Motion for attorneys’ fees
A motion seeking relief under Section 473(b) must be brought within 6 months of entry of the default. (Civ. Proc. Code § 473(b); Austin v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 918, 928 [“This six-month time limitation is jurisdictional; the court has no power to grant relief under section 473 once the time has lapsed.”].)
On January 24, 2025, the Court entered default as to all defendants, including Defendant Jordan Bako. Plaintiff filed this motion on December 23, 2025. Thus, the motion is not timely and must be denied.
Plaintiff shall give notice of this ruling.
12 TEC Deal LLC TENTATIVE RULING: vs. Mercedes- Benz USA, LLC For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs Tec Deal LLC and Saleh Alljalani’s motion for attorneys’ fees is GRANTED. The court awards Plaintiffs their attorneys’ fees in the total amount of $22,880.75. The court awards costs in the total amount of $828.05.
Objections
Defendant asserts 27 objections to the declaration of Mr. Acosta. The overrules all of the objections. The only paragraphs that are material to this motion are those setting forth the rates of counsel and the paralegals (paragraphs 8-12), and paragraphs 16-18, which sets forth the foundation of the billing records (Exhibit A).
Plaintiff has established his personal knowledge as a partner of the firm who is involved with the assignment and management of cases, and set forth the foundation of the billing records.
The remaining paragraphs are inconsequential. (See Tate v. Fratt (1896) 112 Cal. 613, 619 [no error in overruling the objection to remarks that were inconsequential]).
Basis for Attorneys’ Fees
Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d) provides:
“If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the
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court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”
Here, Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to the settlement agreement between the parties, and Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d).
Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees.
Reasonable Hourly Rate
The lodestar method for calculating attorneys’ fees applies to any statutory attorneys’ fees award, unless the statute authorizing the award provides for another method of calculation. (Galbiso v. Orosi Pub. Util. Dist. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1089; see also K.I. v. Wagner (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1425.)
When determining a reasonable attorneys’ fees award using the lodestar method, the court begins by deciding the reasonable hours the prevailing party’s attorney spent on the case and multiplies that number by the reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 998).
The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095.).
The court finds that Mr. Greco’s hourly rate of $595, Mr. Urner’s hourly rate of $525, and the law clerk rates and paralegal rates of $250 per hour are reasonable.
Lodestar multiplier
Defendant requests a negative lodestar multiplier due to the simplicity of this case.
In determining whether to apply a multiplier, the court considers a variety of factors such as the novelty and difficulty of the issues presented, the skill displayed in presenting them, the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, and the contingent nature of the fee award. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132; Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.)
The court is not required to impose a multiplier; the decision is discretionary. (Galbiso, 167 Cal.App.4th at 1089.)
It is true that this was not an action that called for extraordinary legal work or activity. (Rahman v. FCA US LLC (C.D. Cal. 2022) 594 F.Supp.3d 1199, 1207 [no multiplier for a “largely routine lemon law case....”].) However, there is no reason for a negative multiplier, either. Accordingly, the court declines to set a negative multiplier.
Hours Reasonably Expended
The Court will reduce the hours it determines were excessive or not supported. (Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816 [party seeking attorney fees has the “burden of showing that the fees incurred were allowable, were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount” (internal quotation marks omitted)]). “[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v Board of Trustees of California State University (2005)132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396
In challenging attorney fees as excessive, “it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys. v. Cal. Ins. Guarantee Assoc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)
Defendant challenged the time entries by Plaintiffs’ counsel, and selected various entries that Defendant contends should be deducted as either “pre-engagement” work, duplicative/excessive work, administrative/secretarial work, or work that was undertaken in support of Plaintiffs’ action against Defendant Fletcher Jones Motorcars, and not Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA.
The court deducts the following:
-6/12/2024 Draft Attorney/Client Agreement to Saleh Alajalani ($105.00). The court finds that work taken toward the client agreement is not work for the commencement or prosecution of this action pursuant to Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d). -6/17/2024 Communication with Saleh Alajalani regarding Attorney/Client Agreement, request for service records and financial documents, and review of executed Agreement. ($210.00)
-6/18/2024 Draft Attorney/Client Agreement to Mohamad Alajalani. ($105.00) -6/20/2024 Communication with Mohamad Alajalani regarding Attorney/Client Agreement and review of executed Agreement. ($52.50) -6/21/2024 Draft Attorney/Client Agreement to Tec Deal LLC and review executed agreement ($105.00) -8/28/2024 Phone call to Client to request completion of Client Questionnaire ($25.00) -10/16/2024 Review and analyze vehicle repair history in order to prepare early resolution analysis memorandum for file. ($714.00) (duplicative) -11/1/2024 Review, analyze, and annotate Fletcher Jones Motorcars' Set One Discovery Requests for RFAs, RFPs, FROGs, and SROGs to Plaintiff Saleh Alljalani. (excessive – the court deducts half this amount) -1/27/2025 Draft Plaintiff Tec Deal LLC's Response to Fletcher Jones Motorcars' Requests for Production of Documents to Plaintiff Tec Deal LLC, Set One. ($1,130.50) (excessive – the court deducts half this amount) -1/27/2025 Draft Plaintiff Tec Deal LLC's Response to Fletcher Jones Motorcars' Special Interrogatories to Plaintiff Tec Deal LLC, Set One. ($952.00) (excessive – the court deducts half this amount) -1/27/2025 Draft Plaintiff Tec Deal LLC's Response to Fletcher Jones Motorcars' Requests for Admissions to Plaintiff Tec Deal LLC, Set One. ($654.50) (excessive – the court deducts half this amount) -7/22/2025 Draft Check Request Form. ($119.00) (administrative work)
Finally, Defendant contends that all work undertaken toward Plaintiff’s case against Fletcher Jones should not be recoverable.
“When a cause of action for which attorney fees are provided by statute is joined with other causes of action for which attorney fees are not permitted, the prevailing party may recover only on the statutory cause of action.” (Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of San Francisco (2000) 79 Cal. App. 4th 1127, 1133). “However, the joinder of causes of action should not dilute the right to attorney fees. Such fees need not be apportioned when incurred for representation of an issue common to both a cause of action for which fees are permitted and one for which they are not. All expenses incurred on the common issues qualify for an award.” (Id.).
“Once a trial court determines entitlement to an award of attorney fees, apportionment of that award rests within the court's sound discretion.” (Carver v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 498, 505).
Plaintiffs contend that the work toward their case against Fletcher Jones could be used in their case against Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA. Plaintiffs note that Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA knows that Fletcher Jones is an authorized Mercedes-Benz warranty repair facility that performed warranty repairs on the Plaintiff’s vehicle on dates including February 14, 2023; March 13, 2023; and July 12, 2024.
Furthermore, the settlement agreement between the parties did not provide that Mercedes-Benz would only pay apportioned fees. Rather, the settlement agreement provides:
“MBUSA will pay Releasor’s statutory costs and expenses under Civil Code § 1794(d), in the amount determined by the Court to have been reasonably incurred by Releasor in connection with the commencement and prosecution of this action. In ruling on Releasor’s fee/cost motion(s), and except as otherwise provided for in this paragraph, the fees, expenses, and costs amount shall be calculated as if Releasor were found to have prevailed in this action under section 1794(d) of the California Code of Civil Procedure.” (Decl. of Urner, Exhibit A).
Accordingly, the court rejects Defendant’s argument.
Costs
Plaintiffs seek to recover $828.05 in costs.
Defendant does not challenge any specific item of costs. Accordingly, the court awards the full amount.
Plaintiffs shall give notice.
13 Cemex TENTATIVE RULING: Construction Materials Motion for Summary Judgment Pacific, LLC vs. Gunner Concrete, Inc. Plaintiff Cemex Construction Materials Pacific, LLC moves for summary judgment on its Complaint as to Defendants Douglas Scott Milne, II and Geneva Milne (“Defendants”). For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections are OVERRULED. Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED.