Stepp, Kylie v. Kalkat, Jasdeep

Plaintiff also relies on the statutory language of CCP 581c(c) which provides that unless otherwise stated the judgment operates as an adjudication on the merits. In the Court’s view, the language in 581c(c) does not alter long standing case law that statute of limitations is not a merits based adjudication. There are numerous published decisions affirming that principle.

CCP 581c(c) is a general rule that the disposition was on the merits. Conversely, this case law is a specific rule that statute of limitations dispositions are not on the merits. The particular provision is a nearer and more exact view of the subject than the general, of which it may be regarded as a correction. (Gardena Hospital, L.P. v. Baass (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 678, 683)

Because the Court finds the previous judgment does not constitute a merits based ruling for res judicata and collateral estoppel purposes, the demurrer is overruled. The Court declines ruling on other issues, including whether the claims involve the same primary rights, and whether Plaintiff has sufficiently pled delayed discovery for purposes of CCP 338. Defendants shall file an answer within 20 days’ notice of this order. The Court will prepare the order.

13. 25CV04780 Stepp, Kylie v. Kalkat, Jasdeep

EVENT: Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint

The demurrer is overruled with respect to all causes of action. Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice is granted. In order for the [statute of limitations] bar to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint. (Richtek USA, Inc. v. uPI Semiconductor Corp. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 651, 658)

Paragraph 13 of the complaint states: “Despite repeated assurances, Defendant never fulfilled his promise to legally marry Plaintiff or share the assets and income that were to be jointly owned.” The court, trial and appellate, accepts all facts alleged in the complaint as true, and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of the plaintiff. (Kruss v. Booth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 699, 713)

Here, making inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the promise to legally marry and the promise to share in assets are separate promises. Unlike the promise to legally marry (which had a 90 day time window after the ceremony), the Complaint does not identify a specific time in which the more general promise to share in assets was to be performed.