motion challenging application for good faith settlement
hours; and time entries for JP on 06/16/25 (2.80), 06/23/25 (2.30), 06/25/25 (1.30), 10/06/25 (2.10), and 10/10/25 (0.80) for a total 2/3 reduction of 6.2 hours.
The Court also reduces the amount of anticipated time in preparing the reply and attending the hearing on this fee motion by 2 hours.
The Court thus awards the lodestar as follows:
Attorney Hours Hourly Total Rate Joseph M Preis 18.5 $600 $11,100 Joshua R. Mino 3.2 $600 $1,920 Richard Angel 23.5 $450 $10,575 Kris L. Amundsen 6.0 $450 $2,700 Anticipated Hours 8 $450 $3,600 TOTAL 69.2 $29,895
The Court also awards costs in the amount of $143.25. The sum total of attorney fees and costs awarded is $30,038.25.
Counsel for Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant shall provide notice of this ruling. 4 Rodriguez Before the court is the motion of defendant Maria De Lourdes Hernandez v. Ledesma (Ledesma) challenging the application for good faith Ledesma settlement filed by defendant Ramon Villalbaso Hernandez (Villalbaso). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is DENIED.
The only argument Ledesma makes to contest the application for determination of good faith settlement is that Code of Civil Procedure sections 877 and 877.6 are inapplicable to Ledesma because she contends she was not involved in the car accident giving rise to this lawsuit and thus she cannot be considered a joint tortfeasor with Villalbaso. As Ledesma acknowledges, the good faith settlement provisions apply to “one or more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same tort, or to one or more other co-obligors mutually subject to contribution rights.” (Code Civ. Proc., §877, emphasis added.) In addition, Section 877.6 applies “to an action in which it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors.” (Code Civ. Proc., §877.6, emphasis added.)
Here, plaintiff Jose A. Rodriguez Hernandez (Plaintiff) has alleged claims against both Villalbaso and Ledesma arising out of the same accident. The good faith settlement provisions thus apply to the instant settlement and to Ledesma. Ledesma cites no authority supporting her interpretation of the statutes. Moreover, the only evidence offered by Ledesma to support her contention she was not involved in the subject accident is the declaration of her counsel stating Ledesma has maintained she was not involved. This hearsay statement offered by counsel is insufficient to establish Ledesma was not involved in the accident.
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The court has reviewed the application for determination of good faith settlement filed by Villalbaso and has determined that an
application of the factors set forth in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward- Clyde & Assoc. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499 supports a finding that the settlement between Villalbaso and Plaintiff was made in good faith. Ledesma failed to meet her burden of demonstrating lack of good faith. (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6(d).)
Accordingly, the application for determination of good faith settlement filed by Villalbaso is APPROVED.
Villalbaso shall submit a proposed order in accordance with this ruling.
Counsel for Villalbaso is ordered to give notice. 5 Kwok v. Before the Court is a Motion to Charge Members’ Interests in Limited Genera Corp. Liability Companies by defendant/judgment creditor Genera Corporation (Judgment Creditor). For the reasons set forth herein, the motion is DENIED, without prejudice.
Judgment Creditor seeks an order charging the membership interests of plaintiffs/judgment debtors Jackson Kwok and Annie Wong (collectively, Judgment Debtors) in five limited liability companies with payment of the unpaid balance of the judgment entered December 2, 2025 and as amended on February 18, 2026. The five entities are: (1) Singgong LLC, (2) Cat & Mouse Investments, LLC, (3) AOK Consulting, LLC, (4) Oneroadfat LLC and (5) Camstars LLC (collectively, LLC’s).
Here, although Judgment Creditor asserts in the motion that both Judgment Debtors have a membership interest in each of the LLC’s, the evidence presented by Judgment Creditor with the moving papers does not establish this.
Corporations Code section 17705.03 states “on application by a judgment creditor of a member or transferee, a court may enter a charging order against the transferable interest of the judgment debtor for the unsatisfied amount of the judgment.” (Corp. Code, § 17705.03(a).) Corporations Code section 17705.03 also states it is the exclusive remedy by which a judgment creditor seeking to enforce a judgment against a member or transferee may satisfy the judgment from the judgment debtor’s transferable interest. (Corp. Code, § 17705.03(f).) Here, the documents attached as Exhibits C-G to Ms. Graves’ declaration (ROA 1072) do not establish the Judgment Debtors are members or transferees of the LLC’s such that a charging order under section 17705.03 could apply.
The Court notes that Judgment Creditor submitted additional evidence along with the reply in order to show the Judgment Debtors are members of the LLC’s. The Court declines to consider the new evidence submitted along with the Reply. (See, e.g., Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 241 - “general rule of motion practice . . . is that new evidence is not permitted with reply papers.”)