DOE vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al.

24CV025817: DOE vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 08/27/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Department 16D Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-3056 by 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message (a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; (b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and (c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 16D Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16146506749 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed on the Court Reporter Services webpage available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://saccourt.ca.gov/general-information/court-reporter-services-transcripts. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://saccourt.ca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/227/639084034465370000.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

24CV025817: DOE vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 08/27/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

*** EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA 95814. ALL HEARINGS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING: Defendant Jerry Harper’s demurrer to Plaintiff John Doe’s first amended complaint (FAC”) is ruled upon as follows.

This case arises out of the alleged childhood sexual assault of Plaintiff by an employee of Defendant, denominated “Doe 1,” when Plaintiff was incarcerated. Plaintiff alleges that DOE 1 manipulated, coerced, and otherwise forced Plaintiff to submit to acts of sex, including pre-abuse grooming, forced kissing, forced touching, and forced sexual intercourse over a period from early 2002 through April 2003. (FAC ¶ 27.) As alleged, Defendant’s employees failed to provide or summon medical care for Plaintiff, including when Plaintiff confided in his mental health counselor that he was being abused. (FAC ¶ 56.)

Plaintiff alleges physical and emotional injuries as a result. (FAC ¶¶ 117–118.) The FAC includes six causes of action against Defendant for (1) negligence; (2) negligent supervision, training, hiring, and retention; (3) sexual battery; (4) assault; (5) violation of civil rights (Civil Code Sections 51.7, 51.9, 52, 52.1, 52.3 & 52.4); and (6) failure to summon medical care.

Defendant demurs to all six causes of action in the FAC. The Court notes that on August 18, 2026, it ruled upon Defendant California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (“CDCR”) separate demurrer to the FAC.

A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The purpose of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal. App. 4th 968, 994.) For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (CCP § 452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) The Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d at 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025817: DOE vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 08/27/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.) A general demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal. 3d at 318, William S. Hart Union High School Dist. v. Regional Planning Com. (1991) 226 Cal. App. 3d 1612, 1616 fn.2.) Extrinsic evidence may not properly be considered on demurrer or on a motion to strike. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal. App. 3d 868, 881; Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Thornton (1897) 117 Cal. 481, 482.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal. App. 3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . ., we are not concerned with plaintiff's possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal. App. 3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v.

Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 726.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action - not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal. 3d 584, 591.)

The Court addresses the arguments in the order presented in Defendant’s opening memorandum.

First, Third and Fourth Causes of Action (Negligence, Battery and Assault)

Defendant’s demurrer is sustained with leave to amend.

Defendant demurs to these three causes of action on the basis that he is immune from liability pursuant to Government Code § 820.8.

Government Code § 820.8 states “Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury caused by the act or omission of another person. Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by his own negligent or wrongful act or omission.” Generally, direct tort liability against a public employee cannot be premised on the acts of subordinates or other government employees. (Weaver v. State (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 188, 202 [finding that a supervisor was immune under § 820.8 for the acts of subordinates].)

According to Defendant, there are no allegations that Defendant had any personal involvement in connection with the alleged sexual assault upon which these causes of action are based. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Government Code § 820.8 does not immunize Defendant from liability for negligent supervision. This is true, but Defendant’s argument here is directed to the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025817: DOE vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 08/27/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

causes of action for negligence, battery and assault. Defendant does not argue that he is immune from liability for negligent supervision, which is the subject of the second cause of action, not the first, third or fourth causes of action. Thus, while Plaintiff may allege that Defendant had supervisory authority over the correctional officer who assaulted him, such allegations are insufficient to state direct claims for negligence, battery and assault against him. “Plaintiff cannot state a cause of action against the mayor or deputy chief merely for the negligent act or omissions of city employees serving under such officer.” (Martinez v. Cahill (1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 823, 824.)

As to Defendant, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts showing Defendant was involved in the incident causing his and thus as currently alleged, the first, third and fourth causes of action are precluded by Government Code § 820.8. The demurrer is sustained on this basis as to Defendant.

Second Cause of Action (Negligent Supervision, Training, Hiring or Retention)

Defendant’s demurrer is overruled.

“Liability for negligent hiring and supervision is based upon the reasoning that if an enterprise hires individuals with characteristics which might pose a danger to customers or other employees, the enterprise should bear the loss caused by the wrongdoing of its incompetent or unfit employees.” (Mendoza v. City of Los Angeles (1998) 66 Cal. App. 4th 1333, 1339.) “An employer may be liable to a third person for the employer's negligence in hiring or retaining an employee who is incompetent or unfit.” (Roman Catholic Bishop v. Superior Court (1996) 42 Cal. App. 4th 1556, 1564.) “To establish negligent supervision, a plaintiff must show that a person in a supervisorial position over the actor had knowledge of the actor's propensity to do the bad act.” (Z.V. v. County of Riverside (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 889, 902-903.)

Defendant argues that there are no allegations that he hired, trained, supervised, or retained Doe 1 nor any allegations that Defendant knew of any abuse by Doe 1. However, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was “responsible for the supervising, hiring, retention and training of DOE 1”. (FAC ¶¶ 5, 68.) Plaintiff also alleged that Defendant, and others, knew that Doe 1 gained access to children, including Plaintiff and engaged in sexual misconduct. (Id. ¶¶ 24, 68.) Plaintiff alleged that numerous Defendants, including Defendant, were responsible for supervising Doe 1 and that they failed to provide reasonable supervision of Doe 1. (FAC ¶ 70.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, and others, had actual or constructive notice that Doe 1 had engaged in dangerous and inappropriate conduct, including that he knew or should have known that Doe 1 had sexually abused minors, including Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 74, 76.) These allegations, which Defendant does not address, are sufficient for pleading purposes.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025817: DOE vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 08/27/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

Fifth Cause of Action (Violation of civil rights (Civil Code Sections 51.7, 51.9, 52, 52.1, 52.3 & 52.4))

Defendant’s demurrer is overruled.

Plaintiff bases the instant cause of action on “California Civil Code Sections 51.7, 51.9, 52, 52.1, 52.3 and 52.4.” (FAC ¶ 99.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, and others deprived him “of the right to be free from gender violence, sexual battery, sexual harassment and sex discrimination by authority officers, including guards, counselors, advisors or supervisors ” (Id.)

Defendant demurs on the basis that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the identified statutes. In a footnote, Defendant asserts that Civil Code §§ 51.9 and 52.3 are inapplicable. (Memo. 8, fn. 2.) Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts under either the Ralph Civil Rights Act or the Bane Act. However, Defendant cites authority which acknowledges that a Ralph Civil Rights Act or Bane Act claim nay be “based on his or her conduct as a supervisor rather than on personal involvement in violence or a threat of violence against a plaintiff in the same way as for a § 1983 claim.” (Black Lives Matter-Stockton Chapter v.

San Joaquin County Sheriff's Office (E.D. Cal. 2019) 398 F.Supp.3d 660, 679 [citations omitted].) “Therefore, to state a claim against any of the named individual defendants, plaintiffs must allege there exists either (1) defendants were personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between defendant's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” (Id.) Defendant attempts to argue that this standard requires Plaintiff to allege that Defendant instituted a specific policy or procedure that cause the subject abuse.

The authority cited by Defendant does not support this contention. Rather, the cited authority simply noted that a plaintiff alleged that a supervisor instituted policies that resulted in plaintiff being subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures but that no specific policy or procedure was identified. The case did not hold that a plaintiff must allege that a supervisor instituted a specific policy or procedure in order to be liable under the Ralph Civil Rights Act or the Bane Act. (Hydrick v.

Hunter (9th Cir. 2012) 669 F.3d 937, 942.)

Here, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant supervised Doe 1 and knew or should have known that Doe 1 was sexually abusing him as already discussed above in connection with the second cause of action for negligent supervision. These allegations sufficiently set forth a sufficient causal connection between Defendant’s conduct and the constitutional deprivation.

Sixth Cause of Action (Failure to Summon Medical Care)

Defendant’s demurrer is overruled.

Government Code § 845.6 imposes liability on a public entity for injuries proximately caused by

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025817: DOE vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 08/27/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

the failure to furnish or obtain medical care when (1) a public employee knows or has reason to know (2) that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and (3) the employee fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care. (Castaneda v. Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1070.)

As the Court did in connection with the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s demurrer, the Court concludes that this cause of action is sufficiently pled, including as to Defendant Harper.

Plaintiff alleges that he was sexually assaulted by Doe 1, that he requested medical care after an assault, and that he confided in his mental health counselor that he was being sexually abused. (FAC ¶ 56.) This alleges actual knowledge of the sexual assault and abuse and a failure to summon medical care, the first and third elements of the claim. Defendant focuses on the second element, whether Plaintiff was in need of immediate medical care, and also argues that the FAC fails to allege causation.

Defendant contends that the FAC alleges injury only in general terms, far from the statutory standard to show a need for immediate medical care. Section 845.6 creates in public employees a limited duty to summon care for prisoners. (Hart v. Orange County (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 302, 306–307.) The statutory duty does not require public employees to be medical diagnosticians. (Watson v. State (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 836, 843.) Instead, “liability is limited to serious and obvious medical conditions requiring immediate care.” (Id. at p. 841.)

In stating this rule, the Watson Court cited a case in which a person in jail complained of a bad headache and a case in which an arrestee, believed to be under the influence of a drug, hung himself. (Ibid. [citing Kinney v. County of Contra Costa (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 761 and Lucas v. City of Long Beach (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 341].) Watson itself dealt with a torn ankle tendon that went undetected after x-rays and medical examination. Defendant also cites Castaneda, supra, which restates Watson’s “serious and obvious medical condition” standard.

On this caselaw and for the purposes of demurrer, the Court does not find Plaintiff’s injuries as alleged are categorically not “serious and obvious medical conditions” within the meaning of Section 845.6. Defendant’s cases are distinguishable. Castaneda and Watson were decided based on the actual provision of medical care, not on the failure to summon medical care. (Castaneda, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1072; Watson, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 842.) Their statements of the rule are arguably dicta.

Lucas held that apparent drug intoxication did not require medical intervention. (Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at pp. 349–350.) And Kinney held that a prisoner’s request “for something for a headache” cannot reasonably be deemed notice of a need for immediate medical care. (Kinney, supra, 8 Cal.App.3d at p. 770.) These cases do not require sustaining the present demurrer under the facts alleged in the FAC. Section 845.6 requires that a public employee “take reasonable action” in the circumstances. (Gov.

Code, § 845.6.) Plaintiff alleges repeated sexual assault and abuse. (FAC ¶ 27.) Sexual assault allegations cannot simply be equated as a matter of law to allegations of a bad headache or drug intoxication. Plaintiff alleges physical injuries. (FAC ¶ 114.) Taken as true, a juvenile’s report of sexual assault to a

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025817: DOE vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 08/27/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

mental health counselor or his request for medical aid after being sodomized (FAC ¶ 56) may trigger the “modest standard of care” in Section 845.6, “the moral obligation of common decency and common humanity” to summon medical care for a person in need. (Hart, supra, 254 Cal.App.2d at 307.)

Taking the allegations as true, it may be unreasonable not to summon medical care for these alleged injuries. Although the FAC states physical injuries generally rather than specifically, the Court does not find on demurrer that the FAC fails to include allegations of a need for immediate medical care. As to the issue of causation, tort liability is premised on the harmful conduct being a legally recognized cause of injury. (Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d 341, 350.) Section 845.6 “envisions liability for injury resulting from the failure to treat the physical condition requiring treatment and not for some other incidental injury that might have been prevented by the mere presence of medical personnel.” (Ibid. [emphasis added].)

As applied here, Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff suffered physical injury and pain, along with emotional trauma, after the assaults and as a direct result of the failure to summon care. (FAC ¶¶ 117, 118.) This is a sufficient alleged causal link for purposes of demurrer. Defendant’s demurrer to the sixth cause of action is overruled.

Punitive damages

Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages is overruled. Punitive damages are merely a remedy incident to a cause of action and not an independent cause of action. (Hillard v A.H. Robins (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 391.) Indeed, “a demurrer cannot rightfully be sustained to a part of a cause of action or to a particular type of damage or remedy.” (Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1047.) “Since a demurrer does not lie to a part of a cause of action [citations omitted], petitioners’ punitive damage allegations were not subject to real parties demurrer. ‘There is no cause of action for punitive damages.

Punitive or exemplary damages are remedies available to a party who can plead and prove the facts and circumstances [set forth in Civil Code section 3294] ’Punitive damages are merely incident to a cause of action, and can never constitute the basis thereof.’ [citations omitted] Consequently, the trial court’s ruling could have only pertained to the demurrers made on the ground the sixth cause of action failed to state a cause of action for battery. The adequacy of the punitive damages allegations could, however, have been tested by motion to strike.” (Grieves v.

Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 163-164.) Defendant did not file a motion to strike.

In conclusion, Defendant’s demurrer is sustained as to the first, third, and fourth causes of action. The demurrer is overruled as to the second, fifth, sixth causes of action and the claim for punitive damages.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025817: DOE vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 08/27/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

Where the demurrer was sustained, leave to amend is granted. “If the plaintiff has not had an opportunity to amend the complaint in response to the demurrer, leave to amend is liberally allowed as a matter of fairness, unless the complaint shows on its face that it is incapable of amendment.” (City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 747.) Leave to amend is granted as this is Lodi’s first challenge to the complaint on which the Court has ruled.

Where leave was granted, Plaintiff may file and serve an amended complaint no later than September 15, 2026. Defendant shall file and serve a response within the time provided for by the Code of Civil Procedure.

If Plaintiff does not file any amended complaint in response to this order, Defendant shall file and serve its Answer to the First Amended Complaint no later than September 22, 2026. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, Defendant shall respond within the time provided for by the Code of Civil Procedure

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or other notice is required.