Ama Investors, LLC vs. Pro Motorcars Inc

A party moving to recover attorney’s fees has the burden of: (1) establishing entitlement to an award, and (2) documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. (ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1020.)

Prevailing Party

Each side argues that they are the prevailing party. The parties do not dispute that the lease agreement at issue in this action contained an attorney’s fees clause. The dispute lies in which party should be deemed the prevailing party.

Plaintiff argues that it is the prevailing party because eit was awarded a $87,770.64 award against Defendants after trial.

Defendants argue that they are the prevailing party because they substantially defeated Plaintiff’s claims. More specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiff sought at least $175,000 in damages exclusive of interest, but only obtained an award of $87,770.64 (including interest), and that Plaintiff was awarded only $66,842.31 in actual damages, which is approximately only 38% of what Plaintiff sought.

Under Civil Code section 1717(b)(1), the court “shall determine who is the party prevailing on the contract for purposes of this section.... [T]he party prevailing on the contract shall be the party who recovered a greater relief in the action on the contract. The court may also determine that there is no party prevailing on the contract for purposes of this section.”

As explained by the California Supreme Court in Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, “in deciding whether there is a ‘party prevailing on the contract,’ the trial court is to compare the relief awarded on the contract claim or claims with the parties’ demands on those same claims and their litigation objectives as disclosed by the pleadings, trial briefs, opening statements, and similar sources.” (Id. at 876). “The prevailing party determination is to be made only upon final resolution of the contract claims and only by a ‘comparison of the extent to which each party ha[s] succeeded and failed to succeed in its contentions.” (Id.) “[I]n determining litigation success, courts should respect substance rather than form, and to this extent should be guided by ‘equitable considerations.’” (Id. at 877.)

“[T]ypically, a determination of no prevailing party results when both parties seek relief, but neither prevails, or when the ostensibly prevailing party receives only a part of the relief sought.” (Id. at 875, quoting Dean Gardenhome Assn. v. Denktas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1398); see also Goodman vs. Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327, 1331 [holding that plaintiffs that were awarded damages after a court trial, but received nothing due to settlement offsets, were not the “prevailing party” entitled to an award of costs under CCP 1032(a)(4)].)

A party's failure “to obtain its preferred litigation objective [] does not mean that the other party is ipso facto the prevailing party.” (Marina Pacifica Homeowners Assn. v. Southern California Financial Corp. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 191, 205 [trial court acted within its discretion in finding there was no prevailing party on contract where both sides obtained some form of recovery “other than monetary relief”].) Rather, the rule is as follows: “If neither party achieves a complete victory on all the contract claims, it is within the discretion of the trial court to determine which

party prevailed on the contract or whether, on balance, neither party prevailed sufficiently to justify an award of attorney fees.” (Id. at 205-206, citations omitted [noting that “Hsu directs us to ‘respect substance rather than form’ in determining litigation success”]; accord Scott Co. of California v. Blount, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1103, 1109 [although plaintiff was “not automatically a party prevailing on the contract for purposes of section 1717,” where plaintiff sought to prove more than $2 million in damages but succeeded in establishing only about $440,000 in damages, trial court did not abuse its discretion in implicitly concluding that plaintiff prevailed, on balance, for purposes of section 1717].)

However, the trial court may abuse its discretion in finding there is no prevailing party, if, under an abuse of discretion standard, the results are “so lopsided” that it is unreasonable to say one side was not the prevailing party. (de la Cuesta v. Benham (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1290 [holding that, although landlord did not obtain a “complete victory” and, thus, was not “entitled” to fees under section 1717, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to find that the landlord was the prevailing party where it obtained 70% of its claimed damages and tenant recovered nothing on her fraud claim].)

Here, the court finds that Plaintiff was the prevailing party. While the result was a mixed outcome, Plaintiff recovered greater relief than Defendant and ultimately met Plaintiff’s litigation objective — i.e., to be paid rent due. While the result was a mixed outcome, on balance, Plaintiffs recovered greater relief than Defendant and met Plaintiffs’ litigation objective.

As the court found in its 3/20/26 submitted ruling on the trial:

• Defendants breached the lease agreement, as amended, by failing to pay the monthly rent and vacating the property before the 5-year lease term ended. Defendants vacated the Subject Property on or about 1/30/23, despite having eleven months remaining on the lease.

• Plaintiff’s actions or inactions did not cause a constructive eviction. Defendants argued, but failed to show, that the Subject Property had become uninhabitable due to significant terminate infestation and related health risks due to such.

• Plaintiff was able to secure a new tenant who began paying $15,000 per month beginning on 7/1/23. As such, Defendants are not responsible for past rent owing after June 2023.

The court found in favor of Plaintiff on the majority of the disputed issues in this case and found that Defendants’ defenses and arguments lacked evidence. While the monetary award was less than what Plaintiff sought, balancing the totality of the case, the court finds that Plaintiff was the prevailing party.

For this reason, Defendants were not the prevailing party and Defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees is DENIED.

Reasonableness of Fees

The trial court has broad authority to determine the amount of a reasonable fee. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) The award of attorney fees under section 1717 is governed by equitable principles. (Ibid.) The fee-setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the "lodestar," i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (Ibid.) The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered and the trial judge’s decision will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong, i.e., that it abused its discretion. (Ibid.)

“The lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) “The

purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action.” (Ibid.) “In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.” (Ibid.) An attorney’s time spent and hourly rate are presumed to be reasonable. (Mandel v. Lackner (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 747, 761.) Further, prevailing parties are compensated for hours reasonably spent on fee-related issues. (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal. 3d 621, 635.)

Here, Plaintiff’s lawyer Jesse Thaler has nearly 15 years of experience and bills at a rate of $400/hr. The court finds that Plaintiff’s counsel’s billing rate is reasonable based on the market rates for attorneys in Orange County, the experience of counsel, the issues raised in this case, and the type of work performed — particularly trial work.

Plaintiff seeks to $77,880 in attorneys’ fees or 194.7 hours of work based on a $400/hour billing rate.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s fee request is unreasonable and excessive by making several objections. The court addresses each objection below.

1. TBD Placeholders

Defendants first object to Plaintiff’s “TBD” entries, which total 16.0 hours ($6,400) for anticipated work as follows:

• Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees (5.0) • Review Opposition; Reply ISO Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees (3.0) • Opposition to Motion to Tax Costs (3.0) • Prepare and attend Defendant’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees (2.0) • Prepare and attend Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees (1.0) • Prepare and attend Defendant’s Motion to Tax Costs (1.0) • Draft, file and serve amended judgment (1.0)

While the court finds that fees for anticipated work is recoverable, the court finds that the number of hours sought is excessive. The court therefore reduces the number of anticipated hours by 6 hours — i.e., 10 hours of recoverable time.

2. Discovery Motions

Defendants argue that Plaintiff filed two sets of discovery motions and the court already awarded fees and costs for those motions. In Plaintiff’s reply, Plaintiff does not address whether or not Plaintiff is seeking duplicative fees that were already awarded. As such, the court finds that Defendants’ objection is well-taken.

As such, the court reduces Plaintiff’s hours by another 6 hours related to discovery motions.

3. Excessive Time Spent

Defendants argue that Plaintiff billed excessive time for the following entries:

• Initial client meeting and document review (6.7 hours); • Drafting and filing the complaint (5.6 hours); • MSC statement (6.6 hours) — Plaintiff also requested that the MSC be taken off-calendar; • Trial brief (6.7 hours) — Plaintiff’s trial brief was too short to require this much time

The court agrees that these entries are excessive. The court reduces the amount requested by an additional 4 hours related to these entries.

4. Client Calls

Defendants argue that Plaintiff billed over 20 entries to “discuss case status with client,” typically 0.3-0.8 hours. Defendants however do not identify any particular or specific entry that Defendants contend are excessive or improper.

The party opposing a fee motion bears the burden of establishing that the fees are unreasonable by “attack[ing] the itemized billings with evidence that the fees claimed were not appropriate, or obtain[ing] the declaration of an attorney with expertise in the procedural and substantive law to demonstrate that the fees claimed were unreasonable.” (Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys. v. Cal. Ins. Guarantee Assoc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 563-564.) “General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Id. at 564.)

Defendants have not met their burden of attacking any specific client call entries. The court overrules this objection.

5. Block Billing

Defendants object to the following entries as improper block billing:

• 04/01/2025 – Draft trial documents; trial preparation; client discussion (5.3) • 05/09/2025 – Draft trial brief; client preparation (6.7) • 10/30/2025 – Draft oppositions (x2) (7.2)

The court does not find that these entries constitute improper block billing. The court overrules this objection.

6. Clerical Tasks Billed at Attorney Rates

Defendants argue that multiple entries relate to clerical tasks, such as arranging service, filing notices, and transmitting documents. However, Defendants again do not identify any specific time entry that Defendants contend fall under this category. As such, Defendants have not met their burden of challenging such tasks. The court also overrules this objection.

7. Appellate Work

Defendants argues that Plaintiff cannot seek fees for appellate work. The attorneys’ fees clause however allows for such recovery: “If any Party or Broker brings an action

or proceeding involving the Premises whether founded in tort, contract or equity, or to declare rights hereunder, the Prevailing Party (as hereafter defined) in any such proceeding, action, or appeal thereon, shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees....” (Thaler Decl., Exh. 1 to Complaint, § 31 at p. 15). The court overrules this objection.

8. Correspondence with Defendants’ Counsel

Defendants challenge Plaintiff’s billing entry for 20 hours for “100+ email correspondence with Defendants’ counsel.” The court sustains this objection. This entry constitutes improper block billing such that the court/Defendants cannot verify the veracity of any purported correspondence. As such, the court reduces the request by another 20 hours.

9. Arbitration

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s decision to litigate in Superior Court rather than pursuing arbitration materially increased fees and supports reduction. As the court previously found, Defendants had notice of the arbitration provision in the lease since the complaint was filed. Despite opportunities to do so, Defendants waited until the eve of trial, when the parties already incurred substantial fees litigating this case, before moving to compel arbitration. That motion was denied and the court overrules this objection.

Summary of Fees Awarded

The court reduces the 194.7 hours sought by Plaintiff by a total of 36 hours – i.e., the court awards Plaintiff fees for 158.7 hours. Given Plaintiff’s counsel’s rate of $400/hour, the court awards a total of $63,480 in reasonable attorney’s fees in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants Pro Motorcars, Inc. and Mehrdad Jandarian, jointly and severally.

Plaintiff does not request, and the court declines to award, a multiplier in this straightforward case.

Plaintiff to give notice.

2. Upcoming Hearings

Defendants filed a motion to tax costs (ROA 209), which is set for hearing on 9/4/26. Plaintiff filed a motion to tax costs (ROA 213), which is set for hearing on 8/28/26.

On its own motion, the court CONTINUES Plaintiff’s motion to tax costs (ROA 213) from 8/28/26 to 9/4/26, at 9:30 am in Dept. W8, to be heard with the cross-motion matter scheduled at that time (ROA 213).

Plaintiff to give notice.

7 Imperial Bag & Motion for Relief from Waiver of Jury Paper Co. LLC vs. Haight The court GRANTS Defendant STEPHEN HAIGHT’s motion for relief from waiver of his right to a jury trial.

The right to a jury trial is guaranteed by California’s Constitution. (Cal. Const. Art. I, 16.) Section 631 of the Code of Civil Procedure sets forth the only conditions in which a court can find waiver of the right to a jury trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 631(a).)

Specifically, waiver may be found if one of the following is found: (1) By failing to appear at the trial. (2) By written consent filed with the clerk or judge. (3) By oral consent, in open court, entered in the minutes. (4) By failing to announce that a jury is required, at the time the cause is first set for trial, if it is set upon notice or stipulation, or within five days after notice of setting if it is set without notice or stipulation. (5) By failing to timely pay the fee described in subdivision (b), unless another party on the same side of the case has paid that fee. (6) By failing to deposit with the clerk or judge, at the beginning of the second and each succeeding day's session,

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