MAYER, et al. vs SUTTER AUBURN FAITH HOSPITAL FOUNDATION, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT CORPORATION, et al.

25CV010471: MAYER, et al. vs SUTTER AUBURN FAITH HOSPITAL FOUNDATION, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT CORPORATION, et al. 06/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. in Department 8D

Tentative Ruling

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25CV010471: MAYER, et al. vs SUTTER AUBURN FAITH HOSPITAL FOUNDATION, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT CORPORATION, et al. 06/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. in Department 8D

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***NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 25 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE OR GORDON D. SCHABER COURTHOUSE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION.***

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants Sutter Valley Hospitals dba Sutter Roseville Medical Center’s (“Sutter Roseville”) and Sutter Valley Hospitals dba Sutter Auburn Faith Hospital’s (“Sutter Auburn”; and collectively with the remaining defendants “Defendants”[1]) demurrer to Plaintiffs Allan Mr. Mayer’s, Margaret “Peggy” Mayer’s, Scott Allan Mayer’s and Shauna Mayer’s (“Plaintiffs”) first amended complaint is ruled upon as follows.[2]

Background

This is an alleged elder abuse action. Plaintiffs allege that while Allan Mayer (“Mr. Mayer”) was a resident at Sutter Roseville and Sutter Auburn he suffered neglect. (First Amended Complaint “[FAC]”, ¶¶ 42, 47.) Plaintiff alleges that both Sutter Auburn and Sutter Roseville neglected Mr. Mayer by failing to protect him from acquiring a pressure ulcer and failing to treat a wound or pressure ulcer on his back. (Id. at ¶¶ 42, 43.) During or following the care of Defendants, the pressure ulcer worsened to “an unstageable thoracic spine wound with necrosis.” (Id. at ¶ 37.)

Mr. Mayer died from “severe sepsis due to mid-back cellulitis” while admitted at Sutter Auburn. (Id. at ¶ 39.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were aware of a high probability that their care would cause harm or death to Mr. Mayer, yet knowingly disregarded the risk. (Id. at ¶ 47.) Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants’ neglect was the result of an intentional plan by Defendants to put profits over care by understaffing. (Id. at ¶¶ 15, 20-21, 23-24, 48-49.) Finally, Plaintiffs allege the Defendants fraudulently concealed from Mr.

Mayer their policy of maximizing profit and that they were unable to adequately care for him. (Id. at ¶¶ 67, 68.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010471: MAYER, et al. vs SUTTER AUBURN FAITH HOSPITAL FOUNDATION, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT CORPORATION, et al. 06/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. in Department 8D

Plaintiff alleges eight causes of action: (1) elder neglect; (2) elder neglect (enhanced remedies sought); (3) negligence (custodial); (4) fraud (constructive); (5) tort per se (Penal Code § 368); (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (7) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (8) wrongful death. Defendants demur to all causes of action on the ground that the FAC fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Plaintiffs oppose.

Defendants’ unopposed request for judicial notice is GRANTED for the purposes appropriate for judicial notice. (Evid. Code, § 453, subd. (a); Johnson & Johnson v. Super. Ct. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not the truth of the statements contained therein].)

Legal Standard

The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the pleading it challenges by raising questions of law. (Salimi v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 216, 219; Nordlinger v. Lynch (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Super. Ct. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.)

For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view towards substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140–141; Quelimane Co., Inc. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) In this respect, the Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111–1112.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 778.) “[P]laintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . . [W]e are not concerned with plaintiff’s possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 697.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action, not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) The Court draws all reasonable implications and inferences in favor of upholding the complaint. (Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC, supra, 152

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010471: MAYER, et al. vs SUTTER AUBURN FAITH HOSPITAL FOUNDATION, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT CORPORATION, et al. 06/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. in Department 8D

Cal.App.4th at p. 1112.)

Analysis

Sham Pleading Doctrine

Defendants base much of their demurrer on the argument that the FAC is a “sham pleading.” (Def’s Memorandum of Points & Authorities [“MPA”], at pp. 5:3–12:2.) In support Defendants submit the First Amended Complaint from Sacramento Superior Court Case No. 24CV012965, Mayer v. Aloe Holdings, LLC [“Aloe”]. The First Amended Complaint in Aloe (“Aloe FAC”) was brought by the same Plaintiffs as the instant case, is based on similar events as the FAC, and asserted similar causes of action. (Compare FAC with Declaration of Jonathan Corr, Exh. D [“Aloe FAC”].) Unlike the FAC, the defendants in the Aloe FAC were several skilled nursing facilities and their staff. Plaintiffs commenced the Aloe lawsuit on June 29, 2024, and the instant lawsuit on April 29, 2025. Aloe concluded by agreed settlement in November 2025. (Order of Nov. 7, 2025, 24CV012965.)

The general rule on demurrer is that all material facts properly plead are treated as true. (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 697.) But pleaded facts are conclusively deemed true as against the pleader. (Dang v. Smith (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 646, 656.) Thus, when a party alleges facts in one pleading inconsistent with those in a prior pleading, the court may treat the inconsistent pleading as a “sham.” (Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs, Inc. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 336, 343 (“Larson”) [holding that the exception “applies not only to an amended pleading filed in the same action, but also to the first pleading filed in a separate action”].)

The Court may disregard inconsistent allegations in a sham pleading; that is, need not treat the allegations as true. (Ibid.) The Court may also read omitted material facts into the pleading to avoid critical misrepresentations. (Id. at 345.)

The sham pleading doctrine applies only when the allegations are truly inconsistent, such as “logical opposites.” (Dang v. Smith, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 658.) The doctrine is not intended to prevent corrections of errors or clarification of ambiguous facts. (Larson, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 344.) A party may reasonably explain inconsistencies based on mistake or inadvertence or discovery of new evidence. (JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Ward (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 678, 690–692 (“Ward”).) An appellate court explained:

Critically, the sham pleading doctrine “cannot be mechanically applied.” (Avalon Painting Co. v. Alert Lumber Co. (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 178, 185,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010471: MAYER, et al. vs SUTTER AUBURN FAITH HOSPITAL FOUNDATION, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT CORPORATION, et al. 06/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. in Department 8D

44 Cal.Rptr. 90 (Avalon).) It “is not intended to prevent honest complainants from correcting erroneous allegations or prevent the correction of ambiguous facts.” (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 751, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 527.) Instead “the rule must be taken together with its purpose, which is to prevent [an] amended pleading which is only a sham, when it is apparent that no cause of action can be stated truthfully.” (Callahan v. City and County of San Francisco (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 696, 699, 57 Cal.Rptr. 639 (Callahan); see McGee v. McNally (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 891, 897, 174 Cal.Rptr. 253 (McGee) [where omission did not “impugn[] the credibility of appellants' cause of action,” amendment should have been allowed].

(Id. at p. 690 [reversing the trial court’s denial of leave to amend based on application of the sham pleading doctrine].) The sham pleading doctrine is “intended to enable courts to prevent an abuse of process.” (Larson, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 344 (internal quotation marks omitted).) “Plaintiffs therefore may avoid the effect of the sham pleading doctrine by alleging an explanation for the conflicts between the pleadings.” (Ibid.)

Whether the FAC and Aloe FAC are inconsistent is sharply contested by the parties based on a close reading of the two pleadings. Because the purported inconsistencies depend on what was alleged against whom and when, the Court first prepares a timeline of allegations as stated in the FAC:

 Mr. Mayer was hospitalized at Sutter Auburn for back surgery sometime between May 2023 and before July 31, 2023. (FAC ¶ 34.)  July 31, 2023: Mr. Mayer suffered severe stomach pain. No treatment was provided and staff advised that the pain was related to Mr. Mayer’s back injury. (FAC ¶ 34.)  August 1, 2023: Mr. Mayer’s gallbladder perforated, requiring emergency surgery. (FAC ¶ 34.)  Mid-August 2023: Mr. Mayer was discharged to a skilled nursing facility. The records from this facility observed no skin impairment in his mid-spine area. (FAC ¶ 34.)  August 29, 2023: Mr. Mayer was admitted back to Sutter Auburn. A nurse and physical therapist both attended Mr. Mayer and neither recorded anything about a mid-spine wound. (FAC ¶ 35.)  August 31, 2023: A nurse documented a pressure ulcer on Mr. Mayer’s coccyx and noted “an issue on the ‘mid back’” but did not describe or measure the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010471: MAYER, et al. vs SUTTER AUBURN FAITH HOSPITAL FOUNDATION, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT CORPORATION, et al. 06/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. in Department 8D

wound and did not notify a doctor or family member. (FAC ¶ 35.) A nurse documented a dressing on “the mid-spine wound.” There were no doctor’s orders related to the mid-spine wound at that time. (FAC ¶ 36.)  September 1, 2023: Hospital staff documented a “new pressure ulcer” on Mr. Mayer’s mid spine. (FAC ¶ 36.)  September 2-3, 2023: Hospital staff continued to document the pressure sore but did not notify a doctor or family and did not create a care plan or provide treatment. (FAC ¶ 36.)  September 4, 2023: Mr.

Mayer was transferred to Sutter Roseville. Staff did not refer to the mid-back wound in its admission records but a “flowsheet entry” and a nurse both noted the wound. No treatment orders were issued for the mid- back. (FAC ¶ 37.)  September 6, 2023: A physical therapist documented “an unstageable thoracic spine wound with necrosis.” (FAC ¶ 37.) A doctor ordered changing the bandage daily and as needed. Mr. Mayer was transferred to a pulsate air bed. (FAC ¶ 38.)  September 6-10, 2023: Hospital staff documented the mid-back pressure ulcer daily. (FAC ¶ 38.)

Nursing staff did not document changing the bandage before Mr. Mayer’s discharge. (FAC ¶ 38.)  September 11, 2023: The physical therapist documented that the mid-back wound had “100% brown/tan/yellow necrosis.“ Mr. Mayer was discharged to a skilled nursing facility. (FAC ¶ 37.) Sutter Roseville did not provide treatment orders for the pressure ulcer. (FAC ¶ 38.)  September 20, 2023: Mr. Mayer was transferred to Sutter Auburn. (FAC ¶ 39.)  September 24, 2023: Mr. Mayer died from “severe sepsis due to mid-back cellulitis.” (FAC ¶ 39.)

Defendants assert six purportedly contradictory facts. Plaintiffs respond that each of the asserted contradictions is not truly contradictory. (Opp. at p. 8:18–9:2.) Plaintiffs also contend that the FAC simply provides greater specificity than the Aloe FAC after gathering and review of additional medical records and expert consultation. (Opp. at p. 9:7–9.) To support this latter contention, Plaintiffs submit a declaration from Plaintiffs’ attorney, asserting the following:

7. Where the FAC provides greater specificity than the Aloe Complaint, that specificity reflects the gathering and review of additional medical records and expert consultation engaged in by my office in the intervening eleven months to plead this case against the Sutter Defendants.

8. Again, where the FAC provides greater specificity than the Aloe

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010471: MAYER, et al. vs SUTTER AUBURN FAITH HOSPITAL FOUNDATION, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT CORPORATION, et al. 06/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. in Department 8D

Complaint, that specificity reflects my office’s gathering and review of additional medical records and conferring with expert consultants in the intervening eleven months before this case was filed against Sutter.

9. The Aloe Complaint was filed more than a year before the FAC and was directed at the skilled nursing facilities, including Auburn Oaks, Rock Creek, and the Providence defendants. Through discovery and the production of medical records obtained in that earlier action, along with review by expert medical consultants, plaintiffs uncovered and better understood additional facts regarding separate and distinct conduct by the Sutter defendants. The FAC, brought against Sutter, naturally contains more detailed allegations regarding Sutter’s conduct — because it is directed at Sutter. This reflects the ordinary course of litigation, not any inconsistency in pleading.

(Declaration of Jay P. Renneisen, ¶¶ 7-9.)

Defendants allege that the following facts are inconsistent with or omit allegations in the Aloe FAC, as follows:

#1. The FAC states that Sutter Auburn ignored Mr. Mayer’s pain on July 31 and August 1. (FAC ¶ 34.) Defendants assert that allegations in the Aloe FAC are inconsistent:

 On July 21, because of a sudden exacerbation of pain while in nursing care, Mr. Mayer was admitted to Sutter Auburn “to evaluate the cause of his back pain.” An MRI was performed. (Aloe FAC, ¶ 41 (emphasis added).)  During admission, Mr. Mayer developed severe stomach pain and underwent gallbladder surgery. (Aloe FAC ¶ 42.)  Mr. Mayer was recovering well, so he was discharged to a skilled nursing facility. Upon admission [presumably at the nursing facility], Mr. Mayer was stable, communicative, and alert. (Aloe FAC ¶ 43.)

The Court finds that these allegations are not necessarily inconsistent with the FAC’s allegation in paragraph 34 that Sutter Auburn ignored Mr. Mayer’s pain. (FAC ¶ 34 [“During this hospitalization, on July 31, Mr. Mayer was suffering severe stomach pain and both he and his wife Peggy complained repeatedly about this pain. Sutter personnel ignored these complaints and wrongly advised them that Mr. Mayer was just experiencing pain from his back.”].) Even if Mr. Mayer was admitted to evaluate the cause of his back pain, Sutter Auburn staff may have ignored his stomach pain until Mr.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010471: MAYER, et al. vs SUTTER AUBURN FAITH HOSPITAL FOUNDATION, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT CORPORATION, et al. 06/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. in Department 8D

Mayer’s gallbladder perforated.

As such, the Court does not find that this constitutes sham pleading.

#2. Defendants contend that the Aloe FAC makes inconsistent allegations to those in the FAC (FAC ¶¶ 35-36) about when or whether the mid-back wound was documented upon Mr. Mayer’s readmission to Sutter Auburn on August 29. Specifically, the Aloe FAC alleges:

 A skin examination upon admission to Sutter Auburn found pressure ulcers. (Aloe FAC ¶ 48.)  An August 30 “skin examination revealed three pressure sores—two on [Mr. Mayer’s] coccyx area and one on his mid back (thoracic area). Wound care and precautions were instituted.” (Aloe FAC ¶ 48.)

As an initial matter, the Court does not find these allegations to be strictly inconsistent with the FAC, as ¶ 48 of the Aloe complaint does not set forth that the skin examination took place immediately upon admission. It appears that there is a potential contradiction regarding whether the mid-back wound has discovered on August 30 or 31, how the wound has described, and what “wound care and precautions were instituted.” To the extent that the allegations in ¶¶ 35-36 differ by a day and by the description of the wound in the records, the Court finds that such distinction is supported by the declaration of counsel that there was additional gathering and review of medical records between the filing of the Aloe FAC and the FAC in this case.

As such, the Court does not find that this constitutes sham pleading.

#3. Defendants contend that the Aloe FAC is inconsistent with the allegation that Meyer’s “mid-spine pressure ulcer was entirely ignored during his six-day stay at Sutter Auburn.” (FAC ¶ 36.) Specifically, the Aloe FAC alleged that “wound care and precautions were instituted” when Mr. Mayer was readmitted. (Aloe FAC ¶ 48.)

Similar to the above, the Court does not find these allegations to be strictly inconsistent with the allegations in this case. To the extent the Aloe allegations assert that wound care and precautions were instituted, the FAC in this case alleges that a dressing was on the mid-spine wound on August 31, 2023. (FAC ¶ 35.) It also alleges that the records documented a “new pressure ulcer” on September 1, 2023, which was documented the following days. (FAC ¶ 36.) It is unclear from the allegations in the FAC whether this is the same “pressure sore” alleged in the Aloe FAC or a new condition. Further, to the extent there is a potential contradiction between the Aloe FAC allegations and the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010471: MAYER, et al. vs SUTTER AUBURN FAITH HOSPITAL FOUNDATION, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT CORPORATION, et al. 06/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. in Department 8D

allegations in the FAC in this case, the Court finds the new allegations allowable based on the declaration of counsel that there was additional gathering and review of medical records between the filing of the Aloe FAC and the FAC in this case.

As such, the Court does not find that this constitutes sham pleading.

#4. Defendants argue again that the lack of care provided at Sutter Roseville from September 4 to 6, 2023, as described in the FAC is contradicted by the Aloe FAC.

 Upon admission, a skin check revealed the large ulcer on the mid back. Pictures were taken and daily wound care was ordered, including repositioning every two hours. (Aloe FAC ¶ 50.)

Again, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the observations and orders at Sutter Roseville in the FAC are not strictly inconsistent. Paragraph 37 acknowledges that a flowsheet entry on September 4, 2023, noted a pressure ulcer to the mid-back. Similarly, paragraph 38 alleges that, on September 6, 2023, a doctor ordered changing the adhesive bandages as needed and daily. The FAC in this case further alleges, however, that compliance with the orders to change the adhesive bandages was never documented. While this allegation provides more detail, it does not directly contradict the allegations in the Aloe FAC.

As such, the Court does not find that this constitutes sham pleading.

#5. Defendants argue that the characterization of the mid-back wound in the FAC is inconsistent with the Aloe FAC.

 On September 11, Mr. Mayer was cleared for discharge to a skilled nursing facility. “Healing of his pressure sore wounds was noted to be progressing.” (Aloe Fac ¶ 51.)

The Court finds this allegation not inconsistent with the FAC. It may be possible that the records (or someone) noted on September 11, 2023, that the pressure sore wounds were progressing and that a physical therapist also noted on September 6, 2023, that the wound was “unstageable” and on September 11, 2023, that the wound had “100% brown/tan/yellow necrosis.” (FAC ¶ 37.) Indeed, it appears that Plaintiffs’ allegation in the Aloe FAC supports the theory of liability in this case; in other words, Plaintiffs allege that it was noted that the pressure wounds were progressing for purposes of discharge when, in fact, other notes in the record revealed that the wound was not progressing and was necrotic.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010471: MAYER, et al. vs SUTTER AUBURN FAITH HOSPITAL FOUNDATION, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT CORPORATION, et al. 06/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. in Department 8D

As such, the Court does not find that this constitutes sham pleading.

#6. Finally, Defendants contend that the Aloe FAC is inconsistent with the FAC’s allegation that Sutter Roseville’s failure to provide treatment orders upon discharge to a nursing facility caused Mr. Mayer’s wound not to be addressed for several days. (FAC ¶ 38.) The Aloe FAC alleges:

 On September 11, Mr. Mayer was admitted to the nursing facility for treatment of his wounds, among other things. Daily wound care treatments were ordered, as well as monitoring for effectiveness. (Aloe FAC ¶ 52.)

The Court finds that the Aloe FAC does not contradict the FAC’s allegation that Sutter Roseville did not provide treatment orders upon discharge. The allegation in the Aloe FAC provide that treatments were ordered; it does not provide that Sutter Roseville provided such orders.

As such, the Court does not find that this constitutes sham pleading.

The Court now turns to Defendants’ arguments directed against Plaintiffs’ causes of action.

Causes of Action for Elder Abuse

Plaintiffs allege elder abuse through neglect because Sutter Auburn failed to protect Mr. Mayer from acquiring and developing the mid-back pressure ulcer, failed to appropriately treat the ulcer, and entirely ignored both Mr. Mayer’s wound and his complaints of stomach pain, which led to the perforation of his gallbladder. (FAC ¶ 42.) Plaintiffs allege elder abuse against Sutter Roseville for failing to prevent the ulcer from worsening and for failing to provide appropriate orders upon discharge. (FAC ¶ 43.) Defendants argue that the FAC states, at most, a claim for medical negligence and not the specific facts of intentional or willful conduct required to articulate elder abuse.

Abuse of an elder under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (the “Act”) is defined as “[p]hysical abuse, neglect, financial abuse, abandonment, isolation, abduction, or other treatment with resulting physical harm or pain and mental suffering.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.07, subd. (a)(1).) Neglect means “negligent failure of any person having the care or custody of an elder or dependent adult to exercise that degree of care that a reasonable person in a like position would exercise” and includes, but is not limited to “[f]ailure to assist in personal hygiene,” “[f]ailure to provide medical

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010471: MAYER, et al. vs SUTTER AUBURN FAITH HOSPITAL FOUNDATION, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT CORPORATION, et al. 06/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. in Department 8D

care for physical and mental health needs,” and “[f]ailure to protect from health and safety hazards.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.57, subd. (a)-(c).) Under the Act, neglect is not negligence in the undertaking of medical services, but rather concerns the fundamental failure to provide custodial care. (Delaney v. Baker (1999) 20 Cal.4th 23, 34.) Neglect includes only “acts of egregious abuse.” (Id. at p. 35.)

The California Supreme Court has explained:

“neglect” within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.57 covers an area of misconduct distinct from “professional negligence.” As used in the Act, neglect refers not to the substandard performance of medical services but, rather, to the “failure of those responsible for attending to the basic needs and comforts of elderly or dependent adults, regardless of their professional standing, to carry out their custodial obligations.” (Delaney, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 34, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 610, 971 P.2d 986.) Thus, the statutory definition of “neglect” speaks not of the undertaking of medical services, but of the failure to provide medical care. (Ibid.)

(Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771, 783.)

Conduct proscribed by the Act “do[es] not include acts of simple professional negligence, but refer[s] to forms of abuse or neglect performed with some state of culpability greater than mere negligence.” (Delaney v. Baker, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 32.) Recklessness under the Act “involves more than ‘inadvertence, incompetence, unskillfulness, or a failure to take precautions but rather rises to the level of a conscious choice of a course of action with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it.’” (Id. at p. 31.)

In Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 396, 406– 407, the Court identified a number of factors that must be alleged for conduct to constitute neglect within the meaning of the Act and to trigger the enhanced remedies available under the Act. The Court identified the following factors:

The plaintiff must allege (and ultimately prove by clear and convincing evidence) facts establishing that the defendant: (1) had responsibility for meeting the basic needs of the elder or dependent adult, such as nutrition, hydration, hygiene or medical care; (2) knew of conditions that made the elder or dependent adult unable to provide for his or her own basic needs; and (3) denied or withheld goods or services necessary to meet the elder or dependent adult’s basic needs,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010471: MAYER, et al. vs SUTTER AUBURN FAITH HOSPITAL FOUNDATION, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT CORPORATION, et al. 06/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. in Department 8D

either with knowledge that injury was substantially certain to befall the elder or dependent adult (if the plaintiff alleges oppression, fraud or malice) or with conscious disregard of the high probability of such injury (if the plaintiff alleges recklessness). The plaintiff must also allege (and ultimately prove by clear and convincing evidence) that the neglect caused the elder or dependent adult to suffer physical harm, pain or mental suffering. Finally, the facts constituting the neglect and establishing the causal link between the neglect and the injury “must be pleaded with particularity,” in accordance with the pleading rules governing statutory claims.

(Ibid. [citations omitted].)

Taking as true all the allegations of the FAC, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege a claim for elder abuse. Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants had care and custody of Mr. Mayer during his admissions to Sutter Auburn and Sutter Roseville and that Mr. Mayer was over the age of 65 at all relevant times. (FAC ¶¶ 1, 41.)

With respect to the hospitalization at Sutter Auburn, Plaintiffs allege that pressure ulcers were noted upon Mr. Mayer’s admission at Sutter Auburn on August 31 and September 1, 2023. (FAC ¶¶ 35-36.) Nevertheless, Plaintiffs allege that, aside from one documented dressing, no physician orders were made nor further care taken of the midspine ulcer during hospitalization at Sutter Auburn, despite documentation of the midspine pressure ulcer. (FAC ¶¶ 35-36.) As alleged in the FAC, Defendants knew about a mid-spine wound and knew about a new pressure ulcer, but ignored the care of the pressure ulcer and withheld treatment and custodial care. (Cf.

Carter, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 407-408 [affirming trial court’s sustaining of demurrer where “[n]othing [was] alleged about the Hospital’s denial or withholding of any care or about any injury [patient] suffered during this hospitalization”].)

With respect to the hospitalization at Sutter Roseville, Plaintiffs allege that, despite documentation of the mid-back wound on the date of admission on September 4, 2023, no treatment orders were issued until September 6, 2023, when the physician ordered change of bandage daily and as needed. (FAC ¶¶ 37-38.) Despite physician orders, Plaintiffs allege there are no records that such care was actually provided. (FAC ¶ 38.) Further, despite documentation from a physical therapist on September 6, 2023, that the wound was “unstageable” and “necrotic” and despite further notation on September 11, 2023, that the wound had “100% brown/tan/yellow necrosis,” Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Mayer was discharged to a skilled nursing facility without any treatment orders. (FAC ¶¶ 37-38.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010471: MAYER, et al. vs SUTTER AUBURN FAITH HOSPITAL FOUNDATION, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT CORPORATION, et al. 06/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. in Department 8D

Further, Plaintiffs allege that these failures and withholding were caused by an intentional plan to maximize profits at the expense of patient care through understaffing. (FAC ¶¶ 48-50.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were on notice of the consequences of such understaffing through prior civil lawsuits and regulatory actions, but failed to make necessary changes. (FAC ¶¶ 13-15, 23-24.) Finally, Plaintiffs allege that these failures resulted in deterioration of the mid-spine pressure ulcer to a fully necrotic, unstageable pressure ulcer that ultimately caused Mr. Mayer to come massively septic and die from “severe sepsis due to mid-back cellulitis.” (FAC ¶ 39.)

Accordingly, taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiffs’ first and second causes of action for elder neglect is OVERRULED.

Statute of Limitations

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful death are barred by the statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 because such claims are based upon alleged professional negligence. Because Mr. Mayer died on September 20, 2023, but Plaintiffs did not file their claim until April 29, 2025, Defendants contend that the one-year statute of limitations had run.

Plaintiffs argue that their claims for wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional distress are “derivative” of their elder abuse claim. A two-year statute of limitation in Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1 applies to elder neglect claims. (Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1 [actions “for assault, battery, or injury to, or for the death of, an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another”].)

Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 provides, in pertinent part:

In an action for injury or death against a health care provider based upon such person’s alleged professional negligence, the time for the commencement of action shall be three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first.

Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1 provides the time for commencing actions other than the recovery of real property as:

Within two years: An action for assault, battery, or injury to, or for the death of, an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010471: MAYER, et al. vs SUTTER AUBURN FAITH HOSPITAL FOUNDATION, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT CORPORATION, et al. 06/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. in Department 8D

“To determine the statute of limitations which applies to a cause of action it is necessary to identify the nature of the cause of action, i.e., the ‘gravamen’ of the cause of action.” (Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC, supra, 198 Cal.App.4 at p. 412.)

Under Delaney, as under the other Supreme Court cases dealing with the scope of MICRA, the issue is a matter of statutory interpretation. An elder abuse claim could be a “cause of action” for some statutory purposes but not others. For example, in dealing with the statute of limitations, what is controlling is not the nature of the cause of action (in the sense of the legal theory), but the gravamen of the cause of action. (Hydro–Mill Co., Inc. v. Hayward, Tilton and Rolapp Ins. Associates, Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1153, 1158–1159, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 582.)

One cause of action—e.g., negligent misrepresentation—may be governed by different statutes of limitations, whenever the gravamen of the cause of action is different— e.g., professional negligence rather than fraud. (See id. at p. 1155, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 582.) Thus, it makes perfect sense to say that [the plaintiff’s] elder abuse allegations altered the gravamen of what would otherwise have been professional negligence causes of action.

(Smith v. Ben Bennett, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1525; see Benun v. Super. Ct. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 113, 125-126 [“The present record does not contain any suggestion that the Legislature had an implicit intent that section 340.5 was to protect health care providers in any other capacity (particularly the “elder custodian” capacity) than as health care providers.[] The Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1 statute of limitations (applicable to causes for “assault, battery, or injury to, or for the death of, an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another”) is facially applicable to elder abuse actions and provides a two-year limitation period . . . .”].)

In this case, Plaintiffs’ causes of action for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful death is based on the custodial care of Mr. Mayer, not the provision of medical care (and thus do not sound in medical negligence). (See Covenant Care, Inc., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 786 [“elder abuse as defined in the Act, even when committed by a health care provider, is not an injury that is “directly related” to the provider's professional services. . . . As a failure to fulfill custodial duties owed by a custodian happens also to be a health care provider, such abuse is at most incidentally related to the provider's professional health care services.”] Indeed, Plaintiffs’ allegations relate to whether Defendants met their duty in reasonably caring for Mr.

Mayer’s needs by ensuring he did not acquire pressure sores, assuring any sores were properly treated, and “undertaking basic custodial interventions. (FAC ¶¶ 58-

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010471: MAYER, et al. vs SUTTER AUBURN FAITH HOSPITAL FOUNDATION, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT CORPORATION, et al. 06/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. in Department 8D

59, 85.) Accordingly, based on the allegations in the FAC, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ causes of action are based on a failure to meet duties relating to custodial care, not professional services. Thus, the Court does not find that the provisions of section 340.5 applies.

Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiffs’ causes of action for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful death is OVERRULED.

Cause of Action for Constructive Fraud

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not pled sufficient facts to support a cause of action for fraud. Plaintiffs oppose, arguing that they have alleged sufficient facts to support constructive fraud.

To state a claim for constructive fraud, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) a fiduciary or confidential relationship, (2) nondisclosure (breach of fiduciary duty), (3) intent to deceive, and (4) reliance and resulting injury (causation).” (Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1131.)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants created a fiduciary relationship by accepting Mr. Mayer as a patient. (FAC ¶ 64.) Plaintiffs also allege:

67. Defendants were aware, but concealed from plaintiffs, that defendants were managing Sutter Auburn and Sutter Roseville in a manner that was focused on maximizing the profits of Sutter Auburn and Sutter Roseville to the fullest possible extent, even when they knew that doing so was to the detriment of the care to be provided and the safety of the patients. Defendants knew, but concealed from plaintiffs, that because of this plan to prioritize profits over patient care that patients at Sutter Auburn and Sutter Roseville, including Mr. Mayer, would not receive the care they wanted or needed. Defendants misled plaintiffs by failing to disclose this information.

68. Defendants were also aware, but concealed from plaintiffs, that they were not capable of properly caring for Mr. Mayer because their staff lacked the numbers, training, and supervision to ensure that the very high acuity patient population they were serving was cared for in a way so as to ensure that their patients attained and maintained their highest practicable physical, mental, and psychosocial well-being. Defendants knew but concealed that there were numerous complaints that the level of staffing at

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010471: MAYER, et al. vs SUTTER AUBURN FAITH HOSPITAL FOUNDATION, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT CORPORATION, et al. 06/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. in Department 8D

Sutter Auburn and Sutter Roseville was inadequate, and that staff were so overburdened and inadequate that they could not comply with state or federal mandates or the standard of care. Defendants misled plaintiffs by failing to disclose this information.

(FAC ¶¶ 67, 68.) Mr. Mayer relied on these omissions, as he would not have agreed to reside at either Sutter Auburn or Sutter Roseville (or would have promptly sought discharge) if he was aware of these facts; Mr. Mayer then suffered injury as a result of the failure to disclose. (FAC ¶¶ 69, 70.)

The Court finds that these allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action for constructive fraud.

Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiffs’ cause of action for constructive fraud is OVERRULED.

Cause of Action for Tortious Violation of Penal Code section 368

Defendants demur to Plaintiffs’ Penal Code section 368 cause of action on the basis that “Plaintiffs fail to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate Defendants willfully caused or permitted Decedent’s suffering or death, or that Defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous.” (MPA at p. 16). Plaintiffs oppose, arguing sufficient facts have been alleged.

Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action is described as a “tort per se” for violation of Penal Code section 368. That statute is lengthy with several subdivisions but generally imposes criminal penalties for certain conduct against an elder or dependent adult. For example:

A person who knows or reasonably should know that a person is an elder or dependent adult and who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any elder or dependent adult to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any elder or dependent adult, willfully causes or permits the person or health of the elder or dependent adult to be injured, or willfully causes or permits the elder or dependent adult to be placed in a situation in which their person or health is endangered, is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a fine not to exceed six thousand dollars ($6,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010471: MAYER, et al. vs SUTTER AUBURN FAITH HOSPITAL FOUNDATION, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT CORPORATION, et al. 06/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. in Department 8D

(Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (b).)[3]

In this case, as set forth above, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants knew of a mid back wound and ultimately, the mid-back pressure sore Mr. Mayer suffered from and, despite such knowledge (and in the case of Sutter Roseville, despite physician orders to the contrary) failed to provide care to address the injury while in the custody of Defendants. Plaintiffs allege that the such failure was the result of an intentional plan to understaff facilities, despite knowledge of the consequences of such understaffing. Plaintiffs allege that such conduct resulted in serious illness and ultimately, the death of Mr. Mayer.

Taking the allegations in the FAC as true, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts to support willful conduct.

Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiffs’ “tort per se” cause of action is OVERRULED.

Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Similarly, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs allege insufficient facts to support extreme and outrageous conduct with requisite intent to allege a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs oppose.

The elements of a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress are (1) extreme and outrageous conduct with either the intention of causing or reckless disregard for the probability of causing emotional distress; (2) severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate cause. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050–1051.) Outrageous conduct in this context is “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Hughes v. Pair, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1051 [internal quotation marks omitted].)

For the same reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the tort per se cause of action, the Court finds that the FAC alleges sufficient facts of extreme and outrageous conduct with requisite intent.

Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiffs’ cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is OVERRULED.

Disposition

Defendants’ demurrer is OVERRULED in its entirety.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010471: MAYER, et al. vs SUTTER AUBURN FAITH HOSPITAL FOUNDATION, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT CORPORATION, et al. 06/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. in Department 8D

Defendants shall respond as directed by California Rules of Court rule 3.1320(j).

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

[1] Defendants filed separate but essentially similar demurrers and motions to strike for

(1) Defendants Sutter Valley Hospitals dba Sutter Roseville Medical Center’s and Sutter Valley Hospitals dba Sutter Auburn Faith Hospital’s (the hospital defendants); and (2) Defendants Sutter Health, Sutter Valley Hospitals, Sutter Auburn Faith Hospital Foundation, and Sutter Roseville Medical Foundation (the corporate defendants). Plaintiffs filed a combined Opposition and all Defendants filed a combined reply. For convenience, the Court will issue separate rulings for each of Defendants’ motions, incorporating the findings and conclusions set forth herein.

With respect to the instant motion, it appears that the “Defendants” are the same legal entity with different “dba”s. A “dba” cannot be named as a defendant because it is not a separate legal entity. (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Julian Union Elementary School Dist. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 970, 987.) Regardless, Defendants did not raise this issue in their demurrer, and the parties have made allegations and arguments based on the different locations. The Court addresses each location herein. [2] Defendants’ memorandum of points and authorities exceeds the maximum length

allowed without leave of court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113(d).) Excessive argument unduly consumes the limited resources of the Court. Failure to comply with these requirements in the future may result in papers not being considered, matters being continued so that papers may be submitted in the proper format, and/or the imposition of sanctions. [3] Neither party has provided authority to support that the Legislature has impliedly or

expressly recognized a private right of action under Penal Code section 368. “A violation of a state statute does not necessarily give rise to a private cause of action. [Citation.] Instead, whether a party has a right to sue depends on whether the Legislature has ‘manifested an intent to create such a private cause of action’ under the statute. [Citations.] Such legislative intent, if any, is revealed through the language of the statute and its legislative history.” (Lu v. Hawaiian Gardens Casino, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 592, 596.) However, as no party has raised this issue through this motion, the Court does not address it here.