In the Matter of 2012 Irrevocable Matthew L. Gennet Trust

1 The Court refers to the Gennet parties by their first names to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended. 2 All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.

50% of the new income of the trust and that Natasha is a discretionary beneficiary of principal for her health, education, maintenance, and support. (Pet., ¶¶ 6, 10.) The trustee of the Son’s Trust is Respondent Jon Conhaim (“Conhaim”), who is a California resident. (Id., ¶¶ 2, 9; Kelly Decl., ¶ 3.)

On May 1, 2022, Peter moved away from California. (Peter Decl., ¶ 2.) Peter is a resident of, and is domiciled in, Boulder, Colorado. (Ibid.)

In March 2023, Natasha and Matthew’s dissolution of marriage proceedings commenced in Napa County Superior Court, case no. 23FL000157. (Id., ¶¶ 8, 12.)

The Petition primarily concerns the Son’s Trust, but is also asserted against Peter, individually and as trustee of the Parents’ Trust, arising from “sham transactions” between Matthew and the Parents’ Trust. (Kelly Decl., ¶¶ 2, 11; Peter Decl., ¶¶ 1, 3; Pet., ¶ 7.) The Parents’ Trust was formed in 2000 while Peter was a resident of Napa, California. (Suppl. Peter Decl., ¶ 2.)

The Petition’s claims against Peter revolve around a April 1, 2025 Promissory Note executed by Matthew and the Parents’ Trust whereby Matthew, individually, purported to borrow $150,000 from the Parents’ Trust. (Pet., ¶ 14, Exh. B.) The Promissory Note is secured by Matthew’s interest in an investment account in the name of Matthew and Natasha located at Stifel ending in 5861. (Suppl. Peter Decl., ¶ 20.) The loan was requested by Matthew who approached Peter because Matthew “is unemployed, he cannot be employed, and he needed to borrow money to pay his living expenses and expenses arising from the dissolution case pending in Napa Superior Court.” (Id., ¶ 26.) The terms of the loan were discussed while Peter was located in Boulder, Colorado, and the Promissory Note was executed in Boulder, Colorado. (Id., ¶ 27.) Peter did not travel to California in connection with the loan. (Ibid.)

Other than the specific April 1, 2025 Promissory Note, the Petition generally alleges that, beginning on March 2, 2025, Respondents have engaged in a coordinated plan to “exhaust” the Son’s Trust through opaque “loans.” (Pet., ¶¶ 2, 14, 15, 18-24.) Peter denies knowledge of any such plan and denies having any participation in the administration of the Son’s Trust. (Suppl. Peter Decl., ¶ 5.) The Petition continues that, around the same time, the historical funding from the Parents’ Trust to the Son’s Trust was cut off or diverted to create an appearance of insolvency. (Pet., ¶¶ 15-16.)

Natasha alleges that this allows Matthew to claim he has no income, but that, in fact, the “loans” should properly be considered property of the Son’s Trust, to which she is entitled in support of her “support judgment” (which the Court gathers refers to the related dissolution proceeding). (Pet., ¶¶ 16, 19, 24.) Peter claims that the only transfer of money from the Parents’ Trust or Peter individually to the Son’s Trust was the original $2,000,000 gift, and therefore, the claim of “historical funding” in the Petition is unsupported. (Suppl.

Peter Decl., ¶ 23; see also id. ¶¶ 3-4, 15-16, 19, 21-24.) Peter also claims that the only loan that has ever existed between the Parents’ Trust and Matthew individually is the April 1, 2025 loan. (Id., ¶ 24.)

The Parents’ Trust “maintains all of its business records in Colorado and all of its primary representatives, attorneys, accountants, and agents reside in Colorado. The Trust does

not have place of business, office, store, warehouse, facility, location, address or telephone number in California. The Trust does not have any officers, employees, or representatives in California. The Trust does not have any assets or personal property located in California. In [Peter’s] capacity as trustee, [Peter does] not visit California for trust purposes and ha[s] no plans to do so in the future. The Trust no longer conducts any business within California. The Trust no longer owns, manages, develops or operates any assets in California.

The Trust is not registered, qualified or licensed to do business in California. The Trust does not advertise in California and does not solicit any business from California. [Peter does] not maintain a website in California either as an individual or as trustee. Neither the Trust nor [Peter] lease or maintain any real property, personal property, or bank accounts in California.” (Peter Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.) Peter offers several more facts regarding his relevant connections exclusively with Colorado and lack of availment in California. (See generally Suppl.

Peter Decl.)

C. LEGAL DISCUSSION

1. Authority for the Motion

“A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her. (2) To stay or dismiss the action on the ground of inconvenient forum. ...” (§ 418.10, subd. (a)(1)-(2).)

In Opposition, Natasha first urges the Court to deny the motion on the ground that section 418.10 does not apply because this matter is a trust proceeding governed by the jurisdictional framework of Probate Code sections 17000 through 17004. (Opposition, pp. 5-7.)

Natasha’s argument misunderstands the meaning and purpose of those Probate Code sections, which simply hold that a probate court has the same jurisdiction as the superior court in which the probate “court” sits. (See Capra v. Capra (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 1072, 1083-84 [explaining the Probate Code jurisdictional provisions and distinguishing them from fundamental and constitutional jurisdiction].) In this sense, Probate Code sections 17000-17001 do not eliminate the need for a constitutionally-sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction over each defendant.

Moreover, Probate Code section 17004 directly addresses personal jurisdiction in trust proceedings by providing that “[t]he court may exercise jurisdiction in proceedings under this division on any basis permitted by Section 410.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” This statutory provision makes clear that the same personal jurisdiction standards applicable in ordinary civil litigation govern trust proceedings under section 17200. (See also Van Buskirk v. Van Buskirk (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 523, 530 [“As matters of state law, personal jurisdiction rules are the same for civil and trust proceedings.”].)

2. Legal Background for Quashing Service of Summons for Lack of Specific Personal Jurisdiction

a. Two Factors for Determining Personal Jurisdiction

Whether a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in a forum state involves two separate factors. First, the existence of a constitutionally sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction over each defendant; and second, acquisition of such jurisdiction by service of process in accordance with statutory and due process requirements. (Ziller Electronics Lab GmbH v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1222, 1229; Borsuk v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 607, 612.)

Here, only the first factor—the basis for personal jurisdiction (and not the service of process)—is at issue. (See Peter Decl., ¶ 5 [acknowledging that he was served with the Summons and Petition via personal service to his home in Boulder, Colorado]; see generally Support Memo [raising no claim that the service of process was not in accordance with statutory and due process requirements].)

b. Constitutionally Sufficient Basis

A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant upon the following bases: Physical presence in the forum state when served; Domicile in the forum state; General appearance in the action; Contractual consent (forum-selection clauses); and “Minimum contacts” between defendant and the forum state under so-called “long arm” statutes.

Here, the only basis at issue is Peter’s “minimum contacts” with California. (See Support Memo, at p. 6 [asserting no other bases apply and therefore “if the Court is to exercise personal jurisdiction over Respondent, it can only be because of his ‘minimum contacts’ with California”].)

c. Minimum Contacts

“Minimum contacts” means the relationship between the nonresident and the forum state is such that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” under the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. (International Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Compensation & Placement (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316; Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 475.) California courts are authorized to exercise jurisdiction over parties “on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.” (§ 410.10.)

The “minimum contacts” doctrine provides no mechanical yardstick. The extent to which a California court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant depends on the nature and quality of defendant’s “contacts” with the state. The Supreme Court decisions recognize two types of jurisdiction: (1) “general” (sometimes called “all-purpose”); and (2) “specific” (sometimes called “case-linked” or “limited”). (See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco County (2017) 582 U.S. 255, 262; Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 445 (Vons).)

Here, Peter argues that the Court lacks both general and specific personal jurisdiction over him. (Support Memo, p. 2.) Natasha does not address or dispute Peter’s contentions with respect to lack of general personal jurisdiction. Rather, Natasha only contends that the facts of

the case justify the Court asserting specific personal jurisdiction over Peter. Thus, the Court focuses its discussion on specific personal jurisdiction.

d. Specific Personal Jurisdiction

A “nonresident defendant . . . may be subject to the specific jurisdiction of the forum, if the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits, and the ‘controversy is related to or ‘arises out of’ a defendant’s contacts with the forum.’ (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at 446, quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall (1984) 466 U.S. 408, 414.) “[O]nce it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum State, these contacts may be considered in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice.’ [Citation.] “Courts may evaluate the burden on the defendant of appearing in the forum, the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the claim, the plaintiff’s interest in convenient and effective relief within the forum, judicial economy, and ‘the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.’” (Vons, supra, 14Cal.4th at 447-448.)

This analysis has been reduced to a three-factor test: “(1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or results from the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.” (Pedus Building Services v. Allen (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 152, 164 (Pedus).)

Where a nonresident defendant operates entirely outside California, but his/her conduct causes some effect within California, the “purposeful availment” requirement is discussed as an “effects test,” where it must be shown that the defendant purposefully directed its activities at California with knowledge that its conduct would cause harm in this state. (HealthMarkets, Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1173.) “Under California law, to establish specific jurisdiction through the effects test a plaintiff must show the defendant committed an intentional act, expressly aimed at or targeting the forum state, with the knowledge that his act would cause harm in the state.” (Strasner, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at 228.)

Both Peter and Natasha argue under both the “purposeful availment” and “effects” tests.

3. Analysis of the Specific Personal Jurisdiction Factors

Here, Peter argues that all three factors for specific personal jurisdiction fail and that Natasha cannot adduce competent evidence establishing any of them.

“Although the defendant is the moving party and must present some admissible evidence (declarations or affidavits) to place the issue before the court (by showing the absence of minimum contacts with the state), the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, a basis for jurisdiction (minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state).” (School Dist. of Okaloosa County v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1131.)

The first two Pedus factors, together, require Natasha’s claims to have arisen out of, or resulted from, Peter’s act, or consummation of some transaction, with California by which he purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in California, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of California’s laws. (Pedus, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at 164.) Under the “effects” test, Natasha must show that Peter committed an intentional act, expressly aimed at or targeting California, with the knowledge that his act would cause harm in California.

The Court discusses each capacity in which Peter is named in the Petition, separately below.

a. Individual Capacity of Peter

Peter first contends there are no allegations in the Petition concerning Peter in his individual capacity. Thus, there is no showing of the first two prongs by Peter individually. The Court agrees that there is no showing of any suit-related “purposeful availment” or California “effects” by Peter individually. Natasha does not specifically address Peter’s capacity as an individual in Opposition. Moreover, the only relevant evidence presented by Natasha pertains to the Parents’ Trust. (See Kelly Decl., ¶¶ 10-11; see generally 12/15/25 Petition; Natasha Decl.)

Thus, the Court does not find that Natasha has shown sufficient suit-related, California contacts by Peter as an individual under either the “purposeful availment” or “effects” tests.

b. Peter’s Capacity as Trustee

Peter argues that he, in his capacity as Trustee of the Parents’ Trust, has not sought any benefit or protection under California law, and the fact that the loan was made to a California resident does not mean Peter sought a benefit from or protection under California law. Rather, the Promissory Note is governed by Colorado law. (Support Memo, p., 8, citing Pet., Exh. B, ¶ 14.) Thus, the “purposeful availment” test fails.

Furthermore, Peter argues that specific jurisdiction over him in his capacity as Trustee cannot be established under the “effects” test because he did not engage in any intentional action aimed at California and he did not cause any harm by transferring money to Matthew. (Support Memo, pp. 8-9; Reply, pp. 5-6.) Peter argues that sending money to California with the expectation that it be repaid instead of giving it away is not inherently harmful. (Id., p. 9.) Furthermore, he was under no obligation to give money to the Son’s Trust for any purpose and Natasha does not allege that Peter was required to continue giving money to the Son’s Trust for her benefit after she separated from Matthew. (Ibid.)

Rather, Peter contends that the only possible harm was in how the money was spent after it was transferred from the Parents’ Trust; however, Peter is not alleged to have been involved in spending any of the funds, nor does a lender typically control how a borrower spends money. (Ibid.)

In Opposition, Natasha argues that her claims arise directly from Peter’s (as Trustee) California-related activities because: Peter created the Son’s Trust in California with a California

trustee and funded it with $2,000,000 for the benefit of Matthew, a California resident; Peter directed transactions at the Son’s Trust (a California entity), including the sham loan asserted in this action which allegedly “exhausted” the Son’s Trust; and the loan is secured by Matthew’s California property (i.e., Matthew’s interest in an investment account managed by Stifel Nicolaus in San Francisco). (Opposition, pp. 7-9, citing Van Buskirk, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th 523; see also Kelly Decl., ¶¶ 2, 3, 11; Natasha Suppl.

Br., p. 3; Natasha Decl., ¶ 4.) Natasha further argues that Peter’s reliance on the Colorado choice-of-law provision in the Promissory Note is misplaced because the Promissory Note is alleged to be void in the Petition, and a choice-of-law clause does not dictate forum or venue. (Opposition, pp. 11-12.) Additionally, Natasha claims, through her counsel’s declaration, that Peter’s declaration does not deny any of the Petition’s allegations regarding the transactions at issue. (Kelly Decl., ¶ 12.)

As an initial matter, Natasha’s argument that Peter’s act of creating and funding the Son’s Trust in 2012 is a foundational act from which the Petition arises is not supported by a plain reading of the Petition. Rather, it is clear that the foundational acts by Peter at issue are the alleged: (1) April 1, 2025 Promissory Notice whereby the Parents’ Trust loaned $150,000 to Matthew individually and (2) general plan, beginning on March 2, 2025, to “exhaust” the Son’s Trust.

Given that the only suit-related acts occurred in 2025, Natasha’s argument about Peter’s possible past contacts with California is not relevant when determining specific jurisdiction. (See Strasner, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at 226 [“The relevant time period for measuring the nature and quality of a nonresident defendant’s contacts with the forum for purposes of specific jurisdiction is at the time the plaintiff’s cause of action arose.”]; see Opposition, p. 3 [“[Peter’s Declaration] concedes that the Parents’ Trust formerly had substantial California connections and uses ‘no longer’ language that invites inquiry into why and when those connections were severed.”].)

With respect to Natasha’s contention that Peter failed to present evidence to dispute the allegations of the Petition, the Court notes that liability issues are normally irrelevant on a motion to quash. Where the basis for jurisdiction is the defendant’s having caused tortious effects in California, however, a defendant can defeat jurisdiction by presenting “unequivocal proof that it did not cause plaintiff’s injury.” (Weil & Brown, et al., Cal. Practice Guide, Civ. Proc. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2025), Ch. 3-B, § 3:390, citing J.M.

Sahlein Music Co., Inc. v. Nippon Gakki Co., Ltd. (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 539, 545.) While Peter argues he did not cause any harm by the conduct alleged in the Petition, he has not presented “unequivocal proof” in support thereof. Peter’s argument is therefore insufficient, on its own, to defeat jurisdiction. That said, the fact that Peter failed to sufficiently dispute liability has no impact on Natasha’s burden to establish minimum contacts. Nor does Natasha offer any reasoned argument in support thereof.

Rather, Peter expressly reserved his right to challenge the substance of the Petition. (See Support Memo, p. 5.)

As to the April 1, 2025 Promissory Note, a contractual loan made to a California resident does not per se show Peter purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in California, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of California’s laws. (Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 478 [“If the question is whether an individual’s contract with an out-of-state party alone can automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts

in the other party’s home forum, we believe the answer clearly is that it cannot.”].) “[A] ‘contract’ is ‘ordinarily but an intermediate step serving to tie up prior business negotiations with future consequences which themselves are the real object of the business transaction.’ [Citation.] It is these factors—prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with the terms of the contract and the parties’ actual course of dealing—that must be evaluated in determining whether the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum.” (Ibid.)

Here, Natasha argues that the following circumstances regarding the Promissory Note show that Peter’s conduct satisfies the “purposeful availment” test: (1) the loan is secured by Matthew’s interest in an investment account also in Natasha’s name, meaning that Peter encumbered a California asset bearing the name of a California resident who is not a party to the Promissory Note, without her knowledge or consent; (2) Peter knew the future consequence of the loan was to fund California litigation in Napa; and (3) the provision of funds to Matthew personally was structured to circumvent a California trust. (Natasha Suppl. Br., filed 5/8/26, pp. 3-4, citing Suppl. Peter Decl., ¶¶ 2-3, 5, 20, 26; Natasha Decl., ¶ 5.) The Court is not persuaded.

As to the first point, Natasha argues that, “if Matthew defaults, Peter’s remedy lies against an asset held at a California brokerage, bearing a California resident’s name, and subject to division in this Court’s dissolution proceeding.” (Natasha Suppl. Br., p. 3.) However, the brokerage account is an intangible asset that lacks physical characteristics (see Bagby v. Davis (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 652, 658), and therefore it cannot support a showing of purposeful availment toward California. Moreover, it is not the brokerage account, as a whole, that serves as collateral, but rather Matthew’s interest therein.

As to the second point, the evidence purportedly supporting Natasha’s contention is that Matthew “needed to borrow money to pay his living expenses and expenses arising from the dissolution case pending in Napa Superior Court.” (Suppl. Peter Decl., ¶ 26.) This evidence does not necessarily support her assertion that the purpose of the loan was to fund California litigation. The third point—that Peter intentionally circumvented the Son’s Trust—is not supported by the evidence, nor is the Court convinced that an intentional bypassing of a California entity is sufficient to show purposeful availment of opportunities in California.

Instead, Peter has shown that the Promissory Note is governed by Colorado law. While Natasha argues that the Promissory Note is void and the Colorado choice-of-law provision does not dictate the forum, Natasha offers no reasoned argument of how those points help satisfy her burden to show that Peter purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in California. Rather, even if the Promissory Note is void and the Colorado choice-of-law provision does not dictate the appropriate forum, Peter’s act of executing the Promissory Note with the Colorado choice-of-law provision strongly suggests Peter was not acting in such a way to invoke the benefits and protections of California’s law.

Moreover, Peter shows that Matthew was the one who sought out and attempted to instigate the financial transaction with the Parents’ Trust. (See Reply, p. 8; Suppl. Peter Decl., ¶ 26.) This fact, Peter argues, is fatal to finding specific personal jurisdiction. (Ibid., citing ParaFi Digit Opportunities LP v. Egorov (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 124, 128.)

Nor does the April 1, 2025 Promissory Note allegations show an intentional act aimed at or targeting California sufficient to meet the “effects” test. Natasha’s argument is essentially that Peter’s conduct of giving the allegedly sham loan caused harm suffered in California. (Opposition, pp. 8-9.) However, “mere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient connection to the forum.” (Walden v. Fiore (2014) 571 U.S. 277, 290.) Peter’s knowledge that Matthew and Natasha reside in California and that the Son’s Trust is administered in California, and even a foreseeability of California effects from the loan to Matthew (i.e., alleged harm to Natasha, potential collection of Matthew’s interest in a brokerage account, or funding of expenses for Matthew), are insufficient to establish either that Peter purposefully directed his activities at California or that Peter knew his conduct would cause harm in California. (See Walden, supra, 571 U.S. at 285 [“[M]inimum contacts’ analysis look[s] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.”].)

As to Peter’s alleged engagement in a general plan to exhaust the Son’s Trust (a California entity), the allegations by Natasha in the verified Petition are too general to sufficiently connect Peter to California in a meaningful way, under either the “purposeful availment” or “effects” tests. Natasha submits no other evidence regarding this basis for Peter’s liability. Moreover, Peter denies knowledge of any such plan and denies having any participation in the administration of the Son’s Trust. (Suppl.

Peter Decl., ¶ 5.) Furthermore, Peter shows that the only transfer of funds from the Parents’ Trust or Peter individually to the Son’s Trust was in 2012, which undermines Natasha’s contention that a series of sham loans were made as part of the exhaustion plan. The present circumstances appear to be distinguishable from those in Van Buskirk, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th 523, relied upon by Natasha. (See Opposition, p. 8.) There, the court found sufficient California contacts by nonresident trustees of a California trust where the parties had extensive ongoing forum contacts, including that one trustee had filed four lawsuits in California courts after relocating to Idaho, and other trustees had traveled to California for trust transactions and remained trustees of the California trust. (Id. at 532-33.)

Here, on the other hand, there is no competent evidence of contacts, to a similar degree as those in Van Buskirk, between California and Peter following his 2022 move to Colorado.

Thus, the Court does not find that Natasha has shown sufficient suit-related, California contacts by Peter as Trustee under either the “purposeful availment” or “effects” tests.

“If the plaintiff is unable to demonstrate sufficient minimum contacts with the forum to justify jurisdiction, a court is not required to engage in the process of weighing the defendant’s inconvenience of litigating in the forum against the plaintiff’s interests in suing locally and California’s interest in assuming jurisdiction.” (Strasner, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at 226.)

Here, Natasha has failed to demonstrate sufficient minimum contacts between Peter and California to justify jurisdiction. Thus, the Court need not (and does not) consider the parties’ assertions as to the third prong for specific personal jurisdiction regarding whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction over Peter would comport with fair play and substantial justice. The Court’s above finding also renders it unnecessary for the Court to consider Peter’s alternative forum non conveniens ground.

Based on the foregoing, the motion to quash the service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED.

CIVIL LAW & MOTION CALENDAR – Hon. Cynthia P. Smith, Dept. A (Historic Courthouse) at 8:30 a.m.

Nordby Construction Company v. Signorello Winery 23CV000838

CLAIM OF EXEMPTION

TENTATIVE RULING: The matter is CONTINUED to June 3, 2026, at 8:30 a.m. in Dept. A. The Judgment Debtor’s Claim of Exemption is not in the Court file. (Code Civ. Proc., § 703.580, subd. (c) [“The claim of exemption ... shall be received in evidence.”].) The Judgment Creditor is directed to file, no later than May 27, 2026, the Judgment Debtor’s Claim of Exemption with the accompanying proof of service by the levying officer and a Proof of Service demonstrating that Judgment Creditor sufficiently “file[d] with the levying officer a copy of the notice of opposition and a copy of the notice of motion.” (Id., § 703.550, subd. (a).)

**at 9:30 a.m.** Jose Antonio Ceballos Cruz v. Cakebread Cellars 25CV002628

DEFENDANT CAKEBREAD CELLARS’ MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY RESPONSES

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff Jose Antonio Ceballos Cruz is ordered to serve, no later than 14 calendar days from entry of the instant order, code-compliant responses to Cakebread Cellars’ Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, Form Interrogatories – General, Set One, and Form Interrogatories – Employment, Set One. The motion to compel responses is DENIED as to the Requests for Admissions. The request for an award of monetary sanctions is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff and its attorneys of record shall remit, within 14 calendar days from entry of the instant order, monetary sanctions in the amount of $1,300 to Cakebread Cellars courtesy of its counsel of record in the action.

The moving party failed to include in the notice of this motion proper notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system as required by Local Rule 2.9. Moving party is directed to immediately provide, by telephone call AND email, the missing notice to opposing party/ies forthwith. The requirements for requesting oral argument under Local Rule 2.9 remain in effect. However, the Court may grant belated requests for oral argument or continuance of hearing, made by any party who represents it did not timely receive the required notice, regardless of whether or not moving party is present at the hearing.

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