| Case | County / Judge | Motion | Ruling | Indexed | Hearing |
|---|
Demurrer
SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA Department 13 Honorable Daniel T. Nishigaya R. Belligan, Courtroom Clerk 191 North First Street, San Jose, CA 95113 Telephone: 408-882-2240
DATE: May 20, 2026 TIME: 9:00 & 9:01 A.M. TO CONTEST A TENTATIVE RULING, YOU MUST CALL (408) 808-6856 BEFORE 4:00 P.M. ON THE DAY PRIOR TO THE HEARING. You must also inform all other sides to the issue before 4:00 P.M. the day prior to the hearing that you plan to contest the ruling. The Court will not hear argument, and the tentative ruling will be adopted if these notifications are not made. (Cal. Rule of Court 3.1308(a)(1); Civil Local Rule 8.D.)
LINE # CASE # CASE TITLE RULING LINE 1 25CV463413 Rob Millier vs TESLA, INC. Motion for Enforcement of Judgment
Ctrl Click (or scroll down) on Line 1 for tentative ruling. LINE 2 25CV477456 Stonecrest Acquisitions, LLC vs David Hearing: Demurrer Schultz et al Ctrl Click (or scroll down) on Line 2 for tentative ruling. LINE 3 24CV435105 Salvatore Bonina vs Eri Matsushita et al Motion: Summary Judgment/Adjudication
Ctrl Click (or scroll down) on Line 3 for tentative ruling. LINE 4 23CV413954 Jabil Inc. vs Human Bees, Inc. Motion: Compel Appearance at Deposition
Ctrl Click (or scroll down) on Line 4 for tentative ruling. LINE 5 25CV468979 ANDRES LOPEZ et al vs FORD Hearing: Petition Compel Arbitration MOTOR COMPANY et al Ctrl Click (or scroll down) on Line 5 for tentative ruling. LINE 6 24CV452320 William Dresser et al vs Arghavan Amini Hearing: Demurrer et al Ctrl Click (or scroll down) on Line 6 for tentative ruling.
Calendar Line 2
Case Name: Stonecrest Acquisitions, LLC v. David Schultz, et al. Case No.: 25CV477456
Before the Court is Defendant David Schultz’s (“Defendant” or “Mr. Schultz”) demurrer to the Complaint filed by Plaintiff Stonecrest Acquisitions, LLC (“Plaintiff” or “Stonecrest”).
This is an action for breach of contract. According to the allegations of the Complaint, on July 7, 2025, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a “Property Purchase and Sale Agreement” (the “Agreement”) pursuant to which Defendant agreed to sell his interest in real property located at 5324 Borneo Circle in San Jose to Plaintiff for $360,000. (Complaint, ¶¶ 2, 7, 8.) Escrow was to be opened within three days of the execution of the Agreement, however, Mr. Schultz and co-defendant Sandra Lynn Hammack (“Ms. Hammack”) allegedly conspired to interfere with the sale and took actions to prevent the close of escrow. (Id., ¶ 9.)
Looking for case law or statutes not cited here? Search published authorities
Examples: “Why did the court rule this way?” · “What were the procedural grounds?” · “Is appearance required?”
On August 6, 2025, Mr. Schultz’s Homeowners Association (“HOA”) received a payoff demand for full payment for the outstanding balance on the HOA collection amount, but Ms. Hammack took deliberate steps to prevent the HOA from satisfying that demand. (Complaint, ¶ 10.)
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs initiated this action with the filing of the Complaint on October 13, 2025, asserting claims for: (1) breach of contract (against Mr. Schultz); (2) intentional interference with contractual relations (against Ms. Hammack); (3) negligent interference with contractual relations (against Ms. Hammack); and (4) conspiracy (against all defendants). Defendant demurs to the first cause of action on the ground of failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and uncertainty and demurs to the fourth cause of action on the ground of uncertainty. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e) and (f). Plaintiff opposes the motion.
Defendant’s demurrer to the first and fourth causes of action on the ground of uncertainty is OVERRULED. “A special demurrer for uncertainty is not intended to reach the failure to incorporate sufficient facts in the pleading but is directed at the uncertainty existing in the allegations actually made.” (Butler v. Sequeira (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 143, 145-146.) Such a demurer “is strictly construed even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v.
Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) To avoid a demurrer for uncertainty, a pleading merely needs to “set forth the essential facts of [the] case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of [the] cause of action.” (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 714, 719, internal citations and quotations omitted.) Thus, a demurer for uncertainty “should not be sustained if the allegations are sufficiently clear to apprise the defendant of the issues that must be met, even if the allegations of the complaint may not be as clear and as detailed as might be desired.” (Merlino v.
West Coast Macaroni Mfg. Co. (1956) 90 Cal.App.2d 106, 108.) The first and fourth causes of action are both sufficient clearly to apprise Defendant of the nature of each claim, far from “ambiguous” as he claims, and any specific uncertainties can be clarified in discovery.
Defendant maintains Plaintiff fails to state a claim for breach of contract because (1) Plaintiff fails to allege that it was ready, willing and able to perform as of the date required by the Agreement and (2) Plaintiff fails to state a claim for specific performance because it does not allege that damages are an inadequate remedy at law. None of the contentions are persuasive.
First, the first cause of action is not explicitly pleaded as a claim for specific performance, but rather merely breach of contract. While Plaintiff does pray for a judgment of specific performance at the conclusion of the Complaint, to the extent Defendant believes that Plaintiff has not pleaded entitlement to such relief the proper mechanism to raise that issue is a motion to strike and not a demurrer. Further, even if Defendant had properly challenged the relief requested, the Court is not persuaded that his argument would be meritorious.
While it is generally the case that specific performance requires that the plaintiff not have an adequate remedy at law (see Blackburn v. Charnley (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 758, 766), as Plaintiff notes, there is presumption “that the breach of any agreement to transfer real property cannot be adequately compensated for by money damages” (BD Inns v. Pooley (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 289; see also Civ. Code, § 3387).
Second, none of the authorities cited by Defendant provide that a plaintiff claiming anticipatory breach of contract- as Plaintiff does here- must expressly allege that he was ready, willing and able to perform as required by the contract. Instead, these authorities pertain to the evidentiary burden of such a plaintiff at trial or summary judgment. (See Ersa Grae Corp. v. Fluor Corp. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 613, 616; see also County of Solano v. Vallejo Redevelopment Agency (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1273.) Defendant otherwise fails to substantiate his argument that a specific allegation regarding Plaintiff’s ability to perform is required at the pleading stage. In accordance with the foregoing, Defendant’s demurrer to the first cause of action on the ground of failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is OVERRULED.
The Court will prepare the final order.
- oo0oo -
6