Motion for Attorney Fees
Loretta Salinas v. General Motors, LLC, 25CV-0175
Hearing: Motion for Attorney Fees
Date: May 27, 2026
Loretta Salinas (Plaintiff) filed this action against General Motors, LLC (Defendant) alleging violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Civil Code sections 1790 et seq. (the Act). Plaintiff alleged she purchased a 2024 Chevrolet Trailblazer (the Vehicle) from Defendant that suffered from nonconformity(s) to warranty, including, but not limited to, the cameras, electrical, terminal connector, infotainment screen, stabilitrak, and other defects.
The parties mediated and entered into a settlement, whereby Defendant agreed to repurchase Plaintiff’s vehicle for $35,596.59, pay a civil penalty of $49,403.41, and pay Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and costs determined via a noticed motion with Plaintiff as the prevailing party for purposes of the motion. (Declaration of Scott A. Sanchez (Sanchez Dec.), ¶ 2, Ex. 1.)
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees. Plaintiff seeks to recover $18,844.50 in fees incurred and $1,936.39 in costs 1 with a 0.2 multiplier on the fees, making the requested fees $22,613.40. These amounts include three hours of attorney fees for preparation of a reply and oral argument. (Sanchez Dec., ¶ 4.)
Defendant opposes the motion arguing that the requested fees should be reduced because the hourly rates and number of hours billed are unwarranted. Defendant contends that much of the work was unnecessary because the case settled prior to formal discovery and Plaintiff’s attorneys specialize in vehicle defect cases and regularly file pleadings, discovery, and motions very similar to those filed in this case.2
1. Reasonable Hourly Rate
In calculating an attorney fee award, the Court multiplies the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar work. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1134.) The party seeking fees bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the reasonable hours and billing rate. (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320.) “The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expended.” (Id.) Inefficient or duplicative efforts will not be compensated. (Id. at pp. 1315, 1324 [fee award reduced where “much of the work done by the different lawyers was duplicative and unnecessary”].)
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1 Plaintiff asserts that she filed a memorandum of costs contemporaneously with filing the subject motion. (Sanchez Dec., ¶ 3.) There is no memorandum of costs in the Court’s file, but a memorandum of costs is attached to the Sanchez Dec. as Ex. 2. 2 The Court overrules Plaintiff’s objection to the Declaration of Evan T. Martin.
Plaintiff’s counsel is based in Los Angeles County and provides no evidence that the proposed billing rates are the reasonable prevailing hourly rate in San Luis Obispo County. Nor is there evidence that capable local counsel was not available. (See, Rey v. Madera Unified School Dist. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1241; Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233.)
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates are too high, but like Plaintiff, fails to provide evidence supporting the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in San Luis Obispo County for similar work.
In Tidrick v. FCA US LLC (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1147, the appellate court reversed a fee award because the lower court erred in failing to determine the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community. “The relevant ‘community’ is generally based on where the services are rendered, i.e., where the court is located.” (Id. at p. 1157 [citation omitted] [reasonable hourly rate was that charged by consumer attorneys practicing in the local legal community in the county where the action was filed].)
Plaintiff improperly relies on rulings from superior courts in other, larger counties to support her position. (Sanchez Dec., ¶ 15.) Superior court orders and rulings from unrelated cases have “no precedential value” and are “not citable authority.” (Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments Inc. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 360, 399; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115, subd. (a).) Further, the rulings are also irrelevant since none are from San Luis Obispo County.
Plaintiff filed the Supplemental Declaration of Joseph A. Kaufman (Kaufman Dec.) with her reply. Attached to the Kaufman Dec. is this Court’s ruling in Michael Acker v. Ford Motor Co. et al., San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, Case No. 21CV-00721R (Acker) wherein the Court approved attorney Kaufman’s $595 hourly rate.3
In determining reasonable hourly rates “the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009), the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied (Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 700) . . . and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases. (Heritage, at p. 1009.)” (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437.)
The Court finds that the legal market in San Luis Obispo supports Mr. Kaufman’s $595 hourly rate, as it is within the reasonable range of rates prevailing in the community for similar contingency work.
3 The Court notes that in Acker “the parties litigated the matter thoroughly; the parties exchanged written discovery; Ford filed a motion for summary judgment, that was denied; prepared for expert witness discovery; conducted numerous depositions, including those of Plaintiff and multiple Ford PMQs; and the parties participated in settlement negotiations, amongst other actions.” (Supplemental Declaration of Joseph A. Kaufman, Ex. A, p. 5.) Here, the complaint was filed on March 21, 2025. Defendant filed a general denial with affirmative defenses on April 24, 2025. The parties settled in September of 2025, six months after the case was filed.
The proposed hourly rate for attorney Scott A. Sanchez is $375. Mr. Sanchez became an attorney and began practice in consumer protection in November of 2023. He argues that “rates of $1,000 per hour are common for BigLaw firms for 2nd year associates” (Sanchez Dec., p. 5, lns. 23-26) but the standard is firms in San Luis Obispo County, not “BigLaw firms.” Nonetheless, the Court finds that $375 per hour is within the reasonable range for similar contingency work in the community.
2. Multiplier
The Court finds that a multiplier is not warranted in this case. The case was settled six months after it was filed. Plaintiff argues “[a] defendant ‘cannot litigate tenaciously and then be heard to complain about the time necessarily spent by the plaintiff in response’ ” (Reply, p. 2, lns. 9-10), but there is little evidence of litigation, let alone tenacious litigation, in this case.
3. Reasonable Number of Hours
The Court has reviewed the parties’ arguments and highlighted billing entries. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s attorneys billed for administrative and routine tasks that are more apt for a paralegal or even a legal assistant. (Opposition, p. 5, lns. 11-12.) The Court disagrees and finds that the attorney entries are for tasks that may be done by attorneys and that counsel did not expend excessive time on those tasks.
Defendant cites a federal court opinion for its contention that the Court cannot award estimated fees for work not yet performed. (Opposition, p. 6, lns. 3-10.) The decisions of the state courts of appeal are binding on all superior courts of this state (Cuccia v. Superior Ct. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 347, 353) while federal opinions interpreting state law are not binding. (McCann v. Lucky Money, Inc., 129 Cal.App.4th 1382, 1396.)
Published state court opinions regularly award fees based on attorney estimates of reasonable time for specified tasks. (See, e.g., City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 785 [attorney declaration sufficient evidence for fee motion estimating five hours would be expended at the hearing and responding to opposition]; G.R. v. Intelligator (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 606.)
The Court finds that the time estimated for reply and argument is not excessive. The other billing entries do not appear excessive or unreasonably duplicative.
4. Ruling
The Court awards a total of $ $18,844.50 in fees and $1,936.39 in costs. Plaintiff is directed to file the memorandum of costs.
3