Solter vs. Capsavage

For example, Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5 provides that:

Where it is proven by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant is liable for financial abuse, as defined in Section 15610.30, in addition to compensatory damages and all other remedies otherwise provided by law, the court shall award to the plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.5, subd. (a).)

In this case, this court entered judgment in favor of Cross-Complainant and against Cross- Defendant on the 1st Cause of Action for financial elder abuse on February 17, 2026. (See ROA #217.)

Thus, Cross-Complainant is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.

Lodestar Calculation of Attorney’s Fees

Normally, a court should use the lodestar method for calculating the amount of an award of attorney’s fees, unless the statute authorizing attorney’s fees provides for another method of calculation. (Galbiso v. Orosi Pub. Util. Dist. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1089.)

Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5 does not provide another method of calculating reasonable attorney’s fees, so that the court will use the lodestar method.

When using this method, the court begins by determining the reasonable hours the prevailing party’s attorney spent on the case and multiplying that number by the reasonable hourly rate. (See Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131- 1134; Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.)

The prevailing party should not receive a “windfall” through an award of reasonable

attorney’s fees. (Ketchum vs. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.)

Thus, the prevailing party “’bear[s] the burden of. . . documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.’” (Computer Xpress, Inc. v. Jackson, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1020, quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424, 437.)

However, once an attorney has presented evidence of her or his actual time spent and hourly rate charged, the time and hourly rate are presumed to be reasonable. (Mandel v. Lackner (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 747, 761; see Horsford v Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396 [“[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous."]; Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1367 [declarations of counsel are "sufficient to meet the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the fees incurred, without the need to produce copies of counsel's detailed billing statements”].)

“As the trial court ‘is in the best position to value the services rendered by the attorneys in his or her courtroom,’ we leave it in the trial court's discretion to determine the amount of reasonable attorney fees and costs to award . . . under the lodestar method.” (Frym v. 601 Main Street LLC (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 613, 622, quoting 569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437; see also Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132 [“The trial judge is ‘the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.’”].)

Reasonable Hourly Rate

The reasonable hourly rate is based on the reasonable market value of the attorney’s services. (See PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1094-1095 or PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1094-1095.)

This standard applies regardless of how much the attorney actually charged the client. (See ibid.) Thus, the same reasonable hourly rate will apply whether the attorney charged nothing for their

services, charged below-market or discounted rates, represented the client on a contingent fee basis, or are in-house counsel paid a fixed salary.

To determine the reasonable market value of the legal services provided, the court must look to the range of reasonable rates charged by and judicially awarded to comparable attorneys for comparable work. (See Children’s Hospital & Medical Center v. Bonta (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 783; see also PLCM Group v. Drexler, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095 [“[The] reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.”].)

The party requesting fees has the initial burden of producing evidence sufficient to support the reasonableness of the billing rates requested. (See Davis v. City of San Diego (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 893, 903.)

If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce admissible evidence sufficient to show that the rates requested are not reasonable. (See Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 155 [finding court erred in reducing rates where evidence of reasonableness of rate requested was undisputed].)

“In making its calculation [of a reasonable hourly rate], the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees, the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied, and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases.” (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 41, citations omitted; see also Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009.)

The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter of which the trial court has its own expertise. (PLCM Group v. Drexler, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1096.) The trial court may make its own determination of the value of the services contrary to, or without the necessity for, expert testimony. (Ibid.) “It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the

trial court.” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623.)

Here, Cross-Complainant’s Counsel provides evidence that he actually charged Cross- Complainant $350 per hour and this rate is presumed reasonable.

Cross-Defendant does present any evidence that this rate is not reasonable and the court independently finds, based on its knowledge and familiarity with the relevant legal market, that this rate is reasonable.

Hours Reasonably Expended

“An award of attorney fees ‘should ordinarily include compensation for all the hours reasonably spent, including those relating solely to the fee.’” (Frym v. 601 Main Street LLC (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 613, 619, quoting Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1131; see also Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1141 [award of attorney’s fees “may include not only the fees incurred with respect to the underlying claim, but also the fees incurred in enforcing the right to mandatory fees.”].)

The prevailing party has the burden to present verified time records showing the hours spent on the case.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)

However, once they are properly admitted, “the verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Ibid.; see Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1367 [declarations of counsel are “sufficient to meet the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the fees incurred, without the need to produce copies of counsel's detailed billing statements."].)

In challenges to the reasonableness of the number of hours billed, “it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.” (Premier Medical Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Ass’n (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.) “General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Ibid.)

Nonetheless “[a] trial court may not rubber stamp a request for attorney fees, but must determine the number of hours reasonably expended.” (Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 271-272.)

Therefore, prevailing parties should be compensated only for hours reasonably spent on fee-related issues. (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635.)

Here, Cross-Complainant’s Counsel submitted 47 pages of his time records demonstrating 553.10 hours of work spent on this litigation. (See Decl. of John M. Beall (Beall Decl.), ¶ 3.)

Although some of this time was spent on the Complaint filed by Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant as well as the breach of contract cause of action of the Cross-Complaint, both of these matters was inextricably intertwined with the financial elder abuse claim, as they all depended on the enforceability and breach of the 2003 Lease Agreement.

In addition, this action ongoing since August of 2023 and Cross-Defendant litigated this matter aggressively for almost two years before dismissing his complaint on the eve of trial on July 15, 2025. (See id., ¶ 4.)

The hours spent include time related to communications; investigation of all issues; preparation of pleadings; analyzing and reviewing numerous pleadings; analyzing and reviewing records and files, trust documents, and bank statements; preparation of and responding to discovery and depositions; legal research; preparing and filing of motions and documents with the court; investigation and reviewing all property records and recorded documents; attendance at all court hearings; trial preparation; and trial.

The court has reviewed Cross-Complainant’s Counsel’s billing records and deducts the following entries as irrelevant to the litigation or unreasonably incurred:

1.1 hours for “A/R all discovery responses in U.D. action”; 0.2 hours for “File RFD on U.D. case”

0.1 hours for “RR LETTER STATE BAR”; and 3 hours from the total of 7.8 hours to amend the Cross-Complaint.

Therefore, the court will award reasonable attorney’s fees of 548.7 hours x $350 per hour, for a total of $192,045.

Cross-Complainant shall give notice of this ruling.

Motion for Attorney’s Fees 5 30-2023-01350562 Defendants Felix Agranovich’s and Katherine Agranovich’s Motion to Recover Attorney’s Fees Lynn vs. Does 1 through 20 and Costs Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Plaintiffs Brent Lynn and Maya Lynn are ORDERED to pay Defendants Felix Agranovich and Katherine Agranovich reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount of $105,894.83 and costs in the amount of $462.30 within 90 days of service of the notice of ruling.

Pending Motion

Defendants Felix Agranovich and Katherine Agranovich (Agranovich Defendants) move for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount of $103,531.53 and costs of $462.30, as well as additional attorney’s fees required to prepare reply papers and attend the hearing on this matter.

Standard for Motion for Attorney’s Fees

Generally, attorney’s fees are borne by the party that incurred them. (See Pederson v. Kennedy (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 976, 978-79).

Therefore, a party may recover attorney’s fees only if provided for by contract or statute. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10); see also LNSU # 1, LLC v. Alta Del Mar Coastal Collection Community Association (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1081 [“Each party to an action must pay its own attorney fees unless a statute or contract requires the opposing party to pay them.”].)

For example, Civil Procedure Code section 425.16 states that “a prevailing defendant on a[n Anti- SLAPP] special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover that defendant's attorney's fees and