140 BLUE RAVINE, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs PHOENIX MOTOR, INC, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, et al.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver

23CV010098: 140 BLUE RAVINE, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs PHOENIX MOTOR, INC, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, et al. 03/24/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 53

and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING:

*** NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT WILL MOVE TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL THEN BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

Plaintiff/cross-defendant 140 Blue Ravine, LLC’s (“Plaintiff”) “motion for summary adjudication” on both of its causes of action alleged in the Second Amended Complaint (“2AC”) against defendants/cross-complainants Phoenix Motor, Inc. (“Phoenix”) and SPI Solar, Inc. (“SPI”) (collectively “Defendants”) is ruled upon as follows.

Defendants’ counsel again failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1113(f), requiring a table of contents and a table of authorities when the memorandum exceeds 10 pages.

Defendants’ counsel again failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1354(b), expressly prohibiting objections to evidence from being restated or reargued in the separate statement.

Defendants’ counsel again failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1354(b)(3), expressly requiring the written objections to evidence quote or set forth the objectionable statements claimed to be inadmissible, so the Court need not expend its finite resources searching for the specific statements to which these objections are directed to in order to rule on such objections.

Factual Background

This action arises from a 2022 commercial lease whereby defendant PMI agreed to lease certain premises from Plaintiff. This action was commenced on 10/18/2023 with a complaint for breach of contract against defendant Phoenix and its guarantor, defendant SPI. The operative Second Amended Complaint (“2AC”) filed on 12/27/2024 now alleges a single cause of action against defendant Phoenix for breach of the lease agreement and a single cause of action against defendant SPI for breach of the lease

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guaranty.

Defendants filed on 3/7/2025 an initial cross-complaint against Plaintiff but later filed on 11/18/2025 an amended cross-complaint against Plaintiff, alleging causes of action for conversion, trespass, negligent interference with prospective economic relations, violation of Civil Code §1993.07, negligence, and declaratory relief.

This action has not yet been set for trial. The Court notes that although not mentioned anywhere in the moving papers filed on 11/26/2025, Plaintiff previously filed on 2/20/2025 a motion for summary judgment not only on its own 2AC against Defendants but also on Defendants’ cross-complaint or alternatively, for summary adjudication of each cause of action alleged in both pleadings, on the grounds there are no triable issues of material fact and Plaintiff is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law on both pleadings. (See, 5/22/2025 Am. Not. of Mot., p.1:26-p.2:1; p.2:13-16.) As support for summary judgment on the 2AC, Plaintiff relied on Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) Nos. 1-39 (see, Pl. 5/22/2025 Am. Sep. Stm., pp.2-8) and alternatively, Plaintiff sought summary adjudication of the following four (4) issues:

Plaintiff’s first cause of action against Phoenix for breach of contract, citing as support UMF Nos. 1-12 and 16-39; Plaintiff’s second cause of action against SPI for breach of contract, offering UMF Nos. 1-39; Phoenix had a duty to perform under the subject lease agreement but breached same by failing to pay rent when due, relying on UMF Nos. 1-8, 16-18, 20-21 and 29-31; and SPI had a duty to perform under the subject guaranty but breached same by failing to perform when Phoenix failed to timely pay rent, advancing UMF Nos. 1-8, 13- 14, 16-18, 20-21 and 29-31 (see, Am. Not. of Mot., p.2:1-12; Pl. Am. Sep. Stm., p.10).

On 9/25/2025, this Court issued a Minute Order denying the entirety of Plaintiff’s prior a motion for summary judgment/adjudication in its entirety based on Plaintiff’s failure to carry its initial burden of production with respect to both the 2AC and the crosscomplaint, primarily as a result of Defendants’ objections to evidence being sustained, including those to the moving declaration by Cole Strombom.

The present “motion for summary adjudication” was filed shortly thereafter on 11/26/2025.

Moving Papers. Plaintiff now moves for “summary adjudication” on each of the two causes of action alleged against each defendant in the 2AC on the grounds “there are no disputed issues of material fact concerning those claims, thereby entitling [Plaintiff] to

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adjudication of each cause of action in its favor as a matter of law” and consequently, Plaintiff “is thus entitled to $1,189,693.70 in damages, plus attorney’s fees, costs, and post-judgment interest.” (11/26/2025 Not. of Mot., p.2:4-12.) More specifically, Plaintiff seeks summary adjudication of the following two issues:

Plaintiff “is entitled to summary adjudication on its First Cause of Action for Breach of Contract-Lease against Phoenix because Phoenix failed to pay its financial obligations under the Lease,” citing as support UMF Nos. 1-17; and Plaintiff “is entitled to summary adjudication on its Second Cause of Action for Breach of Contract-Guaranty against SPI because SPI guaranteed Phoenix’s obligations under the Lease, which Phoenix has not performed,” relying on UMF Nos. 1- 22. (11/26/2025 Not. of Mot., p.2:12-18; Mov. Sep. Stm., pp.1-6.)

Like Plaintiff’s prior motion for summary judgment/adjudication, the present “motion for summary adjudication” is premised in large part on a declaration by Cole Strombom who is identified as “a member of Plaintiff 140 Blue Ravine, LLC.” (Strombom Decl., ¶1.) Although the present motion is labeled as one which merely seeks “summary adjudication” of individual causes of action alleged in the 2AC, the present motion is properly characterized as one which also seeks summary judgment on the entirety of the 2AC inasmuch as the 2AC consists of just two causes of action and if summary adjudication is granted as to both of these causes of action, Plaintiff will as a matter of law therefore be entitled to summary judgment on the entirety of the 2AC.

The significance of the present motion effectively seeking not only summary adjudication but also summary judgment on the entirety of the 2AC is discussed in greater detail below.

Opposition. Defendants Phoenix and SPI oppose, arguing there are triable issues of fact which mandate denial of this motion. According to the opposition, Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating the absence of any triable issue of material fact insofar as “Plaintiffs [sic] claims regarding breach of contract against [Phoenix and] SPI, and damages [sic] are flawed and unsupported by sufficient evidence.” (Opp., p.1:25-p.2:1.) In particular, the opposition primarily advances the following three (3) contentions:

(1) “The damages in this matter are uncertain” and “disputed” and “[t]he damages calculations that Plaintiff provides are based on an invalid hearing date, lack expert opinion, and are based on inadmissible evidence;” (2) “The ‘Auction’ was not carried out per the strict terms and in compliance with California Code of Civil Procedure [§]1993.07” and “Plaintiff has provided no evidence other than hearsay testimony to allege they [sic] have complied, [with] no invoices, receipts, payments, or proof of any proceeds of the auction;” and (3) “Mitigation efforts have been lackluster at best” and “Plaintiff has not

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disclosed how many prospective tenants applied, the rates for leasing, and any other efforts other than accepting short-term tenants in an attempt to disguise ‘good faith’ without actually using diligence and good faith.” (Opp., p.2:3-23.)

In support of their opposition, Defendants did file a separate statement which insists that everyone of Plaintiff’s proffered 22 UMFs is “disputed” but Defendants did not actually cite any evidence claimed to show the existence of a material dispute with respect to any individual UMF. In other words, the opposition offered no evidence whatsoever in response any of the 22 individual UMFs which Defendants claim to be “disputed” even though Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(1) expressly provides that a party opposing summary judgment/adjudication “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists ” and even though a declaration from Defendants’ CEO was included among the opposition papers.

In any event, according to the separate statement in opposition, the exclusive basis for Defendants’ characterization of all 22 UMFs being “disputed” is the inadmissibility and/or insufficiency of the evidence proffered by Plaintiff as support for the UMFs.

The Court adds that the separate statement in opposition offers no Additional Material Facts which are claimed to preclude summary judgment/adjudication here but Defendants did file written objections to evidence, consisting of objections to 23 separate items of evidence.

Standards for Summary Judgment/Adjudication

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication, the Court engages in a threestep process. First, the issues framed by the pleadings must be identified since the pleadings themselves define the scope of what may be addressed via a motion for summary judgment/adjudication (FPI Development Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382) and the evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings. The Court cannot consider an unpleaded issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to such a motion may not create triable issues beyond the scope of the pleadings, nor are they a substitute for filing amended pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its initial burden of production. Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(1) explains that a plaintiff moving for summary judgment/adjudication “[meets] his or her burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action” and only when “the plaintiff

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or cross-complainant has met that burden” does the burden shift to the defendant or cross-defendant “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” A party opposing summary judgment/adjudication has no evidentiary burden unless the moving party has first met his/her initial burden. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840; see also Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1151-1152; Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1085-1086.)

Only where the moving party makes the requisite initial showing does a court need to examine the opposition papers to determine if the latter demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact which precludes summary judgment/adjudication. (Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) The opposing party must present admissible evidence and may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleading. (Id.)

Additionally, in ruling on the motion, a court must construe the evidence of the opposing party liberally and that of the moving party strictly, resolving any doubts in the opposing party’s favor. (Miller v. Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 868, 874; Cortez v. Vogt (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 917, 925-926; see also, Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Brown v. FSR Brokerage, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 766, 773.)

While a summary adjudication motion is treated largely the same as one for summary judgment, there are a few important differences. One of these differences is found in CRC Rule 3.1350(b), which mandates that issues presented for summary adjudication be stated in the notice of motion and repeated verbatim in the separate statement. Another difference is that summary adjudication cannot be granted unless it “completely disposes” of a cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for punitive damages, or question of duty. Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(1) provides in its entirety:

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for [punitive] damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for [punitive] damages, or an issue of duty. (Underline added for emphasis.)

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Finally, before turning to the specific issues raised by this motion and the opposition, the Court reminds the parties of the “Golden Rule” of summary judgment/adjudication: “If it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist.” (See, Zimmerman, Rosenfeld v. Larson (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1477 (italics in original).) Moreover, according to Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied. (Nazir, at 252 (citing Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Ch.10:95.1); see also, Insalaco v. Hope Lutheran Church of West Contra Costa County (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 506.)

That said, the Court now turns to the specific contentions advanced in support of and opposition to this “motion for summary adjudication” as to both causes of action alleged in Plaintiff’s 2AC.

Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of various filings and proceedings in Plaintiff’s unlawful detainer action (including both the original and amended complaints, the default and default judgment, and the Writ of Possession as well as the Return on Writ of Possession) is granted but only for the limited purposes appropriate for judicial notice. (See, Evid. Code §451(a); §452(b)-(d); see also, Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not to the truth of any statements contained therein]; Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 145-148; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569-70.)

Discussion

Code of Civil Procedure §437c(a)(4). As discussed above, Plaintiff has labeled the present motion as one which seeks only “summary adjudication” of the two individual causes of action now alleged in the 2AC. However, because the 2AC consists of just two causes of action, Plaintiff will as a matter of law be entitled to summary judgment on the entirety of the 2AC in the event summary adjudication is granted as to both causes of action alleged therein. Consequently, this Court finds that the present motion is properly characterized as one which also seeks summary judgment against both Defendants on the entirety of the 2AC, thereby implicating the current provisions of Code of Civil Procedure §437c(a)(4). Subdivision (a)(4) provides in pertinent part:

A party shall not bring more than one motion for summary judgment against an adverse party to the action or proceeding.

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(Underline added for emphasis.)

Importantly, the prohibition set forth in §437c(a)(4) does not make any exception based upon the reasons why a party’s prior motion for summary judgment was denied. It prohibits the “bring[ing]” of “more than one motion for summary judgment” by a party against an adverse party. As applied here and discussed above, Plaintiff filed on 11/26/2025 its first motion for summary judgment/adjudication against both Defendants and this prior motion was “denied in its entirety” on 9/25/2025. Under the plain language of §437c(a)(4) cited above, Plaintiff is statutorily barred from bringing a second motion for summary judgment against Defendants as the former has attempted to do here.

Notably, Code of Civil Procedure §437c(a)(5) provides an exception to the “single summary judgment motion” rule. That is, §437c(a)(5) provides in relevant part: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, on motion or application of any party and a showing of good cause, the court may grant leave for the moving party to bring an additional motion for summary judgment.” However, Plaintiff neither sought nor obtained leave of court to file a second motion for summary judgment against Defendants.

Plaintiff was required to bring a motion or application seeking permission to file a second motion for summary judgment and if the Court were to determine that such motion/application demonstrated “good cause,” the Court may have granted leave to file a second motion of summary judgment against Defendants. Plaintiff failed to comply with this requirement. While nothing in §437c(a)(5) allows such motion seeking leave to be made itself within a second motion for summary judgment, the Court notes that even if it did so, the moving papers filed on 11/26/2025 do not in any event establish the requisite “good cause” to pursue a second motion for summary judgment against Defendants.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s present motion for summary judgment against Defendants is denied in its entirety as procedurally improper under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(a)(4). As such, the Court need not proceed further. However, the Court does so to address an additional and independent reason why Plaintiff’s second motion for summary judgment/adjudication against Defendant Chand is denied even if this motion had not been procedurally improper under §437c(a)(4).

Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(2). This provision states in its entirety:

A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. However, a party may not move for summary judgment based on issues asserted in a prior motion for summary adjudication

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and denied by the court, unless that party establishes to the satisfaction of the court, newly discovered facts or circumstances or a change of law supporting the issues reasserted in the summary judgment motion. (Underline added for emphasis.)

This language expressly limits trial courts’ reconsideration of summary judgment/adjudication motions “unless the [moving] party establishes to the satisfaction of the court, newly discovered facts or circumstances or a change of law...” This “prohibition against repeated summary judgment motions was added to make the summary judgment process more efficient and to reduce the opportunities for abuses of the procedure.” (Bagley v. TRW, Inc. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1096, fn.3.)

Where a second motion truly contains “newly discovered facts” and is not merely a “reformatted, condensed, and cosmetically repackaged” version of its first motion, the trial court will have discretion to consider it. (Patterson v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist. (2007 (Reh. denied; Rev. denied)) 155 Cal.App.4th 821, 827 [citing Bagley, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at 1097 (second motion showed no new law and no new material facts in separate statement)].) Thus, a second motion may be allowed if it is based on newly discovered facts which were not included in a prior motion. (Patterson, supra, at 827 [citing Schachter v.

Citigroup, Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 726, 739]; Bagley, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 1097; Pender v. Radin (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1807, 1811-12 [second motion properly based on newly-discovered facts from depositions taken after first motion denied]; Marshall v. County of San Diego (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1106-1107 [court authorized to permit second motion for summary judgment/adjudication if “supported by evidence that was not presented in connection with the prior motion”].)

Additionally, if the second motion presents issues different from those presented in the first motion, the second motion can satisfy Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(2). (See, Patterson, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 827 [second motion complied with §437c(f)(2) because although “both motions for summary judgment involved ‘duty’ in a general sense, the District’s two motions were not identical and involved different legal theories” (i.e., first motion focused on statutory basis for imposing a duty, while second focused on common law defense of assumption of risk negating existence of duty).)

Thus, a second motion for summary judgment/adjudication must also be based on issues that were not raised in the previous motion which was denied. (See, Nieto v. Blue Shield of Calif. Life & Health Ins. Co. (2010 (Reh. denied; Rev. denied)) 181 Cal.App.4th 60, 72 [insurer’s earlier motion did not address plaintiff’s fraud in obtaining coverage, which was basis for later motion].)

In light of the foregoing authorities, even if Plaintiff’s motion were not subject to denial

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due to Code of Civil Procedure §437c(a)(4), Plaintiff’s motion would still need to be permissible under §437c(f)(2). In this regard, the question before this Court would remain whether Plaintiff’s present “motion for summary adjudication” (which would, if granted, entitle Plaintiff as a matter of law to summary judgment on the 2AC) does more than repackage the same issues and arguments advanced in Plaintiff’s prior motion and whether it presents any “newly discovered facts” within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(2).

Notably, it was Plaintiff’s burden to clearly address and establish a factual basis for such a finding and Plaintiff’s failure to do so is, in and of itself, a valid basis for denial of the present motion. In any event, as will now be shown, this Court’s own independent examination of Plaintiff’s moving papers reveals that the present motion does not satisfy the prerequisites of §437c(f)(2) and thus, it is also subject to denial for this independent ground.

Based on the express language of Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(2), the first inquiry here is whether the issues advanced by Plaintiff in the present motion are the same as those advanced in Plaintiff’s earlier motion. In Patterson, supra, the Third District Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s consideration of the defendant’s second dispositive motion because it raised different issues than the first, explaining that while both motions raised the issue of “duty,” the two motions actually “involved different legal theories” insofar as “[t]he first motion focused on whether there was a statutory basis for imposing a duty” and the second one “focused on whether the common law defense of assumption of risk applied to negate any claim of duty.” (Patterson, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at 827.)

The appellate panel stated, “[a] comparison of the arguments and material facts shows that the District’s second motion for summary judgment is not simply a ‘reformatted, condensed, and cosmetically repackaged’ version of its first motion.” (Id. (underline added for emphasis).) In Nieto, supra, the Second District Court of Appeal found that the trial court properly considered the second dispositive motion because it “addressed an issue not raised by the prior motion. Indeed, in its order denying the prior motion the trial court expressly stated that the motion’s failure to address the elements of fraud was the basis for its denial.

The operative summary judgment motion addressed this previously omitted issue, asserting that Blue Shield was entitled to judgment because appellant committed fraud on the application and specifically identified the elements of fraud established by the undisputed evidence.” (Nieto, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at 72-73.)

In the case at bar, Plaintiff’s present motion raises nearly identical arguments for the two causes of action alleged in the 2AC. Previously, Plaintiff sought summary judgment against both Defendants as to the 2AC and alternatively, summary adjudication on each of the two causes of action alleged therein. Among the grounds specifically cited as support for summary adjudication of these causes were that defendant Phoenix breached its duty under the lease to pay rent when due and that defendant SPI

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breached its duty under the guaranty by failing to guarantee defendant Phoenix’s performance under the lease. (5/22/2025 Am. Not. of Mot., p.2:9-12.) The earlier moving points & authorities proceeded to argue that Plaintiff was entitled to judgment on the 2AC because defendant Phoenix breached the lease and its right to possession of the premises was terminated, thereby entitling Plaintiff to various monetary damages and defendant SPI also breached the guaranty it executed, making it liable to Plaintiff. (5/22/2025 Am.

MPA, pp.6-12.) Plaintiff further asserted that it was entitled to summary adjudication of the 2AC’s two causes of action on essentially the same grounds. (Id., at pp.12-13.) With respect to the 2AC and its causes of action, Plaintiff’s prior moving separate statement set forth UMFs which described the various terms and conditions of the lease agreement and the related guaranty; asserted that Defendants each failed to perform their respective obligations under these two agreements, prompting Plaintiff to proceed with and ultimately succeed on an unlawful detainer action; and identified the monetary damages to which Plaintiff claimed to be entitled despite attempts to mitigate same. (5/22/2025 Am.

SS, pp.2-8, 10.) The Court notes that 39 UMFs cited as support for summary judgment on the 2AC and those UMFs cited as support for summary adjudication of its two individual causes of action are premised exclusively on the Strombom Declaration or the exhibits attached thereto. (Id.)

Similarly, in the present motion Plaintiff seeks summary adjudication on its two causes of action on the grounds that “Phoenix failed to pay its financial obligations under the Lease” and “SPI guaranteed Phoenix’s obligations under the Lease, which Phoenix has not performed.” (11/26/2025 Not. of Mot., p.2:12-18.) The moving points & authorities argue the present motion should be granted because “Phoenix failed to pay its financial obligations under the Lease” and “SPI guaranteed Phoenix’s obligations under the Lease and failed to perform,” thereby entitling Plaintiff to monetary damages pursuant to these two separate agreements. (11/26/2025 MPA, pp.2-3, 5-9.)

The moving separate statement filed in support of the present motion consists of UMF Nos. 1-22 which first describe the lease agreement that defendant Phoenix entered into and the provisions requiring Phoenix to pay rent and other expenses; assert that defendant Phoenix breached the lease by inter alia failing to timely pay rent and now owes Plaintiff a specified sum for those damages which could not be mitigated; describe the terms of the guaranty which defendant SPI executed; assert that SPI failed to comply with the terms of the guaranty by failing to perform the obligations owed by Phoenix under the lease; and claims SPI now owes Plaintiff monetary damages is a specified sum. (11/26/2025 Am.

SS, pp.2-6.) The Court notes like the prior motion, each of the 22 UMFs cited as support for the present motion relies exclusively on the Strombom Declaration or the exhibits referenced therein. (Id.)

Based on the preceding paragraphs, Plaintiff’s present “motion for summary adjudication” (which, if granted, would entitle Plaintiff to summary judgment as a matter

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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of law on the entirety of the 2AC) is not similar to the motion deemed permissible in Patterson, which raised a new, separate and distinct legal ground to negate the existence of a duty. Plaintiff’s present motion is also not similar to the one found permissible in Nieto, where the first motion failed to raise the issue of fraud so as to permit it to be properly raised for the first time in the second motion. In short, the present motion does not genuinely raise any issue or contention that was not raised in the prior motion for summary judgment/adjudication and moreover, although the precise verbiage used in the present motion may vary from that used in the former motion, this Court is persuaded that the present motion is in both form and function nothing more than a “reformatted, condensed, and cosmetically repackaged” version of Plaintiff’s prior motion despite the rule prohibiting same as discussed in Patterson, Nieto, etc.

This conclusion is reinforced by the fact both the prior motion, as it related to the 2AC and two causes of action therein, and the present motion rely exclusively on a declaration by Mr. Strombom or the exhibits referenced therein (which, as addressed below, effectively confirms the present motion is not actually based on any newly discovered facts or evidence).

Since Plaintiff’s earlier motion for summary judgment/adjudication was denied in its entirety and since the present “renewed” motion asserts in substance the same very same issues and grounds as the earlier motion, Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(2) constitutes a categorical bar Plaintiff’s “renewed” motion unless it can be established “to the satisfaction of the court” that “newly discovered facts” now support the issues and grounds being re-asserted in the renewed motion. Because Plaintiff failed to address in the current moving papers its previous motion for summary judgment/adjudication or to provide any explanation as to why any purported “newly discovered facts” were not available or properly before the Court in connection with the previous motion, Plaintiff has necessarily failed to meet its burden of showing that “newly discovered facts” support and justify the present “renewed” motion.

Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(2) clearly allocates the burden of establishing that a renewed motion for summary judgment/adjudication to the moving party but Plaintiff has here failed to meet that burden.

While the Court need not proceed further, it is worth adding that both the prior motion for summary judgment/adjudication (at least to the extent it pertains the Plaintiff’s own 2AC and its two causes of action) and the current one which is artfully labeled as one merely seeking “summary adjudication” (despite the fact it would, if granted, entitle Plaintiff to summary judgment on the entirety of the 2AC) are premised exclusively on declarations by Mr. Strombom and/or the virtually identical array of exhibits referenced therein serves to remove any remaining question that the present motion is not actually based on any newly discovered facts or evidence. One notable difference between Plaintiff’s two motion and the two separate declarations from Mr. Strombom is the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV010098: 140 BLUE RAVINE, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs PHOENIX MOTOR, INC, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, et al. 03/24/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 53

specific amount of damages attributed to Defendants but the Court does not find this constitutes sufficient justification for a “renewed” motion under the various authorities addressed above. Instead, the present motion appears to be an attempt by Plaintiff to cure the various legal and factual inadequacies of the earlier motion for summary judgment/adjudication that was denied. However, Plaintiff’s own failure to properly support and present its motion for summary judgment/adjudication on the first attempt does not warrant this Court expending more of its already limited judicial resources so Plaintiff can have a “second bite at the apple.” The provisions of Code of Civil Procedure §437c are not fairly construed as permitting a party to file serial motions for summary judgment/adjudication until one is ultimately successful and to be sure, the denial of Plaintiff’s original motion in this case was not an invitation for Plaintiff to revise, reinforce, and refile its motion.

Nothing in the Court’s 9/25/2025 ruling on Plaintiff’s earlier motion for summary judgment/adjudication indicates otherwise.

In the end, the Court holds that Plaintiff’s present motion is nothing more than a “reformatted” and “cosmetically repackaged” version of its prior motion (Bagley, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at 1097 [denying as procedurally improper second motion for summary judgment that raised same issues as first motion])] and because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of any “newly discovered” facts or evidence which could not have been presented in connection with the earlier motion, this Court declines to consider the present motion which merely renews several of the issues, grounds and evidence which were previously ruled upon and found to be insufficient to support summary judgment/adjudication.

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s present motion is subject to denial and thus, is denied, on separate and independent bases under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(a)(4) and §437c(f)(2).

Objections to Evidence

In light of the foregoing, the Court need not rule on the parties’ respective written objections to evidence.

Disposition

For the reasons explained above, Plaintiff’s current “motion for summary adjudication” (which, if granted, would as a matter of law entitle Plaintiff to summary judgment on the entirety of its own 2AC) is DENIED in its entirety.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)