VALDOVINOS, et al. vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, et al.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the

24CV024644: VALDOVINOS, et al. vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, et al. 07/15/2026 Hearing on Demurrer (Lemon Law) to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint in Department 8D

hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING:

The demurrer of Defendant General Motors LLC (“Defendant”) to the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) of Plaintiffs Amy Valdovinos and Jorge Valdovinos (“Plaintiffs”) is ruled upon as follows.

BACKGROUND

This is a Lemon Law/Song-Beverly Act Action. Plaintiffs alleges that on November 17, 2021, they purchased a 2022 Cadillac Escalade (“the Vehicle”). (FAC ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs received a warranty, which included, but was not limited to, an express bumper-to-bumper warranty, a powertrain warranty, and an emissions warranty. (FAC ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs allege that subsequent to the purchase of the Vehicle, “[d]efects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period, including but not limited to engine defects, transmission defects, [and] electrical defects[,] among other defects and non-conformities.” (FAC ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant has failed to replace the Vehicle or make restitution after a reasonable number of repair attempts. (FAC ¶¶ 14, 15.)

Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant committed fraud by allowing the Vehicle to be sold to them without disclosing that the Vehicle and its engine and transmission were defective and susceptible to premature failure. (FAC ¶¶ 22, 47, 49-50.) Plaintiffs contend that Defendant was aware of the alleged defects to the Vehicle and/or its related components. (FAC ¶¶ 51-53, 55-59, 66, 69-74.) The FAC alleges that the Engine Defect causes unsafe condition and present a safety hazard because “they severely affect the driver’s ability to control the vehicle, and substantially increase the likelihood that the engine will fail, lose power, and/or cut off during operation, thereby resulting in accidents involving property damage, personal injury and even death.” (Id. ¶ 49.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendant knew of the defects, but failed to disclose and also concealed

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV024644: VALDOVINOS, et al. vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, et al. 07/15/2026 Hearing on Demurrer (Lemon Law) to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint in Department 8D

material facts at the time of sale (FAC ¶¶ 45-72.)

Plaintiffs filed the original Complaint on December 4, 2024, and the operative FAC on August 4, 2025. Plaintiffs allege four causes of action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and one cause of action for fraudulent inducement-concealment.

Defendant demurs to the Fifth Cause of Action (fraudulent concealment) on the grounds that the cause of action is time-barred, it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendant, and that Plaintiffs does not allege a transactional relationship between Defendant and Plaintiffs that gives rise to a duty to disclose.

LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v.

Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) The Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.) A general demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 318; William S.

Hart Union High School Dist. v. Regional Planning Comm’n (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1612, 1616, fn. 2.) Extrinsic evidence may not properly be considered on demurrer or a motion to strike. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881; Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Thornton (1897) 117 Cal. 481, 482.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the Plaintiffs to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . ., we are not concerned with Plaintiff's possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733 [citing Ropgoff v. Grabowski (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 624,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV024644: VALDOVINOS, et al. vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, et al. 07/15/2026 Hearing on Demurrer (Lemon Law) to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint in Department 8D

628].) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action – not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.)

DISCUSSION

Statute of Limitations

The statute provides that an action for fraud is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the cause of action. Thus, the limitations period commences when a plaintiff “obtains knowledge of facts sufficient to make a reasonably prudent person suspicious of fraud. The action, therefore, accrues when a plaintiff has notice or information of circumstances sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry: i.e., when ‘the plaintiff suspects or should suspect that her injury was caused by wrongdoing.’” (Jolly v.

Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1110; see also Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. supra, 35 Cal.4th at 807 [“a fraudulent omission cause of action does not accrue until discovery of all the elements of the cause of action, including Defendant’s deceptive acts of failing to disclose safety defects to Plaintiff at the time of purchase or lease and thereafter”].)

Resolution of a statute of limitations issue is normally a question of fact. (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at 810.) As noted above, when and how Plaintiffs should have reasonably become aware that Defendant allegedly concealed facts at the time of purchase is a question of fact that cannot be determined at the pleading stage. Whereas the defect of the statute of limitations does not appear on the face of the Complaint, the demurrer is overruled on this basis.

In addition, Plaintiffs allege that the statute of limitations was paused by equitable tolling, class action tolling, the discovery rule, fraudulent concealment rule, equitable estoppel, equitable tolling and/or the repair rule. (FAC ¶ 23.) The doctrine of fraudulent concealment tolls the statute of limitations where a defendant’s own deceptive conduct has caused a claim to grow stale. (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1192.) Here, as noted above, Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendant failed to disclose, and actively concealed, material facts from Plaintiffs, including the defects in the Vehicle.

Therefore, based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have shown tolling of the statute of limitations at the pleading stage with regard to the Fifth Cause of Action sufficient to survive the instant challenge to the pleadings. The Court overrules the demurrer to the Fifth Cause of Action on this basis.

Sufficiency and Specificity of Pleading

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV024644: VALDOVINOS, et al. vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, et al. 07/15/2026 Hearing on Demurrer (Lemon Law) to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint in Department 8D

Defendant next argues that Plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable cause of action with regard to the Fifth Cause of Action for fraudulent concealment. Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs fails to plead, among other things, the specific “facts” that Defendant allegedly failed to disclose; allegations establishing that Defendant knew of those “facts” at the time Plaintiffs purchased their vehicle; what advertisements, brochures, or other materials where Defendant could have disclosed the allegedly omitted “facts” that Plaintiffs reviewed and relied upon in purchasing the Subject Vehicle; how long prior to purchasing the vehicle they viewed them; whether those materials, if any, were prepared by Defendant or someone else (such as a dealership); and facts supporting any allegation that Defendant intended to defraud them. (Def. Demurrer MPA at pp. 8-9.)

Generally, there are “four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the Plaintiffs; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the Plaintiffs; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the Plaintiffs; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts. [Citation.]” (Heliotis v. Schuman (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 646, 651.) A duty to disclose material facts may arise not only when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff but also when the defendant has exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the Plaintiffs or when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff. (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336.)

The Court’s consideration of Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ fraudulent concealment cause of action is guided by two principles. First, in evaluating the factual underpinnings of a fraudulent concealment claim at the pleading stage, the Court focuses its inquiry on the unique elements of the claim as asserted by Plaintiffss. (Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, 43-44 [citations omitted].) “For instance . . . [i]f the duty [of disclosure] allegedly arose by virtue of the parties' relationship and the defendant's exclusive knowledge or access to certain facts the complaint must also include specific allegations establishing all the required elements, including (1) the content of the omitted facts, (2) the defendant's awareness of the materiality of those facts, (3) the inaccessibility of the facts to the Plaintiffs, (4) the general point at which the omitted facts should or could have been revealed, and (5) justifiable and actual reliance, either through action or forbearance, based on the defendant's omission.” (Ibid.)

Second, although in California fraud must be pled specifically, courts have repeatedly recognized that “it is harder to apply [the requirement of specificity] to a case of simple nondisclosure. ‘How does one show ‘how’ and ‘by what means’ something didn’t happen, or ‘when’ it never happened, or ‘where' it never happened?’” (Jones v. ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV024644: VALDOVINOS, et al. vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, et al. 07/15/2026 Hearing on Demurrer (Lemon Law) to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint in Department 8D

1187, 1199.) At the same time, allegations that merely plead legal conclusions of fraud are insufficient. (Tindell v. Murphy (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1249.) Thus, even in cases involving claims of fraudulent concealment, “‘the facts and circumstances which constitute the fraud should be set out clearly, concisely, and with sufficient particularity to apprise the opposite party of what he is called on to answer, and to enable the court to determine whether, on the facts pleaded, there is any foundation, prima facie at least, for the charge of fraud.’ [Citation.]” (Scafidi v. Western Loan & Bldg. Co. (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 550, 553.)

In the context of a case alleging fraudulent concealment of transmission defects in a purchased vehicle, the Court of Appeal in Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 844[1], held that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged the elements of fraudulent concealment/suppression where they alleged: (1) the transmissions in numerous vehicles, including the one purchased by the plaintiffs, were defective; (2) the manufacturer knew of the defects and the hazards posed; (3) the manufacturer had exclusive knowledge of the defects but intentionally concealed and failed to disclose the information, (4) the plaintiffs would not have purchased the car if they knew of the defects; and (5) the plaintiffs suffered damages in the form of the money paid to purchase the car.

The Dhital Court found sufficient allegations that the defects caused hesitation, shaking, jerking, and failure to function, as well as allegations that the manufacturer was aware of the defects based on premarket testing and consumer complaints. (Ibid.)

Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant was aware of the various purported defects, but failed to disclose this information at the time of the sale. Plaintiffs specifically allege that Defendant was aware of the defects based on sources not available to consumers, including pre-release testing data, early consumer complaints, aggregate data compiled from Defendant's network of dealers, testing conducted in response to complaints, and warranty repair and part replacement data. (Id., ¶¶ 57-59, 70-72.) Plaintiffs also allege that they would not have purchased the Vehicle had they been aware of the defects and that the defects pose safety risks. (Id., ¶¶ 54, 60-61, 65.) Plaintiffs contend that Defendant knowingly and intentionally concealed these facts, which were material to any decision to purchase the Vehicle. (Id., ¶ 66.)

Taking Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, as the Court must in considering a demurrer, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs plead the Fifth Cause of Action with the requisite factual and legal specificity. Accordingly, the demurrer on this basis is OVERRULED.

Duty to Disclose

Defendant also argues in its moving papers that Plaintiffs fail to allege a sufficient transactional relationship to establish a duty to disclose.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV024644: VALDOVINOS, et al. vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, et al. 07/15/2026 Hearing on Demurrer (Lemon Law) to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint in Department 8D

The Court rejects this argument. Contrary to Defendant's position, no transactional relationship between the manufacturer of a product and subsequent purchasers is necessary to bring a fraudulent omission claim because a manufacturer has a duty to disclose material facts, not only to immediate purchasers, but to subsequent purchasers when the manufacturer has reason to know that the subject product will be resold. (See OCM Principal Opportunities Fund v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 835, 859-860.)

Here, Plaintiffs allege facts sufficient to show that Defendant was aware that the Vehicle would be sold on the open market. Plaintiffs also allege that the Vehicle was backed by express warranties from Defendant. Further, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant had a warranty relationship with Plaintiffs. These allegations are sufficient to withstand Defendant's challenge regarding whether Plaintiffs purchased the Vehicle directly from Defendant.

Additionally, the Court notes that a duty to disclose material facts may arise not only when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the Plaintiffs, but also when the defendant has exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the Plaintiffs, or when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the Plaintiffs. (LiMandri v. Judkins, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at 336.) As discussed above, Plaintiffs have alleged such facts here, and the demurrer on this basis is overruled.

DISPOSITION

The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the Fifth Cause of Action.

Defendant shall file and serve its Answer to the First Amended Complaint no later than July 29, 2026. The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.

[1] The California Supreme Court granted review of Dhital, but subsequently dismissed it,

citingCalifornia Rules of Court, rule 8.528(b)(1). California Rules of Court, rule 8.528(b)(3) provides: “An order dismissing review does not affect the publication status of the Court of Appeal opinion unless the Supreme Court orders otherwise.” Accordingly, here the court finds Dhital binding to the extent is it applicable.