Lynn vs. Does 1 through 20

costs.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (c)(1).) Under this provision, “any SLAPP defendant who brings a successful motion to strike is entitled to mandatory attorney fees.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131.)

The purpose of the statute is “compensating the prevailing defendant for the undue burden of defending against litigation designed to chill the exercise of free speech and petition rights.” (Barry v. State Bar of California (2017) 2 Cal.5th 318, 328.)

On November 21, 2025, the court granted Defendants Felix Agranovich and Katherine Agranovich’s Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Brent Lynn and Maya Lynn’s First Amended Complaint under Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP). (See ROA #207.)

Thus, Agranovich Defendants are the prevailing defendants entitled to attorney’s fees and Plaintiffs do not dispute this fact.

Lodestar Calculation of Attorney’s Fees

Normally, a court should use the lodestar method for calculating the amount of an award of attorney’s fees, unless the statute authorizing attorney’s fees provides for another method of calculation. (Galbiso v. Orosi Pub. Util. Dist. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1089.)

The Anti-SLAPP Statute does not provide another method of calculating reasonable attorney’s fees so that the court may use the loadstar approach with respect to anti-SLAPP motions, although it is not required to do so. (Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1135-1136.)

When using this method, the court begins by determining the reasonable hours the prevailing party’s attorney spent on the case and multiplying that number by the reasonable hourly rate. (See Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131- 1134; Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.)

The prevailing party should not receive a “windfall” through an award of reasonable attorney’s fees. (Ketchum vs. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.)

Thus, the prevailing party “’bear[s] the burden of. . . documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.’” (Computer Xpress, Inc. v. Jackson, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1020, quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424, 437.)

However, once an attorney has presented evidence of her or his actual time spent and hourly rate charged, the time and hourly rate are presumed to be reasonable. (Mandel v. Lackner (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 747, 761; see Horsford v Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396 [“[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous."]; Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1367 [declarations of counsel are "sufficient to meet the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the fees incurred, without the need to produce copies of counsel's detailed billing statements”].)

“As the trial court ‘is in the best position to value the services rendered by the attorneys in his or her courtroom,’ we leave it in the trial court's discretion to determine the amount of reasonable attorney fees and costs to award . . . under the lodestar method.” (Frym v. 601 Main Street LLC (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 613, 622, quoting 569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437; see also Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132 [“The trial judge is ‘the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.’”].)

Reasonable Hourly Rate

The reasonable hourly rate is based on the reasonable market value of the attorney’s services. (See PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1094-1095 or PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1094-1095.)

This standard applies regardless of how much the attorney actually charged the client. (See ibid.) Thus, the same reasonable hourly rate will apply whether the attorney charged nothing for their services, charged below-market or discounted rates, represented the client on a contingent fee basis, or are in-house counsel paid a fixed salary.

To determine the reasonable market value of the legal services provided, the court must look to the range of reasonable rates charged by and judicially awarded to comparable attorneys for comparable work. (See Children’s Hospital & Medical Center v. Bonta (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 783; see also PLCM Group v. Drexler, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095 [“[The] reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.”].)

The party requesting fees has the initial burden of producing evidence sufficient to support the reasonableness of the billing rates requested. (See Davis v. City of San Diego (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 893, 903.)

If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce admissible evidence sufficient to show that the rates requested are not reasonable. (See Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 155 [finding court erred in reducing rates where evidence of reasonableness of rate requested was undisputed].)

“In making its calculation [of a reasonable hourly rate], the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees, the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied, and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases.” (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 41, citations omitted; see also Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009.)

The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter of which the trial court has its own expertise. (PLCM Group v. Drexler, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1096.) The trial court may make its own determination of the value of the services contrary to, or without the necessity for, expert testimony. (Ibid.) “It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court.” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623.)

Agranovich Defendants seek the following hourly rates: $775 per hour for Attorney Vick and Attorney Jassy, $595 per hour for Attorney Ostoff, and $485 per hour for Attorney Harris.

Agranovich Defendants also provide the following evidence regarding the experience and qualifications of their counsel:

Attorney Vick is a founding partner of Jassy Vick Carolan LLP (JVC) and graduated from Harvard Law School in 2001. (See Decl. of Jordyn Ostroff (Ostroff Decl.), ¶ 5.) Attorney Jassy also is a founding partner of JVC and graduated from University of Southern California Law School in 1999. (See id., ¶ 6.) Attorney Ostroff graduated from Berkeley Law School in 2016 and Attorney Harris graduated from Harvard Law School in 2023. (See id., ¶¶ 7-8.)

Agranovich Defendants presented evidence regarding the expertise of their counsel in this area of the law. (See id., ¶¶ 4-8.)

Defendants provide examples of cases in which courts awarded hourly rates comparable to or greater than $775 per hour. (See, e.g., Concerned Jewish Parents & Teachers of L.A. v. Liberated Ethnic Studies Model Curriculum Consortium (C.D. Cal. May 23, 2025) 2025 WL 1549995, at *3 [finding that partner rates ranging from $800 to $1050 were reasonable for anti-SLAPP motion practice]; Herring Networks, Inc. v. Maddow (S.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2021) 2021 WL 409724, at *7 [finding that partners’ hourly rates ranging from $1,050 to $1,150 and associates’ hourly rates ranging from $470 to $720 were reasonable in 2021 for work on an anti-SLAPP motion.].)

Plaintiffs contend that the hourly rates for Agranovich Defendants’ Counsel are unreasonable, but do not provide evidence or examples of hourly rates that are prevailing in the community for similar work.

Therefore, the court finds, based on the undisputed evidence provided by Agranovich Defendants, that these rates are reasonable.

Hours Reasonably Expended

“An award of attorney fees ‘should ordinarily include compensation for all the hours reasonably

spent, including those relating solely to the fee.’” (Frym v. 601 Main Street LLC (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 613, 619, quoting Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1131; see also Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1141 [award of attorney’s fees “may include not only the fees incurred with respect to the underlying claim, but also the fees incurred in enforcing the right to mandatory fees.”].)

The prevailing party has the burden to present verified time records showing the hours spent on the case.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)

However, once they are properly admitted, “the verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Ibid.; see Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1367 [declarations of counsel are “sufficient to meet the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the fees incurred, without the need to produce copies of counsel's detailed billing statements."].)

In challenges to the reasonableness of the number of hours billed, “it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.” (Premier Medical Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Ass’n (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.) “General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Ibid.)

Nonetheless “[a] trial court may not rubber stamp a request for attorney fees, but must determine the number of hours reasonably expended.” (Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 271-272.)

Therefore, prevailing parties should be compensated only for hours reasonably spent on fee-related issues. (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635.)

As the Court of Appeal has explained:

Although [] billing statements in support of a fee request form the “’starting point’” for determining the “‘hours reasonably expended’” in a lodestar calculation, the

trial court is not bound to accept these hours and may reduce them if it concludes the attorneys performed work unrelated to the anti-SLAPP motion, or represented work that was unnecessary or duplicative or excessive in light of the issues fairly presented.

(569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc., supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 441, quoting Christian Research Institute v. Alnor, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1324, 1326; see Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 579-580 [court need not include inefficient or duplicative efforts when awarding attorney’s fees].)

Thus, the defendant may recover fees and costs “only for the motion to strike, not the entire litigation.” (Christian Research Inst. v. Alnor, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1320.)

Therefore, the Court of Appeal has held that:

[A] fee award under the anti-SLAPP statute may not include matters unrelated to the anti-SLAPP motion, such as ‘attacking service of process, preparing and revising an answer to the complaint, [or] summary judgment research.’ . . . Similarly, the fee award should not include fees for ‘obtaining the docket at the inception of the case’ or ‘attending the trial court's mandatory case management conference’ because such fees ‘would have been incurred whether or not [the defendant] filed the motion to strike.’ . . . In short, the award of fees is designed to ‘reimburs[e] the prevailing defendant for expenses incurred in extracting herself from a baseless lawsuit’ . . .rather than to reimburse the defendant for all expenses incurred in the baseless lawsuit.

(569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc., supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 433, citations omitted.)

In this case, Agranovich Defendants’ Counsel submitted detailed time records showing the time spent by each attorney in this litigation. (See Ostroff Decl., Exh. 2.)

Plaintiffs contend that various entries were for purposes other than preparation of the anti-SLAPP motion, and also contend that there were duplicative entries.

The court has reviewed Agranovich Defendants’ Counsel billing records and deducts the following entries as irrelevant to Anti-SLAPP motion or unreasonably incurred:

3/19/2025 Communicate with clients re issue pertaining to Jackson as co - defendants, 0.4 hours ($310.00)

3/20/25 Evaluate effectiveness of service of process and related strategies in response to F. Agranovich questions, 0.3 hours ($178.50)

4/1/2025 Review discovery sent to Agranoviches and communicate with them about it, and effect of filing anti - SLAPP motion on discovery generally, 0.2 hours ($155.00)

4/7/2025 Review proof of service of summons and calculate deadline for filing anti -SLAPP motion, 0.1 hours ($77.50) [duplicative]

4/7/2025 Evaluate and calculate last day to file responsive pleading including if anti - SLAPP motion is considered the responsive pleading, and communicate with client representatives re: same, 0.4 hours ($310.00) [duplicative]

4/28/2025 Communicate with D. Vanderpool re: Joint Defense Agreement and declaration of C. Jackson, 0.4 hours ($310.00)

4/30/2025 Draft notice of related cases to file with anti -SLAPP motion, 0.6 hours ($357.00)

4/30/2025 Review and revise notice of related cases, 0.7 hours ($542.50)

5/1/2025 Review and revise notice of related cases Agranovich, 0.2 hours ($155.00)

8/13/2025 Review proposed stipulation from Lynn’s counsel re: confidential and sealing of Jackson Defendants’ anti - SLAPP motion and evaluate whether Agranoviches should join in stipulation, 0.1 hours ($77.50)

8/14/2025 Evaluate Lynn’s proposed stipulation re confidentiality and strategic considerations re responding to same, 0.1 hours ($77.50)

9/3/2025 Review Lynn’s amended motion to file certain materials under seal and communicate with clients re same, 0.2 hours ($155.00)

1/14/2026 Review and analyze Lynns’ case information sheet and notice of associated counsel in COA 0.3 hours ($178.50)

5/1/2025 Revise declaration of M. Lubin in support of anti-SLAPP motion Agranovich, 0.2 hours ($155.00) [duplicative]

5/23/2025 Review order and new deadlines for hearing on anti-SLAPP motion after transfer to new judge Agranovich, 0.1 hours ($77.50) [duplicative]

In addition, the time incurred for the reply papers and in anticipation of preparing for and attending the hearing is excessive. The court reduces the amount of attorney’s fees for these tasks to $4,165.

Accordingly, the final fee award is $105,894.83.

Costs

Generally, the prevailing party is entitled, as a matter of right, to recover costs in any action or proceeding. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (b); Foothill-De Anza Comm. College Dist. v. Emerich (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 11, 29-30.)

Civil Procedure Code section 1033.5 enumerates the specific costs that are recoverable by the prevailing party in a civil action. (See Code Civ. Proc, §§ 1032, subd. (b), 1033.5.)

Section 1033.5 also provides that the court may award costs not expressly described in the statute

for expenses that are “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation” and are “reasonable in amount.” (Code Civ. Proc, § 1033.5, subd. (c)(2)- (4).)

Here, Defendants claim costs in the amount of $462.30.

Plaintiffs do not challenge this amount.

Therefore, the court awards costs in the amount of $462.30.

Agranovich Defendants shall give notice of this ruling

Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs 6 30-2022-01291447 Respondent California Regional Water Quality Control Board, San Diego Regio’s Motion to Strike Baldwin & Sons, Inc. vs. or Tax Costs is GRANTED. California Regional Water Quality Control Board, San Pending Motion Diego Region Respondent California Regional Water Quality Control Board, San Diego Region moves to strike the memorandum of costs filed by Petitioners Baldwin & Sons, Inc.; Sunranch Capital Partners, LLC; Sunrise Pacific Construction, Inc.; SRC-PH Investments, LLC; Baldwin & Sons, LLC; Shawn M. Baldwin; Randall G. Bone; and Jose Capati.

Standard to Seek Costs – Standard to Strike and/or Tax Costs

Generally, the “prevailing party” is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs of suit in any action or proceeding. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (b); Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 606.)

The “prevailing party” includes “the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).)

In addition, “[i]f any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified, the ‘prevailing party’ shall be as