NEAL vs THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, et al.

25CV002998: NEAL vs THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, et al. 03/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to plf's First Amended Complaint to plf's First Amended Complaint in Department 53

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE:

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25CV002998: NEAL vs THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, et al. 03/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to plf's First Amended Complaint to plf's First Amended Complaint in Department 53

and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING: Defendant The Regents of the University of California’s (“Regents”) demurrer to plaintiff in pro per Adam Neal’s First Amended Complaint (“1AC”) filed on 6/2/2025 is ruled upon as follows.

*** If oral argument is requested, the parties must at the time oral argument is requested notify the clerk and opposing counsel of the specific causes of action that will be addressed at the hearing. The parties are also reminded that pursuant to local rules, only limited oral argument is permitted on law and motion matters. ***

Plaintiff’s opposition filed on 8/4/2025 fails to comply with CRC Rule 3.1110(b)(1) and Rule 3.1113(d)-(e) but it was, in the Court’s considered, considered nevertheless.

Factual Background

This lawsuit, commenced on 2/5/2025, appears to arise from plaintiff’s visit to “a mental health clinic” in Sacramento in January 2023 due to “sleep deprivation,” his being then transferred to UC Davis Medical Center (“UCDMC”), and his subsequent placement on “a 5150-hold” while he slept. (Compl., p.5:7-19; p.7:1-4; p.7:18-p.8:8; see also, p.2:15- 18.) Plaintiff further alleges that after being placed on the 5150-hold, he was involuntarily transferred to a treatment facility in Santa Rosa and this facility later released plaintiff onto “the streets of Santa Rosa” to wait for a bus without his shoes, wallet or phone. (Id., p.6:1-2; p.8:4-11.)

After being dropped off in San Francisco, plaintiff took an Uber back to his apartment in Sacramento and later retrieved his personal belongings from the UC Davis Medical Center. (Id., p.8:16-p.9:9.) This original complaint included causes of action for violation of Title 42 U.S.C. §1983, kidnapping in violation of “CCP [sic] §207(a),” and “Government Code §815.6.”

On 3/5/2025, defendant Regents filed a demurrer but before it could be heard, plaintiff filed on 6/2/2025 the operative 1AC which now purports to assert two causes of action for violation of Title 42 U.S.C. §1983 and “Government Code §815.6.” (See, 1AC, p.2:1- 3.) Although not a model pleading of clarity or concise language, the 1AC generally alleges that the defendant Regents (as the operator of UCDMC) “vindictively arrested the plaintiff as an involuntary psychiatric patient” without his consent and sent him “100-

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV002998: NEAL vs THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, et al. 03/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to plf's First Amended Complaint to plf's First Amended Complaint in Department 53

miles away to a mental health facility in Santa Rosa as ‘Gravely Disabled.’” (Id., at p.7:20-p.8:4.) The 1AC does generically allege that plaintiff suffered unspecified injuries and damages (see, Id., at p.2:6, p.3:6-12), this pleading does not actually identify what these injuries or damages may be, nor does it include a concluding “prayer for relief.”

Moving Papers. Defendant now demurs to the 1AC and the individual causes of action alleged therein on multiple grounds including but not limited to uncertainty; the applicable statute(s) of limitations found in Code of Civil Procedure §§335.1, 340 and/or 340.5 as well as Government Code §911.2; and defendant’s immunity under Welfare & Institution Code (“WIC”) §5278 [no civil or criminal liability for treatment and evaluation pursuant to §5150].

Opposition. Plaintiff opposes, arguing that the instant lawsuit is “even more egregious than the incident in 2016” (relating to a different 5150-hold which resulted in an earlier lawsuit) insofar as “[p]laintiff believes he has been targeted in retaliation for what was about to be discovered during the litigation over the incident in 2016.” (Opp., p.4:20- p.5:1.) In short, plaintiff maintains that his visit to the mental health facility in January 2023 was only to get “a prescription for a different sleep medication” but was then placed on a 5150-hold without justification. (Id., at p.5:1-6.)

With respect to defendant Regents’ statute of limitations argument, the opposition first contends the one-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure §340.5 is “not appropriate” because this is “a civil rights case,” not a professional negligence/medical malpractice action. (Id., at p.5:7-p.7:16.) Plaintiff adds that this action is not barred by the two-year limitations period set forth in §335.1 because this action was actually filed with the Court in November 2024 but was subsequently rejected by the Clerk due to the summons, complaint and civil cover sheet being uploaded into the Court’s new eCourt system as a single PDF document, rather than as separate PDF documents. (Id., at p.13:2-p.14:14.)

Finally, plaintiff contends that this case is governed by the three-year statute of limitations established by §338 and indicates that California Government Claims Act procedures do not apply to a claim under Title 42 U.S.C. §1983. (Id., at p.14:4-14; p.17:2-p.19:6.)

The opposition also asserts that defendant Regents is not entitled to immunity under WIC §5278 it does not apply “to those who use[] it to violate a clearly established federal right,” as is currently alleged in the 1AC based on plaintiff’s unlawful arrest. (Id., at p.7:17-p.10:20.) With respect to defendant Regents’ challenge to the 1AC’s cause of action under Government Code §815.6, plaintiff suggests the “mandatory duty” on which defendant’s liability is based is found in the California Code of Regulations which are applicable to defendant’s Licensed Clinical Social Workers designated to work in Psychiatric Emergency Services, which regulations “have the force of law.” (Id., at

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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p.15:1-p.17:1.)

The Court notes that attached to his opposition is approximately 80 pages of “exhibits,” which include what appears to be some of plaintiff’s medical records, responses to discovery in a different 2024 lawsuit by plaintiff against a different defendant, and other email chains. None of these were considered by the Court since they constitute “extrinsic evidence” which is beyond the permissible scope of a demurrer, where the Court’s consideration is limited to those facts alleged in the operative pleading and those for which judicial notice is both requested and granted. (See, infra.) Moreover, none of these exhibits appear to have any legal relevance to the disposition of this demurrer.

Reply. Defendant Regents maintains that it is entitled to statutory immunity under WIC §5278 and the entirety of the 1AC is time-barred under Code of Civil Procedure §340.5 since this action clearly arises from the provision of medical services, regardless of the theories of liability alleged. The reply adds the even if the two-year limitations of §335.1 applies, this action is barred because this action arises from events occurring in January 2023 but plaintiff did not commence this litigation until February 2025. According to defendant, the 1AC also fails to plead facts sufficient to state a valid claim under Title 42 U.S.C. §1983 or Government Code §815.6.

Legal Standards for Demurrer

A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings, raising issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party’s pleading. (Code of Civil Procedure §422.10 and §589.) A demurrer may only challenge defects on the face of the complaint or from matters that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) However, the face of the complaint includes facts contained in exhibits attached to the complaint. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) A demurrer can be utilized where a complaint itself is incomplete or discloses some defense that would bar recovery. (Guardian North Bay, Inc. v. Superior Court (Myers) (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963, 971-972.)

In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, courts treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. Matters which may be judicially noticed may also be considered. The complaint is to be given a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. (Farmers v. Zerin (1997) 53 CaI.App.4th 445, 451.) Consideration of extrinsic evidence or facts asserted in the memorandum supporting or opposing the demurrer is improper. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson

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(1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal. App. 3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief, we are not concerned with plaintiff’s possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v.

Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.) Still, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the facts pleaded are sufficient to establish every element of the cause of action. (See, e.g. Martin v. Bridgeport Community Assn., Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1031; Sui v. Price (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 933, 938.) The allegations must be factual and specific, not vague or conclusionary. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43–44.)

A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action - not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Finally, a demurrer may only be sustained where it disposes of an entire cause of action. (See, e.g., Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.)

Discussion

As noted above, the present demurrer challenges plaintiff’s 1AC and the two causes of action alleged therein on various grounds. As will be shown below, this demurrer shall be sustained on several grounds which obviate the need for the Court to address each of the specific grounds advanced by defendant Regents.

Welfare & Institution Code §5278. This statute expressly provides that individuals authorized to detain a person for 72-hour treatment and evaluation pursuant to WIC §5150 et seq. “shall not be held either criminally or civilly liable for exercising this authority.” Since both the original complaint filed on 2/5/2025 and the 1AC filed on 6/2/2025 (both of which were ostensibly “verified” by plaintiff (see, Compl., p.10:1-6; 1AC, p.19:1-6)) admit the events giving rise to plaintiff’s claims in this case arise from and relate to his being placed on “a 5150 hold” after presenting to “a mental health clinic” in Sacramento in January 2023 due to “sleep deprivation” and being transferred to the UCDMC (Compl., p.5:7-17; p.7:18-p.8:4; see also, 1AC, p.4:10-20; p.7:17-p.8:4; p.8:17-p.9:20; p.11:7-9), the broad and unqualified immunity found in §5278 effectively precludes defendant Regents from having any civil or criminal liability to plaintiff relative to the January 2023 5150-hold regardless of whether plaintiff pleads and/or proves it

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was wrongful and/or retaliatory. Although the Court need not proceed further, it does so in order to demonstrate additional reasons why this demurrer must be sustained.

Code of Civil Procedure §340.5. This statute provides in pertinent part:

In an action for injury or death against a health care provider based upon such person’s alleged professional negligence, the time for the commencement of action shall be three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first.

For the purposes of this section: (1) “Health care provider” means any person licensed or certified pursuant to Division 2 of the Business and Professions Code, or licensed pursuant to Chapter 2.5 of the Health and Safety Code and any clinic, health dispensary, or health facility, licensed pursuant to Division 2 of the Health and Safety Code. “Health care provider” includes the legal representatives of a health care provider; (2) “Professional negligence” means a negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of professional services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of a personal injury or wrongful death, provided that such services are within the scope of services for which the provider is licensed and which are not within any restriction imposed by the licensing agency or licensed hospital. (Underline added for emphasis.)

Additionally, California decisional law confirms that the label a plaintiff places on a cause of action is not dispositive on which limitation period governs the claim but instead the trial court must determine the substance of the claim in order to determine which statute of limitations controls. For instance, in Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs, Inc. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 336, the plaintiff sued his anesthesiologist and the hospital for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress, alleging that the anesthesiologist performance his professional medical services in an unnecessarily harsh and forceful manner but the trial court correctly characterized the claims as professional negligence and dismissed them for being brought more than a year later. (Larson, at 340.)

Likewise, in Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital (2016) 63 Cal.4th 75, the plaintiff sued a hospital for injuries sustained when a rail on her hospital bed collapsed but because the injury resulted from the use of equipment needed to implement the doctor’s orders concerning medical treatment, the trial court correctly sustained the hospital’s demurrer based on the one-year limitations period found in in §340.5. (Flores, at 79; see also, Nava v. Saddleback Memorial Medical Center (2016) 4

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV002998: NEAL vs THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, et al. 03/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to plf's First Amended Complaint to plf's First Amended Complaint in Department 53

Cal.App.5th 285, 287-288 [one-year statute of limitations for professional negligence, instead of the two-year statute of limitations for ordinary negligence, applied where patient fell from gurney since patient was being transported pursuant to a medical professional's directive].)

In the case at bar, the allegations of both the original complaint and the 1AC leave no doubt that the claims now being asserted by plaintiff arise from against defendant’s provision of professional health care services in January 2023 and indeed, the opposition states that plaintiff came to the “mental health facility” in January 2023 was to get “a prescription for a different sleep medication.” (Opp., at p.5:1-6.) While it is clear that plaintiff now contends he was at that time improperly and/or wrongfully placed on a 5150-hold while asleep at UCDMC, this Court holds that plaintiff’s 1AC and the causes of action alleged therein necessarily arise from defendant’s provision of professional health care services in January 2023 and consequently, they are fundamentally governed by the provisions of §340.5.

Based on the statutory language quoted above, §340.5’s limitations period commences when the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury allegedly caused by the defendant. The factual allegations found in both the original complaint and the 1AC demonstrate that plaintiff himself either knew or suspected that the January 2023 5150- hold was wrongful and/or improper at the time it occurred and this is particularly true in light of his own characterization of this 2023 5150-hold being in retaliation for his 2019 lawsuit relating to a 5150-hold in November 2016 (see, Opp., p.4:20-p.5:1) and therefore, plaintiff was obliged to commence this lawsuit no later than January 2024.

However, plaintiff waited more than another year before filing the present action on 2/5/2025 and as a result, the claims now alleged against defendant in the 1AC are timebarred by virtue of §340.5.

In light of the foregoing, the Court need not proceed further but will do so to identify additional infirmities with the 1AC.

Title 42 U.S.C. §1983. As noted above, plaintiff’s 1AC includes a cause of action against defendant Regents for violation of civil rights under §1983 but as will now be shown, this claim is not viable against defendant Regents as a matter of law for several independent reasons.

First, the United States Supreme Court held in Wallace v. Kato that a cause of action under §1983 is governed by the forum state’s own statute of limitations for personal injury torts (Wallace v. Kato (2007) 549 U.S. 384, 387) and according to the California Supreme Court, California’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims is two years. (Shalabi v. City of Fontana (2021) 11 Cal. 5th 842, 847 (citing Code Civ. Proc. §335.1).) Plaintiff’s §1983 cause of action is time-barred under this binding precedent

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV002998: NEAL vs THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, et al. 03/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to plf's First Amended Complaint to plf's First Amended Complaint in Department 53

inasmuch as the complaint and 1AC demonstrate that this civil rights claim is based on events occurring in January 2023 but instead of filing this lawsuit within two years, plaintiff waited until 2/5/2025, well after the expiration of the two-year period.

The Court acknowledges the opposition’s claim that plaintiff actually submitted for filing in November 2024 a summons, complaint and civil cover sheet but this submission was subsequently rejected by the Clerk. (Opp., p.13:10-17.) However, neither this assertion nor the related documents which were attached to the opposition (see, Opp., Ex. C-E) may be permissibly considered in connection with this ruling on the present demurrer since, based on the authorities cited above, the Court’s sole determination is whether the factual allegations in the challenged pleading are sufficient to constitute a valid cause of action and that consideration of “extrinsic evidence” or facts not alleged in the subject pleading is improper. (Farmers v.

Zerin, supra, 53 CaI.App.4th at 451; Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d at 881.) Accordingly, the opposition’s insistence that this action is not barred by the two-year limitations period found in Code of Civil Procedure §335.1 is beyond the Court’s purview here.

Additionally, even if this suit were timely commenced, the Court finds that this §1983 civil rights claim is not properly alleged against defendant Regents. First, the United States Supreme Court explained in Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police that because of the Eleventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution, neither a state (like California) nor its officials acting in their official capacities are considered “persons” that may be subject to liability under §1983. (Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police (1989) 491 U.S. 58, 71.)

Second and more specifically, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that the very defendant plaintiff has sued in the case at bar, the Regents of the University of California, is as a matter of law not a “person” subject to liability under §1983. (Sellers v. Regents of University of Cal. (9th Cir. 1970) 432 F.2d 493, 500 [Regents is “a corporation created by the Constitution of the State of California” and as such, “it is not a ‘person’ within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §1983. [Citations omitted.]”]; see also, Thompson v.

Los Angeles (9th Cir. 1989) 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 [University of California is “an entity of the state” and is under the Eleventh Amendment “immune from damage claims” under §1983 for constitutional violations] (overruled on other grounds in Bull v. City & County of San Francisco (9th Cir. 2011) 595 F.3d 964, 981).) Third, based on the United States Supreme Court’s express holding in Monell, a municipal corporation cannot be held liable for a violation of §1983 on a respondeat superior theory based on the existence of an alleged employer-employee relationship with the individual(s) committing the civil rights violation. (Monell v.

Department of Social Services of City of New York (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 694.) In light of the foregoing, this Court concludes that defendant Regents may not be subject to either direct or vicarious liability based on §1983 and thus, the demurrer to this cause of action, as currently alleged, must be sustained.

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Government Code §815.6. As noted above, the 1AC also purports to assert a separate cause of action under §815.6, with plaintiff claiming that defendant Regents breached a “mandatory duty.” This second cause of action under §815.6 also fails as a matter of law for several independent reasons.

A. Claims Presentation. First, in light of the discussion above, there can no genuine dispute that defendant Regents is a public entity and under current California law, no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity (or public employee) unless and until a written government claim has been timely presented to the public entity and either acted upon or deemed rejected. (See, Gov. Code §§945.4, 950.2.) It is well established that compliance with this statutory claim presentation requirement is “mandatory” and the failure to present a pre-litigation government claim is fatal to the cause of action. (Pacific Tel. & Tel.

Co. v. Cnty. of Riverside (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 183, 188.) Compliance with the Government Claims Act (“GCA”) is actually an element of a cause of action for damages against a public entity or public employee. (State v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1244.) “Timely claim presentation is not merely a procedural requirement, but rather, a condition precedent to a plaintiff’s maintaining an action against a [public] defendant, and thus, an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action.” (K.J. v.

Arcadia Unified School Dist. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1238.) The GCA requires the timely presentation of a written claim for money or damages directly to a public entity, and the rejection of that claim, as a condition precedent to a tort action against either the public entity or an individual public employee acting within the scope of his/her employment. (Gov. Code §§911.2, 945.4, 950.2; State of California v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.4th at 1245.) Currently, the deadline to present a government claim to a public entity for personal injury is six months from accrual of the cause of action. (Gov.

Code §911.2.)

The Court has reviewed both plaintiff’s original complaint and 1AC and finds that neither alleges plaintiff’s compliance with the aforementioned claim presentation requirement of the GCA. Since the authorities cited above confirm that compliance with the GCA’s claim presentation requirement “mandatory” (Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., supra, 106 Cal.App.3d at 188) and actually an element of the cause of action for damages against the public entity (State v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.4th at 1244), plaintiff’s failure to allege timely presentation of a government claim is fatal to this second cause of action against defendant Regents under Government Code §815.6.

Moreover, because Government Code §911.2 specifies that a government claim relating to personal injury is six months from the date the cause of action accrued and since the 1AC alleges the events giving rise to this lawsuit occurred in January 2023, plaintiff was obliged to present his government claim no later than July 2023 and it is now too late for plaintiff to comply with this six-month deadline. While Government Code §911.4 authorizes an

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application to present a late government claim, such application must be made no later than one year after accrual of the cause of action (Gov. Code §911.4(b)) and since this one-year period expired in January 2024, plaintiff can no longer avail himself to this procedure. In the end, since plaintiff has failed to allege compliance with the prelitigation claim presentation requirement of the GCA and it is now too late for plaintiff either to timely present a government claim or to obtain leave to submit a late government claim, he is now precluded from proceeding with his cause of action against defendant Regents based on Government Code §815.6.

In light of the preceding paragraph, the Court need not proceed further but it does in order to address yet another reason why plaintiff’s cause of action under Government Code §815.6 fails as a matter of law. Government Code §815 generally immunizes all public entities from liability for any injury arising out of an act or omission of the public entity or its employee(s) unless a statute provides otherwise. The subsequent provisions of the Government Code then set forth a variety of situations where a public entity is indeed subject to liability notwithstanding the general immunity found in §815 and relevant here is §815.6, which provides in its entirety:

Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.

Notably, §815.6 does not itself operate as a basis for liability against a public entity but merely prescribes the circumstances under which liability may attach. In 2013, the First District Court of Appeal explained that §815.6 has three discrete requirements which must be met before liability may be imposed against a public entity like defendant Regents: (1) There must be an enactment which imposes a mandatory duty on the public entity; (2) this enactment must be meant to protect against the kind of risk of injury suffered by the party asserting §815.6 as a basis for liability; and (3) the public entity’s breach of that mandatory duty must be a proximate cause of the injury suffered. (San Mateo Union High School Dist. v. County of San Mateo (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 418, 428-429 [citing Ellerbee v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1206, 1215.)

Additionally, since a public entity like defendant Regents enjoys a general immunity from liability in the absence of a statute, California law requires that a plaintiff suing a public entity to identify the specific statute on which liability is based. (See, e.g., de Villers v. County of San Diego (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 238, 247-248.) Moreover, California case law holds that all causes of action seeking liability based on the violation

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of a statute must be pleaded with factual particularity, showing every fact essential to the existence of liability under the relevant statute. (See, e.g., Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (Inclan) (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771, 790 (citing Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Trans. Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 795).) Although the 1AC makes reference to a number of statutes and other enactments, none of them is here a valid basis for imposing liability against defendant Regents based on the facts currently alleged in the 1AC relative to the 5150-hold in January 2023.

B. Title 42 U.S.C. §1983. First, as detailed above, defendant Regents is for several reasons (separate and apart from the Code of Civil Procedure §340.5’s oneyear statute of limitations and WIC §5278’s broad immunity for 5150 determinations) not subject to liability under Title 42 U.S.C. §1983 as a matter of law.

Second, the 1AC appears to cite WIC §5150(a) and (j) as ostensible statutory grounds for liability against defendant Regents (see, 1AC, p.4) and each will now be addressed in turn. In pertinent part, §5150(a) permits certain individuals (i.e., “professional person[s],” “peace officer[s],” etc.), upon probable cause, to have taken into custody a person who, as a result of a mental health disorder, is a danger to others, or to themselves, or gravely disabled, “for a period of up to 72 hours for assessment, evaluation, and crisis intervention, or placement for evaluation and treatment in a facility designated by the county for evaluation and treatment ” While this provision clearly authorizes a 72-hour hold in certain circumstances, this provision does not by its own terms require or otherwise mandate any specific action of the part of a public entity or public employee and as such, §5150(a) fails the very first prong of the three-part test discussed in the San Mateo Union High School District opinion cited above.

In light of this, the Court need not consider the remaining two parts of the three-part test but it remains doubtful that §5150(a) would satisfy either. Thus, in the end, the provisions of §5150(a) cannot support the imposition of liability against defendant Regents based upon a “mandatory duty” theory under Government Code §815.6.

C. WIC §5150(j). WIC §5150(j) states that each person admitted to a facility for evaluation and treatment pursuant to §5150(a) “shall be given” certain information by the admission staff, both orally and in writing. Among other things, this information is to include the justification(s) for the 72-hour hold (i.e., harm to self; harm to others; unable to provide own food, clothing and housing needs) along with the reasons therefor; the possibility of being treated with medication; the possibility of being transferred to another facility; the ability to request evaluation or treatment at a particular facility and/or by a particular mental health professional, although neither can be guaranteed; and the possibility of the 72-hour hold being extended under certain circumstances and the patient’s rights if this occurs.

Although §5150(j) certainly imposes a mandatory obligation to provide certain disclosures both orally and in writing and thus, arguably

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV002998: NEAL vs THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, et al. 03/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to plf's First Amended Complaint to plf's First Amended Complaint in Department 53

satisfies the first prong of the three-part test cited above, this Court is not persuaded that this provision was designed to protect against the type of harm plaintiff is currently alleging in this case (i.e., involuntary 5150-hold; involuntary transfer to treatment facility in Santa Rosa; this facility later releasing plaintiff onto “the streets of Santa Rosa” to wait for a bus; the bus dropping plaintiff off in San Francisco and taking an Uber back to Sacramento; and later retrieving personal belongings from UC Davis Medical Center (Compl., p.8:4-p.9:9)) and more critically, any breach of the mandatory duty to provide the information specified in §5150(j) cannot be shown to have proximately caused the injury and/or damages now alleged by plaintiff. Consequently, plaintiff’s reliance on §5150(j) as a basis for statutory liability against defendant Regents is misplaced because the requirements of §5150(j) do not satisfy two of the three prerequisites for liability on a “mandatory duty” theory pursuant to Government Code §815.6.

D. Title 9 CCR 784.29. Plaintiff’s 1AC also cites portions of the California Code of Regulations as apparent authority for establishing defendant Regents’ liability for breach of a mandatory duty within the meaning of Government Code §815.6. (See, 1AC, p.5:6-15.) In particular, plaintiff identifies Title 9 CCR 784.29(b) and (d) which provide in their entirety:

(b) Informed consent must include a verbal explanation by a physician of the client’s right to refuse or accept medical treatment. It must include a written consent form signed by the client indicating the above information has been given. The signed consent form is to be obtained and kept in the client’s record as specified in Sections 851 and 852.

(d) The client has the right to accept or refuse the proposed treatment, and if he or she consents, has the right to revoke his or her consent for any reason at any time. Licensed mental health professionals or licensed nursing staff shall verify that the client’s health record contains documentation that the client has given informed consent to the proposed treatment or procedure.

First, it must be noted that the above-cited regulations are found in a chapter which, by its own terms, applies only to “mental health rehabilitation centers” but since plaintiff has failed to establish that the UCDMC is a “mental health rehabilitation center” within the meaning of these regulations, this Court is unable to conclude that defendant Regents is obligated to comply with the provisions of either subdivision (b) or (d) of Title 9 CCR 784.29. This alone is fatal to plaintiff’s assertion of liability against defendant Regents on a theory of mandatory duty under Government Code §815.6.

Second, even assuming arguendo that UCDMC is a “mental health rehabilitation center” within the meaning of these regulations and that both 784.29(b) and (d) impose a

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV002998: NEAL vs THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, et al. 03/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to plf's First Amended Complaint to plf's First Amended Complaint in Department 53

mandatory duty on the part of defendant Regents, the Court is not persuaded that either subdivision was enacted for the purpose of protecting against the type of harm which plaintiff is alleging in this case (i.e., involuntary 5150-hold; involuntary transfer to treatment facility in Santa Rosa; this facility later releasing plaintiff onto “the streets of Santa Rosa” to wait for a bus; the bus dropping plaintiff off in San Francisco and taking an Uber back to Sacramento; and later retrieving personal belongings from UC Davis Medical Center (Compl., p.8:4-p.9:9)) and furthermore, defendant Regents’ alleged breach of 784.29(b)’s duty (which is itself limited to obtaining “informed consent”) and (d)’s duty (which is limited to verifying that the health record “contains documentation [of] informed consent to the proposed treatment”) cannot be fairly characterized as a proximate cause of the injury and/or damages alleged herein. Thus, Title 9 CCR 784.29(b) and (d) each fail to satisfy both the second and third prongs necessary for liability on a “mandatory duty” theory and therefore, neither provision cannot operate as a basis for liability against defendant Regents pursuant to Government Code §815.6.

E. Evidence Code §623. The 1AC cites Evidence Code §623 at Page 6:8-12 but since this is plainly a rule of evidence and not a provision of substantive law, it clearly cannot be a statutory basis of liability against defendant Regents in this case.

F. Various Court Opinions. Pages 5-7 of the 1AC purport to identify several court opinions (i.e., Riese v. St. Mary’s Hospital & Medical Center (1988) 751 P.2d 893; Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834; Tolan v. Cotton (2014) 572 U.S. 650; Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co. (1974) 419 U.S. 345; Monroe v. Pape (1961) 365 U.S. 168 (see, 1AC, pp.5-7)) but none of these decisions can create liability against defendant Regents pursuant to Government Code §815.6 since §815 itself plainly states that public entities are immune from liability for any injury unless a statute provides otherwise. Because none of the above-cited cases are statutes, none constitutes a viable exception to the general immunity found in §815.

Disposition

For the reasons explained above, defendant’s Regents’ demurrer to the 1AC must be and hereby is SUSTAINED.

Since this is defendant’s first challenge to plaintiff’s complaint on which the Court has had opportunity to rule, leave to amend is GRANTED. Plaintiff may file and serve a second amended complaint no later than 3/30/2026. Although not required by Court rule or statute, plaintiff is directed to present a copy of this order if and when the amended complaint is presented for filing.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV002998: NEAL vs THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, et al. 03/10/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to plf's First Amended Complaint to plf's First Amended Complaint in Department 53

The Court adds that the scope of leave to amend granted here is limited to curing the defects in the particular cause(s) of action to which the demurrer was sustained. (See, e.g., County Water Coal. v. Santa Cruz County Local Agency Formation Com. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329; see also, Harris v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023.) Thus, to the extent plaintiff may desire to amend the complaint in other respects and/or to add a new cause of action, a noticed motion to amend is required.

Defendant Regents to respond within 30 days if the amended complaint is personally served, 35 days if served by mail.

Moving defendant to provide notice of this ruling and file proof of service of same within five court days.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)