PINKY WESLEY v. TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC.

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

PINKY WESLEY, Case No.: CIVSB2404407 Plaintiff, [TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING DEMURRER TO THE SOLE v. CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC., FILED BY DEFENDANT TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC. Defendant.

I. INTRODUCTION

On February 1, 2024, Plaintiff Pinky Wesley filed a Complaint against Defendant Toyota

Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. The operative First Amended Complaint, filed June 8, 2026, alleges

one causes of action for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA).

Plaintiff alleges that he purchased a 2018 Toyota Camry from Defendant on February 3,

2021, and entered into a warranty contract with Defendant. (FAC ¶ 6.) Plaintiff attached the

warranty contract to the FAC as Exhibit A. Plaintiff alleges that defects with the vehicle

manifested themselves, and Defendant failed to repurchase or replace the vehicle. (FAC ¶¶ 10-

14.)

Now before the Court is Defendant’s demurrer to the first cause of action. Plaintiff

opposes the demurrer.1 After issuing a tentative ruling and holding a hearing on the motion, the

Court now issues its final ruling.2

II. WHY THE MOTION SHOULD BE DENIED

The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA) “authorizes a civil suit by a consumer to

enforce the terms of an implied or express warranty.” (Daughterty v. American Honda Motor

Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 833.) Under the MMWA, “a consumer who is damaged

by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under

this title [15 USCS §§ 2301 et seq.], or under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service

contract, may bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable relief.” (15 U.S.C.

§ 2310(d)(1).)

The MMWA provides that a warrantor may establish an informal dispute settlement

procedure that meets specific legal requirements. (15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3).) If the warrantor does

so and incorporates in a written warranty a requirement that the consumer resort to such

procedure before pursuing any legal remedy under the MMWA, then the consumer may not

commence a civil action unless such he or she resorts to such a procedure. (15 U.S.C.

§ 2310(a)(1-3).)

1 The parties also submitted erroneous or inapplicable pleadings which have not been considered. These included (1) Defendant’s reply in support of the motion (filing date August 4, 2026); the reply is directed to a “sixth cause of action in the Complaint,” which is not alleged or at issue; (2) Plaintiff’s filing of an opposition to a purported defense motion to strike (filing date July 20, 2026); Defendant did not file a motion to strike; and (3) Defendant’s reply to the opposition to the purported motion to strike (filing date August 4, 2026); this reply in support of a non-existent motion (which purported had been filed by the same party filing the reply) references punitive damages and the Song-Beverly Act, neither of which are mentioned in the FAC.

The Court admonishes counsel to avoid errors of this kind in the future. 2 The Court finds that the moving party has complied with its meet-and-confer obligation.

Alternatively, if section 2310(a)(3) does not apply because the warranty does not require

an informal dispute settlement procedure, then no action can be brought “unless the person

obligated under the warranty or service contract is afforded a reasonable opportunity to cure” the

defect. (15 U.S.C. § 2310(e).)

Under the MMWA, Plaintiff therefore cannot bring his action unless: (1) he follows the

warranty’s informal dispute settlement procedures, if the warranty establishes such a

requirement; or (2) he gives Defendant a reasonable opportunity to cure the defect, if the

warranty does not establish informal dispute settlement procedures. While a Complaint may

allege facts in the alternative, i.e., that the warranty establishes or does not establish a mandatory

dispute settlement procedure, Plaintiff must allege at least one of the two prerequisites.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not alleged that he gave Defendant a reasonable

opportunity to cure the breach. It also argues that Plaintiff does not allege that he exhausted the

dispute resolution procedure. (Mtn. at p. 4-5.) Plaintiff responds that he did allege that Defendant

had a reasonable number of opportunities to repair, and the dispute resolution program was not

mandatory because the warranty does not clearly state on its first page that the program was

required. (Opp. at p. 5-6, citing 16 C.F.R. § 703.1(h)(2).)

The warranty agreement attached as Exhibit A to the FAC states that Toyota offers

informal dispute resolution through the Dispute Settlement Program administered by the

National Center for Dispute Settlement. (FAC Ex. A at p. 5.) The warranty agreement advises,

“Failure to use the CDSP may affect your rights and remedies under California’s ‘Lemon

Laws.’” (Id. at p. 6.) The warranty later states: “Important: You must use the Dispute Settlement

Program (or, in California, the CDSP) before seeking remedies through a court action pursuant to

the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.” (Id. at 10.)

The FAC alleges: “Plaintiff has also met all of Plaintiff’s obligations and preconditions to

bring this claim, or alternatively it would have been futile for Plaintiff to do so.” (FAC ¶ 30.) The

FAC further alleges: “Plaintiff has met all of Plaintiff’s obligations for bringing this claim as

provided in the written warranties, or alternatively, Defendant does not maintain an informal

dispute resolution process ... .” (FAC ¶ 31.)

Plaintiff argues that the dispute resolution program was not mandatory because the

warranty contains procedural deficiencies under 16 C.F.R. § 703.1(h)(2), including the failure to

state the program was required on the first page. Therefore, Plaintiff argues, it was not a

prerequisite for bringing suit.

Even if the warranty does not require the informal dispute resolution program, under the

MMWA, Plaintiff must allege that he gave Defendant a reasonable opportunity to repair. (See 15

U.S.C. § 2310(e); Rojas v. Bosch Solar Energy Corp. (N.D. Cal. 2019) 386 F. Supp. 3d 1116,

1128 [holding that an MMWA claim is subject to dismissal for failing to allege pre-suit notice

and an opportunity to cure].)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant had an affirmative duty to promptly offer to

repurchase or replace the Subject Vehicle at the time i[t] failed to conform the Subject Vehicle to

the terms of the express warranty after a reasonable number of repair attempts.” (FAC ¶ 13.)

Defendant does not explain why paragraph thirteen’s allegation regarding Defendant having

been given a reasonable number of repair attempts to conform the vehicle to the warranty is

insufficient to meet this pleading requirement. The Court finds that it satisfies the pleading

requirement and that this motion should be denied as a result.

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III. CONCLUSION

Defendant’s demurrer to the first cause of action is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: [TENTATIVE – NOT FINAL] Hon. Joseph B. Widman Judge of the Superior Court