DEVORE MASON, et al. vs HUYNH, et al.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with

25CV010570: DEVORE MASON, et al. vs HUYNH, et al. 11/13/2025 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 53

a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING: Defendants Diane and My Huynh’s motion to strike self-represented Plaintiffs Daniel Bernal Corea’s and Allison Lynn Devore Mason’s complaint is granted in part and denied in part as set forth below.

In this action, Plaintiffs filed a judicial council form complaint alleging causes of action for motor vehicle and intentional tort. There are no factual allegations included in the complaint. Plaintiffs attached 30 pages of exhibits to the complaint, including a Traffic Crash Report regarding a March 7, 2025 motor vehicle accident.

Defendants move to strike ¶ 14a(2) of the form complaint (the box for punitive damages), in addition to the Traffic Crash Report attached as Exhibit 1 to the complaint.

A motion to strike is appropriate to strike out any irrelevant, false or improper matter asserted in any pleading and the Court may strike out all or any party of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the law. (See Code Civ. Pro. § 436 (a)-(c).) A motion to strike challenges portions of a cause of action that are substantively defective on the face of the complaint. (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682-83; see also Code of Civ. Proc. § 437.) More specifically, a motion to strike should be granted to remove 'any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading,' or where the pleadings are drawn in violation of a law, rule or court order. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 436.) Examples of 'improper' matters include allegations which are 'at variance with the contract.' (California Sugar & White Pine Agency v. Penoyar (1914) 167 Cal. 274, 279.

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading, (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc, § 436.) A motion to strike is limited to the face of the challenged pleading or any matter of which the Court may take judicial notice. (CCP § 437(a).) The use of the motion to strike should be cautious and sparing. It should not be a procedural 'line item veto'. (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal. App. 4th 1680, 1683.)

At the outset, the Court must note that Plaintiffs opposition does not refer to a single allegation in the complaint to argue that punitive damages have been sufficiently alleged. Indeed, there are no actual facts set forth in the body of the complaint. Rather, Plaintiffs refer to a number of “facts” regarding details of the alleged accident which are not set forth in the complaint itself, including

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010570: DEVORE MASON, et al. vs HUYNH, et al. 11/13/2025 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 53

statements Mr. Huynh made to Mr. Correa before police arrived. (Opp. 1:20-3:6.) None of these matters are alleged in the complaint and cannot be considered for purposes of this motion. The Court cannot consider extrinsic evidence on demurrer or motion to strike. A demurrer or motion to strike “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Extrinsic evidence may not properly be considered on a pleading motion such as a demurrer or motion to strike. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal. App. 3d 868, 881.)

In addition, Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice made in the body of their opposition is denied. Pursuant to California Rule of Court Rule 3.1113(l), “[a]ny request for judicial notice must be made in a separate document listing the specific items for which notice is requested and must comply with rule 3.1306(c).” Plaintiffs failed to file a separate document as required by CRC 3.1113(l).

Punitive Damages

In order to plead an entitlement to punitive damages a plaintiff must allege that the defendant is guilty of “oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civil Code §3294(a).) “Malice” under Civil Code §3294(c)(1) means conduct intended to injure the plaintiff or despicable conduct by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of others. Malice “based on a conscious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights, requires proof that the defendant’s conduct is ‘despicable’ and ‘willful.’” (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1211.) “‘[D]espicable’ connotes conduct that is ‘ so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.’” (Id. [citations omitted].)

Despicable conduct includes “that which is in blatant violation of law or policy.” (American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter, & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1050.) Indeed, “[e]ven ‘nonintentional torts’ may form the basis for punitive damages when the conduct constitutes conscious disregard of the rights or safety of other. [citation omitted] ‘Nonintentional conduct comes within the definition of malicious acts punishable by the assessment of punitive damages when a party intentionally performs an act from which he knows, or should know, it is highly probable harm will result.’ [citation omitted].” (Skf Farms v.

Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 907.) Nonetheless, the cases have uniformly recognized that proof of negligence, even gross negligence, or recklessness is insufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. (E.g., G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 31; see Taylor v. Superior Court, (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895, 900 [conc. opn. of Bird, C.J.], 907 [dis. opn. of Clark, J.]; Nolin v. National Convenience Stores, Inc. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 279, 285-286.)

It is true that punitive damages may be available in personal injury actions against one who drives while intoxicated. (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890.) “There is a very commonly understood risk which attends every motor vehicle driver who is intoxicated. [citation omitted] One who willfully consumes alcoholic beverage to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010570: DEVORE MASON, et al. vs HUYNH, et al. 11/13/2025 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 53

physical and mental facilities with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others. The effect may be lethal whether or not the driver has a history of drunk driving incidents.” (Id. at pp. 897-898.) A claim for punitive damages can be premised on despicable conduct involving consumption of alcoholic beverages. (Id at p. 899.)

While Plaintiffs argues in opposition that Taylor supports their request for punitive damages, the Court disagrees. In Taylor the essence of the punitive damages claim was that “Defendant became intoxicated and thereafter drove a car while in that condition, despite his knowledge of the safety hazard he created thereby. This is the essential gravamen of the complaint, and while a history of prior arrests, convictions and mishaps may heighten the probability and foreseeability of an accident, we do not deem these aggravating factors essential prerequisites to the assessment of punitive damages in drunk driving cases.” (Taylor, supra, 24 Cal.3d at 896-897.)

But Plaintiffs have not yet alleged Mr. Huynh willfully became intoxicated knowing he would be operating a motor vehicle despite knowledge of the risks created. Indeed, the form complaint contains no allegations at all directed towards Mr. Huynh. At the very most, the complaint attached the Traffic Collision Report which indicates that Mr. Huynh was driving under the influence. But, even if that were considered an allegation in the complaint, that would only be an allegation of driving while intoxicated.

Plaintiffs have not alleged, for example, that Mr. Huynh “voluntarily consumed alcohol, knowing he would then operate a motor vehicle, and drove while drunk, knowing the safety hazard he created and aware of the probable consequences of his conduct which he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid” which have been held sufficient under Taylor, supra, 24 Cal.3d 890. (Busboom v. Superior Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 550, 552-553.) Allegations that Mr. Huynh was intoxicated while driving by itself are not sufficient. (Dawes v.

Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 90 [“allegations of intoxication, excessive speed, driving with defective equipment or the running of a stop signal, without more, do not state a cause of action for punitive damages.”]

As currently pled, the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to claim punitive damages.

The motion to strike punitive damages is granted.

Exhibit 1 to the Complaint

Defendants also seek to strike the Traffic Crash Report. Defendants argue that the exhibit should be stricken because it is hearsay and is not admissible. Defendants cite no authority indicating that this is an appropriate basis for a motion to strike. Indeed, the hearsay rule is a rule of evidence. But the complaint and the exhibits attached to the complaint are not evidence. Whether or not Plaintiffs attempt to offer the Traffic Crash Report into evidence either at trial, or in connection with a motion, in violation of the hearsay rule is not an issue that is properly addressed on a motion to strike. The Court does note, as set forth above, that the Traffic Crash Report does not demonstrate that Plaintiffs properly alleged punitive damages.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010570: DEVORE MASON, et al. vs HUYNH, et al. 11/13/2025 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 53

The motion to strike Exhibit 1 is denied.

Defendants’ attempt to argue that Exhibit 8 to the complaint should be stricken is rejected. Defendants only moved to strike punitive damages and Exhibit 1. Defendants did not move to strike Exhibit 8. (Notice 2:1-3.)

In sum, the motion is granted as to punitive damages and denied as to Exhibit 1 to the complaint.

Given that this is the first challenge to the punitive damages claim, leave to amend is granted even though Plaintiffs did not request leave in their opposition. “If the plaintiff has not had an opportunity to amend the complaint in response to the demurrer, leave to amend is liberally allowed as a matter of fairness, unless the complaint shows on its face that it is incapable of amendment.” (City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 747.)

Plaintiffs may file and serve an amended complaint no later than November 26, 2025. Defendants shall file and serve their response within 30 days thereafter, 35 days if the amended complaint is served by mail as modified by the CCP 430.41 extension if necessary.

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system as required by Local Rule 1.06(D). Defendants’ counsel is ordered to notify Plaintiffs immediately of the tentative ruling system and to be available at the hearing in person, via Zoom or by telephone, in the event Plaintiffs appear without following the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.