Vay Williams vs. Happy Day Wellness Spa, Inc

34-2020-00286639-CU-PO-GDS: Vay Williams vs. Happy Day Wellness Spa, Inc 09/01/2026 Hearing on Motion to Seal Defendant Changjiang Li's (Doe 7) Motion for Sanctions in Department 16D

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE: Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure: To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Department 16D Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-3056 by 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message (a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; (b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and (c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below.

If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court. Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 16D Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16146506749 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED. Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed on the Court Reporter Services webpage available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://saccourt.ca.gov/general-information/court-reporter-services-transcripts.

Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://saccourt.ca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/227/639084034465370000. A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list. Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk.

If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

*** NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO

34-2020-00286639-CU-PO-GDS: Vay Williams vs. Happy Day Wellness Spa, Inc 09/01/2026 Hearing on Motion to Seal Defendant Changjiang Li's (Doe 7) Motion for Sanctions in Department 16D

THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff in pro per Williams’ “Motion to File Under Seal Defendant Changijiang Li’s (Doe 7’s) Motion For Sanctions Against Plaintiff; Plaintiff’s Opposition; Defendant Li’s Motion to Quash Service of Summons and Other Related Documents Identified Herein” is ruled upon as follows.

Both moving and opposing party failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1110(b)(3)-(4).

Opposing party also failed to comply with CRC Rule 2.111(3).

Factual Background

This action is well known to the Court in light of its unusual nature and amount of law & motion activity.

Moving Papers. As best the Court can determine from the moving papers filed on 7/20/2026 and 7/29/2026, plaintiff now seeks an order filing under seal a vast series of documents, apparently in their entirety (i.e., without any specific redactions) (see, 7/20/2026 Not. of Mot., p.2:1-p.3:9; 7/29/2026 Not. of Mot., p.2:1-p.3:9), including “Defendant Changjiang Li’s (Doe 7’s) and Attorney Lisa Liu’s unserved Motion for Sanctions and Motion to Quash Service of Summons as well as Plaintiff’s related Opposition to their sanctions motion and other clearly related documents as identified herein” on the grounds that “(1) they contain false, harmful and unsubstantiated allegations; (2) they were never properly served on Plaintiff; (3) they have and will continue to cause substantial prejudice to Plaintiff’s professional and personal reputations; (4) Defendant [sic] was recently permitted to file both motions under seal without any showing of harm and despite the motions’ service deficiencies, and (5) they deprive Plaintiff of her privacy and due process rights as long as they remain on the record as is. (Am.

Not. of Mot., p.5:2-14.) According to plaintiff, “the allegations made about Plaintiff in Defendant Li’s and Attorney Liu’s maliciously filed, yet unserved, Motion for Sanctions and Motion to Quash Service of Summons are completely untrue and unsubstantiated, and therefore, violate her rights to privacy and due process.” (Id., at p.5:17-21.) The moving papers confirm that plaintiff actually also seeks to “seal additional documents beyond Li’s Motion for Sanctions which also repeat the harmful,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00286639-CU-PO-GDS: Vay Williams vs. Happy Day Wellness Spa, Inc 09/01/2026 Hearing on Motion to Seal Defendant Changjiang Li's (Doe 7) Motion for Sanctions in Department 16D

unsubstantiated allegations in their sanctions motion, e.g., Li’s Motion to Quash Service of Summons.” (Id., at p.5:22-24.) Plaintiff insists the proposed sealing of the identified documents is proper and warranted for the following reasons:

1. Overriding interests (e.g., privacy, due process, malice) exist that overcome the right of public access to the records; 2. The overriding interest supports sealing the records; 3. A substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the records are not sealed; 4. The proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and 5. No less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest. (Id., at p.3:10-19.)

The moving papers proceed to characterize the documents at issue, including several which plaintiff herself has filed (see, Pl. “List of Documents Conditionally Under Seal,” filed 7/20/2026), as “contain[ing] false, untested, and unadjudicated allegations that directly attack Plaintiff’s professional and personal reputations and have harmed them as a result.” (Mov. MPA, p.2:3-10.) Again, Plaintiff does not identify or provide citations with any specificity which statements within such filings Plaintiff asserts are “false” and “untested” allegations “that directly attack Plaintiff’s professional and personal reputations.” Plaintiff seeks sealing of entire documents. (See, 7/20/2026 Not. of Mot., p.2:1-p.3:9; 7/29/2026 Not. of Mot., p.2:1-p.3:9.)

Plaintiff contends that “[d]espite these facts and jurisdictional problems, the blatant untruths in the Motion for Sanctions; Defendant’s Motion to Quash Service of Summons, and other related documents identified in this motion (see Exh. C) remain a part of the public record, continuing to tarnish Plaintiff’s personal and professional reputations and unjustly depriving Plaintiff of her constitutional rights to due process and privacy in perpetuity” and “[f]or these reasons, consistent with Rule 2.550 and state and federal law, Plaintiff respectfully requests that her Motion to File Under Seal be granted.” (Id., at p.3:9-15.)

According to the moving papers, the documents at issue violate plaintiff’s due process rights insofar as defendant Li’s prior motion for sanctions was not properly served on plaintiff and further violate plaintiff’s “privacy interest in not be publicly portrayed in a highly offensive, false manner,” which plaintiff maintains has “directly affected her ability to obtain a new job as an attorney.” (Id., at p.6:8-p.7:13.)

Plaintiff states that she has in numerous job application and/or job interviews had to specifically disclose the existence of defendant Li’s prior motion for sanctions and motion to quash “despite the fact that: (1) the two motions were not served on Plaintiff yet remain on the record; (2) Plaintiff timely dismissed Defendant Li per the parties’ agreement, thereby rendering both motions moot prior to their filing; (3) the motions contain blatant lies about her character and, by extension, about her fitness to practice

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00286639-CU-PO-GDS: Vay Williams vs. Happy Day Wellness Spa, Inc 09/01/2026 Hearing on Motion to Seal Defendant Changjiang Li's (Doe 7) Motion for Sanctions in Department 16D

law that are wholly unsupported by the record, and (4) the Court never considered the veracity Li’s and Liu’s unsubstantiated, character-assassinating statements in either motion” even though “the Court simply: (5) denied both motions on inconsistent procedural grounds and left them on the record, leaving the public to presume their content to be true.”[1] (Mov. MPA, p.7:14-25.)

Opposition. Defendant Li opposes, arguing that plaintiff has identified “no confidentialby-law information requiring wholesale sealing” of the documents identified in the moving papers but still seeks improperly “to remove from public view filings that document the procedural history leading to Mr. Li’s dismissal after he maintained that Plaintiff had sued the wrong person.” (Opp., p.1:19-21.) The opposition adds that it would be incongruous to seal defendant Li’s motion to quash which was granted, while plaintiff’s own later sanctions motion against defendant Li and his counsel remains part of the public record especially when California court records are presumed to be open to the public. (Id., at p.1:21-p.2:3.)

While a filing may be sealed from public view with an order which includes specific factual findings of an overriding interest, substantial probability of prejudice without sealing, narrow tailoring, and no less restrictive means, plaintiff has not made such a showing. (Id., at p.2:3-5.) Moreover, plaintiff’s own disagreement with the accuracy of the allegations included within a filed motion, even with some claimed “reputational harm from those allegations,” does not itself justify the sealing of any or all of the subject motions or related filings and this is especially true for the motion to quash which was granted. (Id., at p.2:5-8.)

Discussion

“Unless confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to be open.” (CRC Rule 2.550(c).) California Rules of Court, Rule 2.550(a) addresses the standards and requirements for motions to seal, and it provides as follows:

(1) Rules 2.550-2.551 apply to records sealed or proposed to be sealed by court order. (2) These rules do not apply to records that are required to be kept confidential by law. (3) These rules do not apply to discovery motions and records filed or lodged in connection with discovery motions or proceedings. However, the rules do apply to discovery materials that are used at trial or submitted as a basis for adjudication of matters other than discovery motions or proceedings.”

Where a motion to seal is required, a court may order that a record be filed under seal if it expressly finds facts that establish that (1) there is an overriding interest to support the sealing of these records; (2) there is a substantial probability that the parties’ interests

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00286639-CU-PO-GDS: Vay Williams vs. Happy Day Wellness Spa, Inc 09/01/2026 Hearing on Motion to Seal Defendant Changjiang Li's (Doe 7) Motion for Sanctions in Department 16D

will be prejudiced absent sealing; (3) the proposed sealing is narrowly tailored to serve the parties’ interests; and (4) there is no less restrictive means of achieving the overriding interest. (CRC Rule 2.550(d); see also, In re Providian Credit Card Cases (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 292.) The absence of any one of these factors mandates denial of a motion to seal.

A. Overriding Interest Must Be Established to Support Sealing of Records

Plaintiff does not argue that the documents she seeks to seal are subject to any statute specifically providing that “confidentiality is required by law.” (CRC Rule 2.550(a)(1).) Thus, the presumption that court records are open applies. (CRC Rule 2.550(c).) Nor are any of the documents which Plaintiff seeks to seal “discovery motions and records filed or lodged in connection with discovery motions or proceedings.” (CRC Rule 2.550(a)(3).) Rather, “the rules do apply to discovery materials that are used at trial or submitted as a basis for adjudication of matters other than discovery motions or proceedings.” (Id. [emphasis added].)

Plaintiff does not dispute that the Motion for Sanctions and Motion to Quash that she seeks to seal are “other than discovery motions or proceedings.” Thus, as referenced above, Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing an overriding interest to support the sealing of the vast collection of records which are referenced by this motion.

One of the seminal cases relating to the sealing of documents in California is NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, an opinion cited and discussed in the moving papers. Notably, CRC Rule 2.550 and 2.551 are based to a large degree on this California Supreme Court precedent, in which it was confirmed that the First Amendment does not compel public access to materials submitted in connection with discovery proceedings and motions, and materials which are neither used at trial or submitted to the court as a basis for adjudication. (NBC Subsidiary, at 1208-1209, fn. 25 [citing, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v.

Rhinehart (1984) 467 U.S. 20; Matter of Continental Illinois Securities Litigation (7th Cir. 1984) 732 F.2d 1302, 1309, fn. 11; Matter of Krynicki (7th Cir. 1992) 983 F.2d 74, 75-76].) The California Supreme Court also clarified that before closing a hearing or sealing a record on file, a court must not only find an “overriding interest” which justifies the closure of the hearing or sealing of the record but also make certain express findings (i.e., those now set forth in CRC Rule 2.550(d)). (NBC Subsidiary, at 1217-1218.)

While NBC Subsidiary provides a few examples of interests which various courts have acknowledged may constitute an “overriding interest” (Id., at 1222, fn. 46), the California Supreme Court did not attempt to provide a comprehensive or even partial list of interests which might be an “overriding interest” for purposes of overcoming the First Amendment’s dictate for proceedings and filings to remain presumptively open to the public.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00286639-CU-PO-GDS: Vay Williams vs. Happy Day Wellness Spa, Inc 09/01/2026 Hearing on Motion to Seal Defendant Changjiang Li's (Doe 7) Motion for Sanctions in Department 16D

In the interim, however, California courts have found that under appropriate circumstances, various statutory privileges (i.e., attorney-client, etc.), trade secrets and other sensitive proprietary business information, and privacy interests (when properly asserted and not waived) may constitute “overriding interests” which may in certain circumstances support a sealing of the public record. (See, e.g., In re Providian Credit Card Cases (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 292, 298, Fn. 3.) Additionally, some California statutes make clear that certain limited information is not subject to public disclosure (see, California’s “Confidentiality of Medical Information Act” at Civ.

Code §56 et seq.) and CRC Rule 1.201 itself indicates that an individual’s social security number and financial account numbers are not to be included within pleadings and other filings, implicitly indicating that there is an “overriding interest” to shield such information from the public notwithstanding the presumption for court records to remain open to the public.

In this motion, Plaintiff argues that her “due process” and “privacy” rights are the “overriding interests” claimed to overcome the presumptive right of public access to the various records referenced in the moving papers, again consisting not only of defendant Li’s Motion for Sanctions and Motion to Quash Service of Summons but also plaintiff’s own opposition(s) thereto “and other clearly related documents” which are claimed to “contain false, harmful and unsubstantiated allegations” which “will continue to cause substantial prejudice to Plaintiff’s professional and personal reputations ” The Court finds that Plaintiff’s moving papers do not demonstrate an “overriding interest” recognized under California law which supports the sealing of records.

First, Plaintiff’s “due process” argument appears to stem from Plaintiff’s contention that defendant Li’s Motion for Sanctions was not actually served on Plaintiff and as a result, the Court never issued a ruling which specifically adjudicated each allegation made therein. That is, Plaintiff argues that “[t]he Court never considered the allegations in defendant Li’s motion and/or whether anything in it was actually true, nor did it consider Plaintiff’s Opposition to it.” (Mov. MPA, p.2:25-27.) Plaintiff appears to assert that this constitutes a violation of Plaintiff’s “due process” rights and that those rights now constitute an overriding interest necessitating sealing of the Motion for Sanctions and all of its related documents.

This argument is incorrect as there are no “due process” rights, or violation thereof, which serve as an overriding interest to support sealing of such documents.

On 5/7/2025, the Court (Judge Yap) denied defendant Li’s Motion for Sanctions for failure to comply with the service requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7. (See, 5/7/2025 Order on Moton for Sanctions.) The Court did not impose any sanctions against Plaintiff. Plaintiff appears to assume that had the Motion for Sanctions been properly served upon her such that her opposition was considered,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00286639-CU-PO-GDS: Vay Williams vs. Happy Day Wellness Spa, Inc 09/01/2026 Hearing on Motion to Seal Defendant Changjiang Li's (Doe 7) Motion for Sanctions in Department 16D

Judge Yap would then have been required to make factual findings regarding each allegation made by defendant Li within such Motion for Sanctions. This assumption is false. The Court’s disposition of any motion may be based upon a wide range of reasons including, for instance, non-compliance with the Code of Civil Procedure, noncompliance with the California Rules of Court, and/or specific defects such as inadequate notice and/or deficient service. Neither the Code of Civil Procedure nor Rules of Court entitles any party to the Court’s issuance of findings of fact as to any specific, much less every, allegation made within a motion seeking sanctions and/or its supporting documents.

The Court is aware of no legal authority which entitles any party to such extensive findings of fact in connection with the disposition of such a motion. Furthermore, because the Court’s denial of the Motion for Sanctions does not constitute a “trial of a question of fact,” Plaintiff also had no right to request a statement of decision under California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1590. Simply put, at no point was Plaintiff entitled under California law to the adjudication on the merits of any particular allegation, much less every allegation, contained in defendant Li’s Motion for Sanctions.[2] Given that Plaintiff was never entitled to such factual findings in the first instance, Judge Yap’s 5/7/2025 ruling on the Motion for Sanctions cannot be construed as a violation of Plaintiff’s “due process” rights where the motion itself was denied and no sanctions or other penalty was imposed against Plaintiff.

Because there was no violation of Plaintiff’s “due process” rights in connection with the Court’s denial of the Motion for Sanctions, there similarly can be no “due process” rights or violation thereof which can now serve as an “overriding interest” to seal the filings associated with the Motion for Sanctions.

Similarly, Plaintiff’s “due process” argument also stems from her continued argument that Li’s Motion to Quash was similarly not served on her. On 5/7/2025, the Court (Judge Yap) granted Li’s Motion to Quash as unopposed. (5/7/2025 Order on Motion to Quash Service of Summons.) As a result, the Court found that the Motion to Quash was sufficiently noticed and served. Here, Plaintiff’s continued argument that Judge Yap’s 5/7/2025 order is incorrect is itself erroneous. Plaintiff neither sought timely relief from the 5/7/2025 order on the Motion to Quash, nor appellate review of that order.

Plaintiff cannot be heard now to argue that her “due process” rights have been violated by the 5/7/2025 order to support her current motion to seal. Notably, for the same reasons explained above in relation to Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the Motion for Sanctions, Plaintiff was not entitled to factual findings regarding each allegation made by defendant Li within the Motion to Quash. In addition to the fact that Plaintiff presently has no grounds to continue her challenge to the service of the Motion to Quash, the Court notes that the substantive effect of the Court’s ruling was simply to quash service as to defendant Li, an outcome which Plaintiff did not object to as noted in Judge Yap’s 5/7/2025 order.

Again, because there was there was no violation of Plaintiff’s “due process” rights in connection with the Court’s granting of defendant Li’s Motion to

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00286639-CU-PO-GDS: Vay Williams vs. Happy Day Wellness Spa, Inc 09/01/2026 Hearing on Motion to Seal Defendant Changjiang Li's (Doe 7) Motion for Sanctions in Department 16D

Quash, there similarly can be no “due process” rights or violation thereof which can serve as an “overriding interest” to seal the filings associated with such Motion to Quash.

Second, Plaintiff argues that her “privacy rights” were violated and that such violation now constitutes an overriding interest which supports the sealing of the documents pertaining to both the Motion for Sanctions and the Motion to Quash. In this regard, Plaintiff appears to argue that Li’s allegations and statements made in relation to each motion are injurious to Plaintiff’s personal and professional reputation and that Plaintiff has “privacy rights” “to be free from unadjudicated and defamatory accusations that were made in an unserved, late-filed and moot brief.” (Mov. MPA at 9:13-17.) In support of such argument, Plaintiff cites Civil Code sections 45-46 and Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205. This argument, however, does not support the finding of any overriding interest necessary to justify sealing.

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff does not argue that Li’s motions include any statements which disclose sensitive and/or private information regarding Plaintiff’s reputation. Rather, while Plaintiff’s motion makes no reference or citation to any specific statements contained in Li’s motions at all, it appears that Plaintiff is arguing that she has a privacy interest as to another party’s allegations which relate to Plaintiff’s reputation, such that the other party’s allegations themselves must be sealed.

Plaintiff provides no authority demonstrating that she has an overriding interest of privacy as to the allegations of another party. While Plaintiff cites Civil Code sections 45-46, which are the libel and slander statutes, these sections do not support the contention that Plaintiff has an overriding interest to seal allegations which Plaintiff claims are libelous. Rather, these provisions, where applicable, serve as the source of a defamation cause of action. Even to the extent that defamation claims may stem from the right of a person to not be portrayed in a false manner, such general principle does not supply an overriding interest to support sealing, nor do these sections address sealing.

In fact, there is no authority that defamation actions nor the allegations made therein are themselves subject to sealing.

Furthermore, not only does Plaintiff fail to present any legal authority finding an overriding interest to seal allegations made against a party, but where the allegations are made within a court filing, even if argued to be false, they may be subject to the litigation privilege found in Civil Code §47(b) such that they may not be actionable at all. (See, e.g., Finton Construction, Inc. v. Bidna & Keys, APLC (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 200, 211-212 [litigation privilege “now held applicable to any communication, whether or not it amounts to a publication [citations], and all torts except malicious prosecution. [Citations.]”]; [“breadth of the litigation privilege cannot be understated”]; Mallard v. Progressive Choice Ins. Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 531, 543 [litigation privilege not

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00286639-CU-PO-GDS: Vay Williams vs. Happy Day Wellness Spa, Inc 09/01/2026 Hearing on Motion to Seal Defendant Changjiang Li's (Doe 7) Motion for Sanctions in Department 16D

limited to statements made inside a courtroom but rather applies to any publication required or permitted by law in the course of a judicial proceeding].) The fact that allegations subject to the litigation privilege are inactionable only further supports the conclusion that such allegations are also not subject to a privacy interest which warrants sealing. Indeed, Plaintiff’s cited authority, Silberg v. Anderson, provides the California Supreme Court’s holding that a trial court properly dismissed an action based upon the absolute litigation privilege.

Plaintiff’s reference to the Supreme Court’s recitation of the requirement (for application of the litigation privilege) that “the communication be in furtherance of the objects of the litigation” and “that it not be extraneous to the action,” does not provide any support for the sealing of any allegations. (See, Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at 220.)

In sum, although Plaintiff cites to a variety of authorities which generally pertain to the sealing of court records, none appears to be factually similar to the case at bar or otherwise to support the proposition advanced in the present motion: That a litigant who claims another party’s court filings are false, offensive and/or harmful is entitled to have such records sealed from public view. Notably, a substantial amount of filings before this Court in other cases involve allegations made in complaints (including claims brought against individuals, such as based upon alleged fraud/deceit), motions, declarations, etc., where litigants have differing views on what is and is not false, offensive and/or harmful, but such allegations in themselves do not invoke privacy interests and/or result in sealing orders.

The Court finds Plaintiff has failed to satisfy her burden that she has an overriding interest which justifies sealing the Motion for Sanctions and the Motion to Quash based upon Plaintiff’s asserted “privacy rights” in defendant Li’s own allegations.

B. Proposed Sealing Must Be Narrowly Tailored

While the Court need not proceed further, it does so to explain that even if Plaintiff had established an overriding interest which could be argued to support sealing, Plaintiff’s motion would still be denied in its entirety. As explained above, it is Plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that her proposed sealing of the subject court filings is “narrowly tailored.” Plaintiff has failed significantly to satisfy this requirement.

As referenced earlier, Plaintiff does not identify or provide citations with any specificity which statements within Li’s Motion for Sanctions, Motion to Quash, or any other related documents Plaintiff seeks to seal. Plaintiff provides no proposed redactions, but instead simply seeks sealing of entire documents, i.e., every word and sentence of every filed document and exhibits. (See, 7/20/2026 Not. of Mot., p.2:1-p.3:9; 7/29/2026 Not. of Mot., p.2:1-p.3:9.) Such proposed sealing is not narrowly tailored to protect even any claimed overriding interest by Plaintiff. Instead, plaintiff’s proposed redactions to the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00286639-CU-PO-GDS: Vay Williams vs. Happy Day Wellness Spa, Inc 09/01/2026 Hearing on Motion to Seal Defendant Changjiang Li's (Doe 7) Motion for Sanctions in Department 16D

subject court filings unnecessarily attempt to shield from public view the entirety of every filing. This is impermissible as there is no question that every document for which Plaintiff seeks sealing contains portions and statements which Plaintiff could not possibly establish a basis for sealing.[3]

Disposition

For the reasons explained above, plaintiff’s present Motion to Seal defendant Li’s prior Motion for Sanctions and Motion to Quash along with “other related documents” is DENIED in its entirety.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.) [1] Insofar as Plaintiff suggests that sealing of the records at issue would avoid Plaintiff having to disclose

the existence of any such documents in response to inquiries, the Court notes that sealing would not in and of itself obviate plaintiff’s perceived need to make the foregoing disclosures inasmuch as the sealing of the identified documents, even if granted, would not mean that the documents (or their contents) no longer exist but rather would merely be shielded from public view in absence of further court order. Thus, if plaintiff were obligated to disclose the existence of such documents in a job application and/or job interview, she would still be obligated to do so regardless of the outcome of this motion. [2] While Plaintiff has no right to findings of fact regarding any individual allegation, much less all

allegations, filed in support of the Motion for Sanctions, it should go without saying that the mere presence of assertions by a party in any filing cannot be reasonably construed as being accepted by the Court as true where the Court has not addressed, much less found, such assertions to be accurate. [3] Plaintiff refers to the Court’s (Judge Sueyoshi) granting of Li’s prior motion to seal on 2/10/2026 and

argues that “fairness” requires the Court to also grant her motion to seal. Even aside from the fact that defendant Li’s prior motion to seal was granted as unopposed, the nature of Li’s motion as compared to Plaintiff’s present motion provides a useful example as to its substantive differences from this motion. As explained in Li’s motion and the 2/10/2026 order, Li sought sealing of only personal identifying information contained on his driver’s license and permanent residence card, which disclosed Li’s driver’s license number and alien registration number. Li did not seek sealing of any entire filed document, much less the entirety of multiple documents as Plaintiff seeks here.