MIXON, et al. vs WELLSPACE HEALTH, et al.

24CV011792: MIXON, et al. vs WELLSPACE HEALTH, et al. 09/19/2025 Hearing on Demurrer With A Motion To Strike in Department 22

Tentative Ruling

DISCLOSURE

Under the California Code of Judicial Ethics, Canon 3E(2)(a), Judge Damrell discloses that her son is a school friend of the son of one of Plaintiffs' attorneys, Christopher Rodriguez. Upon review, the Court finds no basis for disqualification under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1.

Defendant WellSpace Health (“Defendant” and/or “WellSpace”) demurs to Plaintiffs Latasha Mixon and Rosana Korman’s Complaint as follows: - Plaintiffs’ First Cause of Action for violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”) “fails to state a cause of action because: 1) Plaintiff has failed to plead direct violations of CIPA, 2) Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently [allege] aider and abettor liability, 3) Plaintiff has failed to allege the contents of the communications, and 4) Plaintiff has failed [to] allege interception during transmission, as required to sustain a cause of action for CIPA.” (Notice, p. 3:9-10.) - Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action for unjust enrichment “fails to state a cause of action because Plaintiffs do not sufficiently plead that WellSpace has retained a benefit at Plaintiffs’ expense.” (Id., p. 3:15-17.) - Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action based on violation of the “California Unfair Competition Law (‘UCL’) because Plaintiffs have not alleged any specific economic injuries anywhere in the Complaint, as require[d] to state a claim under California UCL.” (Id., p. 3:19-21.)

Defendant’s Notice of Demurrer also asserts that it “hereby moves to strike Plaintiffs’ demand for attorneys’ fees and punitive damages as Plaintiffs have no[t] adequately pled this request.” (Notice, p. 3:23-24.) However, Defendant filed only a single memorandum, which does not address the standards for a motion to strike and asserts these requests “should be demurred.” (See Demurrer, pp. 13:16-14:7.) Nonetheless, the Court will address the merits of Defendant’s argument.

Moving counsel’s Notices of Motion do not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06. Moving counsel is directed to contact opposing counsel and advise them of Local Rule 1.06, the Court’s tentative ruling procedure, and the manner to request a hearing.

MEET AND CONFER

Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 430.41(a) provides, “[b]efore filing a demurrer

24CV011792: MIXON, et al. vs WELLSPACE HEALTH, et al. 09/19/2025 Hearing on Demurrer With A Motion To Strike in Department 22

pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. If an amended complaint, cross-complaint, or answer is filed, the responding party shall meet and confer again with the party who filed the amended pleading before filing a demurrer to the amended pleading.”

Here, Defendant asserts that “the parties met and conferred via telephonic conference on August 7, 2025 and August 8, 2025 for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. After discussion, the parties could not resolve the underlying issues prior to filing this demurrer.” (Notice, pp. 3:26-4:3.) While this information is typically provided in a supporting declaration executed under penalty of perjury, the Court will accept Mr. Dammann’s representation in the Notice as an officer of the Court.

BACKGROUND

On June 14, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint against Defendant alleging causes of action for (1) violation of CIPA; (2) unjust enrichment; and (3) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law. (Complaint.)

Defendant removed this case to federal court on August 23, 2024. (8-29-24 Notice of Removal.) The case was remanded back to this Court on July 7, 2025. (7-9-25 Order Remanding.) Shortly thereafter, Defendant filed the instant demurrer. On September 5, 2025, the Court, on its own motion, continued the hearing on this matter to September 19, 2025. The Court notes that Defendant did not file a timely reply.

LEGAL STANDARD

1. Demurrer

A defendant may demur to a complaint where the complaint or any cause of action therein “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (CCP § 430.10(e).) A demurrer may only challenge defects on the face of the complaint or from matters that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) Consideration of extrinsic facts asserted in the memorandum supporting the demurrer is improper. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.) However, the face of the complaint includes facts contained in exhibits attached to the complaint. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 778.) “Less particularity is required in pleading matters of which the defendant has superior

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knowledge; e.g., allegations as to D's knowledge or notice or intent.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2022) ¶ 6:121.5, citing Foster v. Sexton, 61 Cal.App.5th 998, 1028.) The complaint will be upheld “so long as it gives notice of the issues sufficient to enable preparation of a defense.” (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (“Doe”) (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 549-550.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief, we are not concerned with plaintiff’s possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v.

Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696- 97.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733, citation omitted.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled, and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action – not whether they are true. (Serrano v.

Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) That said, while the Court will “accept as true the properly pleaded allegations of fact in the complaint,” it will not consider “the contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc. v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom & Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1225.)

Applicable substantive law does not change merely because the case is a class action. (Washington Mut. Bank, FA v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 906, 914.) Indeed, it is “settled that courts are authorized to weed out legally meritless class action suits prior to certification by demurrer or pretrial motion.” (Tucker v. Pacific Bell Mobile Services (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 201, 211 [citing Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 440].)

2. Motion to Strike

A party can move to strike any portions of a complaint that are legally deficient or contrary to the law. (CCP §§ 435, 436.) A motion to strike is proper when a portion of a cause of action has a clear substantive defect, such as a violation of the applicable statute of limitations, seeking punitive damages without basis, or when the face of the complaint fails to state facts showing a primary right of the plaintiff and primary duty of, or wrong committed by, the defendant. (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1683.)

Similarly, a motion to strike is appropriate where the complaint alleges a “purported claim of right which is legally invalid” (Id., at p. 1682-1683.) When a plaintiff seeks punitive damages but is legally barred from recovering such damages, a motion to strike should be granted. (Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 549, 567, review granted 282 Cal.Rptr.3d 638.) However, a motion to strike may not be used as a procedural line-item veto for the civil defendant. (Id., at p. 1683.)

The use of the motion to strike should be cautious and sparing.

Motions to strike are disfavored. Courts considering such motions must presume the allegations contained therein are true and must consider those allegations in context. (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) “Matter that is essential to a cause of action should not be struck and it is error to do so.” (Quiroz v. Seventh Avenue Ctr. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th

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1256, 1281.)

ANALYSIS

1. Demurrer

A. California Invasion of Privacy Act (First Cause of Action)

Section 631 penalizes various forms of secret monitoring of conversations. (Ribas v. Clark (1985) 38 Cal.3d 355, 359.) It provides, in pertinent part: “(a) Any person who, [1] by means of any machine, instrument, or contrivance, or in any other manner, intentionally taps, or makes any unauthorized connection, whether physically, electrically, acoustically, inductively, or otherwise, with any telegraph or telephone wire, line, cable, or instrument, including the wire, line, cable, or instrument of any internal telephonic communication system, or [2] who willfully and without the consent of all parties to the communication, or in any unauthorized manner, reads, or attempts to read, or to learn the contents or meaning of any message, report, or communication while the same is in transit or passing over any wire, line, or cable, or is being sent from, or received at any place within this state; or [3] who uses, or attempts to use, in any manner, or for any purpose, or to communicate in any way, any information so obtained, or [4] who aids, agrees with, employs, or conspires with any person or persons to unlawfully do, or permit, or cause to be done any of the acts or things mentioned above in this section, is punishable by a fine not exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170, or by both a fine and imprisonment in the county jail or pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 ” (Cal.

Pen. Code § 631(a).)

Direct Violations of Section 631(a)

Defendant maintains that “Plaintiffs cannot establish a violation of section 631(a) because WellSpace was a party to any ‘communications’ Plaintiffs allege in this case,” and parties to a conversation cannot eavesdrop on their own conversation. (Demurrer, p. 5:1-17.) However, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that this argument is inapposite and premised on a misreading of the Complaint. (See Opp., pp. 8:26-9:12.)

Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendant is liable for direct violations under section 631(a). Instead, Plaintiffs rely on the fourth prong of section 631(a) to allege that Google, not Defendant, “violated CIPA by using Google Analytics to intercept Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ information when interacting with WellSpace’s website.” (Complaint, ¶ 60.) Plaintiffs allege that “WellSpace aided, employed, agreed with, and/or conspired with Google to track and intercept Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ communications while they used WellSpace’s website.” (Id., ¶ 61.)

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Defendant failed to address Plaintiffs’ opposition on this issue. The Court is persuaded that Defendant’s direct violation argument misreads the Complaint and is therefore irrelevant. Defendant’s demurrer on this ground is OVERRULED.

Aiding and Abetting Liability

Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged aiding and abetting liability against Defendant because tools like Google Analytics are “not eavesdropping when the recording is for the website owner” and Plaintiffs have failed to plead any “allegations of how Google uses the data for its own benefit.” (Demurrer, pp. 5:20-7:21, principally relying on Williams v. What If Holdings, LLC (N.D. Cal. Dec.12, 2022) 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 230732 at p. 4-10.)

However, here, Plaintiffs allege that “Google receives confidential and highly valuable data for thousands of WellSpace users, enabling Google to increase the value of its advertising profiles and services.” (Complaint, ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs also describe how “Google collects and monetizes data [] through Google Analytics, which is a platform that intercepts data from websites to create reports that provide advertising and marketing insights for website operators.” (Id., ¶ 28.) In exchange, “Google receives data regarding the website operator’s users, which it uses to increase the value of its advertising services and profiles.

Google also uses the data to increase the effectiveness of its search services and rankings therein. For example, Google uses this data to improve the effectiveness of Google Audience Targeting, which is a service that directs ads at a specific group of people who share certain attributes. This occurs on websites owned by Google and third-party websites.” (Id., ¶¶ 34-35, 65.)

These allegations are sufficiently different from those in the cases cited by Defendant, where the data collected only benefits the defendant.[1] Plaintiffs have alleged a direct use and financial benefit to Google. Defendant’s demurrer on this ground is OVERRULED.

Contents of the Communications

“The analysis for a violation of CIPA is the same as that under the federal Wiretap Act.” (In re Meta Pixel Healthcare Litig. (2022) 647 F.Supp.3d 778, 791.) Under the Wiretap Act, the term “‘contents’ refers to the intended message conveyed by the communication – ‘any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning” of the communication (18 U.S.C. §2510) – and does not include record information regarding the characteristics of the message that is generated in the course of the communication.’” (In re Zynga Priv Litig. (9th Cir. 2014) 750 F.3d 1098, 1106 (“Zynga”).)

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs allegations are “bare bones conclusory statements” and Plaintiffs have “never provided any details of any ‘messages’ they engaged in, have never asserted what the content of that communication was—much less that it contained Sensitive Information, and

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never claimed to have provided any confidential information during their website usage.” (Demurrer, p. 8:5-11.)

The Court disagrees. Here, Plaintiffs alleged the following: - “WellSpace offers several of these services through its interactive website, WellSpacehealth.org. On this website, users can do things like find doctors, schedule appointments, pay bills, search for resources by condition, and access their WellSpace Health Connect — Patient Portal.” (Complaint, ¶ 2.) - “While utilizing many of these online services, users input private and medical information. Unknown to users, WellSpace has enabled Google to intercept much of this information by placing Google Analytics on its website.

Google Analytics intercepts users’ information in real time and redirects it to Google without users’ consent.” (Id., ¶ 3.) - “The information intercepted by Google includes: (i) types of treatment users are seeking; (ii) physicians with whom patients are seeking treatment; (iii) search queries from the website’s internal search bar; and (iv) when a patient accesses the website’s virtual appointment portal. In connection with this information, Google receives users’ internet protocol addresses (‘IP addresses’), allowing Google to connect the data to specific individuals.” (Id., ¶ 4.) - Plaintiff Mixon alleges that she “has been a WellSpace patient since 2019,” “has been treated for a number of conditions,” and “has used WellSpace’s website to: (i) make appointments; (ii) search for specific treatments; (iii) access the patient portal; (iv) access virtual appointments; (v) find doctors; and (vi) ask questions concerning conditions and treatment options.” (Id., ¶ 12.) - Similarly, Plaintiff Korman alleges that she “has been a WellSpace patient since 2014,” “has been treated for a number of conditions,” and “has used WellSpace’s website to: (i) make appointments; (ii) access the patient portal; (iii) access virtual appointments; (iv) check timing for appointments; (v) check test results; (vi) find doctors; and (vii) exchange messages with providers.” (Id., ¶ 13.) - “WellSpace operates a highly interactive website that patients can use for a number of services.

From links on just the home page, users can find a doctor, review different types of care offered by WellSpace, and evaluate whether users qualify for WellSpace’s services. If users click on ‘Patient’ in the drop-down menu on the homepage, then they are sent to the patient resources page, which allows patients to, among other things, login to their portals, review FAQs and brochures for WellSpace, and sign-up for WellSpace Health Connect—Patient Portal. Patients can also engage in keyword searches in the internal search bar that can be accessed on every page (either directly or through a drop- down menu).” (Id., ¶ 37.) - “WellSpace has implemented Google Analytics.

As a result, Google intercepts user information without consent, including: (i) types of treatment users are seeking; (ii) physicians with whom patients are seeking treatment; (iii) locations in which users are receiving treatment; (iv) search queries from the website’s internal search bar; and (v)

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when a patient accesses the website’s virtual appointment portal.” (Id., ¶ 38.) - “WellSpace also enables Google to obtain users’ IP addresses.” (Id., ¶ 39.) - Plaintiffs provide several examples, alleging that Google intercepts patient searches to locate doctors, specialists, and healthcare centers; any information submitted through the internal search bar; and patient portal visits (i.e. when a patient clicks the “Virtual Visit Portal” webpage). (Id., ¶ 40-49.)

Defendant relies on Cousin v. Sharp Healthcare (S.D. Cal, July 12, 2023) 681 F. Supp. 3d 1117, 1130. There, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs’ allegations regarding hypothetical browsing activity on public-facing websites were too conclusory. (Id., at pp. 1123-1124, 1130.) However, in a later case considering the plaintiffs’ amended pleading – Cousin v. Sharp Healthcare (Nov. 17, 2023 S.D. Cal.) 702 F.Supp.3d 967 (“Cousin II”) – the court held that allegations “that the data included personal search queries – such as specialty healthcare providers and treatments for medical conditions plausibly conveyed content: their PHI.” (Id., at p. 976.)

However, the Cousin decisions were vacated for lack of jurisdiction. (See Cousin v. Sharp Healthcare (S.D. Cal. March 18, 2024) 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48697 at pp. 27-28.) In any event, the Court is persuaded that Plaintiffs’ allegations here are more like those found sufficient in Cousin II.

Likewise, “descriptive URLs” that include the path and a query string with detailed information about the search contain “the substance of a communication.” (In re Meta Pixel Healthcare Litigation (N.D. Cal. 2022) 647 F.Supp.3d 778, 795-796; Doe v. Tenet Healthcare Corp. (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2025) 2025 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 109134, at *36-37 [collecting cases].) This kind of “full-string detailed URL” is not like an IP address because it reveals the contents of what the user was searching for. (Brown v. Google LLC (N.D. Cal. 2023) 685 F.Supp.3d 909, 936.) Here, at least in part, Plaintiffs have alleged that Google Analytics revealed specific search terms, which is sufficient to satisfy the contents requirement. (See Complaint, ¶¶ 45-46.)

The Court is persuaded that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the “contents” of their communications. Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer on this ground is OVERRULED.

Intercepted in Transit

Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege that Google intercepted their communications while in transit.

Defendant cites Heiting v. Taro Pharms. USA, Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2024) 728 F.Supp.3d 1112, for the proposition that “the allegations must show that the third party listens to a communication ‘while the same is in transit or passing over any wire, line, or cable, or is being sent from, or received at any place within this state.’” (Id., at pp. 1124-1125 [emphasis original].) However, there, the pleading alleged that “[b]y virtue of how the Genesys API functions, these communications were intercepted ‘in transit’ and recorded by Genesys” and that “[Defendant] is aware that Genesys collects and stores chats recordings [sic] as they occur.” (Id., at p. 1126.) The Court concluded

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that these allegations were insufficient and stated that “[t]o plausibly allege that Plaintiff's communications were intercepted while in transit, factual allegations regarding the method, or nature, of interception are required.” (Ibid.)

In contrast, here, Plaintiffs do more than simply recite the language of the statute. (See Heiting, supra, 728 F.Supp.3d at p. 1126.) Plaintiffs allege that “Google Analytics intercepts users’ information in real time and redirects it to Google without users’ consent” and the information is intercepted “the moment it is input.” (Complaint, ¶¶ 3, 5; see also, ¶¶ 29 [intercepted in real time], 63.) Plaintiffs also provide examples of how the details of certain website interactions are intercepted through Google Analytics. (Id., ¶¶ 40-47.)

Moreover, unlike the other cases cited by Defendant, Plaintiffs’ allegations do not suggest a sequenced, separate communication to Google. (See Demurrer, pp. 9:18-10:12, citing Rodriguez v. Google LLC (N.D Cal. 2022) 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13476 at pp. *10-11 [use of the word “intercept” was not sufficient where the pleading “made clear Plaintiffs’ theory was essentially one of logging and then transmitting].) Defendant also relies on Barbour v. John Muir Health, a 2023 decision from the Contra Costa County Superior Court (2023 WL 2618967). As Defendant should know, trial court decisions have no precedential value. In any event, Barbour also concerned allegations that evidenced a sequential duplication, not a real-time interception. (Id., at pp. *4-5.)

“[A]llegations that [communications] are intercepted in real time through the use of computer code provides sufficient factual detail to support the 'in transit' requirement [Citation.] A pleading standard to the contrary would require the CIPA plaintiff to engage in a one-sided guessing game because the relevant information about data capture typically resides uniquely in the custody and control of the CIPA defendant and its third-party recorder. [Citation.]” (Doe v. Call-On Doc, Inc. (S.D. Cal. June 13, 2025) 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113269 at p. 34 [internal quotations and citations omitted].) The Court is persuaded that Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient for pleading purposes. Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer on this ground is OVERRULED.

***

Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ CIPA cause of action is OVERRULED.

B. Unjust Enrichment (Second Cause of Action)

“To allege unjust enrichment as an independent cause of action, a plaintiff must show that the defendant received and unjustly retained a benefit at the plaintiff's expense.” (ESG Cap. Partners, supra, 828 F.3d at pp. 1038-39, citing Lectrodryer v. Seoulbank (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 723, 726.)

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Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim fails for two reasons: (1) Plaintiffs were never in privity with Defendant or allege to have a contractual relationship; and (2) Plaintiffs have not plead that they expended their own resources or shown that their sensitive information has become less valuable. (Demurrer, p. 11:3-12.)

First, to the extent that Defendant argues that privity or a contractual relationship is required, Defendant’s position is not supported by any citation to authority or analysis. “When [a party] fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat it as waived.” (Badie, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784-785.) In any event, courts have rejected Defendant’s arguments. (See Professional Tax Appeal v. Kennedy-Wilson Holdings, Inc. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 230, 240, citing Kossian v.

American Nat. Ins. Co. (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 647, 650 [concluding that unjust enrichment “is not narrowly and rigidly limited to quasi-contract principles. [T]he doctrine also recognizes an obligation imposed by law regardless of the intent of the parties. In these instances, there need be no relationship that gives substance to an implied intent basic to the ‘contract’ concept, rather the obligation is imposed because good conscience dictates that under the circumstances the person benefited should make reimbursement.”].)

Second, Defendant’s argument regarding expenses and/or diminution of value misses the mark in the context of an unjust enrichment claim. In support, Defendant cites Katz-Lacabe v. Oracle Am., Inc. (N.D. Cal. April 6, 2023) 668 F.Supp.3d 928, 946. But Katz-Lacabe confirms that “California law requires disgorgement of unjustly earned profits regardless of whether a defendant's actions caused a plaintiff to directly expend his or her own financial resources or whether a defendant’s actions directly caused the plaintiff’s property to become less valuable.” (Ibid., citing In re Facebook Inc.

Internet Tracking Litig. (9th Cir. 2020) 956 F.3d 589, 600 [emphasis added].) While the district court noted that the plaintiffs there had “neither directly expended their own resources, nor shown that their property has become less valuable,” (id., at p. 946), the court ultimately dismissed the unjust enrichment claim because there was no direct interaction between the plaintiffs and Oracle. Therefore, “Defendant did not collect information from Plaintiffs in a manner contrary to the expectations created by the consent process.” (Ibid.)

Rather, “[t]o the extent Defendant [Oracle] has data, [] it was received and/or collected with permission from the third-party websites.” (Ibid., fn 11.) The court noted that the circumstances were unlike those in Hart v. TWC Prod. & Tech LLC, 526 F.Supp.3d 592, 605 (N.D. Cal. 2021), where the court held that the plaintiff “sufficiently pleaded a claim by alleging that [the defendant] unjustly benefited from the use of his location data” without his consent.

Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant received a benefit at the expense of Plaintiffs. (See Complaint, ¶¶ 38-49 [Defendant received benefit of intercepting valuable information without prior authorization or compensation]; 50-53 [allegations regarding the value of medical data]; 54-55 [depriving Plaintiffs of the value of that data and the benefit of the bargain, which included a reasonable expectation that Defendant would protect their data]; 69 [without consent, Defendant imbedded Google Analytics which allowed Google to obtain private information in

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exchange for Defendant’s receipt of “information and analytics that allowed it to refine and more effectively advertise to new and existing patients, increasing revenue as a result”]; 70 [Plaintiffs denied “the value of their private and medical information without any compensation”].) The Court is persuaded that these allegations are sufficient for pleading purposes.

Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer on this ground is OVERRULED.

C. Violation of the UCL (Third Cause of Action)

Standing

Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ UCL claim fails because Plaintiffs have failed to plead specific economic injuries and, thus, have not demonstrated UCL standing. (Demurrer, pp. 11:15-12:12.)

To have standing to bring a UCL claim, a plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact and have lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17204; Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 320-321.) To satisfy this narrower standing requirement, “a party must now (1) establish a loss or deprivation of money or property sufficient to qualify as injury in fact, i.e., economic injury, and (2) show that that economic injury was the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair business practice that is the gravamen of the claim.” (Folgelstrom v.

Lamps Plus, Inc. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 986, 993.) In the context of a data breach, California courts have recognized that a benefit-of-the-bargain theory is sufficient to demonstrate an economic injury from unfair competition. (See Moore v. Centrelake Medical Group, Inc. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 515, 527 [“[A] ‘benefit of the bargain’ approach to establishing UCL standing is rooted in the California Supreme Court's recognition that a plaintiff may demonstrate economic injury from unfair competition by establishing he or she ‘surrender[ed] in a transaction more, or acquire[d] in a transaction less, than he or she otherwise would have.’”].)

The pertinent question on demurrer is whether the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any possible legal theory. (See Gutkin v. University of Southern California (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 967, 976.) Accordingly, if Plaintiffs can state an economic injury under any theory, Plaintiffs’ complaint survives demurrer.

Here, in addition to the allegations summarized above regarding the value of Plaintiffs’ information and how Defendant deprived Plaintiffs of both the value of their data and the benefit of their bargain (see Complaint, ¶¶ 50-55), Plaintiffs have alleged that “Plaintiffs and Class Members have suffered a diminution in value of their private and medical information. Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ data has significant value, there is a substantial market for this information, and participants in this market now either have this data and would no longer purchase it (e.g., Google) or can use this data when marketing through Google since Google has incorporated it into individual ad profiles.” (Id., ¶ 80.) Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that “Plaintiffs and Class Members also suffered economic injury because they did not receive the benefit of their bargain

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with WellSpace. Plaintiffs and Class Members reasonably expected that their private and medical information would be kept confidential as part of what they paid WellSpace for when utilizing it for healthcare services. If Plaintiffs and Class Members had known that WellSpace would permit Google to intercept their private and medical information, then they would not have used WellSpace’s services or would have paid less for the services.” (Id., ¶ 81.) Accordingly, even if Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding diminution of value are too conclusory, Plaintiffs allege a viable benefit of the bargain theory.

Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer on this ground is OVERRULED.

Unlawful and/or Unfair Act

Defendant further argues that, even if Plaintiffs have standing, their UCL claim still fails because Plaintiffs have failed to adequately state a claim by failing to adequately allege an unlawful or unfair act. (Id., pp. 12:13-13:13.) Defendant asserts that “Plaintiffs do not cite any laws or statutes in Count III” and that any reliance on a CIPA violation is insufficient because Plaintiffs have failed to state a CIPA claim. (Id., pp. 12:25-13:1.) As discussed above, Defendant’s challenge to Plaintiffs’ CIPA claim is overruled. Plaintiffs’ UCL cause of action incorporates Plaintiffs’ preceding allegations and therefore incorporates Plaintiffs’ CIPA claim (Complaint, ¶ 74), providing an “unlawful” predicate act for UCL liability.

Contrary to Defendant’s suggestion, the Court is not concerned with whether Plaintiffs can actually establish that Defendant obtained its patient’s data and transferred it to Google. (Highlanders, supra, 77 Cal.App.3d at pp. 696-97 [“Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief, we are not concerned with plaintiff’s possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.”].) To survive a demurrer, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any possible legal theory. (See Gutkin, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 976.) Plaintiffs have done so here.

Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer on this ground is OVERRULED.

2. Motion to Strike

Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages should be stricken as “inappropriate” because it is unsupported by the cited statute and Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to establish malice or oppression. (Demurrer, pp. 13:18-14:1.) Similarly, Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees is not authorized by Penal Code section 637.2 and should be stricken. (Id., p. 14:2-7.)

First, while Penal Code section 637.2 specifies the statutory damages available for a CIPA violation, it does not follow that Plaintiffs are not entitled to also seek punitive damages. (See Opp., p. 19:19-21, Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1256-1257 [holding

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV011792: MIXON, et al. vs WELLSPACE HEALTH, et al. 09/19/2025 Hearing on Demurrer With A Motion To Strike in Department 22

that plaintiff can allege both punitive and statutory damages and, if they prevail, elect between them].) CCP section 3294 establishes the general standard for punitive damages, including definitions for malice, oppression, and fraud. (CCP, § 3294(c)(1)-(c)(3).) For example, “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Id., ¶ 3294(c)(1).)

While Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not include the words oppression, fraud, or malice, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant acted “knowingly” and “actively,” in a “scheme” to “intercept and use” Plaintiffs’ private information, in disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights. (Complaint, ¶¶ 5-7, 54, 57.) The Court is persuaded that these allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to strike.

As for Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees, even if CIPA does not authorize such an award, CCP section 1021.5 does. CCP section 1021.5 contemplates an award of attorneys’ fees in any action that has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest, if certain requirements are met.

Accordingly, Defendant’s request to strike these claims for relief is DENIED.

DISPOSITION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s demurrer, including Defendant’s request to strike certain requests for relief, is OVERRULED, in its entirety.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or other notice is required.

[1] To the extent Defendant argue that Plaintiffs failed to allege a financial benefit to WellSpace

as opposed to Google (see Demurrer, p. 7:4-5), Plaintiffs persuasively argue that Defendant is reading new elements into the claim. (Opp., p. 16:10-14.) Defendant offers no authority for the proposition that Plaintiffs must allege a direct financial benefit to demonstrate aider and abettor liability. “When [a party] fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat it as waived.” (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785.)

To request oral argument on this matter, you must call Department 22 at (916) 874-5762 by 4:00 p.m., the court day before this hearing and notification of oral argument must be made to the opposing party/counsel. If no call is made, the tentative ruling becomes the order of the court. (Local Rule 1.06.)

Parties requesting services of a court reporter may arrange for private court reporter services at

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV011792: MIXON, et al. vs WELLSPACE HEALTH, et al. 09/19/2025 Hearing on Demurrer With A Motion To Strike in Department 22

their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. The list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore is available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/courtreporters/docs/crtrp-13.Pdf.

If you are not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list, a Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) must be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge. The signed form must be filed with the clerk prior to the hearing.

If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211). The form must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the hearing is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

If oral argument is requested, the Parties are encouraged to appear via Zoom with the links below:

To join by Zoom link - https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept22 To join by phone dial (833) 568-8864 ID 16184738886

Counsel for Plaintiff is directed to notice all parties of this order.

Please note that the Complex Civil Case Department now provides information to assist you in managing your complex case on the Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/civil/complex-civil-cases.aspx. The Court strongly encourages parties to review this website regularly to stay abreast of the most recent complex civil case procedures. Please refer to the website before directly contacting the Court Clerk for information.