Advanced Marketing and Distribution, Inc. vs. Robert Kaskie, Trustee to The Lucille MacDonald Trust Dated October 17, 2001

The Court declines to tax the costs. Defendant did not file a timely motion to strike or tax costs. (Cal. R. Ct. Rule 3.1700(b)(1).) And, the cost items at issue are recoverable as reasonable costs and expenses. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a).)

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the ruling.

104 2026-01553833 Order to Show Cause re: Preliminary Injunction

Advanced Plaintiff Advanced Marketing and Distribution, Inc.’s application for a preliminary Marketing and injunction is denied. Distribution, Inc. Defendant’s objections are overruled. vs. Robert Kaskie, Trustee Defendant’s request for judicial notice is granted. to The Lucille MacDonald Trust Plaintiff filed numerous documents on May 7, 2026 which are untimely. Per CCP §1005(b), Dated October all reply papers are required to be filed at least five court days before the hearing. Thus 17, 2001, as Plaintiff’s reply papers were due on or before May 4, 2026.

The Court does not consider amended and any documents filed by either party after May 4, 2026. restated Code Civ. Proc., § 526(a)(3) provides that an injunction may be granted “[w]hen it appears, during the litigation, that a party to the action is doing, or threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the rights of another party to the action respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.” The purpose of CCP § 526(a)(3) is to preserve the status quo pending litigation. (See, Stockton v.

Newman (1957) 148 Cal.App.2d 558, 563.)

First, for an injunction to issue, the moving party must establish a likelihood of prevailing

on the merits. (See San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co., Inc. v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 438, 442.) Evidence must be submitted to establish a probability of prevailing on the merits, and this is customarily done by affidavits or declarations, although a verified complaint and other discovery can be considered. (See Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 527.)

Second, before an injunction is issued, a party has the burden of showing that irreparable harm will be suffered if the injunction is not issued. (See Tiburon v. Northwestern Pacific Railroad Co. (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 160, 179.)

Here, Plaintiff moves for a preliminary injunction prohibiting Defendant from attempting to evict Plaintiff, market for sale or take any action to negatively affect Plaintiff’s tenancy related to the property located at 16691 Noyes Avenue, Irvine, California 92606.

Plaintiff fails to establish a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of its claims, because Defendant has a valid statute of frauds defense.

Civ. Code, § 1624(a)(3) provides that “an agreement for leasing for a longer period than one year” is “invalid, unless [it is]... in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged...”

The lease forming the basis of Plaintiff’s claims is not signed by either party.

Plaintiff attaches the correspondence regarding the lease negotiations to its Complaint. The last email sent was from Robert Kaskie on 8/18/24 which states:

Aloha Steve and Phil, I took out the deposit part. How would you like to handle the building expenses for repairs? Technically, the warranties are irrelevant since you have been the existing tenant. That is how our attorney interprets it. Could you let me know what you're looking to have warranties on? If we are already giving $30K towards any replacement or repairs, we can strike that area if you like, or you can come up with language that suits both parties.

Attached to this email is an unsigned, red-lined lease, with large gray “DRAFT” letters prominently typed across each page. (See Complaint, Ex. J.)

This does not evidence any sort of agreement/meeting of the minds over the terms of the lease.

Plaintiff’s arguments that the lease does not need to be signed to be binding, and/or that Defendant is estopped from asserting the Statute of Frauds because Plaintiff accepted the lease through its possession and performance are not supported by law.

Plaintiff cites to Munford v. Humphreys (1924) 68 Cal.App. 530, 535; however, this case involved only a one-year lease. Plaintiff also cites to Walker v. Dorn (1966) 240 Cal. App. 2d 118, but this too is distinguishable because the lessor had signed the lease in question. Chandler v. Hart (1911) 161 Cal. at 412 dealt with a lease of oil land, and is clearly inapplicable to this situation. Plaintiff also cites to Hines v. Hubble (1956) 144 Cal. App. 2d 830, but this is not applicable as it was a case for quiet title to mining claims.

Also, the lessors in this case signed the lease. (Id. at 836.) Finally, in Beverly Hills National Bank v. Seres (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 255 (also cited by Plaintiff), the lessee executed the lease at issue, took possession and commenced substantial construction on improvements to the store. Thereafter, the lessor owner sent a signed confirmation letter of the five-year lease.

(Id. at 258.)

Plaintiff cites to no legal authority holding that a five-year lease not signed by either party survives the defense of the statute of frauds.

Plaintiff also fails to demonstrate a risk of irreparable harm.

Plaintiff’s CFO, Steven Bolden submits a declaration. (ROA 13.) He states that “Plaintiff’s business consists of manufacturing, marketing and distribution of products in the wellness and automobile electronics industries.” (Bolden Decl., ¶ 4.) He also states that having to move Plaintiff’s operations would “disrupt Plaintiff’s business and pose a potential risk the[sic] Plaintiff’s inventory.” (Bolden Decl., ¶ 14.) He also states that finding a substitute property would be difficult and expensive, and that Plaintiff’s employees might resign. (Bolden Decl., ¶¶ 15-16.)

These statements are somewhat conclusory. No detail is provided about the size of Plaintiff’s inventory that it would need to move and store. Nor is any information provided regarding the type of property that Plaintiff requires to operate its business. It is further unclear why Plaintiff’s employees would resign due to a move. In short, Plaintiff does not meet its burden to establish irreparable injury.

In addition, Plaintiff has not shown that monetary remedies are inadequate. When an award of damages constitutes an adequate legal remedy, a judge may not issue a preliminary injunction. (Tahoe Keys Prop. Owners' Ass'n v State Water Resources Control Bd. (1994) 23 CA4th 1459, 1471.)

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s application for a preliminary injunction is denied.

The Court has reviewed the Notice of Related Case filed in this matter. The Court stays this matter pending the outcome of the related Complaint for Unlawful Detainer filed in Orange County Superior Case No. 30-2026-01559888. The case management conference of August 10, 2026 is vacated. The Court sets a review hearing re: status of the stay for August 31, 2026 at 10:00 a.m. in Department C27.

Defendant is ordered to give notice.

105 2025-01473824 1. Demurrer to Answer 2. Case Management Conference Guerrero vs. BJ's 3. Order to Show Cause re: Sanctions for Failure to File Case Management Statement Restaurants, Inc. Plaintiff Nikole Guerrero’s demurrer to each affirmative defense in Defendant BJ’s Restaurants, Inc.’s answer is sustained in part, with 15 days leave to amend, and overruled in part.

Legal Standard

CCP section 431.30, subdivision (b), provides: The answer to a complaint shall contain: (1) The general or specific denial of the material allegations of the complaint controverted by the defendant. (2) A statement of any new matter constituting a defense.

There are three grounds for a demurrer to an answer: (1) failure to state facts sufficient to