REDSTAR VS ABOVE ALL SERVICES

In Opposition, Plaintiff contends that: (1) The holdings of Rogers v. Whitson (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 662 and Truestone, Inc. v. Simi West Industrial Park II (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 715 support the legal principle that, while a subcontractor who has no direct contractual relationship with a property owner ordinarily may not recover on a quantum meruit or unjust enrichment theory, there may be circumstances where the extent of the parties' dealings can give rise to a cause of action for equitable relief.; (2) The Quantum Meruit cause of action and the Unjust Enrichment cause of action are not duplicative. They contain different allegations.

In Reply, Defendant contends that (1) Plaintif’s unjust enrichment claim is not a cause of action and is duplicative of its quantum meruit cause of action; (2) Plaintiff ignore the “widely accepted” and “long and well established” rule precluding a subcontractor’s quasi-contract claims against the property owner; (3) the demurrer should be sustained without leave to amend.

Demurrer

A general demurrer lies where the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (CCP § 430.10(e).) In evaluating a demurrer, the court gives the pleading a reasonable interpretation by reading it as a whole and all of its parts in their context. (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125.) The court assumes the truth of all material facts which have been properly pleaded, of facts which may be inferred from those expressly pleaded, and of any material facts of which judicial notice has been requested and may be taken. (Crowley v.

Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 672.) However, a demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Daar v. Yellow Cab Company (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.) Facts appearing in exhibits attached to the complaint will also be accepted as true and, if contrary allegations appear in the complaint, will be given precedence. (Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 606.) If the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend if there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank v.

Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)

3rd Cause of Action - Quantum Meruit

Quantum meruit permits a party to recover the reasonable value of services rendered in absence of an express contract. (Pacific Bay Recovery, Inc. v. California Physicians Service (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 200, 215.) “To recover in quantum meruit, a party need not prove the existence of a contract, but it must show the circumstances were such that ‘the services were rendered under some understanding or expectation of both parties that compensation therefor was to be made.’” (Huskinson & Brown v. Wolf (2004) 32 Cal.4th 453, 458.)

To recover in quantum meruit, the “plaintiff must establish both that he or she was acting pursuant to either an express or implied request for such services from the defendant and that the services rendered were intended to and did benefit the defendant”; further, the defendant must have retained [the] benefit with full appreciation of the facts.’” (Pacific Bay Recovery, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at 214-215.) “The idea that one must be benefited by the goods and services bestowed is thus integral to recovery in quantum meruit; hence courts have always required that the plaintiff have bestowed some benefit on the defendant as a prerequisite to recovery.” (Day v.

Alta Bates Medical Ctr. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 243, 249.)

Here, the parties do not dispute the elements of a claim for quasi-contract. Instead, in the Opposition, Plaintiff cites two cases where it was held that a property owner has no liability to a subcontractor beyond the subcontractor’s mechanics lien: Rogers v. Whitson (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 662 and Truestone, Inc. v. Simi West Industrial Park II (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 715.) Plaintiff contends that these cases denied quasi-contractual recovery because there was no allegation that the owner failed to pay the general contract.

These cases held only that “[a] subcontractor, who has no direct contractual relationship with the property owner, may generally not recover on an unjust enrichment theory for benefits conferred on the property.” (Truestone, 163 Cal.Ap..3d at 724.) It noted that this principal is “widely accepted.” (Id.) The Court did not state that its ruling would be different if the property owner had not paid the general contractor, and “a decision is not authority for propositions not considered by the court.” (Maria Torres v.

City of Yorba Linda (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1035, fn. 5.)

Further, in Rogers, the Court referenced the “long and well established” rule cited in the moving papers that “in the absence of contractual privity the right to enforce a mechanics’ lien against real property does not give rise to personal liability on the part of the owner.” (228 Cal.App.2d at 673.) While the Rogers court did note there was no unjust enrichment, it was far from being the basis of its holding. The court merely mentioned it at the end of its opinion addressing a “miscellany of minor contentions” (id. at 675) from the plaintiff subcontractor, one of which was that the landowner would be unjustly enriched at the subcontractor’s expense absent common counts. (Id. at 676.)

The court responded first with the “simple answer” that “plaintiff could have protected himself it he had exercised his lien rights against the property owner” (id.) (which Plaintiff is already doing here), and “[h]aving failed [sic] to do so, his remedies were against [the general contractor] with whom he stood in contractual privity” (id.) (which Plaintiff is also doing here). The court then finally noted, after a “furthermore,” that the property owner had paid its general contractor. (Id.) The throw away point in response to a “minor contention” is not the court’s holding or the basis of it, or a reason for this Court to deviate from clear authority.

Also, in addition to failing to meaningfully distinguish Truestone and Rogers, Plaintiff fails to cite a single case in which a court allowed a subcontractor to pursue quasi-contract or quantum meruit claims against a property owner, regardless of whether a property owner paid its general contractor. Instead, Plaintiff is asking this Court to ignore “widely accepted” and “long and well established” law by creating an exception no court has ever applied. SUSTAINED

6th Cause of Action – Unjust Enrichment

The California Court of Appeal has explicitly held that “unjust enrichment merely duplicates [a] claim for quantum meruit and is not a separate cause of action.” (Jogani v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 901, 904, fn. 2.) “Rather, it is a general principal underlying various doctrines and remedies, including quasi-contract.” (Id. at 911.) A plaintiff’s “attempt to plead a separate cause of action entitled ‘unjust enrichment’ [in addition to a ‘quantum meruit’ claim] adds nothing” and is to be ignored. (Id. at 911; see also Melchior v.

New Line Productions, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 793 (“[T]here is no cause of action in California for unjust enrichment. The phrase ‘Unjust Enrichment’ does not describe a theory of recovery, but an effect: the result of a failure to make restitution under circumstances where it is equitable to do so. Unjust enrichment is a general principle, underlying various legal doctrines and remedies, rather than a remedy itself. It is synonymous with restitution.” (cites omitted)

In the Opposition, Plaintiff cites no authority that supports it claim that it can maintain both an unjust enrichment and quantum meruit cause of action. As noted by Defendant, it also fails to address conclusive language Defendant provided in its moving papers (and during meet and confer efforts, see Kinnear Dec., Exh.1, second page) holding that “unjust enrichment merely duplicates [a] claim for quantum meruit and is not a separate cause of action.” (See above.)

Also, in opposition, Plaintiff points to different language it used pleading the two claims but cites no authority holding that doing so saves a claim that the courts referenced above held does not exist. Plaintiff further concedes that “[a]lthough pleaded as separate causes of action, both the quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims were based on the same factual allegations.” (Opp., p. 3:22.) They are based on the same factual allegations, and are in fact the same, which is why the Jogani court and others held unjust enrichment is duplicative of quantum meruit and improper. SUSTAINED

4. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LIMITED DISCOVERY PURSUANT TO CODE OF CVPS2601049 MILLER VS BIANCO CIVIL PROCEDURE § 425.16(G) BY VEM MILLER Tentative Ruling: Denied.

Responding party to provide notice pursuant to CCP 1019.5.

This is a defamation action. On February 2, 2026, Plaintiff Ven Miller (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendants Riverside County Sheriff Chad Bianco (“Bianco”) and County of Riverside (“County”)(together “Defendants”) for: (1) libel per se; (2) slander per se; (3) defamation by implication; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”); and (5) violation of mandatory duty.

In the operative complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he is a media professional who supports President Donald Trump and attended over 20 events for him from 2020 to 2024. (Complaint at ¶¶ 17-18.) After learning of an upcoming presidential campaign rally for candidate Donald Trump in California, on October 8, 2024, Plaintiff travelled from Nevada to California with two of his lawful firearms in his vehicle to attend the rally. (Complaint at ¶¶ 19-20.) On the afternoon of October 12, 2024, the day of the rally, Plaintiff approached a sheriff’s deputy 20 yards prior to a checkpoint and a mile from the rally venue, disclosed that he had two firearms secured in his vehicle, and asked if the deputies wanted to hold onto his guns. (Complaint at ¶¶ 21-22.)

Thereafter, the deputies detained him, searched his vehicle, and ultimately arrested him for two misdemeanor firearms violations, which have since been dismissed. (Complaint at ¶ 23.) Plaintiff was booked at the John Benoit Detention Center, where he repeatedly requested his right to make a phone call, but his requests were denied. (Complaint at ¶¶ 24-25.) FBI and Secret service agents assessed the incident, determined Plaintiff posed no threat to presidential candidate Donald Trump, and informed Sheriff Bianco of this determination by the morning of October 13, 2024. (Complaint at ¶¶ 26-27, 30.)

Plaintiff was released from custody early on October 13, 2024. (Complaint at ¶ 28.) At approximately 6:30 am on October 13, 2024, Riverside County Sheriff Bianco sent a message to The Epoch Times claiming that Plaintiff, a Trump supporter, was arrested the previous day for minor firearms violations and had stated he was going to kill the President, even though Plaintiff made no such statement. (Complaint at ¶¶ 1, 29, 31-32.) Sheriff Bianco sent the text before the incident became national news and before there was any media inquiry necessitating a response. (Complaint at ¶ 33.)

The information then spread to over 300 news outlets within 24 hours. (Complaint at ¶¶ 34, 44.) Later that morning, after being advised by federal authorities that Plaintiff posed no threat to President Trump, Sheriff Bianco gave an interview to the Riverside Press-Enterprise stating that deputies had stopped another