Vay Williams vs. Happy Day Wellness Spa, Inc

34-2020-00286639-CU-PO-GDS: Vay Williams vs. Happy Day Wellness Spa, Inc 02/25/2025 Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration of October 14, 2024 Order in Department 53

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE: Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure: To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below.

If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court. Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 53/54 Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept53.54 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED. Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/courtreporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf.

Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-13.Pdf. A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list, Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk.

If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING: The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06, and does not provide the correct address for this Court’s Dept. 53/54. Moving party is directed to contact opposing counsel and advise him/her of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing, along with the correct address for this Court’s Dept. 53/54. If moving party is unable to contact opposing party prior to the hearing, moving counsel is ordered to appear at the hearing in person, by Zoom or by telephone.

34-2020-00286639-CU-PO-GDS: Vay Williams vs. Happy Day Wellness Spa, Inc 02/25/2025 Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration of October 14, 2024 Order in Department 53

Plaintiff in pro per Williams’ motion for reconsideration of this Court’s earlier order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants HSZ Management, Inc.; Q&L Service, Inc.; and Da Lin Zhang aka John Zhang (collectively “Defendants”) is ruled upon as follows.

Both the moving and opposing parties again failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1110(b)(3).

Moving party failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1113(d), requiring a table of contents and table of authorities when the points & authorities exceed 10 pages.

The points & authorities filed in reply fail to comply with CRC Rule 3.1113(e) and moving party failed to timely seek or obtain leave of court to file an oversized brief in compliance with CRC Rule 3.1113(f).

Factual Background

This is a personal injury action arising out of a massage which plaintiff received at a “Happy Day Spa” on Stockton Boulevard in Sacramento on 4/6/2018. The original complaint filed on 10/5/2020 alleges that the masseuse, known only as “Coco,” applied “excessive pressure” to plaintiff’s back and caused injury, while the operative second amended complaint filed on 2/8/2023 adds that plaintiff suffered damage to her cervical spine which now limits various activities of daily living including plaintiff’s customary occupation. This matter has not yet been set for trial but the Court notes that on 9/11/2024, plaintiff filed numerous Doe Amendments purporting to add various new defendants to this action.

On 6/17/2024, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment or in the alternative, for summary adjudication as against plaintiff in pro per Williams on the grounds “Plaintiff has sued the wrong parties, and the statute of limitations has run.” (Defs.’ 6/17/2024 Not. of Mot., p.1:27-p.2:1.) As support for this motion, Defendants advances a total of eight (8) Undisputed Material Facts (“UMF”) which asserted that Defendants did not own, operate or have any connection with the subject “Happy Day Spa” on Stockton Boulevard in Sacramento on 4/6/2018 (UMF 2, 8); defendants Q&L Service, Inc. (“Q&L”) and HSZ Management, Inc. (“HSZ”) were not formed until January 2020 (UMF 3-4, 7); and defendant HSZ purchased the assets of the “Happy Day Spa” from nonparty Ascendas in February 2020 but none of the liabilities (UMF 5-6). (The Court notes that none of the eight UMF appeared to relate to or otherwise substantiate the claim that plaintiff’s complaint is barred by the statute of limitations.)

Plaintiff Williams opposed, arguing that Defendants are “proper parties to the case

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under the alter ego and single business enterprise theories of liability” so the Court should “pierce the corporate veils of Defendants and permit her to proceed with this action against them and the other named defendants.” (Pl. Oppos., p.3:26-p.4:1.) The gist of the opposition is that defendant Da Lin “John” Zhang “had ownership and/or officer duties in three other corporations that were doing business under the ‘Happy Day Spa’ business name” (i.e., TZ Investment, Inc.; Z&Z Investment, Inc.; and Z&L Investment, Inc.) and thus, he is a proper defendant along with both Q&L and HSZ. (Id., at p.4:21-p.5:3.)

Plaintiff asserted that Defendants should have their corporate veils pierced and be held liable for plaintiff’s injuries and damages (Id., at p.6:3-28) since (1) discovery will ultimately establish Defendants commingled their funds, failed to follow corporate formalities, and “used some of the corporations as shells for the other ones” (Id., at p.7:1-15) and (2) Defendants breached their duties not only to “their corporations” but also to plaintiff (Id., at p.7:16-p.9-22).

Following oral argument on 9/25/2024, this Court affirmed its tentative ruling which denied Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication but granted their motion for summary judgment on the grounds that “Plaintiff has sued the wrong parties” since the moving papers satisfied Defendants’ initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2) and since plaintiff failed to produce admissible evidence sufficient to establish at least one triable issue of material fact which precludes judgment as a matter of law for Defendants. In its 10/14/2024 Ruling on Submitted Matter (“ROSM”), the Court addressed plaintiff’s request for a “stay issuance” to allow her to file a “proper response” to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment/adjudication and to require Defendants to further brief their “it wasn’t me” argument, along with a “discovery and scheduling” order, stating in pertinent part:

First, the Court must note that although Plaintiff is self-represented in this action in propria persona, self-represented litigants are not entitled to special treatment. (Nelson v. Gaunt (1981) 125 Cal. App.3d 623, 638-639.) Self-represented litigants are required to follow the same procedural rules that govern civil litigation. (McComber v. Wells (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 512, 522-523.) A party representing himself or herself is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and attorneys. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247; Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1210). That Plaintiff happens to be a licensed attorney does not change the responsibilities of a pro per litigant as herself.

Second, the Court finds that the accommodations requested by Plaintiff are not proper. The Court, in its discretion, does not grant such requests here. Rather, in this Court’s view, granting Plaintiff any of the orders which it seeks – “staying

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34-2020-00286639-CU-PO-GDS: Vay Williams vs. Happy Day Wellness Spa, Inc 02/25/2025 Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration of October 14, 2024 Order in Department 53

issuance” of the tentative ruling so that Plaintiff may file a further opposition in 40 days; requiring Moving Defendants to file more briefing in support of their motion; and issuing a “discovery and scheduling” order – would constitute the very special treatment to which no pro per party is entitled to, nor has received by this Court under any similar circumstances. No timely request was made to continue this matter for further discovery necessary to prepare an opposition, or for any other purpose that might constitute good cause.

While the Court appreciates and does not dispute Plaintiff’s indication that the present action as alleged against these particular Moving Defendants is important to Plaintiff, this does not warrant simply disregarding the Code of Civil Procedure, the Evidence Code, the California Rules of Court, and the law relating to self-representation. (10/14/2024 ROSM, pp.7-8.)

The Court notes that Defendants have to date failed to submit a proposed judgment of dismissal as specified in the earlier ruling granting summary judgment. (Had they done so, this motion for reconsideration would have been dropped given that the Court’s authority to reconsider an interim order terminates upon the entry of judgment. (See, e.g., Ramon v. Aerospace Corp. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1236.))

Moving Papers. On 10/24/2024, plaintiff filed the present motion for reconsideration of the order granting summary judgment on the grounds that “new or different facts and law have come to light and were not able to be presented at the time of the original hearing on the motion [for summary judgment].” (Not. of Mot., p.1:26-p.2:2.) In short, plaintiff asks the Court to “modify its order to retain Defendant Zhang as a defendant in this action” and permit “discovery of Defendant Zhang on the issues of the roles and positions that he held in different Happy Day Spa corporations at the time Plaintiff was injured; his knowledge of the locations and addresses of other Defendants who were officers, directors, or employees of the Happy Day Spa corporations doing business at the 6911 Stockton address at the time Plaintiff was injured; the corporation management practices – e.g., board meetings, capitalization, employee supervision, etc. – of himself and other officers and directors of the corporations located at the 6911 Stockton address at the time Plaintiff was injured, and other corporation management related information.” (Mov.

MPA, p.2:8-17.)

More specifically, plaintiff contends that Chavez v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 632, 643-645, Hamilton v. Orange County Sheriff’s Dept. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 759 “and other cases similar to them, all hold that the failure to retain Defendant Zhang as a defendant in this action given the facts that have been provided would constitute an abuse of discretion; would result in a grave injustice and would ignore the common law preference for resolution on the merits” since “they hold that: (1) the denial of Plaintiff’s request for a continuance so that discovery could be conducted

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in part, because Defendants had filed their summary judgment motion, and (2) the grant of Defendants’ summary judgment motion on the grounds that Plaintiff had not been diligent in obtaining discovery from Defendants constitutes an abuse of discretion, especially when no prior motion for a continuance had been granted, the delay in conducting discovery was not entirely Plaintiff’s fault, and Defendant Zhang’s testimony is essential to Plaintiff’s opposition.” (Mov. MPA, p.2:18-p.3:1.)

Plaintiff also maintains that the Court’s determination that Defendant Zhang “did not own, operate or have any connection with the subject “Happy Day Spa” on Stockton Boulevard in Sacramento on 4/6/2018” misstates the facts that were before it and therefore, “warrants a correction of the record and a finding that Defendant Zhang did not meet his initial burden of production because he did own, operate and have connection with the subject Happy Day Spa on Stockton Boulevard, given that he was both CEO and a director of the Defendant TZ Investment, Inc. corporation which was doing business at the 6911 Stockton address on the date that Plaintiff was injured.” (Mov. MPA, p.3:2-9.)

Finally, plaintiff adds that “a first-time, unexpected phone call that she had with counsel for Defendants Ascendas Management and Changjiang Li after the Court’s ruling further demonstrates that it is Defendants who have not been diligent in moving this case forward, not Plaintiff, and that this also warrants a grant of her request for a continuance of review of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Defendant Zhang so that she can gather discovery from him.” (Mov. MPA, p.3:10-15.)

In support of this motion, plaintiff filed a declaration in which she generally avers (1) it was not until 10/22/2024 that she “discovered” the cases of Chavez v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc.; Hamilton v. Orange County Sheriff’s Dept.; and other cases indicating that this Court’s denial of plaintiff’s request for a continuance of the summary judgment motion in order to conduct discovery constitutes an abuse of discretion (Pl. Decl., ¶¶4- 5); (2) the Court’s determination that Defendant Zhang “did not own, operate or have any connection with the subject “Happy Day Spa” on Stockton Boulevard in Sacramento on 4/6/2018” misstates the facts which were in the record and “warrants a finding that Defendant Zhang did not meet his initial burden of production ” (Id., at ¶6); and (3) she received “a first-time, unexpected phone call that she had with counsel for Defendants Ascendas Management and Changjiang Li after the Court’s ruling” which “demonstrates that it is Defendants who have not been diligent in moving this case forward, not Plaintiff ” (Id., at ¶7.)

Opposition. Defendants oppose, first arguing that the telephone call plaintiff had on 10/21/2024 with counsel for different defendants is not relevant to the disposition of Defendants’ earlier motion for summary judgment, which was granted on the grounds

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that they were not at the time of plaintiff’s injury the owners and/or operators of the subject spa location on Stockton Boulevard. The opposition adds that plaintiff’s claim about Defendants “stall[ing] discovery is ridiculous” and there is no evidence to show this, especially since plaintiff never served any discovery on Defendants and since Defendants voluntarily provided plaintiff with the documents showing they did not own or operate the subject spa on Stockton Boulevard when plaintiff was injured in 2018. According to Defendants, plaintiff never made a proper request for continuance but regardless, the facts on which this motion is based are not “new” and therefore, plaintiff has not met her initial burden to justify reconsideration of its earlier order granting summary judgment.

Reply. On 2/14/2025, plaintiff filed a “Factual Update and Reply to Defendants’ Opposition” which spans 18 pages, nearly twice the 10-page limitation found in CRC Rule 3.1113(d) and plaintiff also failed to seek or obtain leave of court prior to filing this oversized brief as required by CRC Rule 3.1113(f). In support of the reply, plaintiff filed a new declaration which includes several exhibits.

Standards Applicable to Reconsideration

Code of Civil Procedure §1008 governs motions for reconsideration and subdivision (a) provides in its entirety:

When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.

It is well established that a motion for reconsideration must be supported by “new or different facts, circumstances, or law,” but the moving party must also provide a satisfactory explanation as to why the new or different facts and/or law were not included in the original motion. (New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 213; Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 685-691 [threshold showing of diligence required, i.e., an explanation is required of why the newly discovered matter was not presented earlier.])

A strict requirement of diligence is applied to the presentation of new facts,

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circumstances or law. (Garcia, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at 690.) “The burden under section 1008 is comparable to that of a party seeking a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence: the information must be such that the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced it at the trial.” (New York Times Co., supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at 212-13 [new deposition testimony did not constitute new or different facts because there was not a satisfactory explanation as to why it could not have been discovered earlier in the discovery process and presented earlier].)

Objections to Evidence

Neither party filed any written objections to evidence.

Request for Judicial Notice

In her “supplemental” reply filed on 2/18/2025, plaintiff requests judicial notice of a declaration which defendant Zhang allegedly filed in another action. Plaintiff’s request is granted but only for those limited purposes appropriate for judicial notice. (See, Evid. Code §451, subd. (a); §452, sub. (b)-(d); see also, Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not the truth of statements therein]; Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 145-148; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569-70.)

Discussion

At the outset, the Court again acknowledges that plaintiff Williams is acting in pro per in this litigation but her status as a pro se litigant does not entitle her to any special treatment due to her lack of legal training or experience. (See, e.g., Nelson v Gaunt (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 623, 638-639.) Instead, self-represented litigants are required to follow the procedural rules that govern civil litigation (see, e.g., McComber v. Wells (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 512, 522-523) and are to be treated like any other party, entitled to the same but no greater consideration than other litigant or attorney (see, e.g., Nwosu v.

Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247; Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1210). In fact, at least one appellate decision states that a rule either requiring or permitting special treatment of parties who represent themselves “would lead to a quagmire in the trial courts, and would be unfair to the other parties to litigation.” (Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543.)

Also, while not necessary to the Court’s determination of this motion, plaintiff Williams has indicated that she is currently an active member of the California State Bar,

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although arguing at the earlier summary judgment hearing that she does not practice law in this particular area. In the end, it remains that there is no justifiable ground for granting plaintiff any special consideration in connection with this motion or more generally, this litigation, beyond that to which any other litigant in any other case would be entitled.

Additionally, as noted above, plaintiff filed on 2/14/2025 a document entitled “Factual Update and Reply to Defendants’ Opposition” along with a declaration to which several exhibits are attached. To the extent these papers may include “new” evidence or argument which was not included in the moving papers filed on 10/24/2024, such “new” evidence and/or argument is disregarded since Defendants had no opportunity to address such matters in their opposition papers. (See, e.g., Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 241; Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537; Tyler v. Children’s Home Society (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 511, 526, n.8.)

That said, plaintiff now seeks reconsideration of the Court’s earlier order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the grounds that “new or different facts and law have come to light and were not able to be presented at the time of the original hearing on the motion [for summary judgment].” (Not. of Mot., p.1:26-p.2:2.) This motion is premised on three primary arguments, each of which will now be addressed in turn.

A. Plaintiff claims that on 10/21/2024, after the Court issued its ROSM on 10/14/2024, she had a telephone conversation with counsel for co-defendants Ascendas Management and Changjiang Li. However, this “new” fact is irrelevant to the disposition of Defendants’ earlier motion for summary judgment/adjudication. While plaintiff contends this telephone conversation somehow demonstrates that it is not her but rather Defendants who failed to diligently move this case forward, longstanding California law is clear that the party obligated to exercise reasonable diligence in prosecuting a civil action is the plaintiff(s) who filed the action and that defendants are under no obligation to move a case forward or to conduct discovery pertaining to the claims alleged by the plaintiff(s). (See, e.g., Hershman v.

Bernard Homes, Inc. (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 651, 655 [“It is settled law that the responsibility of diligent prosecution at every stage of the proceeding is on the plaintiff (Clinton v. Joshua Hendy Corp. (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 183, 188.)”]; Hill v. Bingham (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1, 10 [“Reasonable diligence places on a plaintiff the affirmative duty to make every reasonable effort to bring a case to trial within five years, even during the last month of its statutory life.”]); Abner v. Lushing (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 597, 606 [“It is true that the defendant may bring about a trial of the issue presented by his demurrer, but he is not under any duty to do so The plaintiff is the party charged with the duty of diligence in prosecuting the action, as the issues are presented.”].)

Accordingly, plaintiff’s reliance

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on the 10/21/2024 telephone conversation with counsel for co-defendants Ascendas Management and Changjiang Li does not compel or otherwise justify reconsideration of the Court’s order granting summary judgment.

B. Similarly, the fact that plaintiff did not “discover” until 10/22/2024 the existing appellate authorities of Chavez v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc., Hamilton v. Orange County Sheriff’s Dept. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 759 “and other cases similar to them” is insufficient to support reconsideration here. As explained above, although a motion for reconsideration must clearly be premised on some “new or different facts, circumstances, or law,” California law further requires the party seeking reconsideration provide a satisfactory explanation as to why the new or different facts and/or law were not previously presented to the court in connection with the matter for which reconsideration is sought. (See, e.g., New York Times Co., supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at 213; Garcia, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at 685-691.)

In the case at bar, the moving papers fail to demonstrate how or why plaintiff could not, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, discover the existence of these appellate authorities prior to the hearing on 9/25/2024. Again, self-represented litigants are held to the same standard of reasonable diligence as all other parties in all other cases. Consequently, plaintiff’s purported discovery of these existing appellate authorities on 10/22/2024 does not constitute a valid or proper justification for reconsideration of the earlier order granting summary judgment but it is worth adding here that this Court was at the time of the 9/25/2024 hearing aware of the legal propositions reflected in the above-cited cases.

While it need not specifically address these authorities any further, the Court notes that neither of the cases cited by plaintiff actually required this Court to make a different decision. In Chavez, the Court of Appeal noted that even though plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration was not sufficient to satisfy Code of Civil Procedure §437c(h), the trial court was to still assess whether the plaintiff had demonstrated good cause for a continuance given that plaintiff had in fact filed a declaration and made a timely request for continuance under §437c(h). (Chavez, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at 643-644.)

In the case at bar, as indicated in the Court’s final ruling, “[n]o timely request was made to continue this matter for further discovery necessary to prepare an opposition, or for any other purpose that might constitute good cause.” (10/14/2024 ROSM, p. 8.) Unlike in Chavez, plaintiff Williams here (1) made no request for a continuance of the summary judgment hearing at all by the time she filed her opposition papers and (2) did not file any declaration at all with her opposition papers, much less one which addressed any potential basis for a continuance premised on good cause.

While plaintiff’s opposition brief mentioned that “discovery has not been completed in this case,” it did so only in the context of the following passage:

“Plaintiff will need to do extensive discovery in order to trace the change of

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corporation and property transfers, as well as assets of certain named and served Defendants in this case. Keeping Defendants D.L. Zhang, HSZ Management, Inc. and Q&L Service, Inc. as litigants in this case may enable this case to proceed more quickly if they are required to serve other Defendants under the Happy Day Spa business umbrella so that the liability is spread amongst more of them.” (Opp. to MSJ, p.9:24-p.10:1.)

These statements, which are not supported by any admissible evidence or declaration, do not and cannot serve as an evidentiary basis for a finding of good cause for a continuance, nor does it even include an express or implied request for a continuance. Instead, plaintiff Williams’ request for a continuance was made for the first time during oral argument on the summary judgment motion, only after receiving an adverse tentative ruling.

The second case cited by plaintiff, Hamilton, was and remains inapplicable to this Court’s decision. In Hamilton, the trial court was found to have abused its discretion in denying a continuance of an uncontested summary judgment motion where the parties had stipulated that the hearing should be continued because the plaintiff had already noticed but not yet taken depositions of the witnesses whose declarations had been submitted in support of the defendant’s pending summary judgment motion. (Hamilton, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at 761.)

The facts of the present case bear no resemblance to those of Hamilton. Further, while the Court of Appeal also discussed the “ordinary discretionary standard applied to requests for a continuance,” it stressed that “[t]his requires a showing of good cause.” (Id., at 765.) Again, plaintiff Williams made in the case at bar no showing based upon evidence for a good cause continuance. As such, the authorities cited by plaintiff Williams would not compel a result different from that set forth in the 10/14/2024 ROSM.

C. Plaintiff’s third argument in support of reconsideration is that the Court’s determination that Defendant Zhang “did not own, operate or have any connection with the subject “Happy Day Spa” on Stockton Boulevard in Sacramento on 4/6/2018” misstates the facts that were before it and therefore, “warrants a correction of the record and a finding that Defendant Zhang did not meet his initial burden of production because he did own, operate and have connection with the subject Happy Day Spa on Stockton Boulevard ” (Mov. MPA, p.3:2-9.) This argument fails as well.

First, as discussed above, reconsideration is properly granted only where the moving party provides a satisfactory explanation as to why the new or different facts and/or law were not previously presented to the court in connection with the matter for which reconsideration is sought. Here, there is no discernible reason why this final argument

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could not with reasonable diligence have been presented to the Court at the 9/25/2024 hearing on Defendants’ summary judgment/adjudication motion to the extent it was not then addressed in any part. This alone mandates denial of reconsideration of the Court’s order granting summary judgment.

Second, plaintiff’s suggestion that this Court, in granting summary judgment, determined Defendant Zhang “did not own, operate or have any connection with the subject “Happy Day Spa” on Stockton Boulevard in Sacramento on 4/6/2018” indicates plaintiff’s misunderstanding of the Court’s ruling and its limited role on a summary judgment/adjudication motion. In ruling on such a motion, a trial court makes no findings or determinations of fact (or of law) but rather focuses solely on whether the evidence proffered with the moving papers is sufficient to satisfy the moving party’s initial burden under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p) and if so, whether the opposition has produced evidence sufficient to establish the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (See, e.g., Code Civ.

Proc. §437c; Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1301; Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326-327; Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840; Miller v. Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 868, 874; Cortez v. Vogt (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 917, 925-926; Brown v. FSR Brokerage, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 766, 773.)

In ruling on Defendants’ summary judgment/adjudication motion in this case, the Court never determined that Defendant Zhang did not own, operate or have any connection with the subject Happy Day Spa on Stockton Boulevard in Sacramento on 4/6/2018 but instead merely concluded that (1) Defendants had satisfied their initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2) insofar as the evidence Defendants proffered (to which no objections were asserted) was sufficient to establish each of the 8 UMFs including in the moving separate statement and (2) plaintiff failed to include with her opposition admissible evidence sufficient to establish the existence of at least one triable issue of material fact.

Importantly, such rulings are not the same as making findings of fact after trial. Therefore, plaintiff’s third argument in support of this motion also fails to constitute a valid basis for granting reconsideration but even if it did, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate how or why Defendants’ moving papers were insufficient to their initial burden of production under §437c(p)(2).

D. Finally, insofar as plaintiff’s present motion appears to argue that this Court, in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, either misinterpreted or misapplied relevant legal authorities, this too is not a valid basis on which to obtain reconsideration of the earlier order. (See, e.g., Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00286639-CU-PO-GDS: Vay Williams vs. Happy Day Wellness Spa, Inc 02/25/2025 Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration of October 14, 2024 Order in Department 53

Disposition

For the reasons explained above, plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants is DENIED.

Pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312, moving counsel is again directed to prepare a judgment of dismissal of defendants HSZ Management, Inc.; Q&L Service, Inc.; and Da Lin Zhang aka John Zhang only.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)