VICKIE MABRY-HEIGHT, M.D. VS. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION

25CV025846: VICKIE MABRY-HEIGHT, M.D. VS. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION 09/03/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate in Department 3A

Tentative Ruling

DATE/TIME: September 3, 2026 1:30 p.m. DEP. NO.: 4 JUDGE: HON. JENNIFER K. CLERK: S. PAUL ROCKWELL

VICKIE MABRY-HEIGHT, M.D., Case No.: 25CV025846 Petitioner, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION; STATE PERSONNEL BOARD, Respondents.

Nature of Proceedings: Petition for Writ of Mandate

The following shall constitute the Court’s tentative ruling on the above matter, set for hearing in Department 3A, on Thursday, September 3, 2026, at 1:30 p.m. The tentative ruling shall become the ruling of the Court, unless a party desiring to be heard so advises the Clerk of Department 3A no later than 4:00 p.m. on the Court day preceding the hearing, and further advises the Clerk that such party has notified the other side of its intention to appear.

The Court strongly encourages parties to appear remotely for the hearing on the tentative ruling through the Court’s Zoom Application. However, any party wishing to appear in person may do so, provided that party notifies the Court by 4:00 the Court day before the hearing.

The parties may join the Zoom session for the hearing by audio and/or video through the following link: DEPT JUDGE ZOOM LINK MEETING ID

25CV025846: VICKIE MABRY-HEIGHT, M.D. VS. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION 09/03/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate in Department 3A

3A Hon. Jennifer K. https://saccourt-ca- 161 5277 4854 Rockwell gov.zoomgov.com/j/16152774854

Parties requesting services of a Court Reporter will need to arrange for private Court Reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government Code § 68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a Court Reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by using the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore, available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp- 13.Pdf

If a Court Reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list is not used, aStipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) must be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing. Once the form is signed, it must be filed with the Clerk of Department 3A.

Pursuant to Government Code Section 69959, Court Reporters are not permitted through the use of remote technology, and any Court Reporter designated for the hearing shall be physically present in the Courtroom.

If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a Court Reporter, the party must submit a Request for Co[1]urt Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the Clerk of Department 3A at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the Clerk of Department 3A will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official Court Reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING

Introduction

This action concerns a 2014 decision (2014 Decision) by Respondent State Personnel Board (SPB) in which SPB determined that Petitioner Dr. Vickie Mabry-Height (Petitioner) had been the victim of discrimination by Respondent California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) in its hiring practices. SPB ordered CDCR to pay Petitioner backpay, benefits, and interest. CDCR challenged SPB’s decision, which was ultimately upheld by the Third District Court of Appeal in 2022, approximately eight years later.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025846: VICKIE MABRY-HEIGHT, M.D. VS. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION 09/03/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate in Department 3A

While CDCR exhausted its efforts to reverse the SPB decision, no determination of the amount due to Petitioner was made and CDCR did not pay to Petitioner any amount toward her award. Following the court of appeal’s decision, the parties negotiated regarding the amount CDCR owed to Petitioner, but failed to agree on terms. In late 2023, CDCR and Petitioner jointly requested that SPB hold a hearing to determine the amount due to Petitioner. On January 4, 2024, SPB denied the request, finding that it had not been timely submitted.

Petitioner, then represented by other counsel, did not challenge the January 4, 2024, order denying the backpay hearing.

On October 29, 2025, through current counsel, Petitioner filed this action, which seeks to enforce the original 2014 SPB order directing CDCR to pay her backpay, benefits, and interest, or, alternatively, to set aside the 2024 SPB order denying the joint request for a backpay hearing. As the Court previously determined in ruling on Respondents’ demurrers, the parties’ failure to obtain a determination regarding the amount owed to Petitioner within the one-year period provided in the 2014 Decision did not extinguish CDCR’s obligation to pay to Petitioner backpay, benefits, and interest pursuant to the Decision. The Petition for a writ of traditional mandamus to compel CDCR to comply with its obligations under the 2014 Decision will be granted. With this determination, the alternative request for a writ of administrative mandate is moot, and will be denied as such.

Petitioner’s request for judicial notice of court records and official acts of state administrative agencies is granted. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c), (d).) The court, however, does not accept the truth of any facts within the judicially noticed documents except to the extent such facts are beyond reasonable dispute. (Poseidon Devel., Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1117-18.)

Background[2]

In 2008, Petitioner applied for a Physician & Surgeon position with CDCR. (Pet. RJN Exh. 1 [2014 SPB Decision], p. 7.) After she was denied employment, she filed a discrimination complaint with SPB alleging CDCR denied her employment based on her age, race, and gender. (Id. pp. 17-18.)

On February 6, 2014, SPB issued a decision sustaining Petitioner’s complaint. (Pet. RJN Exh. 1.) The SPB decision stated:

Respondent shall pay to Complainant all backpay, benefits, and interest that would have

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025846: VICKIE MABRY-HEIGHT, M.D. VS. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION 09/03/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate in Department 3A

accrued to her had she been hired as a Physician & Surgeon, retroactive to July 18, 2008, through May 31, 2011. Complainant’s backpay award shall be offset by any sums Complainant earned through her other employment since the first established act of discrimination.

This matter is referred to the Chief Administrative Law Judge and shall be set for hearing upon written request of either party, within one year of the effective date of SPB’s Decision, in the event that the parties are unable to agree as to the salary, benefits and interest, if any, due Complainant under the provisions of Government Code section 19584.

(Id. at pp. 30-31.)

CDCR challenged the SPB decision by filing a petition for writ of mandate in this Court. On March 7, 2017, Judge Chang, of this Court, denied CDCR’s petition and upheld SPB’s decision sustaining Petitioner’s discrimination complaint. (Pet. RJN Exh. 3 [Order and Judgment Denying Petition, Mar. 7, 2017].)

CDCR sought appellate review, and on February 7, 2022, the court of appeal issued the published opinion in Dep’t of Corrs. & Rehab. v. State Pers. Bd. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 908 affirming Judge Chang’s decision. (Pet. RJN Exh. 2.)

Thereafter, Petitioner and CDCR participated in a Voluntary Settlement Conference in an effort to reach agreement on the amount owed to Petitioner, but were unsuccessful. (Pet. RJN Exh. 4 [Joint Request for Backpay Hearing, Dec. 21, 2023].) On December 21, 2023, Petitioner and CDCR filed a joint request to SPB for a backpay hearing to have an ALJ determine the specific amounts of salary, benefits, and interest CDCR owed. (Ibid.)

On January 4, 2024, ALJ Mark Kruger issued a decision finding that the joint request for back pay hearing was untimely. The ALJ’s decision stated:

Arguably, the parties should have filed this request on or before February 6, 2015, as there is no indication that either party requested a stay of enforcement of the board’s decision while pursuing their appeals. Nevertheless, under these circumstances, it was reasonable for the parties to believe that the one-year period to request the SPB for a backpay hearing began to run on April 14, 2022, when the remittitur was issued. Thus, to be timely, a request for a back pay hearing should have been filed on or before April 14, 2023. The parties’ request was filed 8 months late.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025846: VICKIE MABRY-HEIGHT, M.D. VS. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION 09/03/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate in Department 3A

(Pet. RJN Exh. 5 [Order Denying Request for Backpay Hearing, Jan. 4, 2024] p. 3.)

As noted, no party challenged the Order Denying Request for Back Pay Hearing. Instead, on December 13, 2024, Petitioner, through prior counsel, filed a “Request for Judgment Determination Regarding Damages Award Calculation; or in the alternative, Request for an Order Remanding to the State Personnel Board to Conduct a Backpay Hearing” in the original trial court case before Judge Chang. (Pet. RJN Exh. 6.)

On May 16, 2025, Judge Chang issued an order denying Petitioner’s request. (Pet. RJN Exh. 7.) The court noted that Petitioner did not provide the court with courtesy copies of the request and did not notify the court of the filing for approximately five months. (Ibid.) The court further observed:

The Court understands RPI’s [Dr. Mabry-Height’s] predicament regarding the SPB’s denial of RPI’s request for a backpay hearing. However, there is no relief available in this litigation. The Court makes no opinion as to whether Petitioner [sic] could seek relief in a newly filed petition for writ of mandate regarding the SPB’s January 4, 2024 decision to deny RPI’s request for a backpay hearing. The Court notes that this determination was made over a year ago, and it is unclear to the Court why RPI has not already sought judicial review of the SPB’s decision. This does not alter the Court’s conclusion, however, that there is no relief available to RPI in this litigation.

(Ibid.)

On September 16, 2025, Petitioner’s prior counsel submitted an “Appeals/Complaint Form” to SPB which purported to appeal the January 4, 2024 Order Denying Request for Back Pay Hearing. Two days later, on September 18, 2025, SPB informed counsel by email: “Your appeal cannot be accepted for filing for the following reasons: (1) there is no appeal procedure for challenging a decision declining to accept a late-filed appeal; and (2) there is no reconsideration mechanism of any kind for decisions rendered 1 year and 8 months ago.” (Pet. RJN Exhs. 9, 10.)

On October 29, 2025, through her current counsel, Petitioner filed the original Petition in this action. The operative First Amended Petition was filed on November 26, 2025. Petitioner asserts two causes of action: (1) Petition for traditional mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085) against Respondent CDCR for enforcement of a ministerial duty to pay back pay, interest, and benefits; (2) Petition for administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) against Respondent SPB for review of the Order Denying Back Pay Hearing.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025846: VICKIE MABRY-HEIGHT, M.D. VS. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION 09/03/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate in Department 3A

Both Respondents filed demurrers to the First Amended Petition. On April 9, 2026, the Court issued its order overruling the demurrers. As to the First Cause of Action, the Court held that CDCR had failed to establish that its obligations under the 2014 Decision were no longer enforceable. (Ruling on Submitted Matters, April 9, 2026.) The Court rejected CDCR’s contentions that the 2014 Decision imposed a one-year jurisdictional time limit on the availability of a backpay hearing and that the one-year time period for requesting a backpay hearing in California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 52.4(e)(1)(R), applied.

As to the Second Cause of Action, the Court found that Petitioner had sufficiently alleged equitable estoppel such that her challenge to the 2024 decision denying a backpay hearing was not time-barred as a matter of law.

The matter is now before the Court for a merits determination.

Standards of Review

“An ordinary mandamus action under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 permits judicial review of ministerial duties as well as quasi-legislative acts of public agencies.” (Carrancho v. California Air Resources Bd. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1264-65.) Mandamus is available to “to compel the performance of a clear, present, and ministerial duty where the petitioner has a beneficial right to performance of that duty.” (Ibid.) Further, “[m]andamus may issue to correct the exercise of discretionary legislative power, but only if the action taken is so palpably unreasonable and arbitrary as to show an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.” (Ibid, italics in original.)

In reviewing an agency decision under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, a trial court must determine “whether the public agency committed a prejudicial abuse of discretion.” (Family Health Centers of San Diego v. State Dept. of Health Care Services (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 88, 96-97, quotations, citations omitted.) “Abuse of discretion is established if the public agency has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.” (Ibid.) “If a finding is supported by substantial evidence, [the trial court] may not disregard or overturn it merely because a contrary finding would have been equally or more reasonable.” (Ibid.).

The court reviews issues of law, including interpretation of regulations and statutes, de novo. (Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 337, 343; see also State Water Res. Control Bd. Cases (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 674, 722 [“The proper interpretation of a statute, and its application to undisputed facts, is a question of law”].)

Discussion

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025846: VICKIE MABRY-HEIGHT, M.D. VS. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION 09/03/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate in Department 3A

As noted, the First Amended Petition asserts two causes of action: Traditional Mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 1085, and, alternatively, Administrative Mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 1094.5.

First Cause of Action – Traditional Mandate against CDCR

Petitioner argues that CDCR has a ministerial obligation to comply with the 2014 Decision awarding her backpay, benefits, and interest. As Petitioner contends, decisions of the SPB “are binding upon all parties to a proceeding before it” and parties are permitted to seek judicial enforcement of such decisions. (Gov. Code, § 18710.) It is undisputed that the 2014 Decision was upheld by the court of appeal in 2022, and that CDCR has not paid Petitioner any amount pursuant to the 2014 Decision. Thus, in order to defeat Petitioner’s traditional mandamus claim, CDCR must demonstrate that it has no continuing obligations under the 2014 Decision, that is, Petitioner’s right to an award of “all backpay, benefits, and interest that would have accrued to her had she been hired as a Physician & Surgeon, retroactive to July 18, 2008, through May 31, 2011” has been extinguished.

Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (a)

CDCR argues, as it did on demurrer, that it has no continuing obligations under the 2014 Decision because Petitioner did not timely obtain a backpay hearing. CDCR now appears to contend that the cause of action in traditional mandate is governed by the three-year limitations period established by Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (a), which applies to a liability created by statute. CDCR argues that “a claim to compel a public officer’s performance accrues when the officer ‘assumes an independent position adverse to the plaintiff.’” (CDCR Opp. 3-5, citing Lerner v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Education (1963) 59 Cal.2d 382, 396.) Thus, CDCR contends:

CDCR’s position adverse to this obligation was manifest no later than the litigation it prosecuted against the 2014 Decision, litigation that concluded with the remittitur on April 14, 2022. Measured from that date, the three-year period expired on April 14, 2025. This action, filed October 29, 2025, is more than six months late.

(CDCR Opp. 13:6-9.)

CDCR’s argument ignores that fact that following the issuance of the remittitur, CDCR did not dispute its obligation under the 2014 Decision, that is, Petitioner’s entitlement to an award in some amount. Rather, CDCR jointly sought the relief which Petitioner now seeks here – a

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025846: VICKIE MABRY-HEIGHT, M.D. VS. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION 09/03/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate in Department 3A

determination of the amount of the award. CDCR participated in the Voluntary Settlement Conference and later submitted the joint request for backpay hearing to the SPB in December of 2023. CDCR did not take the position that its obligations under the 2014 Decision were extinguished until after SPB’s denial of the jointly requested backpay hearing. Even assuming the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (a), CDCR’s “position adverse to this obligation” could not have been known to Petitioner until sometime after the January 4, 2024, denial of the back pay hearing.[3] Thus, Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (a), does not bar the First Cause of Action.

2014 Decision’s one-year time limit

CDCR next reiterates its argument that the one-year period for the parties to request a backpay hearing specified in the 2014 Decision bars Petitioner’s traditional mandate claim. CDCR contends “the 2014 Decision directs that the amount [of the award] be set for hearing upon a request ‘within one year,’” and thus, “reading that provision as optional or meaningless, as Petitioner urges, renders the Board’s chosen limitation a nullity, exposing the State to a back-pay demand in perpetuity, an absurd result the Board cannot have intended when it fixed a finite, one-year window.” (CDCR Opp. 14:28-15:3.) The Court rejects this argument for similar reasons explained in the ruling on CDCR’s demurrer.

In order to establish that the failure of any party to obtain a backpay hearing has extinguished CDCR’s obligations under the 2014 SPB Decision, CDCR must demonstrate that the one-year limitations period in the Decision is mandatory, such that Petitioner’s right to any award was contingent on a determination of the amount CDCR must pay to Petitioner within the stated time period.

The “Orders” section of the 2014 SPB Decision contains two components. The first provision establishes CDCR’s substantive obligation:

Respondent shall pay to Complainant all backpay, benefits, and interest that would have accrued to her had she been hired as a Physician & Surgeon, retroactive to July 18, 2008, through May 31, 2011. Complainant’s backpay award shall be offset by any sums Complainant earned through her other employment since the first established act of discrimination.

(Pet. RJN Exh. 1, p. 30.)

Next, in a separate paragraph, the Orders section provided a procedure for determining the amount of the award:

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025846: VICKIE MABRY-HEIGHT, M.D. VS. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION 09/03/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate in Department 3A

This matter is referred to the Chief Administrative Law Judge and shall be set for hearing upon written request of either party, within one year of the effective date of SPB's Decision, in the event that the parties are unable to agree as to the salary, benefits and interest, if any, due Complainant under the provisions of Government Code section 19584.

(Pet. RJN Exh. 1, p. 31.)

This language gave the parties multiple options for determining the amount of the award. They could reach agreement regarding the amount of the award without an SPB hearing, such as by informal agreement or by submitting to some other dispute resolution forum; alternatively, they could submit a request for a hearing to the Chief Administrative Law Judge within one year. However, nowhere does the 2014 Decision state that CDCR will owe Petitioner nothing unless the amount due to Petitioner is determined within one year.

At most, the second provision of the Orders is susceptible to a reading that a one-year deadline applies to the opportunity to request a SPB hearing, but this construction is not compelled by the text of the Orders. As the Court previously noted, the 2014 Decision establishes no consequence at all if the one-year time period is exceeded. In any event, nothing in the 2014 Decision provides that CDCR’s underlying obligation is contingent upon compliance with the one-year time period. Thus, the separate referral to the Chief Administrative Law Judge for purposes of setting the amount of the award does not suggest that CDCR’s underlying obligation to Petitioner would cease if the matter was not set for hearing and the award calculated within the stated time period.

CDCR’s prior representations and litigation conduct confirm that the one-year period stated in the 2014 Decision is not mandatory. CDCR, along with Petitioner, argued in the Joint Request for Backpay Hearing that there was good cause for requesting the hearing more than one year after the 2014 Decision became effective:

Thus, given the writ petition and the appeal, the question of whether CDCR owed [Petitioner] backpay was not final until the Court of Appeal issued [the] Remittitur on April 14, 2022, at which point the Parties diligently began attempting informal negotiations and participated in mediations. Any petition for backpay hearing before this date would have been premature.

(Pet. RJN Exh. 6.) If CDCR’s obligation was extinguished one year after the 2014 Decision’s effective date, the date of the remittitur would have been irrelevant, as would the existence of good cause for the delay. ALJ Kruger accepted April 14, 2022, when the remittitur was issued, as the date upon which the one-year period would begin to run. The ALJ also considered the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025846: VICKIE MABRY-HEIGHT, M.D. VS. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION 09/03/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate in Department 3A

parties’ arguments that good cause excused the filing of the request more than one year after April 14, 2022. Again, if the one-year time limit in the 2014 Decision were mandatory, there would be no reason for the ALJ to have made these findings.

Finally, as a practical matter, there is no principled means to give effect to the 2014 Decision’s one-year time period for requesting a hearing. The Decision itself is unclear in how the one-year period is to apply. For example, the language, “This matter is referred to the Chief Administrative Law Judge and shall be set for hearing upon written request of either party, within one year of the effective date of SPB’s decision,” could mean that a hearing must be set within one year, or merely that the request must be made within one year. (Pet.

RJN Exh. 1, p. 31.) Further, the statement, “in the event that the parties are unable to agree as to the salary, benefits, and interest, if any, due Complainant under the provisions of Government Code section 19584” is ambiguous, because, as discussed further herein, Government Code section 19854 applies where “the board revokes or modifies an adverse action,” not to discrimination claims. (Gov. Code, § 19854.) Moreover, neither CDCR nor Petitioner apparently considered the oneyear period to be mandatory, as they jointly requested a backpay hearing nearly ten years after the issuance of 2014 Decision, arguing that good cause excused the delay.

The 2014 Decision made no provision for extension of the one-year period, but the parties appeared to assume it would not strictly apply.

In sum, there is nothing to support a finding that CDCR’s obligation to pay to Petitioner backpay, benefits, and interest was contingent upon compliance with the one-year time period articulated in the 2014 Decision. Thus, the parties’ failure to comply with that timing requirement did not extinguish CDCR’s obligation to pay Petitioner the backpay, benefits, and interest pursuant to the 2014 Decision.

California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 54.2

CDCR also argues that determination of the amount of the award is governed by title 2, section 52.4(e)(1)(R), of the California Code of Regulations. CDCR contends that the 2014 Decision “expressly invokes ‘the provisions of Government Code section 19584’ and California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 52.4 [CCR Section 52.4] is the regulatory mechanism that governs the requesting and conduct of the section 19584 back pay hearing.” (CDCR Opp. 15:11-14.) Under that regulation, “requests for back pay hearings, as described in section 61, shall be filed within one year of the date of the board’s decision giving rise to the back pay obligation.” (Cal.

Code Regs., tit. 2, § 52.4(e)(1)(R).) A late filing is permitted only “within 30 days after the end of the period,” and only for good cause. (Id. at § 52.4(e)(3).) CDCR acknowledges that this provision applies to backpay hearings “as described in [title 2], section 61,” which does not include backpay orders based on sustained findings of discrimination.[4] (See Cal. Code Regs.,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025846: VICKIE MABRY-HEIGHT, M.D. VS. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION 09/03/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate in Department 3A

tit. 2, § 61(a).) However, CDCR now contends “[t]his regulation informs interpretation of the 2014 Order” in that “the Board wrote section 19584 into the Decision as the governing authority, so that if the framework applies, its deadline applies[.]” (Opp. 15:16, 24-26.)

As discussed in the Court’s Order overruling Respondents’ demurrers, however, the reference to Government Code section 19854 in the 2014 Decision does not mean that the limitations periods in CCR Section 52.4 apply to the instant proceeding, let alone that CDCR’s obligations are contingent on compliance with them. Government Code section 19584 provides for the payment of back pay and benefits in cases where disciplinary actions are set aside, not in discrimination cases. Rather, Government Code section 19584 applies “[w]henever the [SPB] revokes or modifies an adverse action and orders that the employee be returned to his or her position,” and provides for the employee to receive “payment of salary and all interest accrued thereto, and the reinstatement of all benefits that otherwise would have normally accrued.” (Gov. Code, § 19584.)

CCR Section 52.4 provides the procedure for filing appeals and complaints to the SPB, including limitations periods for various types of claims. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 52.4.) None of the provisions of CCR Section 52.4 apply to a request for a backpay hearing following a sustained finding of discrimination. Section 52.4, subdivision (e)(1)(R), does provide a one year filing period for “[b]ack pay claims and requests for back pay hearings, as described in section 61 [CCR Section 61].” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 1, § 52.4, subd. (e)(1)(R).)[5] CCR Section 61, in turn, references Government Code section 19584 and applies as follows:

This section applies to Appellants: (1) who are entitled to salary pursuant to Government Code sections 19584, 19180, 19253.5, and 19585; and (2) whose appeals with the board resulted in a final board decision: (A) revoking or modifying Appellant's adverse action; (B) restoring a rejected probationer to his or her position; (C) revoking or modifying a medical demotion, transfer, or termination; or (D) revoking or modifying a non-punitive termination, demotion, or transfer.

(Cal. Code Regs., § tit. 2, § 61, subd. (a).)

The decision at issue here, an order for backpay and other amounts following a sustained finding of discrimination, did not involve any of the situations described in CCR Section 61, subdivision (2)(A)-(D). CCR Section 61 does not apply on its face, and therefore, neither does CCR Section 52.4(e)(1)(R).[6]

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025846: VICKIE MABRY-HEIGHT, M.D. VS. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION 09/03/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate in Department 3A

Thus, CDCR’s underlying obligation to pay to Petitioner “all backpay, benefits, and interest that would have accrued to her had she been hired as a Physician & Surgeon, retroactive to July 18, 2008, through May 31, 2011” did not cease because no party requested a hearing to determine the amount of that award within one year of the 2014 Decision’s effective date.

Availability of legal remedy

CDCR also contends that traditional mandamus is unavailable because Petitioner failed to utilize an adequate legal remedy, in the form of the backpay hearing requested and denied by SPB. (CDCR Opp. 17:11-22.) CDCR argues: “Petitioner failed to invoke it in time, first by not requesting the hearing within the period the Decision set, and then by not seeking timely review of the January 4, 2024, denial [of the backpay hearing request].” (Ibid.)

Traditional mandamus generally requires the absence of a “plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1086.) Here, Petitioner seeks to enforce CDCR’s obligation under the 2014 Decision to pay backpay, benefits, and interest. The SPB backpay hearing proffered by CDCR as an adequate legal remedy, however, is merely one available mechanism for determining the amount of this obligation. As discussed above, CDCR’s obligation under the 2014 Decision exists whether or not a backpay hearing occurs. Further, as the 2014 Decision provides, a backpay hearing is not required in order to determine the amount CDCR must pay to Petitioner; the parties were free to negotiate an agreeable amount or determine the amount by another method.

Petitioner could have timely challenged the 2024 denial of the joint request for backpay hearing, and it is undisputed that she failed to do so. But enforcement of CDCR’s underlying obligation is the subject of Petitioner’s first cause of action, which should not be conflated with the method of calculating the amount of the obligation. Petitioner’s failure to challenge the denial of the backpay hearing request thus does not foreclose here traditional mandate claim here, because the foregone remedy, the backpay hearing before SPB, is not coextensive with the mandatory duty Petitioner seeks to enforce – CDCR’s underlying obligation to pay backpay, benefits, and interest.

The Court notes CDCR’s warning about creating an open-ended obligation that could “expose the State to a back-pay demand in perpetuity.” (Opp. 15:2.) Any such concerns are alleviated here by the fact that CDCR’s obligation to pay Petitioner backpay and other amounts is established; only the amount remains to be determined. CDCR, having notice of its obligation to Petitioner, need not wait for a demand to fulfill its debt. As CDCR’s submissions in support of the joint request for backpay demonstrate, CDCR is able to calculate an amount it believes satisfies its obligations under the 2014 Decision. (Pet. RJN Exh. 4.) As CDCR controls when

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025846: VICKIE MABRY-HEIGHT, M.D. VS. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION 09/03/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate in Department 3A

and how it satisfies its legal obligations, the duration of any exposure to a “back-pay demand” is entirely up to CDCR.

Instead, the greater fairness concern is that Petitioner, who prevailed in her claim of discrimination against CDCR and defended that result through a lengthy appeal process, could be denied the benefit of the 2014 Decision merely because the amount of her award was never fixed. It would be wholly inequitable for CDCR to avoid its significant underlying obligations in the 2014 Decision because the parties did not promptly utilize one of the available means of determining the amount of the award. It bears repeating that CDCR did not dispute that it owed Petitioner an award under the 2014 Decision until after ALJ Kruger determined that the joint hearing request was untimely, a contention neither party had appeared to raise.

In sum, CDCR’s obligation to pay to Petitioner “all backpay, benefits, and interest that would have accrued to her had she been hired as a Physician & Surgeon, retroactive to July 18, 2008, through May 31, 2011” (Pet. RJN Exh. 1, p. 30) is a mandatory duty enforceable through traditional mandate. (Lomeli v. Dept. of Corrections (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 788, 794, 798.) This obligation is separate and apart from the calculation of the amount to be paid to Petitioner.

Second Cause of Action – Administrative Mandate

The parties agree that the Second Cause of Action, a challenge to the denial of the joint request for backpay hearing under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, is pleaded in the alternative to the First Cause of Action. Because the Court grants the writ of traditional mandate, the claim for administrative mandamus is moot and need not be addressed. (See SPB Opp. 1:5-9; CDCR Opp. 20:3-4; Reply, 19:17-20.)

Remedy

Petitioner requests the following remedial process:

The Court should resolve enforceability and timeliness, enter judgment granting a peremptory writ, and direct that the CDCR-calculated minimum of $526,621.63 be satisfied within sixty days after personal service of the writ — its cash components paid to Petitioner, its pension and leave components effected as the law provides — subject to the verified correction procedure described in Part VI. All disputes concerning any additional recovery are reserved for a focused accounting on the writ’s return, and the payment is a dollar-for-dollar credit that waives nothing.

(Opening Mem. 2:12-19.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025846: VICKIE MABRY-HEIGHT, M.D. VS. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION 09/03/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate in Department 3A

CDCR objects to Petitioner’s proposed remedy, arguing that Petitioner’s approach would require CDCR to pay an initial amount that Petitioner herself contends is inaccurate. CDCR also argues that Petitioner’s proposal would require the Court to sit as referee for subsequent award calculations, a posture which is inconsistent with a writ of traditional mandate to enforce a mandatory duty. (CDCR Opp. 10:22-23:17.)

The Court agrees with CDCR that Petitioner’s proffered approach is not acceptable. Having upheld CDCR’s obligation to pay to Petitioner the award provided in the 2014 Decision, determination of the amount of the award is outside the scope of this Court’s review.

As discussed in the Court’s ruling on Respondents’ demurrers, counsel for SPB previously explained that that in discrimination cases, SPB does provide a forum for resolving disputes about the amount of a backpay award, not pursuant to CCR Section 52.4, but rather by following a similar “borrowed” procedure. It appears to the Court that this forum would be the sensible mechanism for resolving this long dispute. The Court is inclined to issue the writ and, if necessary, refer the matter to SPB for further proceedings consistent with this ruling. However, the Court invites the parties to discuss other potential forms of remedy at the hearing.

Disposition

The Petition for Writ of Traditional Mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085) is granted.

Respondent CDCR shall pay to Petitioner all backpay, benefits, and interest that would have accrued to her had she been hired as a Physician & Surgeon, retroactive to July 18, 2008, through May 31, 2011, as ordered in the 2014 Decision. Respondent CDCR shall file a return to the writ within 90 days of entry of judgment stating what efforts it has made to comply with the writ. Upon the filing of the return, the Court will consider referring the matter to Respondent SPB for a hearing to determine the amount of the award payable to Petitioner.

The Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) is denied as moot.

Petitioner shall prepare a judgment consistent with this ruling that attaches this ruling as an exhibit, submit it to the opposing parties for approval as to form, and thereafter submit it to the Court for signature in accordance with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312. (See also Local Rule 2.15.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025846: VICKIE MABRY-HEIGHT, M.D. VS. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION 09/03/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate in Department 3A [1] Petitioner filed a second Petition on August 10, 2026, which states “Updated: 07/28/2026” on

the caption page. Petitioner did not seek leave to amend the petition, which was filed after the Department filed the instant motion. Further, Department filed the instant motion on June 17, 2026, which operated as a stay of the action until the disposition of the motion to change venue. (South Sutter, LLC v. LJ Sutter Partners, L.P. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 634, 655 [“A motion to change venue operates as a supersedeas or stay of proceedings”], citing Pickwick Stages System v. Superior Court (1934) 138 Cal.App.448, 448.) Accordingly, the Court does not consider the second “updated” petition here. [2] The Background section is adapted from the Court’s May 15, 2026, ruling on Respondents’

demurrers. [3] To the degree CDCR claims that the six-month limitations period in Government Code section

19630 applies “to the extent the First Cause of Action is in substance a challenge to the January 4, 2024 order,” the Court does not find that Petitioner’s traditional mandate cause of action is a challenge to the order denying the backpay hearing. [4] As ALJ Kruger noted in the Order Denying Request for Back Pay Hearing:

Generally, the right to a back pay hearing is limited to appeals specifically identified by California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 61, subdivision (a). Noticeably absent from that regulation are backpay claims from sustained complaints of discrimination.

(RJN Exh. 1, p. 3.)

[5] The version of Section 52.4 in effect in 2014 contained the identical one year filing period for

requests for back pay hearings, but at subdivision (e)(1)(Q). (LEXIS 2014 California Administrative Code Archive, Cal Code Regs., tit. 2, § 52.4, subd. (e)(1)(Q).) [6] It may be that the Decision’s reference to Government Code section 19584 was intended to

invoke SPB’s apparent practice of “borrowing” the backpay hearing mechanism for determination of award amounts where claims of discrimination are sustained. As counsel for SPB discussed at the hearing on Respondents’ demurrers, SPB typically applies Section 52.4 in disciplinary cases, not in matters involving sustained claims of discrimination. However, SPB’s counsel further offered that in discrimination cases, SPB does provide a forum for resolving disputes about the amount of any back pay award, not pursuant to Section 52.4, but rather by following a similar “borrowed” procedure. In any event, as discussed, the reference does not establish that CDCR’s obligations under the 2014 Decision were extinguished.