STEINER VS THE PALMS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION

Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) Where the dates alleged in the complaint show the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations, a general demurrer lies. (Saliter v. Pierce Bros. Mortuaries (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 292, 300.)

Statute of Limitations: Where the dates alleged in the complaint show the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations, a general demurrer lies. (See Saliter v. Pierce Brothers Mortuaries (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 292, 300.) The running of the statute of limitations must appear “clearly and affirmatively” from the face of the complaint. It is not enough that the complaint might be time-barred. (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42.)

Allegations that an event occurred “on or about” the crucial date for statute of limitations purposes overcome a general demurrer. It is enough that the claim may be timely. (Childs v. State of California (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 155, 160.) Legal malpractice actions must be commenced within one year of the plaintiff’s discovery of facts constituting the wrongful act or omission or four years from the date of the wrongful act or omission, whichever occurs first. (CCP §340.6(a).) The time for commencement of an action for legal malpractice is tolled during the time that “[t]he plaintiff has not sustained actual injury” or “[t]he attorney continues to represent the plaintiff regarding the specific subject matter in which the alleged wrongful act or omission occurred.” (CCP § 340.6(a)(1)-(2).)

CCP §340.6(a) time bars apply to claims whose merits necessarily depend on an attorney’s violation of a professional obligation while providing professional services. (Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1229.) An attorney’s representation of a client ends when the client discharges the attorney or consents to a withdrawal, the court consents to the attorney’s withdrawal or upon completion of the tasks for which the client retained the attorney. (Gonzalez v. Kalu (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 21, 28; Laclette v.

Galindo (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 919, 927.) The Complaint alleges Plaintiff terminated Kauffman’s representation on March 21, 2024. (¶52.) Plaintiff alleges he did not discover Kauffman’s prior relationship with Guralnick & Gilliland LLP until “on or about March 5, 2025,” when he found Kauffman’s LinkedIn profile. (¶¶53, 114, 117, 125.) The Complaint was filed on January 23, 2026. Plaintiff alleges the claims are timely because of the delayed discovery rule – he alleges he did not discover facts about Kauffman’s alleged conflict of interest until March 5, 2025. (Complaint ¶114.)

The discovery rule is an important exception to the general rule of accrual which postpones accrual until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action. (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807.) Under the rule, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff either: (1) actually discovers the injury and its cause or (2) could have discovered the injury and its cause through the exercise of reasonable diligence. (Angeles Chem. Co. v.

Spencer & Jones (1996) 44 Cal. App. 4th 112, 120.) “Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff suspects or should suspect that her injury was caused by wrongdoing, that someone has done something wrong to her.” (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1110; see also Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397-98.) “[A] plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face that his claim would be barred without the benefit of the discovery rule must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence.” (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at 808 [internal quotation marks omitted].)

Plaintiff’s claims for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty against Kauffman are based on allegations that his representation had been delayed, communication was inadequate, and Kauffman did not disclose her prior employment relationship with Guralnick & Gilliland. (¶111.) Defendant notes Plaintiff knew about the alleged lack of communication and delay in representation prior to January 2025 and argues simply learning of Kauffman’s prior employment did not, by itself, create a claim for malpractice.

Defendant is correct. Plaintiff asserts many allegations against Kauffman that have nothing to do with her supposed conflict of interest arising from her prior employment. Plaintiff alleges “Kauffman’s failure to seek injunctive relief or aggressively prosecute the claim during her representation forced Plaintiff into a position where, after terminating her counsel, he had no choice but to personally fund the biohazard cleanup in July 2024 to render the home inhabitable and saleable.” (¶112.) Plaintiff alleges Kauffman failed to transmit the November 2023 inspection report to opposing counsel until January 17, 2024, which constituted an unreasonable delay. (¶111.)

Plaintiff further alleges Kauffman failed to communicate with Plaintiff from November 16, 2023 to December 31, 2023. (¶111.) The Complaint also alleges Kauffman advised Plaintiff there “was never really a case” on March 15, 2024, even though Plaintiff contends the evidence supported viable claims. (¶111.) Plaintiff terminated Kauffman’s representation on March 21, 2024. (Complaint ¶52.) The time for commencement of an action for legal malpractice is tolled during the time that “[t]he attorney continues to represent the plaintiff regarding the specific subject matter in which the alleged wrongful act or omission occurred.” (CCP § 340.6(a)(2).)

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiff knew of all of the acts constituting the alleged legal malpractice as of March 21, 2024. The only exception is Plaintiff did not know of Kauffman’s prior relationship with Guralnick & Gilliland until on or about March 5, 2025. (¶114.) Importantly, the “on or about” allegations regarding Plaintiff’s discovery on March 5, 2025, save Plaintiff’s claim for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty based on Kauffman’s failure to disclose her prior employment relationship. (Childs v.

State of California (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 155, 160.) Plaintiff’s reliance on the delayed discovery rule and the “on or about” allegations indicate Plaintiff’s claims might be timely. The demurrer can only be sustained where the running of the statute of limitations appears “clearly and affirmatively” from the face of the complaint. It is not enough that the complaint might be time-barred. (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42.) Since Plaintiff has pled a valid legal malpractice claim and claim for breach of fiduciary duty based on the delayed discovery rule upon learning of Kauffman’s prior employment, the entire cause of action is saved.

A general demurrer does not lie to only part of a cause of action. (Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1167 (disapproved on other grounds by Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905, 948.) The ninth cause of action for fraud by concealment is governed by a three-year statute of limitations under CCP §338(d). (See CCP §340.6(a) (“An action against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission, other than for actual fraud...shall be commenced within one year...”) (emphasis added).)

Plaintiff alleges Kauffman concealed her prior employment and Plaintiff did not discover that concealment until March 5, 2025. (Complaint ¶125.) The Complaint was then filed within three years of Plaintiff’s discovery. Plaintiff alleges his injuries were ongoing and cumulative and he did not know or have reason to know of Kauffman’s prior employment relationship at any time during Kauffman’s representation of him. (Complaint ¶54.) Again, Plaintiff’s pleading of the delayed discovery rule saves this claim.

7th Cause of Action – Legal Malpractice: The elements of a cause of action for legal malpractice are: (1) an attorney-client relationship; (2) a negligent act or omission; (3) causation; and (4) damages. (Slovensky v. Friedman (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1518, 152.) To prevail in a legal malpractice action, simply showing the attorney erred is not enough. (Filbin v. Fitzgerald (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 154, 166.) The plaintiff must also establish that “but for the alleged malpractice, it is more likely than not that the plaintiff would have obtained a more favorable result.” (Ibid.; see also Viner v.

Sweet (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1232, 1244.) Plaintiff must prove that actual loss or damage was sustained as a result of the attorney’s negligence. (Williams v. Wraxall (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 120, 130.) Defendant argues Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged damages to a reasonable degree of certainty. In a legal malpractice claim, plaintiff must prove that actual loss or damage was sustained as a result of the attorney’s negligence. (Williams v. Wraxall (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 120, 130.) The Complaint alleges: As a direct and proximate result of Kauffman’s legal malpractice, Plaintiff suffered damages including: loss of the opportunity to pursue timely claims against the HOA with adequate legal representation; out-of-pocket expenses of $12,102 for remediation that should have been the HOA’s responsibility; prolonged exposure to hazardous conditions and resulting physical and psychological harm; legal fees of $3,859.85 paid to Kauffman for inadequate representation; and diminished property value due to delayed remediation. (¶113.)

Plaintiff’s allegation that he lost the opportunity to pursue his claims against the HOA is confusing. The very existence of Plaintiff’s lawsuit negates this allegation. As to the other claimed damages, it is unclear from the Complaint how Kauffman’s alleged malpractice caused any of the claimed harms. Paying for remediation that should have been the HOA’s responsibility is not linked to Kauffman’s actions or failure to act. Neither is Plaintiff’s alleged exposure to hazardous conditions. Kauffman did not cause the rodent infestation at Plaintiff’s home. There is no connection between Kauffman’s representation and a diminished value in Plaintiff’s home. Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged the element of damages to support this cause of action.

8th Cause of Action – Breach of Fiduciary Duty: “The elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty are the existence of a fiduciary relationship, its breach, and damage proximately caused by that breach.” (City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith (1998) 68 Cal. App. 4th 445, 483) A fiduciary relationship exists when confidence is reposed by persons in the integrity of others, who voluntarily accept the confidence and therefore cannot act so as to take advantage of the others' interests without their knowledge or consent. (Tri-Growth Centre City Ltd. v.

Silldorf, Burdman, Duingnan & Eisenberg (1989) 216 Cal. App. 3d 139) “The essence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship is that the parties do not deal on equal terms, because the person in whom trust and confidence is reposed and who accepts that trust and confidence is in a superior position to exert unique influence over the dependent party.” (Barbara A. v. John G. (1983) 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 383.)

Plaintiff alleges Kauffman owed Plaintiff a fiduciary duty. (¶116.) Plaintiff alleges Kauffman breached her fiduciary duty owed to Plaintiff by “failing to disclose her prior employment” and the “resulting conflict of interest;” “providing representation that was influenced by her prior relationship with the HOA’s counsel; advising Plaintiff to take actions that benefited the HOA rather than Plaintiff; and failing to zealously advocate for Plaintiff’s interests.” (¶117.) Just as with the prior cause of action, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged damages.

The Complaint merely alleges “Plaintiff suffered damages” as a “direct and proximate result of Kauffman’s breach of fiduciary duty.” (¶118.) However, it is unclear what damages Plaintiff suffered and how those damages are connected to Kauffman’s actions, if they are at all. This is not sufficient to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.

9th Cause of Action – Fraud and Concealment: The elements of fraud are: (1) misrepresentation or concealment, (2) knowledge of falsity, (3) intent to defraud, (4) justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage. (Lovejoy v. AT&T Corp. (2004) 119 Cal. App. 4th 151, 157-158.) “Generally, fraud actions are subject to strict requirements of particularity in pleading.” (Furia v. Helm (2003) 111 Cal. App. 4th 945, 956.) This means that every element of the cause of action must be pled factually and specifically and the policy of liberal pleading does not apply. (Quelimane Co. v.

Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal. 4th 26, 47.) This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal. 4th 631, 645.) The specificity requirements of fraud is “relaxed when it is apparent from the allegations that the defendant necessarily possesses knowledge of the facts.” (Quelimane Co. v. Steward Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal. 4th 26, 27.) Defendant argues Plaintiff has not alleged facts to show Defendant intended to defraud Plaintiff or that Plaintiff justifiably relied on Defendant’s concealment.

Plaintiff alleges Kauffman “intentionally concealed [her prior employment] from Plaintiff with the intent to induce Plaintiff to retain her and continue her representation.” (¶122.) The Complaint alleges Plaintiff “reasonably relied on Kauffman’s implied representation that no conflicts of interest existed that would affect her ability to represent him.” (¶124.) Plaintiff further alleges “[a]s a direct and proximate result of Kauffman’s fraud and concealment, Plaintiff suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial.” (¶126.)

Plaintiff pleads generally he suffered damages as a result of Kauffman’s concealment. However, as discussed above, it is not clear there is any nexus between Plaintiff’s claimed damages and Kauffman’s alleged actions. Demurrer on the basis of Statute of Limitations for 7th, 8th and 9th Causes of Action, it is DENIED. Demurrer on the basis of failure to state facts sufficient for 7th, 8th and 9th Causes of Action, it is SUSTAINED with leave to amend. Plaintiff to file amended complaint in 15 days.

Case Management Conference for 8.25.26 confirmed.

5. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME HEARING RE: MOTION TO STRIKE STEINER VS THE PALMS COMPLAINT ON COMPLAINT OF CVPS2600913 HOMEOWNERS STEPHEN ANTHONY STEINER BY ASSOCIATION RHONA KAUFFMAN Tentative Ruling: Motion to Strike is MOOT.