DEMURRER
5. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME DEMURRER ON COMPLAINT FOR CVPS2600522 TAYLOR VS PEREZ OTHER REAL OF TENNLEY TAYLOR Tentative Ruling: Sustained.
Sustained with leave to amend. Plaintiff granted leave to file 1st Amended Complaint within 10 days of this order becoming final.
Moving party to provide notice pursuant to CCP 1019.5.
On February 5, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint to Quiet Title. By filing this Complaint, Plaintiff seeks a judicial determination of ownership of the manufactured home at issue due to conflicting and adverse claims arising from abandonment, outdated administrative registration records, and unrecorded transfers.
Defendant now demurrers to the Complaint on grounds of failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Defendant contends that (1) Plaintiff has not established a present interest in the property; (2) Plaintiff cannot establish adverse possession because she has not satisfied the mandatory five-year occupancy requirement; (3) manufactured homes are personal property and cannot be subject to adverse possession of real property; (4) the Court has already adjudicated possessory rights in favor of Defendant; (5) Plaintiff has named a deceased person as a defendant.
In Opposition, Plaintiff contends that (1) disputed facts and competing claims of ownership are not appropriate for resolution at the pleading stage; (2) Plaintiff’s claim is not limited to adverse possession; (3) HCD registration does not conclusively establish ownership; (4) unlawful detainer does not establish ownership; (5) the relationship between land and manufactured home is factually disputed; (6) Plaintiff’s possession and stabilization of the property demonstrate that ownership is actively disputed; (7) Defendant’s evidence shows inconsistencies; (8) the demurrer improperly seeks factual determination.
Demurrer
A general demurrer lies where the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (CCP § 430.10(e).) In evaluating a demurrer, the court gives the pleading a reasonable interpretation by reading it as a whole and all of its parts in their context. (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125
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Katleman (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 666, 672.) However, a demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Daar v. Yellow Cab Company (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.) If the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend if there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
A quiet title action seeks to establish or “quiet” title to or an interest in real property as between adverse claimants. (CCP § 760.020(a); Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. McGurk (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 201, 210.) It is an appropriate remedy to establish any kind of legal or equitable rights, title, estate, lien or interest in real property as against an adverse claim or cloud on title. (CCP §§ 760.010(a) and 760.020(a).) A complaint for quiet title must be verified and include: (1) the subject property’s description; (2) plaintiff’s title as to which a determination is sought and the
basis of the title; (3) adverse claims to plaintiff’s title against which a determination is sought; (4) the date as of which the determination is sought (if other than the date the complaint is filed, a statement of reasons why that date is sought); and (5) a prayer for the determination of plaintiff’s title against the adverse claims. (CCP § 761.020; West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 802).
Here, Plaintiff has filed a verified Complaint. The complaint includes the property’s description. However, there is nothing in the Complaint showing Plaintiff’s title as to which a determination is sought and the basis for the title. Plaintiff alleges only that she took possession of the manufactured home in February 2025, but mere possession without more does not create a legal or equitable interest sufficient to support a quiet title claim (nor does Plaintiff provide authority otherwise). Plaintiff does not allege that she purchased the manufactured home, or that she received any conveyance or transfer of ownership, or that she has a written instrument establishing an ownership interest. She also does not allege that she is a bona fide purchaser or that she acquired any interest through inheritance, gift, or any other recognized method of acquiring property rights.
Defendant also contends that Plaintiff has not established adverse possession because he has not met the five-year continuous occupancy requirement. Defendant does not provide authority for this proposition, but is likely referring to CCP § 325, which provides, in part:
(b) In no case shall adverse possession be considered established under the provision of any section of this code, unless it shall be shown that the land has been occupied and claimed for the period of five years continuously, and the party or persons, their predecessors and grantors, have timely paid all state, county, or municipal taxes that have been levied and assessed upon the land for the period of five years during which the land has been occupied and claimed. Payment of those taxes by the party or persons, their predecessors and grantors shall be established by certified records of the county tax collector.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that she discovered and took possession of the manufactured home in February 2025. (See Complaint, page 3, D16). Plaintiff filed this action on February 4, 2026. Therefore, by her own admission, she has possessed the manufactured home for approximately one year, which is far short of the five-year requirement under CCP § 325.
In the Opposition, Plaintiff contends that her claim is not limited to adverse possession, but to a broader ownership and title dispute, including conflicting chain of title, disputed ownership of the manufactured home, reliance on administrative HCD records, lack of documented transfer, and unresolved classification of the property. The problem with Plaintiff’s “broader theory” approach is that, while a quiet title action does not necessarily require adverse possession, it does require alleging a cognizable ownership interest as the basis for the Plaintiff’s title.
Plaintiff does not appear to allege any actual chain of title into himself. Instead, he relies on alleged defects in defendant’s title without pleading his own. Without pleading the basis for his title, this claim fails. That is, Plaintiff cannot quiet title merely by attacking defects in Defendant’s ownership; Plaintiff must plead the nature and extent of his own title. Plaintiff has failed to do so. SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
Matters Beyond the Scope of the Pleading
Defendant goes beyond the four corners of the Complaint, submits a declaration of counsel, John Calvo, and contends that on March 4, 2026, this Court issued judgment in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff in an Unlawful Detainer Action (UDPS 2501119). Defendant states that the Court issued a writ of possession to Defendant for the same manufactured home that is the subject of
this quiet title action. On March 9, 2026, Plaintiff attempted to get an Ex Parte Emergency Stay of Enforcement of Judgment, a Stay of Writ of Possession, and a Motion to Recall or Quash the Writ of Possession, and Defendant contends that the Court denied all of these requests. Then Defendant contends that on March 25, 2025, the lockout was conducted by the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department on the subject manufactured home under the rights of aforementioned Writ of Possession. According to Defendant, Plaintiff had abandoned the property, stripped and damaged all systems, and cut electrical, plumbing, gas, and sewer lines to the point that property is currently uninhabitable.
The issues raised by Defendant (abandonment of manufactured home, lockout extinguishing ownership rights, Plaintiff relinquishing possession, prior UD determining ownership/possession), these issues appear to involve factual and issue/claim preclusion issues that cannot be resolved on demurrer.
Defendant also improperly tries to turn this into an evidentiary hearing in another way: by attaching a Department of Housing and Community Development Certificate of Title to the subject manufactured home as Exhibit 1 to the Demurrer. The document shows title was issued on December 31, 2025.
“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Ct. (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.)“The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)
Defendant contends that Plaintiff has named Antonio Rotella as a defendant in this action. According to Defendant, Antonio Rotella died on June 29, 2020, nearly five years before Plaintiff filed this Complaint. Defendant contends that a deceased person cannot be named as a defendant in a civil action. This constitutes a defect in parties that provides an additional ground for demurrer. Attached as Ex. 2 to the Declaration of John Calvo is a death certificate evidencing that Antonio Rotella died on June 29, 2020.
While a deceased person lacks capacity to be sued, Defendant has again brought in extrinsic evidence on demurrer. Also, this does not affect the fact that the cause of action for quiet title is not properly alleged.
Regardless of Defendant trying to turn this into an evidentiary hearing, as a threshold matter, and as discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.