| Case | County / Judge | Motion | Ruling | Indexed | Hearing |
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MOTION TO CONTEST GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT
1. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME MCCLOUD VS RIVERSIDE MOTION TO CONTEST GOOD CVRI2405772 COUNTY FAITH SETTLEMENT TRANSPORTATION Tentative Ruling: Continue for 120 days to allow discovery for Tech-Bilt factors. New date September 18, 2026.
Any party to an action in which it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract debt may seek a judicial determination that a settlement was made in good faith; such a determination bars any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault. (CCP § 877.6 (a), (c)-(d).)
The case of Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499, established the often-cited factors to be considered by the court in determining whether a settlement was made in good faith, as follows: (1) a rough approximation of the plaintiff’s total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability; (2) the amount paid in settlement; (3) the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs; (4) a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if her were found liable after trial; (5) the settlor’s financial condition and insurance policy limits; and (6) the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of the nonsettling defendants.
A settlor’s percentage of liability is the touchstone question to be considered by the trial court in a contested good faith settlement hearing. (City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1262.)
The party claiming the settlement was not in good faith has the burden of proof on this issue. (CCP § 877.6(d).)
At issue here is whether the proposed $30,000 settlement is disproportionate. For the first Tech-Bilt factor, Plaintiff has claimed about $1.2 million in damages. The $30,000 settlement represents less than 3% of this total. It may be justified if the settling defendant’s share of liability is minimal, or if their net worth is limited.
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Here, Cross-Defendants present testimonies that Peralta was the primary cause of the accident by executing an unsafe U-turn directly in front of Burleson’s vehicle. (Oliveira Dec. ¶ 7.) The responding officer’s conclusion in the traffic report supports this view.
However, Cross-Complainants also present Plaintiff’s own testimony to show that Burleson’s conduct was a significant contributing factor. Specifically, the McCloud deposition transcript shows that Plaintiff herself stating that Burleson was distracted in her driving by looking at warehouses immediately before the accident. (Ovanesian Decl., Ex. C.) A report also indicated that Burleson was potentially driving over the speed limit (i.e. 60-mph in a 50-mph zone). (Id., Ex. E.) At this stage, it is not unplausible that Burleson could be assigned a much higher percentage of fault than currently settled. Accordingly, the $30,000 settlement appears disproportionate to Burleson’s potential liability.
The other relevant consideration includes the settling defendant’s financial condition and insurance policy limits. (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates, supra, 38 Cal. 3d at 499.) Cross-Defendants argue that a settlement for policy limits often supports good faith. However, the inquiry also includes the settling defendant’s personal financial condition.
Here, the record does not contain any evidence regarding Burleson’s net worth, assets, income, occupation, or overall ability to pay a judgment beyond the $30,000 insurance policy. In City of Grand Terrace, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, the court of appeal overturned a good faith determination because no evidence was submitted showing the defendant’s financial condition, even with potential insurance coverage. There, there was “evidence that settlor was an airline captain and nothing more.” (City of Grand Terrace, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d 1264.)
The settlor’s financial ability is a factor for the trial court to properly evaluate the reasonable range of the settlement. (Id.) This mirrors the deficiency here. There appears to be no evidence of the settlor’s financial status. This information is needed to determine if a policy-limit settlement is reasonable compared to Burleson’s personal ability to respond to the damages.
As to the sixth factor, although Cross-Complainants question the misleading negotiation process, the evidence does not show collusion or fraud.
An objecting non-settlor may move for a continuance to allow “for the purpose of gathering facts” so that “the matter can be fully and fairly litigated.” (City of Grant Terrace, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1265.) Here, the court will grant a continuance for 120 days for discovery as there is limited information about the settlor’s financial conditions from either side.
2. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE CVRI2502882 N.I. VS BUKARAU ORDER Tentative Ruling: Grant. No opposition.
3. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME SERRANO VS ROYAL PLAZA TEXTILES, INC., A MOTION TO COMPEL CVRI2504134 NEW YORK ARBITRATION CORPORATION Tentative Ruling: Grant. No opposition.