Mirzadeh vs. Sandoval

In ruling on a demurrer, a court must accept as true all allegations of fact contained in the complaint. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) A demurrer challenges only the legal sufficiency of the affected pleading, not the truth of the factual allegations in the pleading or the pleader’s ability to prove those allegations. (Cundiff v. GTE Cal., Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1404- 05.)

First Cause of Action for Undue Influence and/or Lack of Capacity

The Complaint alleges Capital Aspects engaged in conduct amounting to undue influence over Ghasem Mirzadeh’s (“Decedent”) within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.70. (Compl. ¶ 31.) The Complaint specifically identifies actions by Defendants Soheyla Sandoval, Zahra Mirzadeh, Syed Ahmad Hashemian, and Farkhondeh Mirzadeh that constitute “excessive persuasion” that overcame decedent’s free will when decedent was ill, medicated, and mentally impaired. (Id. at ¶¶ 30-31.)

“Undue influence” is defined as “excessive persuasion that causes another person to act or refrain from acting by overcoming that person’s free will and results in inequity.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.70, subd. (a).) In determining whether a result was produced by undue influence, section 15610.70 directs courts to consider: (1) the victim’s vulnerability; (2) the influencer’s apparent authority; (3) the tactics used by the influencer; and (4) the inequity of the result. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.70, subd. (a)(1)–(4).) The Complaint does not allege Capital Aspects exerted any authority or used any tactics to persuade decedent to act. The demurrer is sustained to the first cause of action.

Second Cause of Action for Financial Elder Abuse

The Complaint alleges Capital Aspects committed financial elder abuse by taking, assisting, or retaining property of an elder by means of undue influence and wrongful appropriation. (Compl. ¶ 44.) Plaintiff identified particular actions taken by Defendants Soheyla Sandoval, Zahra Mirzadeh, Syed Ahmad Hashemian, and Farkhondeh Mirzadeh. (Id.)

Financial abuse of an elder occurs when a person “[t]akes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains ... real or personal property of an elder or dependent adult by undue influence, as defined in Section 15610.70.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30, subd. (a)(3).) The Complaint does not allege any acts of undue influence by Capital Aspects. The demurrer is sustained as to the second cause of action.

Defendant Capital Aspects Limited Liability Co. to give notice.

Motion to Quash Service of Summons

Defendant Farkhondeh Mirzadeh’s motion to quash service of the Summons and Complaint on Defendant Farkhondeh Mirzadeh is DENIED.

A court lacks jurisdiction over a defendant if there has not been proper service of process upon that defendant. (See Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 801, 808.) Therefore, “[a] defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her . . . .” (Civ. Proc. Code, § 418.10, subd. (a); see Board of Supervisors v. Superior Court (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 830, 855, fn. 4.)

Generally, “once a defendant files a motion to quash the burden is on the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the validity of the service and the court’s jurisdiction over the defendant.” (Bolkiah v. Superior Court (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 984, 991; see also Summers v. McClanahan (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 403, 413 [same].) However, this burden shifts when a properly executed proof of service has been filed. “The return of a [registered] process server [] upon process or notice establishes a presumption, affecting the burden of producing evidence, of the facts stated in the return.” (Evid. Code, § 647); see Floveyor Int’l, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 789, 795; American Exp. Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 390.)

On November 19, 2025, after the instant motion was filed, Plaintiff filed a properly executed proof of service showing service of the Summons and Complaint on Defendant Farkhondeh Mirzadeh via personal service. (ROA 39.) Katharyne Davis is a registered California process server. (Id.) Davis declares under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that she personally delivered the Summons and Complaint to Defendant Farkhondeh Mirzadeh. (Id.) Plaintiff’s properly executed proof of service showing service of the Summons and Complaint on Defendant Farkhondeh Mirzadeh creates a rebuttable presumption that service was proper. (Floveyor Int’l, Ltd. v.

Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 789, 795; American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 390 [“Evidence Code section 647 provides that a registered process server’s declaration of service establishes a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence of the facts stated in the declaration.”].)

Defendant Farkhondeh Mirzadeh declares that she did not receive two copies of the notice and acknowledgement of receipt and that she did not execute a written acknowledge of receipt of summons and return it to Plaintiff. (Farkhondeh Mirzadeh Decl. ¶¶ 4-5 [ROA 35].) This is insufficient to rebut the presumption of proper personal service of the Summons and Complaint. The motion to quash service of summons and complaint is denied.

Plaintiff to give notice.

54 Johnson vs. Darden Restaurants, Inc.

23-01334261 Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default

The Motion to Set Aside Default brought by Defendant Christopher Zarate is DENIED as MOOT.

The motion seeks to set aside a default entered against Defendant on December 2, 2025; however, no default is reflected in the record of this action. While the record indicates Plaintiff submitted a document for filing on December 2, 2025, this filing was rejected on December 10, 2025, with the stated reason being: “A motion was filed and set for hearing by the defendant.” (ROA No. 127.)

The referenced motion was a Motion to Quash, which was filed by Defendant on August 21, 2025 (well in advance of the attempted default) and subsequently denied on January 16, 2026. (ROA No. 146.) Following the hearing on the Motion to Quash, Defendant’s Answer was accepted for filing on February 4, 2026. (ROA No. 149.)

The continued presence of this motion on the Court’s calendar reflects multiple failings by Counsel.

More than five months have passed since the Request for Entry of Default was rejected (ROA No. 127.) More than three months have passed, since Defendant’s Answer was accepted for filing. (ROA No. 149.)

While “Defendants engaged in multiple attempts to meet and confer with Plaintiff’s counsel to stipulate to set-aside the entry of default,” all such attempts pre-date rejection of the purported default filing. (¶2 of Baldwin Declaration.) Defense Counsel apparently ceased their efforts to communicate with Plaintiff (or to review the electronic record of this action), after December 4, 2025. Plaintiff’s Counsel, in turn, opted against communicating the rejection of the filing to Defendant.

Consequently, this motion remained on the Court’s already congested calendar, delaying the hearing of another, perhaps meritorious motion.

In light of the above failings, the Court orders Counsel for Plaintiff Ryne Osborne and Counsel for Defendant Zarate, Rudie Baldwin, to read and review the OCBA’s Civility Guidelines, available on the court website at: https://www.occourts.org/forms-filing/rules-court

55 Zinchefsky vs. Zinchefsky

25-01524036 Demurrer to Amended Complaint

The Demurrer brought by Defendant Steven Zinchefsky is SUSTAINED, with leave to amend, as to the First through Fourth Causes of Action. Additionally, Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice (ROA No. 82) is GRANTED, pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d).

Initially, in demurring to Plaintiff’s claims, Defendant offers multiple facts, without offering citation to either the First Amended Complaint or judicially noticeable matters. (See Demurrer: 4:25-5:17.) Defense Counsel is reminded that demurrers consider only the facts alleged in the complaint and matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) Additionally, Counsel is reminded that the Court will not independently search the complaint or judicially noticeable material, to find support for factual statements made within a demurrer: “We are not required to search the record to ascertain whether it contains support for [Defendant’s] contentions.” (Mansell v. Board of Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 545.)

The portion of the Demurrer which seeks a plea in abatement is OVERRULED: To obtain a statutory plea in abatement absolute identity of the parties, causes of action and remedies is required. (Plant Insulation Co. v. Fibreboard Corp. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 781, 788; See also People ex rel. Garamendi v. American Autoplan, Inc. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 760, 770.)

Here, as Plaintiff’s Probate Petition seeks relief under Probate Code sections 17200, 850 and 859 (See Exhibit 2 of RJN) and, as the instant civil action asserts claims for Financial Elder Abuse, Conversion, Theft, Constructive Trust, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Negligence, and Aiding and Abetting, no absolute identity is apparent.

While Defendant asserts “judgment in the probate case would preclude a determination of the Amended Complaint in the civil case” (Demurrer: 8:15-18 [ROA No. 84]), this statement is made without any further analysis or citation to authority. At most, this portion of the demurrer offers general citations to “Pet”