GREEN vs ALAMEDA-CONTRA COSTA TRANSIT DISTRICT

After Plaintiff logged onto the Teams meeting in his office, his supervisor Robert Reyes came to Plaintiff’s office and told Plaintiff to log off and to follow Reyes to Reyes’ office. (SSF Nos. 47- 48.) Plaintiff then sat in Reyes’ office, out of camera range, and listened to the Meeting. (SSF Nos. 49-56.) After the conclusion of the Meeting, Defendant’s Manager of Labor Relations Leonard Bellow called Reyes and asked if anyone had been in Reyes’ office during the meeting. When Reyes replied that Plaintiff had been in his office, Bellow said “I thought we told you not to have anybody else in the room. I thought we told you to have him log off.” (SSF No. 57.)

Reyes was immediately placed on paid administrative leave, and Plaintiff was placed on paid administrative leave the following day. (SSF No. 60.) Defendant’s stated reason for placing Plaintiff on paid administrative leave was to restrict his access to confidential personnel information while Defendant was investigating Plaintiff’s attendance at the Meeting despite Defendant’s instruction to Reyes that Plaintiff was not to attend the Meeting. (SSF Nos. 61-62.) Although Plaintiff purports to dispute SSF Nos. 61-62, he cites no evidence creating any dispute to SSF Nos. 61-62 as stated; instead, he contends (1) he had not in fact previously disclosed any confidential information, and (2) he believes Defendant’s investigation into the incident was “cursory”.

Plaintiff remained on paid administrative leave through January 22, 2024. (SSF No. 66.) While Plaintiff was on paid administrative leave, he filed three union grievances. (SSF Nos. 68-70.) Although Defendant initiated a disciplinary action against Plaintiff for his attendance at the meeting, ultimately no discipline was imposed. (SSF No. 78.) Although Plaintiff purports to dispute SSF No. 78, the evidence he cites does not create any dispute as to SSF No. 78 as stated.

As to Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action for Retaliation in Violation of Labor Code § 1102.5, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED.

Labor Code § 1102.5 prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for sharing information that the employee reasonably believes discloses a violation of a federal, state, or local statute, rule, or regulation with government agency, a person with authority over the employee, or with another employee who has the authority to investigate or correct the violation. (Id.; see also Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703, 709.) A plaintiff bringing this claim must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that his protected conduct was a contributing factor to an adverse employment action. (Id. at 712.)

If the plaintiff does so, the employer bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the alleged adverse employment action would have occurred for a legitimate, independent reason even if the employee had not engaged in the protected conduct. (Id.)

Here, Plaintiff fails to submit any evidence establishing that he engaged in conduct protected by Labor Code § 1102.5. The First Cause of Action, as pled, identifies Plaintiff’s protected activity as complaining to Defendant’s executives management team about executives “not taking the threat assessment meeting seriously and instead using the Teams Conference as a ‘safe space’ to

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

24CV074354: GREEN vs ALAMEDA-CONTRA COSTA TRANSIT DISTRICT 06/10/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District (Defendant) CRS# 698687826310 in Department 19 ridicule and mock other employees.” (See Complaint, paragraph 34.) Plaintiff fails to identify any federal, state, or local statute, regulation or rule that he reasonably believed Defendant violated by “failing to take [the Meeting] seriously”. Moreover, the undisputed evidence establishes that Plaintiff did not complain to any government agency, or to any employee of Defendant with the authority to “investigate or correct” the alleged violation of Defendant’s executives “failing to take [the Meeting] seriously”. (SSF Nos. 73 and 75.)

Instead, Plaintiff complained only to his union, not to a government agency or Defendant’s management, on November 27 and November 30, 2023. (Id.) Moreover, Plaintiff’s union complaints were made after Plaintiff had already been placed on paid administrative leave, so the paid administrative leave necessarily could not have been imposed in retaliation for complaints that had not yet occurred.

In his opposition brief, Plaintiff identifies his protected activity as a series of emails in 2022- 2023 that he characterizes as regarding various safety and security concerns. (SSF No. 74; see also Plaintiff’s Additional Facts Nos. 103-118.) But Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that he reasonably believed any of those emails disclosed a violation of a federal, state, or local statute, regulation, or rule. The Court also observes that Plaintiff cites three cases (on page 17 of his opposition brief) in support of his contention that he engaged in protected activity under Labor Code § 1102.5, but two of those cases (Franklin and Cabesuela) did not involve a claim for violation of § 1102.5, and the third case (St. Myers) did not address whether the plaintiff had engaged in protected activity within the meaning of § 1102.5.

Because Plaintiff has not submitted evidence creating a triable issue of material fact as to whether he engaged in protected activity within the scope of Labor Code § 1102.5, the Court does need to reach the issue of whether he was subjected to an adverse employment action. The Court will assume, for the purposes of this motion, that being placed on paid administrative leave while disciplinary actions are pending can constitute an adverse employment action. (See, e.g., Whitehall v. County of San Bernardino (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 352, 367.)

But the same cannot be said for the removal of Plaintiff’s Special Project Pay, because the Special Project Pay had already been scheduled to expire on December 31, 2023, and that decision was made long before Plaintiff’s alleged protected activity. (See SSF Nos. 25-28 and 79.) Likewise, the “rumors” that Plaintiff discussed in his deposition, spread by unknown coworkers, do not constitute an adverse employment action in the absence of any evidence that Defendant caused or permitted those rumors to circulate. (See SSF Nos. 82-84; see also St.

Myers v. Dignity Health (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 301, 316.)

But even if Plaintiff had submitted evidence of protected conduct that contributed to Defendant’s decision to place him on paid administrative leave, Defendant’s evidence establishes that it would have taken the same action for legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons whether or not Plaintiff engaged in that conduct. (See SSF Nos. 61-62; see also Lawson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at 712.) Although Plaintiff purports to dispute SSF Nos. 61-62, he cites no evidence creating any dispute to SSF Nos. 61-62 as stated; instead, he contends (1) he had not in fact previously disclosed any confidential information, and (2) he believes Defendant’s investigation into the incident was

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

24CV074354: GREEN vs ALAMEDA-CONTRA COSTA TRANSIT DISTRICT 06/10/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District (Defendant) CRS# 698687826310 in Department 19 “cursory”.

As to Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action for Violation of Labor Code § 6310, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED.

Labor Code § 6310 prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee who has made a bona fide complaint to a government agency having statutory responsibility for employee safety or health, or to the employer or its representative, or who has participated in an occupational health and safety committee established pursuant to Labor Code § 6401.7.

Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action fails for the same reason as his First Cause of Action. The Second Cause of Action, as pled, alleges that Defendant violated Labor Code § 6310 by retaliating against him for (1) attending the Meeting, and (2) complaining to Defendant’s executive management team about executives “not taking the threat assessment meeting seriously and instead using the Teams Conference as a ‘safe space’ to ridicule and mock other employees.” (See Complaint, paragraphs 41-42.)

The undisputed facts establish that Plaintiff was placed on paid administrative leave after attending the Meeting, but also that his supervisor Reyes was told Plaintiff was not permitted to attend the Meeting due to concerns about the potential disclosure of confidential information. (SSF Nos. 44-46.) Plaintiff was placed on paid administrative leave pending an investigation into why he had attended the Meeting after his supervisor had been told that Plaintiff should not attend. (SSF Nos. 61-62.)

Plaintiff fails to present any legal authority supporting a contention that attendance at a meeting of a Threat Assessment Team, by someone who is not a designated member of the Threat Assessment Team and whose supervisor was told should not attend the meeting (SSF Nos. 41-46 and 57), is conduct that implicates Labor Code § 6310. In addition, Plaintiff fails to present any legal authority that an alleged complaint that Defendant’s executives were “not taking the threat assessment meeting seriously” is conduct implicated by Labor Code § 6310.

To the extent that Plaintiff now contends that his Second Cause of Action is based on the series of emails in 2022-2023 that he characterizes as regarding various safety and security concerns (SSF No. 74; see also Plaintiff’s Additional Facts Nos. 103-118), Plaintiff offers no admissible evidence that he was placed on paid administrative leave for sending those emails. To the contrary, as discussed above, the evidence establishes that Plaintiff was placed on paid administrative leave during an investigation as to why his supervisor Reyes had Plaintiff attend the Meeting that Reyes had been told Plaintiff was not permitted to attend. That does not constitute protected conduct under § 6310.

As to Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action is based on the same conduct as his First and Second Causes of Action and fails for the same reason. Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action is based on Defendant’s personnel management decision to place him on paid

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

24CV074354: GREEN vs ALAMEDA-CONTRA COSTA TRANSIT DISTRICT 06/10/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District (Defendant) CRS# 698687826310 in Department 19 administrative leave while investigating why he attended the Meeting that Plaintiff’s supervisor was told Plaintiff was not to attend. As a matter of law, personnel management decisions cannot support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, even if undertaken for an improper motive. (See, e.g., Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 908, 946.)

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED for the reasons above.

In reviewing this motion, the Court did not read or consider Defendant’s (1) evidence submitted with reply papers or (2) response to Plaintiff’s Separate Statement. Those filings are prohibited by Code of Civil Procedure § 437c(b)(4). The cases Defendant cites in its uninvited “Response to Plaintiff Kenneth Green’s Objections to Evidence Filed in Support of Defendant’s Reply” predate the 2024 amendment to § 437c(b)(4).

In addition, the Court did not read or consider Defendant’s 13 page “Response to Plaintiff’s Objections to Documentary Evidence”. No provision of the Code of Civil Procedure or the California Rules of Court authorizes that filing.

The Court rules as follows on Defendant’s Objections to Evidence:

Objections Nos. 1-9, 11, 13-14, 17-18, and 21 are OVERRULED on the grounds asserted. Defendant fails to adequately explain why the difference between “paid administrative leave” and “suspension” has any significant effect on the import of this testimony.

Objections Nos. 10 and 12 are SUSTAINED as lacking foundation.

Objection No. 15 is SUSTAINED as contradicting the declarant’s prior deposition testimony.

Objections Nos. 16, 19-20, and 22-26 are SUSTAINED as lacking foundation.

The Court rules as follows on Plaintiff’s Objections to Evidence:

Objections Nos. 1-2 are OVERRULED on the grounds asserted. The testimony does not appear to be offered to prove whether Plaintiff disclosed confidential information, but rather to show Defendant’s motivation of Defendant’s managers in deciding that Plaintiff should not attend the November 16, 2023 meeting.

Objections Nos. 3-6 are OVERRULED on the grounds asserted.

This entire action is DISMISSED with prejudice.