Brazil v. Lyft, Inc.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281, a “written agreement to submit to arbitration an existing controversy or a controversy thereafter arising is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract.”

Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 provides, in pertinent part, the following: “On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement. (c) A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact ....”

(d)? If the court determines that a party to the arbitration is also a party to litigation in a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party as set forth under subdivision (c), the court (1) may refuse to enforce the arbitration agreement and may order intervention or joinder of all parties in a single action or special proceeding; (2) may order intervention or joinder as to all or only certain issues; (3) may order arbitration among the parties who have agreed to arbitration and stay the pending court action or special proceeding pending the outcome of the arbitration proceeding; or (4) may stay arbitration pending the outcome of the court action or special proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.)

As our Supreme Court has explained:?[W]hen a petition to compel arbitration is filed and accompanied by prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy, the court itself must determine whether the agreement exists and, if any defense to its enforcement is raised, whether it is enforceable. Because the existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting the petition, the petitioner bears the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.

If the party opposing the petition raises a defense to enforcement’either fraud in the execution voiding the agreement, or a statutory defense of waiver or revocation (see [Code Civ. Proc.] § 1281.2(a), (b))?that party bears the burden of producing evidence of, and proving by a preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to the defense.” (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.)

The party seeking to compel arbitration “bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence.” (Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc.¿ (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284.)¿¿?In determining whether an arbitration agreement applies to a specific dispute, the court’ should attempt to give effect to the parties' intentions, in light of the usual and ordinary meaning of the contractual language and the circumstances under which the agreement was made.”¿¿(Weeks v. Crow¿ (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 350, 353 [citations omitted].)

“To determine whether a contractual arbitration clause requires arbitration of a particular controversy, the controversy is first identified and the issue is whether that controversy is within the scope of the contractual arbitration clause.”¿(Titolo¿v. Cano¿ (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 310, 316.)

In ruling on a petition or motion to compel arbitration, “the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court's discretion, to reach a final determination.” (Giuliano, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 1284.)

Discussion

Lyft moves to compel arbitration and stay litigation against Lyft until the arbitration is complete. As noted above, the party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence. (Engalla, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 972.) This is usually done by presenting a copy of the signed, written agreement to the court.

“A petition to compel arbitration or to stay proceedings pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281.2 and 1281.4 must state, in addition to other required allegations, the provisions of the written agreement and the paragraph that provides for arbitration. The provisions must be stated verbatim or a copy must be physically or electronically attached to the petition and incorporated by reference.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.)¿¿

Defendant provides the declaration of Kimberly Simmons, a safety senior specialist for Lyft. (Simmons Decl., ¶ 1.) Ms. Simmons provides that she is familiar with the records retention policies for Lyft including thus of Plaintiff. (Id., ¶ 2.) Ms. Simmons provides that she is familiar with the user sign-up and consent process, which requires a Lyft user to create an account using the Lyft App. (Id., ¶¶ 3, 7.) When creating an account in the Lyft App, and periodically thereafter, a user must consent to the Terms of Service; a user cannot utilize the Lyft App unless they have accepted the Terms of Service. (Id., ¶ 8.)

Ms. Simmons accessed Lyft’s records and determined that Plaintiff created an account with Lyft on December 27, 2021. (Id., ¶ 11.) Plaintiff affirmatively accepted Lyft’s Terms of Service prior to the accident subject to this lawsuit. (Id., ¶ 12.) At the time of the accident, the December 9, 2020 Terms of Service were in affect which Plaintiff accepted on December 27, 2021. (Id., ¶ 14.)

Section 17 of the Terms of Service contains an arbitration provision. The Arbitration Agreement provides: “YOU AND LYFT MUTUALLY AGREE TO WAIVE OUR RESPECTIVE RIGHTS TO RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES IN A COURT OF LAW BY A JUDGE OR JURY AND AGREE TO RESOLVE ANY DISPUTE BY ARBITRATION, as set forth below. This agreement to arbitrate (''Arbitration Agreement") is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA''); but if the FAA is inapplicable for any reason, then this Arbitration Agreement is governed by the laws of the State of Delaware, including Del.

Code tit. 10, § 5701 et seq., without regard to choice of law principles. This Arbitration Agreement survives after the Agreement terminates or your relationship with Lyft ends. ANY ARBITRATION UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL TAKE PLACE ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS; CLASS ARBITRATIONS AND CLASS ACTIONS ARE NOT PERMITTED. Except as expressly provided below, this Arbitration Agreement applies to all Claims (defined below) between you and Lyft, including our affiliates, subsidiaries, parents, successors and assigns, and each of our respective officers, directors, employees, agents, or shareholders.

This Arbitration Agreement also applies to claims between you and Lyft's service providers, including but not limited to background check providers and payment processors; and such service providers shall be considered intended third-party beneficiaries of this Arbitration Agreement. Except as expressly provided below, ALL DISPUTES AND CLAIMS BETWEEN US (EACH A "CLAIM" AND COLLECTIVELY, "CLAIMS") SHALL BE EXCLUSIVELY RESOLVED BY BINDING ARBITRATION SOLELY BETWEEN YOU AND LYFT. These Claims include, but are not limited to, any dispute, claim or controversy, whether based on past, present, or future events, arising out of or relating to: this Agreement and prior versions thereof (including the breach, termination, enforcement, interpretation or validity thereof), the Lyft Platform, the Rideshare Services, rental or use of bikes or scooters through the Lyft Platform, Lyft promotions, gift card, referrals or loyalty programs, any other goods or services made available through the Lyft Platform, your relationship with Lyft, the threatened or actual suspension, deactivation or termination of your User Account or this Agreement, background checks performed by or on Lyft's behalf, payments made by you or any payments made or allegedly owed to you, any promotions or offers made by Lyft, any city, county, state or federal wage-hour law, trade secrets, unfair competition, compensation, breaks and rest periods, expense reimbursement, wrongful termination, discrimination, harassment, retaliation, fraud, defamation, emotional distress, breach of any express or implied contract or covenant, claims arising under federal or state consumer protection laws; claims arising under antitrust laws, claims arising under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and Fair Credit Reporting Act; and claims arising under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Americans With Disabilities Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Family Medical Leave Act, Fair Labor Standards Act, Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (except for individual claims for employee benefits under any benefit plan sponsored by Lyft and covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 or funded by insurance), and state statutes, if any, addressing the same or similar subject matters, and all other federal and state statutory and common law claims.

All disputes concerning the arbitrability of a Claim (including disputes about the scope, applicability, enforceability, revocability or validity of the Arbitration Agreement) shall be decided by the arbitrator, except as expressly provided below. BY AGREEING TO ARBITRATION, YOU UNDERSTAND THAT YOU AND LYFT ARE WAIVING THE RIGHT TO SUE IN COURT OR HAVE A JURY TRIAL FOR ALL CLAIMS, EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THIS ARBITRATION AGREEMENT. This Arbitration Agreement is intended to require arbitration of every claim or dispute that can lawfully be arbitrated, except for those claims and disputes which by the terms of this Arbitration Agreement are expressly excluded from the requirement to arbitrate.” (Exh. 3, § 17.)

The Court finds, contrary to Plaintiff’s brief argument to the contrary (see Opp., at p. 2), Lyft has met its initial burden to show a valid arbitration agreement exists and applies to Plaintiff’s case. This shifts the burden to Plaintiff to identify a dispute regarding the existence or scope of the agreement or some other defense to enforcement. (See Garcia v. Stoneledge Furniture LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 41, 51-52; Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047.)

In opposition to the motion, Plaintiff argues (1) that Defendant Hassel was driving for Lyft at the time of the accident; (2) that there is no arbitration agreement between Plaintiff and Hassel; and (3) that because of the risk of conflicting rulings if Plaintiff’s claims are litigated in court against Hassel and arbitrated against Lyft, the Court should deny the motion to compel arbitration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, subdivisions (c) and (d).

But where, as here, the parties have agreed that their agreement to arbitrate is governed by the FAA, the procedural rules of the FAA apply and displace the procedural provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2. (Victrola 89, LLC v. Jaman Properties (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 346-48; Rodriguez v. American Technologies (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1121-22.)

And under the FAA?s procedural rules, the motion to compel the arbitration must be granted, and the litigation between the parties who agreed to arbitrate must be stayed, even if there are other pending claims not subject to arbitration that arise from the same transaction or occurrence, and even if there is a risk of inconsistent or conflicting rulings. (See 9 U.S.C. § 3; Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Construction (1983) 460 U.S. 1.)

The FAA “leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed,” even when “the result would be the possibility inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums.” (Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd (1985) 470 U.S. 213, 218.)

Here, Lyft has shown there is a valid arbitration agreement which is governed by the FAA, displacing the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 upon which Plaintiff bases here opposition. Plaintiff briefly argues that Plaintiff was not provided reasonable notice of the arbitration agreement to establish his assent to arbitrate. No evidence or further discussion is provided to support this argument. Plaintiff does not argue that the arbitration agreement is not binding or was waived. Accordingly, the motion to compel arbitration is granted.

Conclusion

The Court GRANTS motion to compel arbitration filed by Lyft, inc. The Court STAYS this litigation of Plaintiff’s cause of action against Lyft, Inc. (only), pending the results of arbitration. The Court SETS a post-arbitration status conference for February 10, 2027, at 8:30 a.m., in Department 514 of the Stanley Mosk Courthouse. The Court ORDERS the Plaintiff and Defendant Lyft to file a report regarding the status of the arbitration by no later than February 3, 2027. The trial date remains as scheduled with regard to Plaintiff’s cause of action against Hassel. Moving Party is ORDERED to give notice.

Case Number: 25STCV37843 Hearing Date: May 18, 2026 Dept: 514 Henson v. Barlow Respiratory Hospital 25STCV37843 Demurrer filed by Defendant Barlow Respiratory Hospital Tentative Ruling The demurrer is sustained with leave to amend.

Background

On December 29, 2025, Liza Sigua Henson, individually and as successor in interest to Larry Matundan (“Plaintiff”) filed the complaint in this action. On February 5, 2026, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (the “FAC”), naming as defendants Barlow Respiratory Hospital (“Defendant”), Billy Doe, and Does 1 through 50 and asserting causes of action for: (1) medical negligence; (2) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (3) unlawful retaliation in violation of Health and Safety Code section 1278.5; (4) reckless neglect of an elder person in violation of the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Protection Act; and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

On April 8, 2026, Defendant filed this demurrer to Plaintiff’s FAC. Plaintiff filed an opposition on May 5, and Defendant filed a reply on May 11. No trial date has been set.

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10 provides: “The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds:?