Sykes vs. Lyft, Inc. the Estate of Brandon Blackthorne, Deceased

The motion to strike is granted. There are no specific facts showing Defendant acted with intentional, willful, or reckless disregard for the safety of others as required for malice.

Should Plaintiff wish to file an amended complaint that addresses the issues in this ruling, Plaintiff must file and serve it within 15 days of service of notice of ruling.

Defendant to give notice.

6 Karasu vs. OFF CALENDAR Beylem 7 Sykes vs. Lyft, Inc. the Estate TENTATIVE RULING: of Brandon Blackthorne. Deceased Motion to Compel Arbitration

Defendant Lyft, Inc., moves to compel arbitration of Plaintiffs George Allen Sykes, individually and as successor in interest to the Etate of Chandler Sykes, and Heather Hughes’s survival claim. For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED.

Applicability of the FAA

The right to arbitration depends upon contract, and thus, a motion to compel arbitration is akin to a suit in equity seeking specific performance of that contract. (See Little v. Pullman (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 558, 565.)

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which includes both procedural and substantive provisions, governs agreements involving interstate commerce. The FAA provides that written arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” (9 U.S.C., § 2.)

The parties here do not dispute that the agreement is governed by the FAA’s substantive rules.

Standard to Compel Arbitration Pursuant to the FAA

On a motion to compel arbitration under the FAA, the court’s role is limited to deciding: “(1) whether there is an agreement to arbitrate between the parties; and (2) whether the agreement covers the

dispute.” (Brennan v. Opus Bank (9th Cir. 2015) 796 F.3d 1125, 1130.)

When deciding whether a valid arbitration agreement exists, courts generally apply “ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts.” (First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan (1995) 514 U.S. 938, 944.) Thus, the FAA permits arbitration agreements to be invalidated by “‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.’” (AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S. at p. 339, quoting Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto (1996) 517 U.S. 681, 687.)

The party seeking to compel arbitration bears an initial burden to make a prima facie showing the claims asserted in the complaint are covered by a valid agreement to arbitrate. (Molecular Analytical Systems v. Ciphergen Biosystems, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 696, 710-711.) Then, “the party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving that the claims at issue are unsuitable for arbitration” or that a contract to enforcement exists. (See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph (2000) 531 U.S. 79, 91.)

Evidence and Scope of Arbitration Agreement

A party moving to compel arbitration bears an initial burden of producing “prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165–166.) If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement. (See Gamboa, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165-166.)

Here, Defendant submits evidence Decedent Chandler Sykes entered into an arbitration agreement with Defendant Lyft, Inc. (Sniegowski Decl. ¶ 13, Exs. 1-2.) Plaintiffs do not dispute the existence, validity, or authenticity of the arbitration provision. (See generally Opp.)

The claims brought by Decedent’s Estate fall within the broad scope of the arbitration agreement, as the arbitration agreement covers in relevant part: “any dispute, claim or controversy, whether based on past, present, or future events, arising out of or relating to: this Agreement.” (Sniegowski Decl., Ex. 2 at p. 23; see Rice v. Downs (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 175, 186, as modified on denial of reh'g (June 23, 2016), as modified (June 28, 2016) [holding “broad”

arbitration agreements cover torts and claims where the allegations “touch matters” covered by the contract].)

Defense to Enforcement

Plaintiffs’ opposition does not argue any contract defense (e.g., unconscionability) exists and, therefore, waives the issue. (See In re Marriage of Schroeder (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1154, 1164 [noting a brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made, and if not furnished on a particular point, the contention is waived].)

Court’s Discretion to Not Enforce the Arbitration Agreement or to Stay Arbitration

If the court finds a valid arbitration agreement covers the parties’ dispute and the FAA’s procedural rules apply, the court is without discretion to deny the motion and must compel arbitration. (9 U.S.C. § 4; see Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd (1985) 470 U.S. 213, 218.) The California Arbitration Act (the “CAA”), on the other hand, provides the court discretion to refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement or stay arbitration in circumstances where there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2(c).)

Plaintiffs argue that the court should exercise its discretion under the CAA to refuse to enforce the arbitration agreement or, in the alternative, stay the proceeding on arbitrable claims until after the trial on Plaintiff’s litigated claims.

Defendant argues that the CAA procedural rules do not provide an “escape hatch” for Plaintiffs to avoid arbitration because the Arbitration Agreement provides the FAA applies, the arbitrator has sole authority to determine issues of arbitrability, and even if the FAA did not apply, then the Delaware choice-of-law provision would govern.

Although the CAA’s procedural rules apply by default in cases brought in California courts, the FAA’s procedural rules apply where there is “an express provision in the arbitration agreement” providing for the federal procedural rules to apply. (See Avila v. Southern California Specialty Care, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 835, 840-841, citing Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 899, 922 [even where agreement specifies FAA governs any disputes, CAA governs procedures] and others; see also Quach v. California Commerce Club, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 562, 582 [holding the CAA’s

procedural rules apply by default in cases brought in California courts].)

Courts have held that agreements providing the parties must engage in arbitration “in accordance with” the FAA, “governed by the [FAA],” or “pursuant to the FAA” do not show an express agreement to have the FAA’s procedural rules apply. (See Wright v. WellQuest Elk Grove, LLC (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 267, 280-281, disapproving of Rodriguez v. American Technologies, Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1115; Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1334, 1342-1343 n. 3.) On the other hand, courts have held that agreements providing the agreement is “governed by the [FAA]” or providing that enforcement of the agreement “shall be governed by the [FAA]” do show an express agreement to have the FAA’s procedural rules apply. (See, e.g., Victrola 89, LLC v.

Jaman Properties 8 LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 346; Peleg v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc.(2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1445-1446.) As the California Supreme Court explained, “[t]he phrase ‘governed by’ is a broad one signifying a relationship of absolute direction, control and restraint. . . . [T]he [choice-of-law] clause reflects the parties’ clear contemplation that ‘the agreement’ is to be completely and absolutely controlled by’ [the stated jurisdiction’s] law.” (Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 459, 469.)

Here, the arbitration agreement provides the agreement “is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act.” The court finds this provision reflects the parties’ intent to have the agreement governed by both the substantive and procedural requirements of the FAA. In other words, the court has no discretion to refuse to enforce the arbitration agreement or stay the arbitration pending resolution of this proceeding.

Stay

Defendant Lyft requests a stay of all claims in this action, pending resolution of the arbitration of the survival claims.

Section 3 of the FAA provides that:

If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has

been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.

(9 U.S.C., § 3.)

Where the court orders arbitration of only some pending claims, the court has discretion to stay all proceedings. (See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. (1983) 460 U.S. 1, 22-23; U.S. for Use and Benefit of Newton v. Neumann Caribbean Intern., Ltd. (9th Cir. 1985) 750 F.2d 1422, 1426-1427.)

Here, the court finds overlapping issues of fact and law between those arbitrable claims and those litigated by the heirs. For this reason, the court exercises its discretion to stay this action pending arbitration.

The court sets an ADR Review Hearing for February 23, 2027, at 9:00 a.m. in this Department.

Defendant is ordered to give notice.

8 Acuahuitl vs. Nissan North TENTATIVE RULING: America, Inc. Lawsuit for Exception and Motion for Dismissal

Plaintiff Norberto Coyomani Acuahuitl files a “Lawsuit for Exception and Motion for Dismissal.” For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.

“A notice of motion must state in the opening paragraph the nature of the order being sought and the grounds for issuance of the order.” (Cal. Rules Ct., Rule 3.1110(a).) In addition, the memorandum supporting each motion “must contain a statement of facts, a concise statement of the law, evidence and arguments relied on, and a discussion of the statutes, cases and textbooks cited in support of the position advanced.” (Cal. Rules Ct., Rule 3.1113(b).)

Here, the court cannot determine what relief Plaintiff seeks or the ground(s) for that requested relief.

To the extent Plaintiff’s motion opposes Defendant Santander’s previously filed demurrer to the purported FAC, that demurrer is no longer pending, thereby rendering Plaintiff’s “motion” moot.