CABRERA vs THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION, A PUBLIC ENTITY

24CV011693: CABRERA vs THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION, A PUBLIC ENTITY 02/25/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 25

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE:

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24CV011693: CABRERA vs THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION, A PUBLIC ENTITY 02/25/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 25

and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

Tentative Ruling

Defendant California Department of Conservation, a Public Entity’s (“Defendant”) motion for summary adjudication as to Plaintiff Miguel Cabrera’s (“Plaintiff”) first, second, third, and sixth causes of action is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections are OVERRULED. The Court does not rule on the evidentiary objections filed by Defendant in response to Plaintiff’s evidence and Separate Statement because they concern evidence deemed immaterial to the decision on the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).) Defendant’s request for judicial notice is UNOPPOSED and GRANTED for the limited purposes permitted for judicial notice.[1]

Overview

Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendant, working in the Geologic Energy Management Division from September 2021 until his termination on August 31, 2023. (Compl., at p. 2.) In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was wrongfully terminated by Defendant after filing a whistleblower complaint with the California Attorney General’s Office and the California State Auditor on February 27, 2023. (Compl., ¶ 15.) Specifically, in his “whistleblower complaint,” Plaintiff expressed his “concerns about the illegality of unconstitutional state action effectively enforcing SB 1137” (Stats. 2022, ch. 365)—which created 3,200-foot buffer zones between oil and gas operations and community spaces—while it was temporarily suspended pending the outcome of a 2024 state referendum to overturn the law. (Compl. ¶¶ 11-12, 15.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendant subsequently terminated his employment as a result of his whistleblower complaint. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges six causes of actions against Defendant: (1) wrongful termination; (2) violation of California Labor Code section 1102.5; (3) violation of the California Whistleblower Protection Act (“WPA”) section 8547.1; (4) failure to prevent retaliation; (5) retaliation; and (6) constructive wrongful termination.

Defendant moves for summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s first, second, and sixth causes of action, arguing that Plaintiff failed to present a timely government claim, as required by Government Code section 911.2. Defendant also moves for summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s first and/or sixth causes of action on the grounds that the claims are barred by sovereign immunity under Government Code section 815. Lastly, Defendant moves for summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s third cause of action, arguing that Plaintiff failed to file a

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV011693: CABRERA vs THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION, A PUBLIC ENTITY 02/25/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 25

whistleblower retaliation claim with the State Personnel Board (“SPB”).

Legal Standard

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, the Court engages in a three-step process. First, the Court identifies the issues framed by the pleadings. The pleadings define the scope of the issues on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. (FPI Dev. Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.) Because a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is limited to the issues raised by the pleadings (Lewis v. Chevron (2004) 119 Cal. App. 4th 690, 694), all evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings; the Court cannot consider an unpled issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its burden. A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication bears the burden of persuasion that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 850, quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) A defendant is not required to conclusively negate one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action. (Saelzer v.

Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 780-781.) Rather, to meet its burden, the defendant is required to show only that the plaintiff cannot prove an element of its cause of action; i.e., that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain evidence necessary to show this element. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 853-855.) Further, the initial burden requires a showing that the plaintiff “could not prevail on any theory raised by the pleadings.” (Hawkins v.

Wilton (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 936, 939-940.) At the same time, a defendant cannot shift the burden to the plaintiff simply by suggesting the possibility that the plaintiff cannot prove its case; a moving defendant must still make “an affirmative showing” in support of its motion. (See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 854-855 fn. 23; Addy v. Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 214.)

Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a material factual issue exists as to the cause of action alleged or a defense to it. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p); see generally Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal. App. 4th 322, 326-327.) In ruling on the motion, the Court must consider the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.)

While a summary adjudication motion is treated largely the same as one for summary judgment, there are a few important differences. One of these differences is that California Rule of Court, Rule 3.1350, subdivision (b) mandates that issues presented for summary adjudication be stated

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV011693: CABRERA vs THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION, A PUBLIC ENTITY 02/25/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 25

in the notice of motion and repeated verbatim in the separate statement. Another difference is that summary adjudication cannot be granted unless it “completely disposes” of a cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for punitive damages, or question of duty. Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f)(1) provides in its entirety:

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.

Discussion

Defendant explains that its “motion for summary adjudication concerns the four non-FEHA claims for wrongful termination and retaliation.” (MPA at p. 2:9-10.) Plaintiff appears to concede that the four causes of action at issue in this motion are not brought pursuant to the FEHA, even though alleged violation of the FEHA may be the public policy that Plaintiff contends has been violated. (Opp’n at 3:2-6, 6:16-20.)

1. Compliance with the Government Claims Act: First, Second, and Sixth Causes of Action

Defendant asserts that the Court should grant summary adjudication as the first, second, and sixth causes of action on the basis that Plaintiff has failed to timely file a claim under the Government Claims Act. In support of this motion, Defendant submits UMF No. 1, which provides: “Plaintiff did not file a government claim with the Government Claims Program of the Department of General Services.” (UMF No. 1.)

In opposition, Plaintiff disputes Defendant’s UMF 1, arguing that he submitted a timely government claim via U.S. Certified Mail on November 2, 2023, to the State of California at 915 Capitol Mall, Sacramento, California 95814. (Hicks Decl., ¶ 3, Exhibit A.) Plaintiff argues that the claim fulfilled the necessary requirements for a government claim under Government Code section 910. Plaintiff further argues that the evidence of his government claim sufficiently disputes Defendant’s assertion that Plaintiff filed no claim at all, such that a triable issue of fact exists as to whether or not Plaintiff filed a claim.

The Government Claims Act (“the Act”) provides that an action for monetary damages cannot be

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV011693: CABRERA vs THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION, A PUBLIC ENTITY 02/25/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 25

maintained against a public entity unless a plaintiff has first presented a written claim to the public entity. (Govt. Code, § 945.4.) For claims involving injury to a person, claims must be presented to the public entity within six months of the accrual of the cause of action, whereas a claim relating to any other cause of action shall be presented not later than one year after the accrual of the cause of action. (Govt. Code, § 911.2, subd. (a).) The Act requires the timely presentation of a written claim for money or damages directly to a public entity, and the rejection of that claim, as a condition precedent to a tort action; in other words, failure to present the claim is a bar to the cause of action. (Govt. Code, §§ 911.2, 945.4; State of California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239.)

The Act contains detailed provisions regarding the presentation of a claim to the state. For example, it provides the claim must be delivered to the Department of General Services (“DGS”) within specified timeframes, and must be submitted on a form provided by DGS. (Govt. Code, §§ 900.2, subd. (b), 910.4, 911.2, subd. (a), and 915, subd. (b).) Specifically, section 915(b) provides, in relevant part:

[A] claim, any amendment thereto, or an application for leave to file a late claim shall be presented to the state by either of the following means: (1) Delivering it to an office of the Department of General Services. (2) Mailing it to the Department of General Services at its principal office.

(Gov. Code, § 915.)[2] Nevertheless, subsection (e)(2) provides:

A claim, amendment, or application shall be deemed to have been presented in compliance with this section even though it is not delivered or mailed as provided in this section if, within the time prescribed for presentation thereof, any of the following apply: . . . It is actually received at an office of the Department of General Services.

The California Supreme Court has held that the Act “reflects the Legislature’s intent to precisely identify those who may receive claims on behalf of a . . . public entity.” (DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, 992 (“DiCampli”).) Further, the DiCampli Court explained:

Section 915(e)(1) reflects the Legislature's intent that a misdirected claim will satisfy the presentation requirement if the claim is “actually received” by a statutorily designated recipient. Thus, compliance with section 915(e)(1) requires actual receipt of the misdirected claim by one of the designated recipients. If an appropriate public employee or board never receives the claim, an undelivered or misdirected claim fails to comply with the statute. (Life, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 901, 278 Cal.Rptr. 196.) This straightforward construction honors the statutory

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV011693: CABRERA vs THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION, A PUBLIC ENTITY 02/25/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 25

language and is consistent with the purpose of the claims statutes.

(Id. at pp. 992-993.) Based on this analysis of the language and expressed intent of the Act, the California Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal and held that public entity was entitled to summary judgment where it was “uncontested that the claim was never delivered or mailed” as required by the Act and where there was no evidence that the appropriate recipient actually received the claim. (Id. at pp. 991-992.)

As relevant to Plaintiff’s first, second, and sixth causes of action, Defendant has produced evidence that no record exists of a government claim filed by Defendant regarding the first, second, and sixth causes of action. (Franco Decl., ¶¶ 2-3, Syp Decl., ¶¶ 2-3, Exhibits A, B; see UMF No. 1.) The causes of action in this case arose on or about August 31, 2023, based on the termination of Plaintiff’s employment. As such, Defendant has presented evidence that a claim was neither filed with DGS, nor did DGS actually receive a claim under the Act. Further, Plaintiff does not allege in his Complaint that he filed a claim with the Government Claims program of DGS. Based on this evidence, the Court finds Defendant has met its initial burden.

Accordingly, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to establish a triable issue of material fact. Here, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of a letter dated November 2, 2023, sent to the following address: State of California at 915 Capitol Mall, Sacramento, California 95814. (Hicks Decl., ¶ 3, Exhibit A.)

However, as noted above, a claim presented to the state must be delivered to the office of DGS or mailed to DGS at its principal office. (Govt. Code, §§ 900.2, subd. (b), 910.4, 911.2, subd. (a), and 915, subd. (b).) Plaintiff has presented no evidence that the address to which he mailed the letter was DGS’s principal office address. Likewise, Plaintiff has presented no evidence that any such claim was actually received at an office of DGS. (See Govt. Code, § 915, subd. (e).)

Plaintiff asserts that the evidence of the November 2, 2023 letter provides a triable issue of material fact because it disputes Defendant’s allegation that Plaintiff filed no government claim at all. However, Plaintiff misinterprets Defendant’s UMF 1, which states the following: “Plaintiff did not file a government claim with the Government Claims Program of [DGS].” (Italics added.) Plaintiff does not argue otherwise and has failed to provide any evidence of any claim or other correspondence he sent to DGS regarding a claim under the Act.

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the November 2, 2023 letter does not satisfy the Act’s requirements for a valid government claim. (See DiCampli, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 992- 933, 994.)

Accordingly, the motion for summary adjudication is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s first, second, and sixth causes of action.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV011693: CABRERA vs THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION, A PUBLIC ENTITY 02/25/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 25

2. Immunity: First and Sixth Causes of Action

Although the foregoing is dispositive as to the first and sixth causes of action, the Court also addresses Defendant’s alternative argument that these causes of action are barred by sovereign immunity under Government Code section 815. Defendant argues that this is strictly a question of law.

Plaintiff opposes, arguing that his Complaint includes unnamed defendants that can be held liable for their wrongful actions, such that Defendant may still be held vicariously liable for Plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim under a theory of respondeat superior. To this end, Plaintiff relies on Government Code section 820, which states: “except as otherwise provided by statute (including [Government Code section] 820.2), a public employee is liable for injury caused by his act or omission to the same extent as a private person.”

Government Code section 815 shields all public entities from liability except where liability is specifically provided by statute (see, e.g., Harshbarger v. City of Colton (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1335, 1339, citing Cochran v. Herzog Engraving Co. (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 405, 409.) Since a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is a common law cause of action, it cannot be asserted against a public entity like Defendant. (See, e.g., Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 901 [Government Code section 815 bars Tameny actions (e.g., common law claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy) against a public entity]; Lloyd v.

County of Los Angeles (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 320, 329 [holding that a Tameny claim for violation of public policies espoused in Labor Code section 1102.5 failed because section 815 bars such common law actions against public entities].)

Further, an individual employee cannot be held liable for wrongful termination by the employer at common law. (See, e.g., Miklosy v. Regents of University of California, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 900 [“An individual who is not an employer cannot commit the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy; rather, he or she can only be the agent by which an employer commits that tort.” (emphasis in original)]; see also Weinbaum v. Goldfarb (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1315.) Thus, Defendant may not be held vicariously liable for its employees’ actions based on a claim of wrongful termination.

For these reasons, the first and sixth causes of action also fail.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s first and sixth causes of action is also GRANTED on these grounds.

3. Compliance with Government Code Section 8547.8: Third Cause of Action

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV011693: CABRERA vs THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION, A PUBLIC ENTITY 02/25/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 25

Defendant asserts that the Court should grant summary adjudication as the third causes of action on the basis that Plaintiff has failed to timely comply with the requirements of Government Code section 8547.8 by failing to file a written complaint with the SPB within 12 months of the events at issue. In support of this motion, Defendant submits UMF Nos. 2 and 3, which provide:

2. Nowhere in Plaintiffs complaint does Plaintiff allege that he filed a whistleblower retaliation complaint with the [SPB] for violations of the [WPA] at any time from September 1, 2023 through September 1, 2024, or at any time before filing his civil complaint in this lawsuit on June 12, 2024

3. Plaintiff did not file a whistleblower retaliation complaint with the [SPB] for violations of the [WPA] at any time from September 1, 2023 through September 1, 2024, or at any time before filing his civil complaint in this lawsuit on June 12, 2024.

(UMF Nos. 2-3.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that his Complaint sufficiently alleges that he made protected disclosures (as defined under Government Code section 8547.2) to the Attorney General and State Auditor in February 2023, and that whether those disclosures satisfy the statutory requirements of a written complaint the WPA is a mixed question of law and fact. Plaintiff also argues that the November 2, 2023 letter provides sufficient notice of his “intent” to pursue a claim under Government Code section 8547.1.

The WPA (Gov. Code, § 8547 et seq.) prohibits retaliation against state employees who report waste, fraud, abuse of authority, violation of law, or threat to public health. Government Code section 8547.8, subdivision (a) provides:

A state employee or applicant for state employment who files a written complaint with his or her supervisor, manager, or the appointing power alleging actual or attempted acts of reprisal, retaliation, threats, coercion, or similar improper acts prohibited by Section 8547.3, may also file a copy of the written complaint with the [SPB], together with a sworn statement that the contents of the written complaint are true, or are believed by the affiant to be true, under penalty of perjury. The complaint filed with the board, shall be filed within 12 months of the most recent act of reprisal complained about.

(Emphasis added.) Further, subdivision (c) provides, in relevant part:

[A]ny action for damages shall not be available to the injured party unless the injured party has first filed a complaint with the [SPB] pursuant to subdivision (a),

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV011693: CABRERA vs THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION, A PUBLIC ENTITY 02/25/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 25

and the board has issued, or failed to issue, findings pursuant to Section 19683.

(Emphasis added.) Courts have held that “[s]uch a complaint is, in effect, a prerequisite to a suit for damages under section 8547.3 since ‘any action for damages shall not be available to the injured party unless the injured party has first filed a complaint with the SPB pursuant to [section 8547.8] and the board has issued, or failed to issue, findings pursuant to Section 19683.’” (See Bjorndal v. Superior Court (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1107-08.) “Exhaustion of every possible stage of an administrative process is not particularly necessary” with respect to section 8547.8 as “the only prerequisite to bringing suit that the statute mentions is the issuance of (or failure to issue) findings pursuant to Section 19683.”[3] (State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners v. Superior Court (2009) 45 Cal.4th 963, 973.)

Defendant has provided evidence showing that there is no record of Plaintiff filing a complaint with SPB or that SPB ever received actual notice of such a complaint in any other way. (Franco Decl., ¶¶ 4-5, Syp Decl., ¶¶ 4-5, Exhibits C, D.) Plaintiff also does not allege in his Complaint that he filed a whistleblower retaliation complaint with SPB. Thus, because failure to file a complaint with SPB would effectively bar a suit for damages under section 8547.3, the Court finds that Defendant has met its initial burden, such that the burden shifts to Plaintiff to establish a triable issue of material fact.

Plaintiff appears to concede that he did not file a written complaint with SPB, asserting that the November 2, 2023 letter is sufficient to comply with section 8547.8. However, Plaintiff fails to proffer legal authority that his communications with the Attorney General and State Auditor otherwise satisfy the prerequisite of filing a written whistleblower retaliation complaint, which the Legislature has expressly provided must be filed with SPB as a prerequisite to an action for damages. In any case, the Court is not convinced that Plaintiff could successfully argue as much, because Plaintiff alleges that his communications with the Attorney General and State Auditor took place in February 2023, whereas the alleged retaliation based thereon took place when his employment was terminated in August 2023. (Compl., ¶¶ 15, 18, 19, 37.)

An employee complaining of whistleblower relation may bring an action for damages in Superior Court “only after the employee files a complaint with [SPB] and the board ‘has issued, or failed to issue, findings.’” (State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners v. Superior Court, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 978.) (Italics in original.)

The Court finds Plaintiff’s citation to Hood v. Haciena La Puento Unified School Dist. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 435) unpersuasive. The Hood Court held that the trial court properly sustained without leave to amend the demurrer to the plaintiff’s second cause of action under the WPA because the plaintiff failed to plead exhaustion pursuant to section 8547.8 and such failure was jurisdictional. (Id. at pp. 439-441.) Indeed, it would appear that the decision in Hood supports Defendant’s position through this motion. While Plaintiff contends that “exhaustion doctrines are subject to exceptions, including where administrative remedies are inadequate or unavailable,”

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV011693: CABRERA vs THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION, A PUBLIC ENTITY 02/25/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 25

Plaintiff presents no evidence that filing with the SPB in this case was “inadequate or unavailable.” (See Opp’n at 8:7-12.)

Because Plaintiff has provided no evidence of filing such a written complaint with SPB, Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s third cause of action is GRANTED.

Disposition

Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to the first, second, third, and sixth causes of action is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections to Defendant’s evidence in support of its UMFs 2 and 3 are OVERRULED. The Court does not rule on the evidentiary objections filed by Defendant in response to Plaintiff’s evidence and Separate Statement because they concern evidence deemed immaterial to the decision on the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).) Defendant’s unopposed request for judicial notice is also GRANTED for the limited purposes permitted for judicial notice. (See Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not to the truth of the statements contained therein].)

This minute order is effective immediately. Defendant shall submit a proposed under in accordance with the provisions of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.

[1] The Court observes that Plaintiff filed an opposition on January 9, 2026, whereas the deadline to file his

opposition was January, 8, 2026, for the original hearing date of January 28, 2026. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(2).) Accordingly, the Court in its discretion will consider the opposition. In the future, all counsel shall comply with all applicable deadlines.

Defendant filed a singled-spaced, 10-page reply to Plaintiff’s opposition. In addressing the length of its reply, Defendant explains that California Rules of Court 2.108, subdivision (1) “requires lines on each page to be either one-half spaced or double-spaced.” (Reply to Opp’n, p. 1, fn. 1.) Defendant further explains that the 37-line pleading paper it used to prepare its reply is one-half spaced. (Ibid.) However, California Rules of Court 2.108, subdivision (1) states that the lines of each page must be one and one-half spaced or double-spaced. It is unclear whether Defendant meant to represent that the reply was one and one-half spaced. Regardless, in its discretion, the Court has considered Defendant’s reply. In the future, all counsel shall comply with the California Rules of Court and seek leave of court for pages beyond the limit.

[2] Section 915 provides for different delivery or mailing instructions to a judicial branch entity and Trustees of the

California State University, neither of which are at issue in this action. (See Gov. Code, § 915, subds. (c)-(d).) [3] Courts have held that claims under the WPA are not subject to the claim filing requirements of the Act because

the WPA’s administrative procedure satisfies the purposes of the Act. (Cornejo v. Lightbourne (2013) 220

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV011693: CABRERA vs THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION, A PUBLIC ENTITY 02/25/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 25

Cal.App.4th 932, 936, 942.)