STEPHENS v. LAUB LAW PLCC, ET AL.

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR MAY 1, 2026

On April 5, 2023, demurring-defendant specially-appeared for defendant Joey Max

Laub (managing partner of Laub & Laub) on behalf of plaintiff for a readiness conference

in plaintiff’s family law case. (TAC, ¶¶ 11, 22.) During this hearing, the court suggested

that defendant Lori London act as judge pro tem for an upcoming settlement

conference. (TAC, ¶ 23.) However, defendant London had previously represented

plaintiff’s ex-wife. (TAC, ¶ 23.) Plaintiff immediately objected. (TAC, ¶ 23.) Demurring-

defendant advised plaintiff to “just agree,” assuring him that any settlement conference

proceedings before defendant London would be non-binding. (TAC, ¶ 24.) Plaintiff

reluctantly consented on the record but later informed demurring-defendant he would

not sign a written waiver. (TAC, ¶ 25.)

Nevertheless, on May 23, 2023, defendant London presided over the settlement

conference. (TAC, ¶ 26.) Plaintiff alleges he suffered harm.

2. Request for Judicial Notice

Pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d), the court grants demurring-

defendant’s unopposed2 request for judicial notice of (1) the reporter’s transcript in the matter of Stephens v. Stephens (El Dorado Super. Ct., Case No. SFL20110189) dated

April 5, 2023; and (2) the court docket for Stephens v. Stephens.

3. Legal Principles

“[A] demurrer challenges only the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the truth or

the accuracy of its factual allegations or the plaintiff’s ability to prove those allegations.”

(Amarel v. Connell (1998) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140.) A demurrer is directed at the face of

the complaint and to matters subject to judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30,

subd. (a).) All properly pleaded allegations of fact in the complaint are accepted as true,

however improbable they may be, but not the contentions, deductions or conclusions of

2 Plaintiff does not oppose the request for judicial notice; however, he claims

demurring-defendant misidentified the case number and date of the transcript. (Opp. at 3:22–26.) Plaintiff asks the court to use the correct information. The court will use the case number and date reflected on the judicially-noticed transcript.

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR MAY 1, 2026

facts or law. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural

Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604.) A judge gives “the complaint a

reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Blank,

supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.)

4. Discussion

“An action against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission, other than for actual

fraud, arising in the performance of professional services shall be commenced within

one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should

have discovered, the facts constituting the wrongful act or omission, or four years from

the date of the wrongful act or omission, whichever occurs first.” (Code Civ. Proc.,

§ 340.6, subd. (a).) “It is well settled that the one-year limitations period of [Code of Civil

Procedure] section 340.6 ‘ “is triggered by the client’s discovery of ‘the facts constituting

the wrongful act or omission,’ not by his discovery that such facts constitute

professional negligence, i.e., by discovery that a particular legal theory is applicable

based on the known facts.” (Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter &

Hampton LLP (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 658, 685.)

Here, as demurring-defendant argues, the one-year statute of limitations under

Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6, subdivision (a) applies to all three causes of action

alleged against demurring-defendant: professional negligence, IIED, and breach of

fiduciary. (See Stoll v. Superior Court (9 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1366–1369.) That is because

for each of these causes of action, the TAC alleges that demurring-defendant advised

plaintiff to waive a conflict of interest, concealed conflicts, and/or compelled plaintiff to

appear before his “former adversary” acting as judge pro tem. (TAC, ¶¶ 37, 42.)

Therefore, each cause of action arises from demurring-defendant’s performance of

professional legal services.

Based on the allegations in the TAC, plaintiff knew demurring-defendant advised him

to waive the conflict of interest – the alleged conflict being that defendant London, who

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR MAY 1, 2026

previously represented plaintiff’s ex-wife, was the proposed judge pro tem for an

upcoming settlement conference – during the readiness conference on April 5, 2023.

April 5, 2023, is the only date upon which the TAC alleges demurring-defendant to have

acted. (TAC, ¶¶ 14, 22.)

Therefore, the one-year statute of limitations ran on April 4, 2024. Plaintiff did not

file his original complaint until April 21, 2025.

Plaintiff argues that he did not reasonably discover that “appreciable harm”

occurred until his disability benefits were reinstated in May 2024. (Opp. at 6:24–7:1,

7:8–10.) However, the court rejects this argument. The alleged fact constituting

demurring-defendant’s wrongdoing was that demurring-defendant advised plaintiff to

waive the conflict of interest. The TAC clearly alleges this occurred on April 5, 2023.

Additionally, plaintiff argues that additional wrongdoing occurred in May 2023 and

May 2024. However, there are no allegations in the TAC alleging that demurring-

defendant committed any wrongdoing in May 2023 or May 2024.

Because each cause of action alleged against demurring-defendant is time-barred,

the demurrer is sustained. Because plaintiff has had a previous opportunity to amend,

and it does not appear reasonably likely that plaintiff can further amend the pleading to

cure the statute of limitations defect (it is the court’s understanding that demurring-

defendant’s involvement in this case was limited to the April 5, 2023, readiness

conference), the court denies further leave to amend.

Defendant Morgenstern’s Motion to Strike

Having sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, the motion to strike is

denied as moot.

TENTATIVE RULING # 3: THE DEMURRER IS SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. THE MOTION TO STRIKE IS DENIED AS MOOT. NO HEARING ON THIS MATTER WILL BE

HELD (LEWIS v. SUPERIOR COURT (1999) 19 CAL.4TH 1232, 1247), UNLESS A NOTICE OF

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR MAY 1, 2026

INTENT TO APPEAR AND REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT IS TRANSMITTED

ELECTRONICALLY THROUGH THE COURT’S WEBSITE OR BY TELEPHONE TO THE COURT

AT (530) 573-3042 BY 4:00 P.M. ON THE DAY THE TENTATIVE RULING IS ISSUED.

NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES OF AN INTENT TO APPEAR MUST BE MADE BY TELEPHONE OR

IN PERSON. PROOF OF SERVICE OF SAID NOTICE MUST BE FILED PRIOR TO OR AT THE

HEARING.