Ramona Olivas v. General Motors, LLC

(Stanley Mosk Courthouse: Dept. 400) August 24, 2026 DEPARTMENT 400 LAW AND MOTION RULINGS

The Court tenders the following tentative decision in the matter Ramona Olivas v. General Motors, LLC, Los Angeles County Superior Court case number 25STCV01162, set for hearing on August 24, 2026. Ramona Olivas (Plaintiff) moves for an award of attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $23,579.41 against General Motors, LLC (Defendant). Plaintiff's motion is granted in the partial amount of $18,800.21.

A. Legal Standard

"[A]s a general rule, attorney fees are not recoverable as costs unless they are authorized by statute or agreement." (People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. Speedee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 424, 429.)

If the buyer prevails on an action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, "the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action." (Civ. Code, Sec. 1794, subd. (d).)

"In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other costs." (Civ. Code, Sec. 1717, subd. (a).)

The court may determine fees pursuant to the section upon notice and motion by a party. The party prevailing on the contract is that "who recovered a greater relief in the action on the contract." (Id., Sec. 1717, subd. (b)(1).) The court may also determine that there is no prevailing party.

The attorney bears the burden of proof as to "reasonableness" of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1033.5, subd. (c)(5).) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.)

A plaintiff's verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.)

"In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice." (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488.)

In determining whether the requested attorney's fees are "reasonable," the Court's "first step involves the lodestar figure--a calculation based on the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the lawyer's hourly rate. The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of facts specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided." (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2008) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 92.)

In determining whether to adjust the lodestar figure, the Court may consider the nature and difficulty of the litigation, the amount of money involved, the skill required and employed to handle the case, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case. (EnPalm LLC v. Teitler (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774 (EnPalm).)

Under Civil Code section 1794, courts must first make an initial determination of the actual time expended before ascertaining whether that amount of time and the amount thus charged are reasonable. (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 34.) In making such a determination, courts are to consider the complexity of the case, procedural demands, skill exhibited by counsel, and results achieved. (Ibid.)

If the time expended or resulting charge are not reasonable under these circumstances, the trial court must award a lesser amount. (Ibid.) It is the prevailing buyer's burden to show that the fees incurred were allowable, reasonably necessary to the litigation, and reasonable in amount. (Ibid.)

B.

Discussion

Plaintiff moves for a total award of attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $23,579.41, consisting of $21,208.20 in fees and $2,371.21 in costs incurred by Prestige Legal Solutions (PLS). This includes a lodestar multiplier of.2. Without the multiplier, the claim is for $17,673.50 plus costs of $2,371.21 for a total of $20,044.71.

As a prevailing party, under the Song-Beverly Act Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees based on actual time expended. (Civ. Code, Sec. 1794, subd. (d).) Pursuant to a 998 offer to compromise by Defendant, Plaintiff is also entitled to costs and expenses. (Pengilley Decl. P. 52, Ex. D.)

As a threshold matter, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees is untimely. "A notice of motion to claim attorney's fees for services up to and including the rendition of judgment in the trial court . . . must be served and filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal." (Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(b)(1).) A notice of appeal must be filed 60 days after a notice of entry of judgment is filed or 180 days after entry of judgment, whichever is earliest. (Id., rule 8.104(a)(1).)

"[A] compromise agreement contemplating payment by defendant and dismissal of the action by plaintiff is the legal equivalent of a judgment in plaintiff's favor." (DeSaulles v. Community Hospital of Monterey Peninsula (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1140, 1155 [quoting Goodstein v. Bank of San Pedro (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 899, 907].) Plaintiff dismissed this action on January 26, 2026. Plaintiff had 180 days thereafter, or until July 27, 2026, to file the present motion. This motion was filed June 30. Thus, it is timely.

Counsel's initial attorney's fee total is reduced by $1,244.50 due to Defendant's objections. Defendant raises many objections to the fees claimed by Plaintiff as excessive. The Court will address each in turn.

First, Defendant argues that counsel is not entitled to recover a $4,500 flat fee for work which occurred before the filing of Plaintiff's complaint. A buyer is entitled to attorney's fees "determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of" a Song-Beverly Action. (Civ. Code, Sec. 1794, subd. (d).) Attorney's fees relating to the commencement of an action would include those fees incurred prior to filing the complaint. The language of section 1794 does not preclude such fees as Defendant suggests. The Court finds $4,500 related to pre-commencement work reasonable. Thus, the Court declines to strike these fees.

Second, Defendant challenges various tasks by PLS, including the drafting of an objection to a notice of deposition, opposition to a motion for a protective order, discovery requests, and an opposition to a motion to compel initial disclosures. Defendant argues that these tasks could not have taken as long as the billing reflects because Lemon Law matters are highly formulaic and counsel already possessed templates for all relevant motions.

The Court finds that the hourly totals presented by Plaintiff are reasonable even if such templating was proven. Counsel still reasonably needed to spend time ensuring that documents were properly prepared and analyzing Defendant's own templated discovery demands to ensure that they were indeed consistent with prior filings. Indeed, Defendant's suggestion that Plaintiff should be awarded less fees because Defendant serves the same discovery in each case is not well taken -- attorneys should remain diligent in each individual matter. Additionally, the time taken to oppose Defendant's own motions, even if formulaic, is well spent. Thus, the Court finds these fees reasonable as well, with no category appearing excessive.

Third, Defendant challenges certain tasks as clerical and administrative work not properly billed by counsel. The Supreme Court has noted that purely clerical or administrative work should not be billed at an attorney or paralegal rate. (Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei (1989) 491 U.S. 274, 288, fn. 10.) Here, Defendant points to 2.6 hours billed for paralegals updating the case file and sending routine correspondence. Such ministerial tasks are properly stricken. Accordingly, the Court reduces counsel's fee award by $807.

Fourth, Defendant challenges certain routine tasks as examples of minimum increment billing. Specifically, Defendant points to the preparation of a case management statement, notice of case management conference, and notice of posting jury fees as tasks which could not possibly take 6 minutes each. While these are simple matters, a diligent attorney may take the time to double-check filings and spend up to 6 minutes preparing a simple document. Thus, the Court finds these fees reasonable as well.

Fifth, Defendant challenges hours billed by counsel to attend Court-ordered OSC hearings. Indeed, such hearings are avoidable with timely filings. Thus, these fees are not properly reimbursed as they were not necessary to the litigation. Accordingly, the Court reduces counsel's fee award by $437.50.

Sixth, Defendant challenges the 10.3 hours counsel alleges to have spent on the present attorney's fee motion and 5 hours spent drafting a reply. However, based on Defendant's fervent opposition, such hourly totals are reasonable. Counsel compiled great amounts of evidence to support its fee claims, carefully drafted the initial motion, and drafted a very detailed reply addressing every challenge made by Defendant to the fee motion. Thus, these hours are properly justified as well.

Counsel is not entitled to a fee multiplier. Plaintiff seeks a lodestar multiplier of 1.2. She bases this on the complexities of the present case and counsel's decision to advance litigation costs. However, the present action is a highly formulaic Song-Beverly case which does not justify a positive multiplier based on complexity. Nor is counsel's decision to advance litigation costs a dispositive factor. Thus, the Court does not award a multiplier.

Accordingly, after subtracting the $1,244.50 properly challenged by Defendant, the Court awards Plaintiff $16,429 in attorney's fees. Plaintiff is awarded $2,225.46 in costs. Plaintiff also seeks reimbursement for costs and expenses incurred in the amount of $2,371.21. (Pengilley Decl. P. 24, Ex. C.) Defendant challenges multiple claimed costs.

First, it challenges $66.50 in filing costs and $35.25 in electronic service costs related to oppositions to motions filed by Defendant. It is not outside the ordinary for a litigator to oppose the motions of the other party; thus, the Court does not strike these costs.

Second, it objects to $155.75 in jury fees because the case did not proceed to trial. But it is normal for counsel to preserve the right to a jury trial for their client, even if settlement is the ultimate goal and result. However these fees may be returned upon request. Therfore the Court does not award money for jury fees. Thus, these are not stricken either.

Third, Defendant challenges Plaintiff's deposition costs. But these are allowed under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(3)(A). Accordingly, the Court awards a total of $2,215.46 in costs.

In summary, the Court awards Plaintiff $16,429 in attorney's fees, does not award a lodestar multiplier, and awards Plaintiff $2,225.46 in costs. Thus, Defendant is ordered to pay $18,654.46 in attorney's fees and costs ([$16,429 in fees] + [$2,225.46 in costs] = $18,654.46).

Conclusion: The Court grants Plaintiff's motion in the partial amount of $18,654.46.

Case Number: 25STCV04351 Hearing Date: August 24, 2026 Dept: 400 MOTION FOR LEAVE

The Court tenders the following decision in the matter Narine Deremsezyan v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC, et al., Los Angeles County Superior Court case number 25STCV04351, set for hearing on August 24, 2026. Narine Deremsezyan (Plaintiff) moves for leave to file a first amended complaint (FAC) in this matter. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC, et al. (collectively, Defendants) have not filed an opposition. The motion is granted.

A.

Legal Standard

The court may, in its discretion and after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading, including adding or striking out the name of any party, or correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 473, subd. (a)(1).) California courts are required to permit liberal amendment of pleadings in the interest of justice between the parties to an action. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 473, subd. (a); Dieckmann v. Superior Court (1985) 175