Demurrer
1. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME CVME2500849 JORDAN VS LOVE DEMURRER Tentative Ruling: Overrule the Demurrer, with 30 days leave to Answer. Continue the CMC to November 18, 2026.
The TAC alleges that in April of 2013, the Jordans and Hannah discussed that Hannah would be a straw buyer for the subject Anza property and would hold title to the property for the benefit of her parents, and if her parents decided to sell it and move back to Texas, Hannah would convey the property to them. (TAC ¶ 13.)
The Jordans paid the $1,000 earnest money check as well as the balance of the purchase price in cash. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.)
Hannah’s name was placed on the grant deed. (Id. ¶ 16.)
The Jordans took possession of the property, made numerous improvements, and paid all the taxes and insurance up to 2022 when Hannah began intercepting his mail and paying the taxes. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 35.)
Plaintiff also alleges that when Hannah and her family moved in with Plaintiff on 8/20/23 after Karen Jordan passed away, Hannah reaffirmed to Plaintiff that she would hold the property in trust for Plaintiff’s benefit and would convey it to him on demand. (Id. ¶¶ 20-22.)
By these allegations, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged his actual performance on the oral agreement.
As a result, the Statute of Frauds does not apply.
Defendants assert that title vested in Hannah’s name on 4/22/13 so, Plaintiff’s claims were barred by 4/22/15 (CCP § 339(1) – two years) or by 4/22/16 (CCP § 338(d) – three years.)
However, the TAC alleges that after his wife died in 2022, Hannah and her family moved in with Plaintiff on 8/30/23. (TAC ¶¶ 18-19.)
Thereafter, Hannah and Tanith made threats to Plaintiff, and moved his personal property outside where it was left to be destroyed by the elements. (Id. ¶ 22.)
On 10/10/24, Hannah served Plaintiff with a 60-Day Notice to Quit. (Id. ¶ 24, Ex. “6”.)
Plaintiff became suspicious and discovered Hannah had used the Anza property as security for an $85,000 personal loan. (Id. ¶ 25.)
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She also served a UD action on Plaintiff and refused to convey the Anza property to him pursuant to his 1/14/25 demand. (Id. ¶ 27.)
The TAC then alleges that after all of these recent events, Plaintiff realized and discovered that Hannah was not going to be the straw buyer and had fraudulently induced him into using his own funds, granting her title, and that she did not intend to keep her promises. (Id. ¶ 28.)
What seems to be missing here is Plaintiff’s allegation of an “inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence.” (Fox, supra.)
But, there is a reasonable inference of such inability based on Hannah’s reaffirmation of the oral agreement allegedly occurring on 8/30/23.
The original Complaint was filed on 1/30/25, within the applicable statute of limitations periods.
Thus, the demurrer is overruled on this ground.
1st & 2nd COA: In the Opposition, Plaintiff asserts that he intentionally did not name Hannah’s lender (Rocket Mortgage) because he only seeks jurisdiction over the named Defendants and all unknown persons/entities.
Plaintiff asserts Rocket Mortgage is a bona fide lender that did nothing wrong and has a legitimate recorded lien against the property.
Plaintiff adds that if Rocket Mortgage had made its loan after he recorded his lis pendens on 1/30/25, the lender would be necessary.
Plaintiff seeks a judgment to clear his interest against Hannah who unjustly acquired and maintains an interest through her wrongdoing.
Plaintiff’s argument is persuasive.
Moreover, the TAC alleges all the required elements of a quiet title action, which Defendants did not dispute.
Thus, the demurrer is overruled.
3rd, 4th, and 5th: The TAC alleges Hannah wrongfully acquired the subject Anza property and retains it despite Plaintiff’s demand she convey it back to him, as she promised. (TAC ¶¶ 86-92, 97-103.)
It is alleged that Hannah continues to wrongfully detain the property and to maintain her illegal self-help scheme to get Plaintiff to voluntarily move out. (Id. ¶ 102.)
While Defendants argue that these claims cannot be alleged as causes of action, if Plaintiffs’ other causes of action are upheld, they may support imposition of a constructive trust.
Alternatively, if not, unjust enrichment may potentially be found.
As to constructive trust based on fraud, Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to allege he promptly tried to rescind the fraudulent transaction after learning of Hannah’s wrongful action.
Defendants rely on Leeper v. Beltrami (1959) 53 Cal.2d 195, 214-217 as support for this argument.
But, there, the Court was focused on plaintiffs’ delay in seeking rescission in the context of a statute of limitations analysis. (Id. at 211.)
“Rescission, whether legal or equitable, will not be permitted unless the plaintiff acts promptly in rescinding.” (Ibid.)
In Leeper, the Court found the complaint on its face, showed the plaintiff did not rescind promptly after knowledge. (Id. at 214.)
Leeper is inapposite to the facts alleged here in the TAC.
The 6th cause of action in the TAC incorporates all prior allegations in the TAC. (TAC ¶ 153.)
It is alleged that on 3/3/13 in Texas, Hannah fraudulently induced her parents to let her be the straw buyer to purchase a home in California, and she would hold the Deed of Trust as trustee for their benefit, and falsely stated she would deed it back to them if the decided to sell the Anza home and move back to Texas. (Id. ¶ 156.)
The truth was Hannah did not intend to only be a straw buyer and did not intend to ever grant the property back to her parents. (Id. ¶¶ 157, 161.)
The Jordans relied on Hannah’s representations and arranged to purchase the Anza property. (Id. ¶¶ 158-163.)
It is alleged that Hannah knew at the time she made the oral promises that her representations were false and she intended to induce her parents to use their own money and put title in only Hannah’s name. (Id. ¶¶ 164.)
The Jordans relied on Hannah’s statements and were justified in doing so because she is their “lone [sic] time trusted daughter.” (Id. ¶¶ 165-167.)
The TAC alleges that Plaintiff alleges he suffered and continues to suffer a great financial loss due to Hannah’s retention of the title to his property, securing an $85,000 personal loan against the property, being served with Notices to Quit, refusing to convey the property, serving him with a UD action, concealing her actual intent, etc. (Id. ¶¶ 166-182.)
These allegations are sufficient to allege a claim of fraud in the inducement, with particularity.
2. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JOHN TAYLOR VS 25859 BOWERBANK AND GARCIA RAINEY CVME2507496 JEFFERSON AVENUE, LLC AS COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR DEFENDANT 25859 JEFFERSON AVENUE, LLC Tentative Ruling: Deny the motion to disqualify counsel for the LLC.
Deny the motion for a protective order and sanctions (No IDC was requested)—all responses to be provided within 20 days.
Vacate the TSC.
A 7-day jury trial is scheduled for April 16, 2027.
All parties must strictly comply with Local Rule 3401 and should be familiar with Reales Investment v. Johnson (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 463.
The parties are directed to download, review, and follow the trial binder preparation pamphlet available on the court’s website.
All experts shall be deposed no later than