Zinchefsky vs. Zinchefsky

Per the Complaint, Janie L. Mulrain “is the Successor Trustee of the Zinchefsky Trust and the Personal Representative of Mary’s Estate.” (¶31 of FAC; See also ¶24, ¶42 of FAC [ROA No. 62].)

While Plaintiff asserts standing under Welfare & Institutions Code section 15657.3, subdivision (d)(2), the First Amended Complaint does not allege the personal representative refused to commence or maintain an action. Instead, the complaint concedes that Ms. Mulrain has filed a petition requesting instructions from the probate court. (¶24 and ¶77 of FAC.) At best, Plaintiff asserts Ms. Mulrain is handling the petition for instructions poorly, asserting she omitted “discussion of charges that occurred on Steven’s own banking cards” and “conducted no investigation or discovery beyond what Ryan provided to her.” (¶78 and ¶82 of FAC.)

Per the First Amended Complaint, however, the above deficiencies led to Plaintiff “filing a Declaration ‘in support’ of the Petition,” within the probate action, which included additional evidence. (¶86-¶87 of FAC.) Plaintiff also alleges he filed a second petition of his own, which requests “court supervision of Trustee Mulrain’s administration” and examination of the “evidence regarding Steven’s expenditure of Mary’s assets...to determine whether and in what amount Mulrain should be directed to recover funds from Steven....” (¶88 of FAC.)

Per the First Amended Complaint, all the above pending probate petitions were continued to April 28, 2026. (¶91 of FAC.) Per Defendant, the Petition for Instructions by Ms. Mulrain is presently set to be heard on September 15, 2026. (Reply: 5:14-16 [ROA No. 97].)

Based on the above, it is not yet clear whether the personal representative of Mary Catherine Zinchefsky will pursue claims on behalf of the Estate and Trusts.

Consequently, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support standing, with respect to the First Cause of Action.

In asserting standing exists, Plaintiff cites Estate of Lowrie (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 220; however, this action is distinguishable. In Lowrie, it was the individual appointed as both trustee and personal representative, who was alleged to have committed elder abuse. (Id. at p. 227-228.) The Court invoked Probate Code section 259, to find standing on behalf of the plaintiff therein: “Probate Code section 259 is a forfeiture statute that deems abusers of elder or dependent adults to have predeceased a deceased, abused elder or dependent adults.” (Id. at p. 228.)

The Court explained: “[I]f Sheldon [the alleged abuser] predeceased decedent, Lynelle would become the successor trustee and the successor beneficiary to the remainder. Thus, Lynelle would become the person entitled to succeed to decedent’s estate and Lynelle would have standing to bring this case.” (Id. at p. 229.) The Court further explained that standing pursuant to Probate Code section 259 was necessary: “If abusers gain control of an estate, they may not use a restrictive interpretation of standing as an escape hatch.” (Id. at p. 231.)

In contrast to the above, there are no allegations the relevant trustee and personal representative - Janie L. Mulrain – engaged in elder abuse. Consequently, Probate Code section 259 has no application.

With respect to the remaining claims asserted against Defendant Steven Zinchefsky, Plaintiff alleges he brings his claims “in his individual capacity as a beneficiary” as well as “derivatively for the Zinchefsky Trust and/or Estate....” (¶6 and ¶133 of FAC [ROA No. 62].) The Complaint alleges harm to the Estate and Trust, only. (See ¶104, ¶115, ¶120, ¶122, ¶129 and ¶143 of FAC [ROA No. 62].)

“A cause of action that survives the death of the person entitled to commence an action or proceeding passes to the decedent’s successor in interest...and an action may be commenced by the decedent’s personal representative or, if none, by the decedent’s successor in interest.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.30.)

As noted above, Janie L. Mulrain is the personal representative of Mary Zinchefsky’s Estate. (¶31 of FAC; See also ¶24, ¶42 of FAC [ROA No. 62].)

Additionally, “[a]t common law, where a cause of action is prosecuted on behalf of an express trust, the trustee is the real party in interests because the trustee has

legal title to the cause.” (Saks v. Damon Raike & Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 419, 427.) “The corollary to this rule is that the beneficiary of a trust generally is not the real party in interest and may not sue in the name of the trust. A trust beneficiary has no legal title or ownership interests in the trust assets; his or her right to sue is ordinarily limited to the enforcement of the trust, according to its terms.” (Ibid.) “Thus, absent special circumstances, an action prosecuted for the benefit of a trust estate by a person other than the trustee is not brought in the name of a real party in interests and is demurrable.” (Ibid.)

“However, ‘where a trustee cannot or will not enforce a valid cause of action that the trustee ought to bring against a third person, a trust beneficiary may seek judicial compulsion against the trustee. In order to prevent loss of or prejudice to a claim, the beneficiary may bring an action in equity joining the third person and the trustee.’” (Pillsbury v. Karmgard (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 743, 753-754.)

Similarly, “[t]he beneficiary can maintain a suit in equity against the tortfeasor only if the trustee improperly refuses or neglects to bring an action, or if the trustee cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction of the court, or if there is a vacancy in the office of trustee.” (Estate of Bowles (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 684, 692.)

As noted above, Janie L. Mulrain “is the Successor Trustee of the Zinchefsky Trust.” (¶31 of FAC; See also ¶24, ¶42 of FAC [ROA No. 62].) Additionally, the allegations in the Complaint indicate it is not yet clear whether Ms. Mulrain will pursue the claims sought to be asserted herein by Plaintiff. (See ¶24, ¶77, ¶78, ¶82, ¶86-¶88 and ¶91 of FAC [ROA No. 62].)

Consequently, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support standing, with respect to the Second through Fourth Causes of Action.

While the above defects are potentially curable, it does not appear that Plaintiff can allege sufficient facts to demonstrate the personal representative and trustee has improperly failed to act, until resolution of the Petition for Instructions, currently pending within the Probate Proceeding.

Based on representations from Counsel, this Petition is not scheduled to be heard until September 15, 2026. (Reply: 5:14-16 [ROA No. 97].)

Rather than provide Plaintiff with four months leave to amend, the Court is inclined to stay this action, pending resolution of the above, pursuant to its inherent authority. (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 141.)

The Court will set a status conference for October 2, 2026, at 8:30 a.m. in Department C16. Plaintiff is granted 20 days leave to amend; however, this 20- day period will not commence until the stay is lifted.

56 BMW Bank of North America vs. Serna

25-01526562 Application/Request & Motion - Other

Plaintiff BMW BANK OF NORTH AMERICA, a Utah industrial bank, by and through its servicer, BMW FINANCIAL SERVICES NA, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company’s unopposed Application for Writ of Possession against Defendants Shelley M. Serna and Manuel T. Villagrana II for the 2021 BMW X7 M50i motor vehicle, Serial No. 5UXCX6C08M9F15693 (the “Vehicle”) is GRANTED.

The Court ORDERS Defendants Shelley M. Serna and Manuel T. Villagrana II to turn over to Plaintiff the Vehicle which is believed to be located at Extra Space Storage, Space Number J373, at 15875 Laguna Canyon Rd., Irvine CA 92618. The failure to turn over the Vehicle to Plaintiff may subject Defendants to being held in contempt of court. The Court waives the requirement for Plaintiff to post an undertaking since the amount owed is higher than the estimated value of the Vehicle.

Defendants’ re-delivery bond shall be $95,000.

Moving Party is to give notice.

58 Iwanaga vs. Global Financial Data Incorporated

19-01094012 Motion for Pretrial Determination of Admissibility of Evidence

Defendant and Cross-Complainant Global Financial Data Incorporated (“GFD”), Defendant Michelle Huff Kangas, and Defendant Bryan Taylor’s motion for an order to exclude evidence of Kangas’s alleged comments about her criminal case or conviction for any purpose is DENIED.

“Except as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible.” (Evid. Code, § 351.) Relevant evidence is that which has “any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” (Evid. Code, § 210.) Defendants contend Kangas’s alleged comments about her criminal case and conviction are irrelevant or marginally because the comments were not directed at Plaintiffs and that any alleged harassment was not based on sex.

Plaintiffs Kevin Iwanaga, Lindsay Amendola, and Pierre Gendreau allege they were subjected to a sexually hostile work environment in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). FEHA “recognize[s] two theories of liability for sexual harassment claims ... ‘... quid pro quo harassment, where a term of employment is conditioned upon submission to unwelcome sexual advances ... [and] hostile work environment, where the harassment is sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment.’ ” (Herberg v. California Institute of the Arts (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 142, 149; Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1043.)

“[A] hostile work environment sexual harassment claim requires a plaintiff employee to show she was subjected to sexual advances, conduct, or comments that were (1) unwelcome [citation]; (2) because of sex [citation]; and (3) sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive work environment [citations]. In addition, she must establish the offending conduct was imputable to her employer.” (Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 279.) “To plead a cause of action for [hostile work environment] sexual harassment, it is only necessary to show that gender is a substantial factor in the discrimination, and that if the plaintiff had been a man she would not have been treated in the same manner.

Accordingly, it is the disparate treatment of an employee on the basis of sex-not the mere discussion of sex or use of vulgar language-that is the essence of a sexual harassment claim.” (Id. at p. 280 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].)

“ ‘ “[W]hether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances [including] the frequency of the