Vickie Mabry-Height, M.D. v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation; State Personnel Board

25CV025846: VICKIE MABRY-HEIGHT, M.D. VS. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION 03/02/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 4

Tentative Ruling

DATE/TIME: March 2, 2026 10:00 a.m. DEP. NO.: 4 JUDGE: HON. JENNIFER K. CLERK: D. TRAN ROCKWELL

VICKIE MABRY-HEIGHT, M.D., Case No.: 25CV025846 Petitioner, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION; STATE PERSONNEL BOARD, Respondents.

Nature of Proceedings:  Demurrer of Respondent CDCR  Demurrer of Respondent SPB

The following shall constitute the Court’s tentative ruling on the above matters, set for hearing in Department 4, on Monday, March 2, 2026, at 10:00 a.m.

The Court strongly encourages parties to appear remotely for the hearing on the tentative ruling through the Court’s Zoom Application. However, any party wishing to appear in person may do so, provided that party notifies the Court by 4:00 the Court day before the hearing. Pursuant to Government Code Section 69959, Court Reporters are not permitted through the use of remote technology, and any Court Reporter designated for the hearing shall be physically present in the Courtroom.

The parties may join the Zoom session for the hearing by audio and/or video through the following link/telephone number:

https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept4 (833) 568-8864 ID: 160 7584 1179

25CV025846: VICKIE MABRY-HEIGHT, M.D. VS. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION 03/02/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 4

Parties requesting services of a Court Reporter will need to arrange for private Court Reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government Code § 68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a Court Reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by using the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore, available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp- 13.Pdf If a Court Reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list is not used, aStipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) must be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing.

Once the form is signed, it must be filed with the Clerk of Department 4. Pursuant to Government Code Section 69959, Court Reporters are not permitted through the use of remote technology, and any Court Reporter designated for the hearing shall be physically present in the Courtroom. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a Court Reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the Clerk of Department 4 at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away.

Once approved, the Clerk of Department 4 will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official Court Reporter will be provided.

Introduction

This action arises from a more than decade-old decision by Respondent State Personnel Board (SPB). In 2014, SPB determined that Petitioner Dr. Vickie Mabry-Height (Petitioner) had been the victim of discrimination by Respondent California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) in its hiring practices, and that Petitioner was entitled to an award of backpay, benefits, and interest. CDCR challenged SPB’s decision, and the case made its way through the superior and appellate courts, resulting in a 2022 decision by the Third District Court of Appeal upholding SPB’s 2014 order.

In late 2023, after failing to informally agree on the amount of the monetary award owed to Petitioner, CDCR and Petitioner jointly requested that SPB hold a hearing to determine the amount. On January 4, 2024, SPB denied the request, find that it had not been timely submitted.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025846: VICKIE MABRY-HEIGHT, M.D. VS. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION 03/02/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 4

Petitioner, then represented by other counsel, did not challenge the January 4, 2024, order denying the backpay hearing.

On October 29, 2025, through current counsel, Petitioner filed this action, which seeks to enforce the original 2014 SPB order directing CDCR to pay her backpay, benefits, and interest, or, alternatively, to set aside the 2024 SPB order denying the joint request for a backpay hearing.

Both Respondents demur to the operative First Amended Petition. The Court will address both demurrers in a single ruling. Because the First Amended Petition states a cause of action, the demurrers will be overruled, as discussed herein.

SPB’s unopposed request for augmentation of the record is granted. The material attached at Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Alvin Gittisriboongul shall be included in any administrative record lodged in connection with this matter.

Background

In 2008, Petitioner applied for a Physician & Surgeon position with CDCR. (1st Am. Pet. ¶ 4.) After she was denied employment, she filed a discrimination complaint with SPB alleging CDCR denied her employment based on her age, race, and gender. (1st Am. Pet. ¶¶ 4, 13.) On February 6, 2014, SPB issued a decision sustaining Petitioner’s complaint. (1st Am. Pet. ¶ 13-14, Exh. A.) The SPB decision stated:

Respondent shall pay to Complainant all backpay, benefits, and interest that would have accrued to her had she been hired as a Physician & Surgeon, retroactive to July 18, 2008, through May 31, 2011. Complainant’ s backpay award shall be offset by any sums Complainant earned through her other employment since the first established act of discrimination.

This matter is referred to the Chief Administrative Law Judge and shall be set for hearing upon written request of either party, within one year of the effective date of SPB’s Decision, in the event that the parties are unable to agree as to the salary, benefits and interest, if any, due Complainant under the provisions of Government Code section 19584.

(1st Am. Pet. Exh. A, p. 30-31 [2014 SPB Order].)

CDCR challenged the SPB decision by filing a petition for writ of mandate in this Court. On March 7, 2017, Judge Chang, of this Court, denied CDCR’s petition and upheld SPB’s decision

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025846: VICKIE MABRY-HEIGHT, M.D. VS. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION 03/02/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 4

sustaining Petitioner’s discrimination complaint. (1st Am. Pet. Exh. C.)

CDCR sought appellate review, and on February 7, 2022, the court of appeal issued the published decision in Dep’t of Corrs. & Rehab. v. State Pers. Bd. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 908 affirming Judge Chang’s decision. (1st Am. Pet. Exh. B.)

Thereafter, in 2022 and 2023, Petitioner and CDCR “attempted to resolve their differences regarding the outstanding payment calculations, but could not reach an agreement.” (1st Am. Pet. ¶ 22.) On December 21, 2023, Petitioner and CDCR filed a joint request to SPB “for a back pay hearing to have an ALJ [administrative law judge] determine the exact amounts of salary, benefits, and interest owed.” (1st Am. Pet. ¶ 23, Exh. E.)

On January 4, 2024, ALJ Mark Kruger issued a decision finding that the joint request for back pay hearing was untimely. The ALJ’s decision stated:

Arguably, the parties should have filed this request on or before February 6, 2015, as there is no indication that either party requested a stay of enforcement of the board’s decision while pursuing their appeals. Nevertheless, under these circumstances, it was reasonable for the parties to believe that the one-year period to request the SPB for a backpay hearing began to run on April 14, 2022, when the remittitur was issued. Thus, to be timely, a request for a back pay hearing should have been filed on or before April 14, 2023. The parties’ request was filed 8 months late.

(1st Am. Pet. Exh. F [Order Denying Request for Backpay Hearing] p. 3.)

As noted, no party challenged the Order Denying Request for Back Pay Hearing. Instead, on December 13, 2024, Petitioner, through prior counsel, filed a “Request for Judgment Determination Regarding Damages Award Calculation; or in the alternative, Request for an Order Remanding to the State Personnel Board to Conduct a Backpay Hearing” in the original trial court case before Judge Chang. (1st Am. Pet. Exh. G.)

On May 16, 2025, Judge Chang issued an order denying Petitioner’s request. (1st Am. Pet. Exh. F.) The court noted that Petitioner did not provide the court with courtesy copies of the request and did not notify the court of the filing for approximately five months. (Ibid.) The court further observed:

The Court understands RPI’s [Dr. Mabry-Height’s] predicament regarding the SPB’s denial of RPI’s request for a backpay hearing. However, there is no relief available in this litigation. The Court makes no opinion as to whether Petitioner could seek relief in a

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025846: VICKIE MABRY-HEIGHT, M.D. VS. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION 03/02/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 4

newly filed petition for writ of mandate regarding the SPB’s January 4, 2024 decision to deny RPI’s request for a backpay hearing. The Court notes that this determination was made over a year ago, and it is unclear to the Court why RPI has not already sought judicial review of the SPB’s decision. This does not alter the Court’s conclusion, however, that there is no relief available to RPI in this litigation.

(Ibid.)

On September 16, 2025, Petitioner’s prior counsel submitted an “Appeals/Complaint Form” to SPB in which purported to appeal the January 4, 2024 Order Denying Request for Back Pay Hearing. Two days later, on September 18, 2025, SPB informed counsel by email: “Your appeal cannot be accepted for filing for the following reasons: (1) there is no appeal procedure for challenging a decision declining to accept a late-filed appeal; and (2) there is no reconsideration mechanism of any kind for decisions rendered 1 year and 8 months ago.” (Declaration of Alvin Gittisriboongul, Exh. 1.)

On October 29, 2025, through her current counsel, Petitioner filed the original Petition in this action. The operative First Amended Petition was filed on November 26, 2025. Petitioner asserts two causes of action: (1) Petition for traditional mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085) against Respondent CDCR for enforcement of ministerial duty to pay back pay, interest, and benefits; (2) Petition for administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) against Respondent SPB for review of Order Denying Back Pay Hearing.

Standard of Review

In a mandamus proceeding, the respondent may challenge the sufficiency of a petition for writ of mandate by filing a demurrer. (May v. City of Milpitas (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1323.) A petition for writ of mandate is subject to a demurrer on the same grounds as a civil complaint. (Code Civ. Proc, § 1109; Rodriguez v. Municipal Court (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 521, 526.) “A demurrer tests only the sufficiency of the pleading.” (Cedar Fair, LP. v. County of Santa Clara (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1159.)

The court “assume[s] the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded and matters of which judicial notice has been taken” (Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 725), “ but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “[T]he... plaintiff’s ability to prove [the pleading's] allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court....” (Cedar Fair, L.P. v.

County of Santa Clara, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1159, quotations, citations omitted.) In considering a demurrer, the court must determine whether the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025846: VICKIE MABRY-HEIGHT, M.D. VS. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION 03/02/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 4

pleading, standing alone, states a cause of action under any possible legal theory. (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title. Guar Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38-39.) The court should overrule a demurrer if the facts alleged in a complaint or petition are sufficient to state a cause of action. (Ibid.)

Discussion

Each Respondent demurs to the cause of action asserted against it, and CDCR joins in SPB’s demurrer. The Court will address each cause of action in turn.

First Cause of Action – Traditional Mandate against CDCR

CDCR demurs on the grounds that “there is no clear duty for CDCR to pay Petitioner any amount at all arising from the 2014 SPB Decision.” (CDCR Opening Mem. 12:12-13.) CDCR contends that the 2014 SPB Decision does not impose any clear duty upon CDCR and does not create any present rights for Petitioner to enforce. In CDCR’s view, the 2014 SPB Decision “did not determine that any amount at all was owed by CDCR to Petitioner, and recognized the possibility that perhaps none was owed at all” and, moreover, “did not order CDCR to make any payment amount.” (Id. at 14:3-5.)

Further, CDCR contends, the 2014 Decision explicitly stated the timeframe within which a backpay hearing was to occur, “within one year of the effective date of the SPB’s Decision,” and thereby “established an adequate remedy that Petitioner simply did not timely pursue.” (Id. at 13:27-14:8.) Because the SPB denied the request for a backpay hearing, CDCR contends that Petitioner’s right to relief pursuant to the 2014 SPB Decision is now effectively extinguished: “Whatever duty may have once existed has long since expired and is thus no longer present, such that the Court may not enforce any the SPB’s 2014 order, which, by its own terms, required Petitioner to seek a back pay hearing within one year.” (Reply, 4:10- 14.)

Petitioner argues in opposition that CDCR’s obligation to pay Petitioner some amount in compliance with the 2014 SPB Decision did not expire simply because the procedure outlined in the Decision for determining that amount did not occur. Petitioner contends that SPB’s order directing CDCR to pay to Petitioner “all backpay, benefits, and interest” exists as a separate obligation from the determination of the amount CDCR would be required to pay. Petitioner alleges this obligation is enforceable as a mandatory duty pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, and that the First Amended Petition adequately states a cause of action thereunder.

The Court agrees. CDCR places great weight on the statement in the 2014 SPB Decision referring the matter to the Chief Administrative Law Judge for hearing “within one year of the effective date of the SPB’s Decision.” However, the Decision directs the Chief Administrative

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025846: VICKIE MABRY-HEIGHT, M.D. VS. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION 03/02/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 4

Law Judge to set the matter for hearing upon the request of either party: “This matter is referred to the Chief Administrative Law and shall be set for hearing upon written request of either party, within one year of the effective date of SPB’s Decision ” (1st Am. Pet. Exh. A. p. 31.) Thus, while CDCR argues that the 2014 SPB Decision “required Petitioner to seek a back pay hearing within one year if the parties could not reach agreement” (Reply 2:11-13, italics and underline in original), that is not what the Decision states.

Rather, the Decision directs the Chief Administrative Law Judge to set the matter for hearing at the request of either party, but no later than one year from the effective date of the decision. By directing the Chief Administrative Law Judge to set the matter for hearing within one year upon request if the parties were unable to agree on the amount, the Decision simply retains SPB’s jurisdiction over the matter for the purpose of determining the amount of the award. This referral to the Chief Administrative Law Judge does not suggest that CDCR’s obligation to Petitioner would cease to exist if the matter was not set for hearing and the award calculated within the stated time period, as the 2014 SPB Decision establishes no consequence if the one-year time period is exceeded. (See e.g.

Cal. Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Pers. Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1145-1147.)

Nor is determination of the amount of the award governed by title 2, section 54.2(e)(1)(R) of the California Code of Regulations, as CDCR suggests. CDCR notes that under that regulation, “requests for back pay hearings, as described in section 61, shall be filed within one year of the date of the board’s decision giving rise to the back pay obligation.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 52.4(e)(1)(R).) However, this provision applies to back pay hearings “as described in [title 2], section 61,” which does not include back pay orders based on sustained findings of discrimination.[1] (See Cal.

Code Regs., tit. 2, § 61(a).) As ALJ Kruger noted in the Decision Denying Request for Back Pay Hearing, the authorization for a back pay determination by SPB originated from the 2014 SPB Decision itself: “Nevertheless, the SPB granted the parties that right [to a back pay hearing] by way of its February 6, 2014, decision, and gave the parties one year from that date to file a back pay claim if they could not agree on the amounts owed.” (1st Am. Pet. Exh. F, p. 3.) As discussed above, nothing in the 2014 SPB Decision purports to invalidate CDCR’s obligation or extinguish SPB’s jurisdiction upon the expiration of the oneyear period.

CDCR’s position on demurrer, that it owes Petitioner nothing pursuant to the 2014 SPB decision, is also contradicted by its representations in the Joint Request for Backpay Hearing. In that submission, CDCR did not dispute its obligation to pay Petitioner an appropriate amount of backpay, benefits, and interest, despite the fact that the one-year time period since the effective date of the 2014 SPB Decision had long since passed when the parties submitted their joint request. (1st Am. Pet., Exh. E.) Rather, CDCR represented that it had “calculated the total amount of backpay, benefits, and interest owed to [Petitioner] as $439,942.05 (amount owed) + $86,679.58 (interest), or $526,621.63.)” (Id. at 14:15-17, bold and underline in original.) Only

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025846: VICKIE MABRY-HEIGHT, M.D. VS. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION 03/02/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 4

after ALJ Kruger issued the Decision Denying Request for Back Pay Hearing did CDCR contend that it no longer owed Petitioner anything under the 2014 SPB Decision.

CDCR fails to establish, for purposes of demurrer, that its obligations under the 2014 SPB Decision are no longer enforceable. The Petition adequately states a cause of action under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 for enforcement of CDCR’s obligations under the 2014 SPB Decision. (Lomeli v. Department of Corrections (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 788, 794-795 [Government Code section 18710 “reflects [petitioner’s] right to seek judicial enforcement of the SPB order (pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085) after CDC refused to comply with SPB’s order”].)

CDCR’s demurrer is overruled.

Second Cause of Action – Administrative Mandate against SPB

SPB demurs separately to the Second Cause of Action, which seeks a writ of mandate setting aside the Order Denying Request for Back Pay Hearing. (1st Am. Pet., ¶¶ 61-68.) SPB argues that Government Code section 19630 requires that “[a]ny petition for a writ challenging a decision of the board shall be filed within six months of the date of the final decision of the board.” Here, SPB contends, the Order Denying Request for Back Pay Hearing became final on January 4, 2024, but Petitioner did not initiate this action until October 29, 2025, well after the six-month deadline established by Government Code section 19630. (SPB Opening Mem. 6:1- 7.)

Petitioner responds that the doctrine of equitable tolling applies to excuse the delayed filing of the Petition and that her allegations in support of equitable tolling are sufficient to withstand demurrer. Specifically, Petitioner argues that she has sufficiently alleged that the actions of her former attorney should not be imputed to her because her “counsel’s conduct amounted to ‘positive misconduct’ by which [Petitioner] was ‘effectually and unknowingly deprived of representation.’” (Carroll v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 892, 898-899, quoting Daley v. County of Butte (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 380, 391.)

“Equitable tolling is a ‘judicially created, nonstatutory doctrine’ that ‘ “suspend[s] or extend[s] a statute of limitations as necessary to ensure fundamental practicality and fairness.” ‘” (Saint Francis Memorial Hospital v. State Dept. of Public Health (2020) 9 Cal.5th 710, 719, quoting McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88, 99.) The doctrine “applies when three ‘elements’ are present: ‘[(1)] timely notice, and [(2)] lack of prejudice, to the defendant, and [(3)] reasonable and good faith conduct on the part of the plaintiff.’” (Id. at p. 724, quoting Addison v. State of California (1978) 21 Cal.3d 313, 319.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025846: VICKIE MABRY-HEIGHT, M.D. VS. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION 03/02/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 4

Addressing Petitioner’s equitable estoppel allegations, SPB does not argue that the first two elements, timely notice and lack of prejudice, are absent. (SPB Opening Mem. 7:26-8:1 [“SPB defers to CDCR on whether the first two elements of timely notice and lack of prejudice are met based on these facts”].) However, SPB argues that the third element, reasonable and good faith conduct on the part of the plaintiff, “could not possibly be satisfied here.” (Id. at 8:1-2.) SPB contends that “petitioner may not simply seek relief from an untimely pursuit by blaming her counsel.” (Id. at 9:20-22.)

SPB cites Bonifield v. County of Nevada, 94 Cal.App.4th 298 for the proposition that “attorney neglect does not satisfy the standard of reasonableness and special circumstances required by California’s equitable tolling doctrine.” (Id. at p. 306, disapproved on other grounds in City of Los Angeles v. County of Kern (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 298.)

As Petitioner argues in opposition, however, she alleges that her attorney’s transgressions were not mere negligence and instead rise to the level of “positive misconduct,” an exception to the general rule that attorney negligence is imputed to the client and which Bonifield did not address. (Opp. to SPB, 12:9-17.) For example, Petitioner alleges: her former attorney failed to keep her apprised of events in the case; failed to respond to her requests for information and updates; erroneously filed a request for back pay determination in the Superior Court; failed to timely challenge the Order Denying Request for Back Pay Hearing and instead told Petitioner that filing such a challenge was “not an option.” (1st Am.

Pet. Exh. M [Declaration of Vicke Mabry-Height, M.D.], ¶¶ 6-33.) Petitioner further alleges that she herself contacted the Court Clerk to inquire about her counsel’s request to Judge Chang, only to discover that five months had passed since the filing and that the court was unaware of the request. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-24.)

The Court declines to resolve on demurrer the factual question of whether Petitioner’s former counsel’s alleged conduct constitutes “positive misconduct” such that it should not be imputed to her in analyzing the applicability of equitable estoppel. As the cases cited by SPB on reply illustrate, “whether counsel’s conduct amounted to ‘positive misconduct’” involves examination of “the factual circumstances” at issue in a particular case and typically arises in contexts other than demurrer. (See e.g.

Carroll v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 898-899 [motion for relief under Code Civ. Proc., § 473]; Seacall Development, Ltd. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 201 [motion for relief from order of dismissal for lack of prosecution]; Transit Ads, Inc. v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd. (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 275 [motion for relief under Code Civ. Proc., § 473].)

For pleading purposes, Petitioner sufficiently alleges that her former counsel committed “positive misconduct” such that the third element of the equitable estoppel doctrine is satisfied. While Petitioner must ultimately prove that her action is not untimely in proceedings on the merits, the First Amended Petition adequately alleges a cause of action for administrative

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025846: VICKIE MABRY-HEIGHT, M.D. VS. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION 03/02/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 4

mandamus.

The demurrer of SPB is overruled.

Disposition

The Demurrers are overruled.

Respondents shall answer within 30 days of the effective date of this Minute Order.

The Minute Order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice under California Rules of Court Rule 3.1312 is required.

[1] As ALJ Kruger noted in the Order Denying Request for Back Pay Hearing:

Generally, the right to a back pay hearing is limited to appeals specifically identified by California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 61, subdivision (a). Noticeably absent from that regulation are backpay claims from sustained complaints of discrimination.

(1st Am. Pet. Exh. F, p. 3.)