Marshall Sperbeck vs. Capital Christian Center

34-2021-00293300-CU-CO-GDS: Marshall Sperbeck vs. Capital Christian Center 10/15/2025 Hearing on Demurrer to Third Amended Complaint in Department 54

https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp- 13.Pdf

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants Capital Christian Center (“CCC”) and Capital Christian School’s (“CCS”) (collectively “Defendants”) demurrer to the third cause of action in the Third Amended Complaint (“3AC”) is OVERRULED as follows.

Background

This action arises out of Plaintiffs Marshall Sperbeck (“Sperbeck”), Vanessa Lepisi, Greg Arbrust, David Scott Sorgea, Porfirio Garza, Jr., and Lisa Navolio’s (collectively “Plaintiffs”) former employment with Defendants.

Plaintiffs filed this action on January 29, 2021. The original Complaint contained a single cause of action for declaratory relief, seeking a declaration that arbitration agreements Plaintiffs signed during the hiring process are void and unenforceable.

On June 1, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ application to amend the Complaint. Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on March 11, 2024, adding several causes of action. Defendants demurred to the FAC and subsequently filed SAC, and the Court sustained each of those demurrers, in part, on various grounds. Plaintiffs filed the operative 3AC on March 11, 2025.

34-2021-00293300-CU-CO-GDS: Marshall Sperbeck vs. Capital Christian Center 10/15/2025 Hearing on Demurrer to Third Amended Complaint in Department 54

Defendants now demur to the 3AC as to one cause of action, the third cause of action for fraud – false promise/misrepresentation alleged by Sperbeck against Defendants.

Factual Allegations

The 3AC contains the following allegations, which are pertinent to the pending demurrer.

1. Plaintiff MARSHALL SPERBECK is and was at all times herein a resident of the County of Sacramento, State of California and was employed by [CCC]. Plaintiff Marshall Sperbeck (hereafter “SPERBECK”) was employed in the capacity of Director of Advancement for [CCS] from August 1, 2017 and was terminated on or about March 3, 2020. ....

9. Plaintiffs, and each of them, believe and thereon allege that they were each wrongfully terminated . . . . ....

77. In/about early 2018, SPERBECK was actively recruited to join Capital Christian while he was employed with Jesuit High School.

78. During the recruitment process, SPERBECK met with Rick Cole, CCC’s Pastor and President of CCS [hereafter “Cole”]. SPERBECK told Cole that he was unwilling to leave his position with Jesuit unless CCS could match his compensation in his then current position.

79. In response, Cole made express representations to SPERBECK in order to induce SPERBECK to leave his employment with Jesuit and accept employment with CCS.

80. Cole promised SPERBECK a guaranteed five- year employment term with comparable perks to SPERBECK’s position with Jesuit, including an 8% contribution to his 403(b) account, 100% medical/dental/ vision coverage, a $1,440 phone stipend and CCS tuition

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00293300-CU-CO-GDS: Marshall Sperbeck vs. Capital Christian Center 10/15/2025 Hearing on Demurrer to Third Amended Complaint in Department 54

discount. Cole further promised SPFRBECK that in exchange for leaving Jesuit and accepting work at CCS, SPERBECK would receive 4 weeks of paid vacation per year.

81. In furtherance of these promises, and as an inducement to convince SPERBECK to leave his position with Jesuit High School, Cole told SPERBECK that CCC had secured the funding to pay his salary, including a portion of which would be paid by one of the school's prominent donors.

82. In order to induce SPERBECK further to take the position at CCS, Cole and SPERBECK met directly with the donor to confirm his commitment to pay portions of SPERBECK’s salary for each of the next five years.

83. Cole made these statements and promises to SPERBECK directly and in the presence of witnesses.

84. SPERBECK relied upon these statements and promises and left his position at Jesuit High School to take the position as Director of Advancement.

85. SPERBECK’s reliance on Cole’s statements was reasonable. Cole was the President of CCS and the principal pastor at [CCC]. Cole and CCC’s executive representative Jason Batt spoke to SPERBECK with the authority of their respective positions. SPERBECK knew that CCC had an excellent reputation as a secondary school and that Cole was a second-generation pastor of CCC and head of CCS. SPERBECK’s reliance was further reasonable because SPERBECK spoke with the school’s donor and confirmed that CCS had secured funding to pay a portion of his salary for the promised contract term. SPERBECK confirmed this information before he tendered his resignation to Jesuit High School.

86. SPERBECK would not have left his position at Jesuit but for the agreement to match his salary and benefits with a guaranteed term of employment.

87. When SPERBECK was presented on-boarding paperwork, his agreement did not specify his five-year term.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00293300-CU-CO-GDS: Marshall Sperbeck vs. Capital Christian Center 10/15/2025 Hearing on Demurrer to Third Amended Complaint in Department 54

He discussed this specifically with Rick Cole. Cole stated that the agreement was preliminary and ministerial in nature and promised to redraft SPERBECK’s employment agreement including the five-year employment term once the agreement was accepted.

88. COLE’s statements and promises to SPERBECK about his employment terms were false and made to appease SPERBECK and induce him to leave his Jesuit position.

89. COLE made the foregoing statements and promises to SPERBECK about his employment terms without an intention to perform them.

90. COLE knew that his statements and promises were false when they were made and that he did not intend to perform them because he knew that donor funds could not be designated for a particular employee’s salary. ....

92. SPERBECK relied on Mr. Cole’s position as a President of a Christian Worship Center and School to keep his promises and accepted the preliminary offer as drafted.

93. Once employed, SPERBECK became a member of Defendants’ Executive Team and worked closely with . . . . ARMBRUST, LEPISI, SORGEA and GARZA to run CCS in that capacity.

94. Despite numerous promises to revise SPERBECK’s agreement, Cole avoided discussions with SPERBECK about his contract and CCS failed to reduce the promised terms to writing. .... 101. In early 2020, CCC hired Tim Wong as the Head of School for CCS. .... 102. Following Wong’s hire, Plaintiffs SPERBECK, ARMBRUST, LEPISI, GARZA and SORGEA . . . met with

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00293300-CU-CO-GDS: Marshall Sperbeck vs. Capital Christian Center 10/15/2025 Hearing on Demurrer to Third Amended Complaint in Department 54

Rick Cole and Jason Batt . . . to discuss concerns about Wong. In addition to discussing their employment security, Plaintiffs discussed concerns that Wong would engage in conduct detrimental to Capital Christian financially. 103. Cole told Wong that he had spoken to Plaintiffs and described their complaints. Wong then told the Plaintiffs who were Executive Team members that he considered them to be “disloyal” because they had warned Cole about him and that he could not trust them. 104. . . . CCC/CCS fired SPERBECK on/about March 3, 2020. .... 111. As a direct and proximate result of CCC's fraudulent statements and false promises, SPERBECK was terminated and has suffered economic damages, including but not limited to past and future wage loss, lost benefits, lost career opportunities and has lost increases that would directly impact his retirement benefits. (3AC ¶¶ 1-111.)

Legal Standard

A demurrer may be sustained only if the challenged pleading lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (See Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 778.) “[P]laintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . ., [the Court is] not concerned with plaintiff's possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.”(Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733 [citation omitted].)

A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action - not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.)

Discussion

Defendants demur to the 3AC’s third cause of action (Sperbeck’s claim of fraud – false

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00293300-CU-CO-GDS: Marshall Sperbeck vs. Capital Christian Center 10/15/2025 Hearing on Demurrer to Third Amended Complaint in Department 54

promise/misrepresentation)[1] on the ground that Sperbeck “does not sufficiently or properly allege ‘promissory fraud.’” (Mem. of P.&A. ISO Demurrer (“MPA”) 1:14-15.) In particular, Defendants argue that Sperbeck fails to plead actionable scienter and does “not address the defect[] identified in the Court’s prior order [on Defendants’ demurrer to the SAC, i.e., that] ‘Plaintiffs fail[ed] to allege that Cole made the promises without an intention to perform.’” (MPA 3:22-4:4, 5:4.) Defendants further argue that the allegations concerning the meeting, during which a prominent CCS donor confirmed his commitment to pay portions of Sperbeck’s salary, undermine this cause of action. (MPA 4:13-6:19.)

Plaintiffs oppose the demurrer, rejoining that they “carefully considered the Court’s previous rulings on challenges to the pleadings and [have] properly pled the Third cause of action in the [3AC].” (Opp’n 1:4-6.)

The Court agrees that the third cause of action is sufficiently pled.

“The elements of fraud that will give rise to a tort action for deceit are: (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 974 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].) “Each element must be alleged with particularity.” (Beckwith v. Dahl (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1060.)

“ ‘Promissory fraud,’ as is alleged in this case, is a subspecies of the action for fraud and deceit. ‘A promise to do something necessarily implies the intention to perform; hence, where a promise is made without such intention, there is an implied misrepresentation of fact that may be actionable fraud. [Citations]’ [Citation.]” (Moncada v. West Coast Quartz Corp. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 768, 776.)

Here, Sperbeck alleges Cole made the promises concerning the terms of his employment with Defendants “without an intention to perform them.” (3AC ¶ 89.) The Court of Appeal has held that such a general averment is sufficient to allege both the defendant’s lack of intent to perform a promise and the scienter element. (See Beckwith v. Dahl (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1060-1062 [stating that “the only necessary averment is the general statement that the promise was made without the intention to perform it, or that the defendant did not intend to perform it,” and that such an averment “also sufficiently [pleads] the element of scienter”].)

Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer on those two bases is overruled. Sperbeck has sufficiently alleged that Cole made the referenced promises without the intent to perform them and scienter.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00293300-CU-CO-GDS: Marshall Sperbeck vs. Capital Christian Center 10/15/2025 Hearing on Demurrer to Third Amended Complaint in Department 54

Further, the Court finds that the allegations concerning Sperbeck’s conversation with the CCS donor do not somehow weaken the sufficiency of his allegations of promissory fraud against Defendants. Sperbeck does not name the donor as a defendant, and he does not allege a conspiracy between the donor and Defendants. Rather, he alleges facts concerning his conversation with the donor to support his allegation that he reasonably relied on Cole’s promises concerning the terms of his employment. (See Compl. ¶ 85 [“Sperbeck’s reliance was further reasonable because [he] spoke with the school’s donor and confirmed that CCS had secured funding to pay a portion of his salary for the promised contract term.”].)

For the stated reasons, Defendants’ demurrer is denied in its entirety.

In light of its ruling, the Court does not reach Defendants’ arguments concerning the alleged promises Cole made to Sperbeck about his position being “secure” after Wong was hired (see MPA 6:21-7:22), because a general demurrer does not lie to only a part of a cause of action, and Sperbeck has sufficiently alleged a promissory fraud cause of action against Defendants based upon the alleged promises Cole made to him concerning the terms of his employment. (PH II, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682.)

Defendants shall file an answer to the 3AC no later than October 27, 2025.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

[1] The Court notes that other moving papers, the Notice of Demurrer and Demurrer, reference additional causes of action. However, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities filed in support of the Demurrer only challenges the third cause of action. Therefore, the Court limits its discussion to that claim.