pleadings. The pleadings define the scope of the issues on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. (FPI Dev. Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.) Because a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is limited to the issues raised by the pleadings (Lewis v. Chevron (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 690, 694), all evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings.

The Court cannot consider an unpled issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not create issues outside the pleadings and are not a substitute for an amendment to the pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.) Indeed, it has often been noted that “[i]t would be patently unfair to allow plaintiffs to defeat [defendant’s] summary judgment motion by allowing them to present a “moving target” unbounded by the pleadings.” (Melican v.

Regents of University of California, (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 168, 176-177.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its burden. A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication bears the burden of persuasion that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 850 [quoting Code Civ. Proc. §437c(p)(2)].) A defendant is not required to conclusively negate one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action. (Saelzer v.

Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 780-781). Rather, to meet its burden, the defendant is required to show only that the plaintiff cannot prove an element of its cause of action, i.e., that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain evidence necessary to show this element. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 853-855.) Further, the initial burden requires a showing that the plaintiff “could not prevail on any theory raised by the pleadings.” (Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 936, 939-940.)

At the same time, a defendant cannot shift the burden to the plaintiff simply by suggesting the possibility that the plaintiff cannot prove its case; a moving defendant

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must still make “an affirmative showing” in support of its motion. (See Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854-855, n.23; Addy v. Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 214.) Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a material factual issue exists as to the cause of action alleged or a defense to it. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p); See generally Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326-327.)

While a summary adjudication motion is treated largely the same as one for summary judgment, there are a few important differences. One of these differences is that California Rule of Court, Rule 3.1350, subdivision (b) mandates that issues presented for summary adjudication be stated in the notice of motion and repeated verbatim in the separate statement. Another difference is that summary adjudication cannot be granted unless it “completely disposes” of a cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for punitive damages, or question of duty. Code of Civil Procedure §437c, subdivision (f)(1) provides in its entirety:

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.

Finally, according to Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied. (Id. at p. 252 [citing Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Ch.10:95.1].)

Finally, in ruling on the motion, the Court must consider the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.)

III. Evidentiary Rulings

Plaintiffs’ objects to the separate statement based on California Rules of Court, rule

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3.1350(d). However, this objection appears to be misplaced as Plaintiffs do not appear to object to Defendant’s evidence. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(b), “[a]ll written objections to evidence must be served and filed separately from the other papers in support of or in the opposition to the motion.” To the extent Plaintiffs have raised objections to certain evidence offered by Defendant in Plaintiffs’ response to the separate statement, such objections are overruled because Rule 3.1354 expressly requires written objections be set forth in a separate document and also quote the objectionable material. To the extent Plaintiffs’ objections are directed to the UMFs themselves, such objections are overruled because objections must be directed at evidence presented. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.1352, 3.1354.)

Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice is granted as to the existence of the documents attached as Attachments 1-5. (See RFJN, p. 2.) Plaintiffs’ request for the Court to take judicial notice of the facts contained therein is denied. The Court only takes judicial notice of the existence of the documents and not the truth of their contents. (See Professional Engineers v. Dept. of Transportation (1997) 15 Cal.4th 543, 590; Evid. Code § 451, subd. (a); § 452, sub. (b)-(d); see also, Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not to the truth of the statements contained therein]; Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 145-148; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569-70.)

Plaintiffs’ requests for judicial notice nos. 6-8 are denied as the facts and documents that are the subject of the requests do not appear to be the appropriate subjects of judicial notice.

Plaintiffs’ requests for judicial notice nos. 9-11 are granted for the limited purposes of judicial notice stated above.

Defendant’s objection in reply to Exhibit A is overruled. The Court need not rule on the remaining objections as they are not relevant to the disposition of the motion.

Defendant appears to assert additional objections to Plaintiffs’ evidence cited in support of their Additional Material Facts (“AMF”) in its response to Plaintiffs’ AMFs filed in reply. As discussed above, California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(b) requires written objections to be filed separately. To the extent Defendant has raised objections to certain evidence offered by Plaintiffs in support of the AMFs, such objections are overruled because Rule 3.1354 expressly requires written objections be set forth in a separate document and also quote the objectionable material. To the extent Defendant’s objections are directed to the UMFs themselves, such objections are

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overruled because objections must be directed at evidence presented. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.1352, 3.1354.)

IV.

Discussion

As a threshold matter, Defendant fails to comply with California Rule of Court, rule 3.1350(b) requiring the verbatim repetition of the issues from the Notice of Motion. As noted in Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728, this is an issue of due process. (Id. at pp. 743-744 [citing Gonzales v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1542, 1546 [summary adjudication must include proper notice of each issue to be adjudicated so that opposing party does not raise only one triable issue of fact in order to defeat the motion, without intending to concede the other issues].)

Indeed, failure to comply with California Rule of Court, rule 3.1350(b) is sufficient grounds to deny a motion for summary adjudication. (Schmidlin, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 744 [“Here defendants’ separate statement reflects no attempt to comply with that requirement. That alone precludes a holding that the trial court erred in denying the motion”].) Here, Defendant’s separate statement does not include any of the seven issues for summary adjudication listed in its notice of motion. Instead, Defendant’s separate statement asserts facts relevant to each plaintiff.

This does not comply with Rule 3.1350. Accordingly, Defendant’s alternative request for summary adjudication is DENIED because Defendant fails to comply with Rule 3.1350 and fails identify which Undisputed Material Facts (“UMF”) purportedly supports each of the issues identified in its notice of motion.

To prevail on the instant motion, Defendants must establish they are entitled to summary judgment as to the 3AC. As indicated earlier, on summary judgment or summary adjudication, a moving party must meet his initial burden regardless of whether the opposing party disputes any issues of material fact. (See Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1087 [“[t]he lack of opposition in the instance case thus was an improper ground upon which to grant summary judgment, in the absence of finding that defendant met its initial burden of proof.”) Here, Defendant has failed to meet its initial burden with respect to UMFs 11 and 49.

UMF 11 asserts, “In approximately March 2020, NOVOLIO became aware that there were going to be layoffs at CAPITAL,” citing to the deposition of Plaintiff Novolio at 34:21-35:15. (Separate Statement at p. 4:1-4.) However, Defendant fails to include the relevant portions of the deposition transcript in its evidence. (Defendant’s Exhibit Index, Ex. T.) As a result, the UMF is unsupported.

UMF 49 states, “LISA NOVOLIO was employed by CAPITAL from April 2006 – mid-

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October 2020, citing Plaintiff Novolio’s deposition at 8:22-9:1 and 12:13-17. (Separate Statement at p. 14:26-15:2.) In the cited testimony, Plaintiff Novolio testifies that her last day of employment was October 2020. However, Defendant offers no testimony or other evidence to support its assertion that Plaintiff Novolio’s employment began in April 2006. Thus, this UMF is unsupported as well.

Defendant’s failure to adequately support even one UMF would require denial of the motion. Thus, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED for failure to satisfy its initial burden.

Although the Court need not proceed further, it finds that even if Defendant had satisfied its initial burden, the motion would still be denied, because Plaintiffs raise triable issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment.

UMF 3 asserts, “CAPITAL CHRISTIAN SCHOOL never operated as a separate corporate entity and always operated as an educational ministry of CAPITAL CHRISTIAN CENTER.” (Separate Statement at 2:15-17.) In response, Plaintiffs proffer evidence that the School was a separate corporate entity. (See AMF 1, 2.) Specifically, Plaintiffs produce a California Secretary of State Certificate showing that the School was incorporated as an Limited Liability Company that was registered with the Secretary of state. (RFJN 1.) Additionally, Plaintiffs cite to the testimony of Plaintiff Greg Armbrust and his declaration, which includes a copy of the School’s operating agreement, to show that the School operated as a separate corporate entity. (Plaintiffs’ Compendium of Evidence (“COE”), Ex. G; Tab 2, Ex. A.) Plaintiffs’ evidence is sufficient to raise a triable issue of material fact with respect to UMF 3.

In reply, Defendant argues that the School, as a corporation, did not exist at the time of Plaintiffs’ termination, is not a proper party, and the argument is disingenuous as all Plaintiffs allege they were Defendant’s employees rather than the School’s employees. As discussed above, a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied. (Nazir, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 252.) Here, Defendant’s UMF asserts that the School never operated as a separate corporate entity. Defendant concedes this fact is material to its motion, and Plaintiffs’ evidence successfully disputes the fact. Thus, Plaintiffs have raised a triable issue of material fact with respect to this UMF.

UMF 5 asserts, “CAPITAL CHRISTIAN SCHOOL stopped operating on June 30, 2023,” citing the declaration of Perry Kallevig. (Separate Statement at 19-21.) Plaintiffs present evidence, to which Defendant did not object, that the School stopped operating on June

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30, 2024. (RFJN 5.) Plaintiffs’ evidence raises a triable issue of fact as to the date the School stopped operating.

UMF 7 asserts, “CAPITAL CHRISTIAN SCHOOL was experiencing a downward enrollment trend in the two to three years prior to the 2019- 2020 school year,” citing the testimony of Plaintiff Vanessa Lepisi. (Separate Statement at 3:3-7.) Plaintiffs dispute this UMF with the testimony of Plaintiff Greg Armbrust. (AMF 35.) Plaintiff Armbrust, who served as the director of admissions for the School, testified that there was not a decrease in enrollment between the 2018 / 2019 and 2019 / 2020 school years. (Plaintiffs’ COE, Ex. G, 31:14-25, 129:8-14.) This evidence is sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the School was experiencing decreasing enrollment during the relevant timeframe.

Although Plaintiffs may have raised additional triable issues of fact, the Court need not continue. The existence of even a single triable issue of material fact is sufficient to warrant denial of the motion. Thus, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for summary judgment for this reason as well.

IV.

Disposition

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Defendants’ alternative request for summary adjudication is also DENIED.

This minute order is effective immediately. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312, Plaintiffs shall prepare an appropriate order which conforms to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subd. (g).